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The disciples of a great scholar are not limited to those who have come directly under his academic guidance. His colleagues in the same field of scholarship recognize a similar indebtedness as they stimulate and support each other in pushing back the boundaries of knowledge on a common front. In both these kinds of discipleship the legacy of Etienne Gilson is singularly rich. At Paris and Toronto he was and is a noted professor with serious and capable students. National boundaries, however, have not limited the array of scholars who acknowledge discipleship in the wider sense.

As the Master reaches his seventy-fifth birthday in June 1959, his disciples of whatever sort greet him with affection and esteem. This volume is the expression of those sentiments in an appropriate manner by his colleagues in the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, who have directly felt the stimulating influence of his genius and example, and who have collaborated with him in creating a centre of research and teaching which, it is confidently hoped, will be one of the monuments to his memory.

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The Accidental and Essential Character of Being
in
The Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas

J. OWENS

ALREADY within his own lifetime the doctrine of St Thomas Aquinas on being was criticized as openly contradictory.[1] It maintained at the same time that being was essential to created natures, and that being was accidental to such natures. It declared that a thing's being was constituted by the thing's essential principles, and yet was not the essence of that thing. To Siger of Brabant these assertions bore the earmarks of a quite apparent contradiction, even though he seems to have suspected in them the presence of something that he did not understand.[2]

Are these apparently contradictory tenets actually present in the text of St Thomas? An examination of his statements on the essential and the accidental character of being in created things can yield, as will be seen, only an affirmative answer. St. Thomas expresses this twofold character of created being too often and in too many different ways to allow it to be attributed to carelessness or to be explained away by any semantic considerations. He teaches that being is accidental to created things, and that it is essential to them. The problem is not so much to investigate the presence of these *prima facie* opposite assertions in the writings of St Thomas, but rather to inquire whether they are at all contradictory in his own doctrine of being. Are they but two different aspects that created being necessarily presents in his metaphysical analysis? Are both required for an adequate understanding of his teaching? Will the neglect of either one lead to a basic misunderstanding of his metaphysical notions in regard to the being of creatures?

There is even more at stake, however, than the aim to get back of the controversies to which the Thomistic doctrine of being has given rise, in particular on the distinction between essence and existence. That purpose, of course, would more than justify an intensive inquiry into the problem. Yet of still greater importance is the bearing of the question on the general nature of metaphysical knowledge and of all human knowledge taken as a whole. If the metaphysical procedure of St Thomas establishes successfully that being is both accidental and essential to creatures, will it not be discovering a radical ambiguity or equivocity at the very base of human knowledge? Being is what is first conceived by the human intellect, and into the concept of being all other concepts are resolved. If being then, is in itself ambiguous, there will be no possibility and no need of reducing the processes of human thought to any fundamental notion that is absolutely simple. A monolithic conception of human thinking will be rendered inadequate, the ideal of a universal science will be shown to be impossible of attainment, and the way will be left open, as far as metaphysics is concerned, for the autonomy of the various sciences within their own special fields. The problem, therefore, has an importance of its own apart from its relation to historic controversies. There is good reason for investigating the ambiguity of being as it is made apparent through these texts of St. Thomas.

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[1] "Dicere quod esse non est essentia rei, sed aliquid constitutum per essentiae principia, est idem affirmare et negare: cum constitutum per essentiae principia nihil aliud sit quam ipsa res ex illis constituta." Siger de Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam,* Introductio, q. VII, in the *Reportatio* of Godfrey of Fontaines; ed. C. A. Graiff, *Questions sur la Métaphysique* (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1948), p. 16 (14)-(17). On 1272-1274 as the probable date of the *Quaestiones,* see ibid., Introduction, pp. XXI-XXVII.

[2] ". . . modum tamen ponendi non intelligo." Op. cit., p. 16.25.

The Equivocity of Being (*Ens*)

In the *Contra Gentiles* St Thomas states that God alone is essentially being: ". . . solus Deus est essentialiter ens" (*CG*, II, 53; ed. Leonine, XIII, 391b 9-10). He means evidently enough that all other things are not essentially being. The essential possession of being is reserved to God alone. Yet in *De Veritate* he asserts just as plainly that every nature whatsoever is essentially a being: ". . . quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens; . . ."[3] Every nature, every thing, is accordingly by its very essence denominated "being." It is of its very self a being. Unless it were a being it could not be a nature or a reality or a thing. By virtue of its own essence, then, every created thing is a being.

Each of these statements of St Thomas, taken just in itself, is at first sight clear enough. Only when they are confronted with each other do they indicate their difficulties. No nature except God alone is essentially *ens*. Every nature whatsoever is essentially *ens*. Only a radical equivocity in what is meant by *ens* could save these assertions from directly contradicting each other. Is such an ambiguity actually intended by St Thomas when he speaks about being? A grammatical indication in the translation of the two sentences into English may point in that direction. In the first case, *ens* is translated without the indefinite article: ". . . God alone is essentially being" (English Dominican tr.). In the second case it is translated with the article: ". . . every reality is essentially a being' (tr. R. W. Mulligan). Yet of itself this grammatical difference need not imply equivocity. In instances other than being the omission of the indefinite article in English would hardly affect the meaning. The statements "Every man is essentially an animal" and "Every man is essentially animal" differ only in niceties of grammar. The inclusion or omission of the article does not seem to indicate any diversity of meaning. Where the predicate is univocal it remains univocal in spite of the difference in grammatical expression. If in the case of being, then, there is ambiguity, the ambiguity will lie much deeper than in the grammatical form. If there is a radical difference of meaning as signified by the one term in these statements of St Thomas, will not that difference have to emerge from the very notion of being itself? Being, apparently, will have to have one sense in which it can be predicated essentially of every nature whatsoever, and another sense in which it can be predicated essentially of God alone.

In point of fact, St Thomas does maintain this radical equivocity of being. He sees in it the occasion of Avicenna's deception in regard to the nature of created being. Criticizing the Arabian's stand that being (*ens*) is an accident following upon the essence of a created thing, St Thomas writes:

> Similiter etiam deceptus est ex aequivocatione entis. Nam ens quod significat compositionem propositionis est praedicatum accidentale, quie compositio fit per intellectum secundum determinatum tempus. Esse autem in hoc tempore vel in illo, est accidentale praedicatum. Sed ens quod dividitur per decem praedicamenta, significat ipsas naturas decem generum secundum quod sunt actua vel potentia (*In X Metaph.*, lect. 3; ed. Cathala-Spiazzi, no. 1982).

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[3] *De Ver.*, I,1c; in *Quaestiones Disputatae* (ed. R. Spiazzi, Turin: Marietti, [1949]), I,2b. Cf.: "Unumquodque enim est ens per essentiam suam." *De Ver.*, XXI, 1, arg. 1. ". . . nulla enim res naturae est quae sit extra essentiam entis universalis, . . ." *De Ver.*, XXI, 1c. The statement "Sed creatura habet esse per suam essentiam," *De Ver.*, XXI, 5, arg. 2, is not challenged in the reply to the *argumentum*.

The notion of being, as expressed by the Latin participle *ens*, is therefore admittedly equivocal for St Thomas. "Equivocal," of course, was a respectable term in the philosophical tradition in which St Thomas was writing. Aristotle in *Categories* (1, 1a1-12) had used the word "equivocal" or "homonym" to denote things of which the name is identical but whose definitions, as denoted by the name, are different. The word remained the same throughout its different usages, the definitions of the various things as denoted equivocally by the word were different, and the things themselves were "equivocal." In Latin the force of the term "equivocal" lay in the fact that the same word (*vox*) was applied *equally* to things that had different definitions as denoted by that one word, just as in Greek the etymology of "homonym" meant that one and the same (*homos*) word was used in these different cases. In Aristotle's examples, a man and an ox, as denoted by the one term "animal", were univocal; but a man and a painting, as denoted by the same Greek word (*Zôion*), were equivocal. In the first case the definitions as denoted by the word are the same; in the second case they are different.

The use of the term "equivocal" in this philosophical tradition denotes, accordingly, that the objects signified by one and the same word have different definitions, and that they are signified by that word according to one or the other of the different definitions. They have different meanings, and according to one or the other of those meanings they are designated in their respective instances by the same word. This usage evidently includes under the term "equivocal" all things that are not strictly univocal. It was continued through Boethius and so passed over into the early Scholastic vocabulary. For Boethius equivocals were of five kinds. There were equivocals by chance, as for instance the son of Priam in the Homeric epic and the son of Philip of Macedon were both called by the same name Alexander. Both are considered to have the same name entirely by chance. Then there were equivocals by resemblance, as a man and a painting were called equivocals in the Aristotelian *Categories;* equivocals by proportion or analogy; equivocals by common origin, as in Aristotle's example "medical"; and finally equivocals by reference, as in the Stagirite's example "health." These four latter types were called equivocals by design, as opposed to equivocals by mere chance.[4]

"Equivocal," then, in the Scholastic vocabulary to which St Thomas was heir, did not necessarily mean equivocal by chance. In various ways the reason for the equivocity could be found in the things themselves, and it could even be required by the very natures of the things. "Being," for instance, is of such a character that it can be either substantial or accidental. There is something about a substance that calls for the designation "being"; and there is likewise something about an accident that demands the same designation. Yet in so far as being is capable of definition, the definition or meaning in these two instances is different. One may show that this use of a common term is required on account of the reference of secondary instances to a primary instance, as in Aristotle, or by the proportionality of the respective natures to their corresponding being, as in St Thomas. In either case the equivocity or use of the same name is not by chance. It is required by the natures of the things themselves.

In the present case, St Thomas is asserting that being (*ens*) may signify, equivocally, either the composition of a proposition or a nature that goes in a category. In the first case it is an accidental predicate: "Nam ens quod significat compositionem propositionis est praedicatum accidentale, . . ." The reason given is that the composition is made by the intellect according to a determined time. To be (*esse*) in any particular time, however, is an accidental predicate: ". . .

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[4] Boethius, *In Cat. Arist.*, Lib. I; *PL*, LXIV, 166BC.

quia compositio fit per intellectum secundum determinatum tempus. Esse autem in hoc tempore vel in illo, est accidentale praedicatum." The sense of being that the intellect expresses when it joins subject and predicate by means of the verb "is" depends upon something accidental. It depends upon a definite time. But to be in this or that period of time is certainly something accidental to a created nature as such. In this sense being is accidental to a created thing.

According to this text, then, being is an accidental predicate when it expresses existence in a particular time. It denotes such existence when it signifies the composition between predicate and subject in a proposition. Whether it is expressed by the participial form *ens* or the infinitive form *esse,* it designates in this case something that is accidental to the nature of which it is predicated. Indifferently as participle or infinitive it is an accidental predicate. The particular grammatical form, apparently, has of itself little or nothing to do with the accidental or essential character of the predication.

What is the philosophical background against which this doctrine is being sketched? To some extent at least, it is quite evidently Aristotelian. The notion of the verb in a proposition as a speech form dependent upon time for its signification is Aristotelian teaching, as is likewise the description of the verb "to be" as the expression of the composition in a proposition. But does this Thomistic way of distinguishing two equivocal significations of being fit in with the various ways in which being is expressed for the Stagirite? Aristotle's doctrine was that being is expressed in four different ways.[5] Of these the first two ways listed in Book E of the *Metaphysics* were being *per accidens* and being in the sense of the true. Being *per accidens* meant that something happens to be found with something else, as for instance in the statement "The carpenter *is* a musician." There is nothing in the nature of the carpenter as such that requires him to be a musician. That he is a musician is entirely accidental to the fact that he is a carpenter. The verb "is," accordingly, expresses in this case something accidental to the nature of the subject as such. It expresses being *per accidens.* It of course presupposes being *per se,*[6] for it is concerned with the principal type of being, namely being as found in the categories.[7] It is concerned with a carpenter and with music, both of which are types of being that are found in the predicaments. But the being expressed by the verb in this proposition is not a type of being found in any of the categories. It is something over and above any predicamental being. It is *per accidens* in regard to the principal type of being, that is, the being that is limited to the necessary grooves of the categories. For Aristotle the *per accidens* kind of being was as it were only a name,[8] and seemed rather akin to not-being.[9]

Like being *per accidens,* so for Aristotle the second way in which being is expressed, being as true, is also concerned with the principal type of being, being as in the categories. Being as true is not found in things, but in the intellect or the mind. It is in fact caused by the operation of the intellect.[10] It is viewed accordingly as presupposing predicamental being, just as being *per accidens* presupposes the *per se* being of the categories. What is found in the things according to the necessary requirements of the categories seems to be looked upon as the basic and permanent type of being, while chance associations like those expressed in being *per accidens,* or the composition that the intellect makes when in its own activity it relates different categories as subject and predicate, are regarded as subsequent ways in which the things that are in the categories may be.

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[5] *Metaph.,* Δ 7,1017a7-b9; E 2,1026a33-b2.

[6] *Metaph.,* K 8,1065b2-3; *Ph.,* II 6,198a7-9.

[7] Cf. *Metaph.,* E 4,1027b31-1028a2.

[8] ". . . the accidental is practically a mere name." *Metaph.,* E 2,1026b13-14; Oxford tr.

[9] ". . . the accidental is obviously akin to non-being." Ibid., b21; Oxford tr.

[10] Cf. *Metaph.,* E 4,1027b25-34.

Is St Thomas, then, grouping under one head the first two Aristotelian ways of expressing being? Is he ranging both under the notion of being as an accidental predicate? If so, just how is he connecting the two? In the second *Quodlibetum*, the same twofold signification of the participle *ens* is described against the background of the two questions taken from the *Posterior Analytics* (II, 1-10, 89b23-94a19) of Aristotle, the *an est* and the *quid est*. St Thomas states:

> Ens autem non ponitur in definitione creaturae, quia nec est genus nec differentia; et ideo alia quaestio est *an est* et *quid est*. Unde, cum omne quod est praeter essentiam rei, dicatur accidens; esse quod pertinet ad quaestionem *an est*, est accidens; et ideo Commentator dicit in V Metaphysic., quod ista propositio, *Socrates* est, est de accidentali praedicato, secundum quod importat entitatem rei, vel veritatem propositionis. Sed verum est quod hoc nomen *ens*, secundum quod importat rem cui competit hujusmodi esse, sic significat essentiam rei, et dividitur per decem genera; . . . (*Quodl.*, II, 3c; ed. Mandonnet, Paris, 1926, p. 43).

Here again St Thomas is dealing with the same ambiguity of being, as expressed by the participle *ens*. *Ens* can mean being as an accidental predicate, or it can mean something essential, in fact the essence of the thing as found in one of the categories. The division is obviously the same as the one found in the *Commentary on the Metaphysics*.[11] As in that text, the being that is an accidental predicate is expressed indifferently by the participial form *ens* and the infinitive form *esse*. The *ens* that does not enter the definition of the thing is the *esse* that is an accident. It is the *esse* that goes with or belongs to (*competit*) the essence of the thing. *Ens* and *esse*, accordingly, are used synonymously to denote being in the sense of an accidental predicate. This predicate, St Thomas says expressly, is an accident because it is apart from or over and beyond (*praeter*) the thing's essence. When it is expressed by a finite form of the verb like "is," as in the proposition "Socrates is" or "Socrates exists," the situation is still the same. Being in this case is an accidensal predicate, no matter what grammatical form of the verb is used to express it. It is accidental, moreover, whether it is taken to imply the being of the thing or the truth of the proposition: "secundum quod importat entitatem rei, vel veritatem propositionis."

St Thomas, therefore, is quite clearly grouping under the one head the first two Aristotelian ways of expressing being. Being *per accidens* and being as the true are regarded as coming under the common caption of being as an accidental predicate. The being of the thing, in so far as it answers to the question *an est* or does the thing exist, and the being that is signified by the composition in a proposition, seem looked upon as the same way of expressing being. At least, both are implied when being is predicated of a thing in an accidental way. Does St Thomas then understand that the verb, which according to Aristotelian doctrine expresses being according to a particular time, signifies both the being that is actually exercised by the thing and the composition that is found in the judgment?

St Thomas does interpret Aristotle in exactly that way:

> Ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum EST consignificat compositionem, quia non eam principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute: nam EST, simpliciter dictum, significat *in actu esse*: et ideo significat per modum verbi.

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[11] *In X Metaph.*, lect. 3, no. 1982. In both texts the basic division falls between being as ranged in the categories and being as subject to accidental existence and expressed in the truth of a proposition.

> Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum EST, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus substantialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod cum volumus significare quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum EST, vel *simpliciter* vel *secundum quid*: simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus, secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora (*In I Periherm.*, lect. 5; ed. Leonine, no. 22).

When being is signified in verbal form, and so according to conditions of time, it expresses principally, according to this interpretation, the actuality that the intellect understands as basic in the thing. It presents itself to the intellect by way of actuality in an absolute manner, and not hypothetically or conditionally. It means that the thing actually is or actually exists, according to the time in question. That actuality, signified in this way by the verb, is however the actuality of every form whatsoever. Such being is the actuality of every substantial form or act, and also is the actuality of every accidental form. Substance and accidents have in common the requirement of being actuated by the further actuality that is expressed in the verb "to be." When one wishes to express in a proposition, then, that any form or act whatsoever is actually present in a subject, one uses the verb "to be."

The being that is expressed by the truth in a proposition is accordingly viewed by St Thomas as consequent upon the actual exercise of being in the thing. The proposition is true because the thing happens to be or is that way. Being as the true follows upon actuality that is the common requirement of every substance and every accident. If this requirement is something accidental to the thing, what follows upon it will likewise be accidental. There is no difficulty in ranging both under the heading of being as an accidental predicate.

Can this interpretation, however, be called in any sense genuine Aristotelianism? At least there is no hint in the text of Aristotle that being *per accidens* and being as the true express basically but one way of being. Nor is there any notion in the Stagirite's doctrine that a further actuality is required for all forms, substantial as well as accidental. Still less is there any teaching in Aristotle that the being that answers the question *an est* is accidental to a thing. Rather, it is the general aspect of being that necessarily accompanies every definable thing. The definition gives the answer to the question *quid est*. But you cannot know the *quid est* without thereby knowing the *an est*. If a thing can be defined it is by that very fact known as a being in the sense corresponding to the *an est* for Aristotle. His principal example is the lunar eclipse. An observer on the moon, he claims, would know immediately and simultaneously that the eclipse is and what it is. An observer on the earth, however, would know immediately that it is, but would have to reason to find out what it is. The definition would not be immediately known, but only mediately as the result of a reasoning process. So where the defining elements are not immediately known as such, the being that corresponds to the *an est* has to be known before the answer to the *quid est* can be attained (*APo.*, II 8, 93a16-b3). In no case, then, can the *quid est* be known before the *an est*.

For Aristotle, consequently, the *an est* does not signify any accidental or contingent existence.[12] For St Thomas, on the other hand, it denotes an accidental predicate. For Aristotle, the answer to the question *quid est* necessarily includes the answer to the question *an est*. If you know what an eclipse is you thereby know that it is. The question *an est* inquires merely if something is able to have the general character of being, and so does not indicate a combination of mutually exclusive notions, like a centaur or a goat-stag. If, like a centaur or a goat-stag, it is not even a being, there is no possibility of asking the further question "What is it?" One cannot know what it is unless one knows simultaneously or previously that it is something contained within the range of the notion "being." For St Thomas, on the other hand, one can know what a thing is without knowing that it is in reality. The question *an est* refers here to the real existence of the thing. One can know what a phoenix is, or a mountain of gold is, or what an eclipse is, without knowing whether any of these actually exist in the real world.[13] For Aristotle, the *an est* is not at all asking if the thing exists in reality, but only if it is free from internal contradiction, if it is a being in the most general sense of the word. The answer to the *an est* is for him a partial, inchoative cognition of the thing, sufficient to establish it as a being. After that one can go on to acquire the further knowledge that gives its definite nature, that tells *what* it *is*. For St Thomas, on the contrary, the *an est* is asking precisely "Does the thing exist?" The being that answers such a question is accordingly an accidental predicate, whether it is the existence actually exercised by the thing in reality or whether it is the composition made by the intellect in forming a proposition.

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[12] See S. Mansion, *Le Jugement d'Existence chez Aristote* (Louvain & Paris, 1946), p. 273.

That, then, is the first sense of being for St Thomas. It is being in the sense of actually exercised existence. As such it is described as accidental to the thing. The other sense of being, however, signifies the very natures of the things found in the categories: "Sed ens quod dividitur per decem praedicamenta, significat ipsas naturas decem generum secundum quod sunt actu vel potentia" (*In X Metaph.*, lect. 3; ed. Cathala-Spiazzi, no. 1982). In designating the natures of created things, the participle *ens* is signifying their essences. What it is expressing is essential to the things in question. Just as the predicates man, animal, living thing, body, and substance give essential characteristics of the human individual, so the further predicate "being" denotes his essence in a still vaguer way. Though strictly neither genus nor difference, it functions in this manner as a sort of super-generic predicate. Just as a man is an animal or a body, so also is he a being.

This description of the second sense of being seems meant to cover the third and fourth Aristotelian ways of being, just as being in the sense of an accidental predicate included the Stagirite's first two ways. The third way for Aristotle was being as in the categories, and the fourth way was being as act and potency. St Thomas is joining these two under the one caption "the natures of the ten genera according as they are actual or potential." In the light of his doctrine just considered about existence as the actuality of every substantial form and every accidental form, any predicamental form may be considered either as actuated by its existence or as not actuated by its existence. In the former case it denotes the nature or the essence of the thing and belongs to one of the categories. In both senses, therefore, it comes under the one head of predicamental being and is expressed by the participle *ens* when *ens* means that which is divided into the ten categories.

In denoting the essence, *ens* in this second sense involves the thing itself to which existence, as an accidental predicate, belongs: "Sed verum est quod hoc nomen *ens*, secundum quod importat rem cui competit hujusmodi esse, sic significat essentiam rei, et dividitur per decem genera; . . ." (*Quodl.*, II, 3c; ed. Mandonnet, p. 43). In this sense *ens* designates the thing that exists. It means a being. It is an essential predicate, not an accidental one. It includes all the being that is divided into the ten categories. When *ens* in the other sense is said to be an accident, it cannot, therefore, be an accident in the meaning of something that belongs to one of the nine accidental categories of being. It is something *praeter essentiam rei* and *aliquid non existens de essentia rei* (*ibid.*). It is something over and above the essence, something that does not appear in the essence of the thing. In this way St Thomas interprets Aristotle's (*Metaph.*, B. 3, 998b17-27) dictum that being is not a genus. It is not a genus because it lies outside the ten supreme genera of things. The genera are concerned with natures or essences, and existence lies outside the whole order of finite essence.

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[13] Cf. *De Ente*, c. IV; p. 34.12-14; *In I Sent.*, d.8, q.4, a.2 (ed. Mandonnet, I,222); *In II Sent.*, d.3, q.1, a.1, Solut. (II,87).

The equivocity of the participle *ens* for St Thomas consists then in the twofold usage of the term to denote on the one hand the very essence or nature of a created thing, and on the other hand to denote an actuality that lies outside the essence. In the former case it is an essential predicate, in the latter case an accidental one. It means on the one hand any nature or thing that goes in a category, on the other hand the existence that lies outside all the categories. Because he can understand *ens* in the former sense, St Thomas is able to consider himself the defender of the Aristotelian teaching that every nature is essentially a being (*Metaph.*, Γ 2, 1003b26-33) and that being adds nothing over and above the nature, so that "a man and a 'being' man are the same" (b26-27). *Ens* designates the nature of the thing, and not something accidentally added to that nature. Without further explanation St Thomas can simply deny the Avicennian tenet that being is an accident, and can say that Avicenna was deceived by the equivocity of being. He can for the purposes of the question under consideration restrict the meaning of *ens* to one of its senses and ignore for the moment the other.

In the commentary on Boethius' *De Hebdomadibus*, for instance, St Thomas just as sharply contrasts the meaning of the participle *ens* with the actuality that is expressed by the infinitive *esse*: "Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod dicimus esse, et aliud per hoc quod dicimus id quod est; sicut et aliud significamus cum dicimus currere, et aliud per hoc quod dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse significantur in abstracto, sicut et albedo; sed quod est, id est ens et currens, significantur in concreto, velut album."[14] The *quod est* or *ens* is contrasted with the *esse* in the same way in which a runner is contrasted with the act of running. *Ens*, like "runner," signifies *in concreto*. It signifies the subject as possessing the act of being or the act of running. *Esse* and "running," on the other hand, signify only the act in question, abstracting from the subject that is or the person who runs. Accordingly, they signify *in abstracto*, that is, in abstraction from their subject. Like the noun "whiteness," they denote their act abstractly. *Ens* and "runner," however, signify the subject concretely with the act, just as the neuter of the Latin adjective "album," meaning "a white thing," expresses the subject as qualified by the color white.

In this usage, therefore, St Thomas restricts the participial form *ens* to the one sense of the "thing that is," and the infinitive form *esse* to the sense of the actuality of being. They are compared as subject and form, against the Boethian background of the *quod est* and *quo*. For the most part throughout his works, the participle *ens* is in fact used by St Thomas in the sense of "that which is." Yet at times he does not hesitate to use it, without explanation, solely in the other sense of the actuality of being. He may even say that *ens* does not express the essence or quiddity: ". . . in quolibet genere oportet significare quidditatem aliquam, ut dictum est, de cujus intellectu non est esse. Ens autem non dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi . . ." (*In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a.2, ad 2m; ad.

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[14] *In de Hebd.*, c. II; ed. Mandonnet, I,171, except "currere et esse" for "currere et ens."

Mandonnet, I, 222-223). Emphasizing the fact that the notion of a thing does not involve the thing's real existence, St Thomas can state bluntly in this way that *ens* does not mean the quiddity, but only the act of being. It signifies the act in abstraction from the concretion with the essence. The participle *ens* is here expressing the act *in abstracto,* just as definitely as does the infinitive form *esse* in this text and in the text already quoted from the *Commentary on the De Hebdomadibus.* Just as St Thomas in the present text resumes the notion *esse* by means of the participle *ens,* so in fairly numerous other instances[15] does he use *ens* as a substitute for *esse* in expressing the act of being. He feels free to use it in either sense, and may on occasion restrict it to just one of its two senses and deny it the other sense. This is quite in accord with the Aristotelian usage of equivocals.[16]

One may be tempted to ask if this equivocity of the participle *ens* is really required by the nature of being, or if it is merely an accident of usage. If subject and act are different, why not consistently use one term to denote the subject, and another term to denote the act? St Thomas implies clearly enough that they are different objects of signification: "Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod dicimus esse, et aliud per hoc quod dicimus id quod est; . . ." (*In De Hedb.,* c. II). One object is signified by the Latin infinitive form of the verb, namely the act *in abstracto,* like "being" or "running." Another object is signified by the Latin participles, namely the concretion of subject and act, like "that which is" or "a runner." Why not, then, use the infinitive *esse* consistently to mean the act of being, and the participle *ens* just as consistently to denote that subject that exercises the act? Is there anything in the nature of being that would militate against such a consistent usage?

There is a grammatical peculiarity that makes itself felt at once in attempting to answer these questions. In Latin, for all other verbs than "to be" the participial form signifies *in concreto* only, and not *in abstracto.* "Currens" and all other such participles denote the one who exercises the act. They denote the concretion of subject and act, and not the act taken by itself. "Currens" means "a runner", and not the act of running. Only the participle *ens* can signify both the act of being and the subject that exercises the act. In English, for all verbs other than "to be" the participial form designates the act and not the subject. The participle signifies only *in abstracto,* according to St Thomas' terminology, and not *in concreto.* "Running," for example, means the act taken by itself, and not the one who runs. "Being," however, just as in Latin, can have both significations. One may speak of "a human being" in the sense of the subject that is human, and one may likewise say that a man possesses being. In both languages the participle can denote either the act alone or the subject concretely with the act. Does this hint that in the case of being, language is not able to restrict the notion to just one signification, as with other verbs? Is there something about being that renders equivocity indispensable?

One may expect readily enough a difference between verbs that signify an act belonging to one of the categories of accidents, and a verb signifying an act that is beyond all the categories. It is easy enough to compare the act of running, as is done in the text of St Thomas , with the act of whiteness. Both belong in the categories. It is easy enough to consider the act and the subject as separate objects of consideration in each case. One can think of the subject of whiteness, a body, in complete isolation from that particular color. Whiteness is merely accidental to the body, in the full predicamental sense of accident. Similarly one can think of the subject of running, an animal, apart from the act of running. No animal necessarily has to be thought of as always running. Running is a predicamental accident. But can one ever think of the subject of being in complete isolation from all being? No matter how one tries to conceive it, it is always represented as a being. If it is not represented as a being, it is not represented at all. It would be nothing. There would be nothing there to represent.

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[15] E.g.: ". . . sic *ens* esset genus, quod significat ipsum esse." *CG,* I,25; ed. Leonine, XIII,76b11-12. ". . . solus Deus est essentialiter ens, omnia autem alia participant ipsum esse." *CG,* II,53 XIII,391b-10. ". . . cum esse Dei sit eius essentia, ut ostensum est, si Deus esset in aliquo genere, oporteret quod genus eius esset *ens:* nam genus significat essentiam rei, . . ." *ST,* I.3,5c; ed. Leonine. ". . . hoc autem nomen ens, significat ipsum esse." *In IV Metaph.,* lect. 2, (ed. Cathala) no. 556.

[16] On this topic see J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian* Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951), pp. 60-63.

This super-universal or transcendent character of being prevents the consideration of any subject whatsoever in precision from being. No subject can prescind from being in the way that a body can prescind from whiteness or an animal from running. Being is a necessary aspect of everything whatsoever. It is somehow essential to every nature. It seems like an act that is wrapped in its own subject. There can hardly be any question here of two realities, one of which is subject and the other is the act, as there are in the instances of the body that is white and the animal that is running. The ambiguity cannot be explained by saying that the same term *ens* is used on some occasions to denote the subject of being and so signifies something essential to every nature; while on other occasions it is used to mean the act of being and so designates something accidental to all created natures. The difficulty is that the subject in this case cannot be considered as prescinding from the act. The subject necessarily is a being, and yet its being is accidental to it. In what sense, then, is the act of being accidental to a created nature, and in what sense is it not accidental? The root of the equivocity seems to lie not in the distinction between subject and act, but in the very relation of the act of being to its proper subject. Being appears as *both* accidental and essential to any created nature.

ESSE—An Accident and not an Accident

In the fifth article of the twelfth *Quodlibetum* St Thomas notes, on the one hand, that an accident is conceived as belonging to a pre-existing subject (*accidens intelligitur inesse alicui praeexistenti*—ed. Spiazzi, p. 226b). On the other hand, he recalls the well-known dictum of St Hilary that regarding God "*esse enim non est accidens nomen*" ("Being is not an accidental name, . . ." —*De Trin.*, VII, 11; tr. McKenna). This saying implies that in all creatures being is an accident. According to the conception of accident that has just been noted, being should therefore require in creatures a pre-existing subject. Yet, St Thomas insists, being is the first act of all. Even an angel cannot be pre-existent to its own being. No form whatsoever can be except through its *esse* (*nulla forma est nisi per esse*). Substantial being (*esse*), then, is not properly an accident in created things, even though it is an accident in the sense that it is not part of their essence: "Et sic dico quod esse substantiale rei non est accidens, sed actualitas cuiuslibet formae existentis, . . . et sic proprie loquendo, non est the act of being to its proper subject. Being appears as *both* accidental and accidens. Et quod Hilarius dicit, dico quod accidens dicitur large omne quod non est pars essentiae; et sic est esse in rebus creatis, . . ." (*Quodl.*, XII, 5; ed. Mandonnet, p. 430).

This text recognizes two senses of the term "accident." There is a wider sense, in which everything that is not a part of the essence may be called an accident. In this sense of something over and above (*praeter*) the essence, being, whether expressed by the participle *ens* or the infinitive *esse*, has been called an accident in the passage already quoted from the *Quodlibeta* (II, 3c; ed. Mandonnet, p. 43).

In the same sense, presumably, being (expressed by both *ens* and *esse*) was named an accidental predicate in the text from the commentary on the tenth Book of the *Metaphysics* (lect. 3; ed. Cathala-Spiazzi no. 1982), since the two passages are quite closely parallel. In the wide sense, then, everything outside the essence is an accident, whether or not it is a form answering to the conditions necessary for the accepted categories of accidents. Against the background of the mediaeval controversies,[17] this can only mean that the notion "accident" is wider than the nine Aristotelian predicaments. There is a sense of the term that does not fit in with the concept of a predicamental accident. In this wider sense, being is in created things an accident: ". . . et sic est esse in rebus creatis, . . ."

In the proper sense of the word accident, however, the being of created things is not an accident: ". . . proprie loquendo, non est accidens." The proper sense of accident, in the tradition that lay behind the mediaeval metaphysical controversies, would be understood as denoting the accepted Aristotelian meaning of a predicamental accident. But the substantial being of a thing can hardly be a predicamental accident. A predicamental accident supposes its substance already complete as substance, and is added to a so completed subject. Without substantial being, however, there is simply no subject to which an accident could be added. Substantial being, therefore, cannot function as a predicamental accident, as an accident in the proper sense of the Aristotelian tradition: "Et sic dico quod esse substantiale rei non est accidens, sed actualitas cujuslibet formae existentis, . . ."

The notion expressed by the infinitive *esse* in this text is clearly the actuality of every form. As seen in the preceding section of the present article, this is the actuality upon which the composition in a proposition is grounded, and is being in the sense of an accidental predicate. The whole question of whether being is an accident in a wide or in a proper sense, accordingly, is concerned with being that is taken *in abstracto*. It is a question that is asked about the act of being, and not about the subject of being. The sense in which *esse* is not accidental is not, at least as far as the position of the question envisages it, the same sense in which *ens* is essential to every nature. The two meanings of accident in the present question bear directly upon the sense in which *ens* was called an accidental predicate. Being, as expressed by the participle *ens*, has already been shown to mean both subject and act. As subject it was essential to all natures, as act is was accidental. Now, being in the sense of act is declared to be in one way an accident, and in another way not an accident. It is an accident in a wide sense, but not in a proper sense. In the proper sense of the word "accident," the act of being is not accidental to its subject.

Is this distinction of a proper and a wide sense of accident merely an *ad hoc* invention? It hardly can claim any sanction in Scholastic tradition. That being was neither substance nor accident but something better than either, had already been taught by William of Auvergne.[18] But that it did not come under any of the predicamental accidents and still had to be called an accident, in a different sense of the term "accident," was something new. The doctrine that being is accidental to things was also familiar enough.[19] But that this doctrine required a notion of accident that was not contained within the proper sense of the word in the Aristotelian tradition, had not been brought forward. True, accident had been contrasted with property in the traditional scheme of the predicables.[20] But this distinction did not go outside the orbit of the categories. Rather, it narrowed the concept of accident instead of widening it. It was entirely concerned with the way in which one category was predicated of another. It was not at all a widening of the notion "accident" outside the sphere of the predicamental accidents. The wider sense that allowed being to be called an accident without making it a predicamental accident seems to arise only from the consideration of the present question. If the distinction between the wide and the proper senses of accident is valid, it will have to have its foundation in the peculiar way in which the act of being is accidental to a creature. The distinction does not help to discover the accidentality of being. Rather, it is first revealed by the study of the way in which one category is accidental to another. Therefore it is accidental in a wider sense.

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[17] On this background, see E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), pp. 52-56.

[18] "Gratia igitur et electione omnium quae sunt, et aliud, et melius omnibus his quae sunt ostenditur ipsum esse: non potest igitur accidere esse secundum se, sed necessario omni substantia et accidente melius est, . . ." William of Auvergne, *De Trin.*, c. VII; (ed. Orleans & Paris, 1674) II, Suppl., p. 9a.

[19] "Et esse de quo queritur per an est, est accidens ei quod ipsa res est, scilicet ei de quo queritur per quid est; omne autem accidens alicui, causatum est; si enim esset ens per se, non esset accidens alii." Algazel, *Metaphysics*, II,3 (ed. J. T. Muckle, Toronto: St. Michael's College, 1933), p. 53.15-17. ". . . dicemus ergo quod naturae hominis ex hoc quod est homo accidit ut habeat esse: . . ." Avicenna, *Metaph.*, V,2A (ed. Venice, 1508), fol. 87vl. "Hoc ergo quod est, ab alio habet esse, et illud quod est, et sic esse hoc modo

There is nothing in the traditional doctrine of accidents, then, that will be of positive aid in investigating the accidental character of being in the doctrine of St Thomas. Negatively, the study of the traditional notions makes clear that being is not an accident in the Aristotelian sense of the term. It is not related to its subject in the way that a predicamental accident is related to its substance: ". . . esse est accidens, non quasi per accidens se habens, sed quasi actualitas cujuslibet substantiae; . . ." (*Quodl.*, II, 3, ad 2m; ed. Mandonnet, p. 43). It cannot be described as just *per accidens* to its subject. It is rather the actuality of every substance, as though necessary for the constitution of every substance even though it is an accident. The vocabulary becomes difficult, and seems to throw but little light on the doctrine. The solution will have to emerge from a deeper study of the Thomistic notion of being, and not from any definitions of the term "accident" or *per accidens*. The negative consideration that being is not a predicamental accident, however, is sufficient to indicate that substantial being somehow enters into the very constitution of the substance itself. Not being a predicamental accident, it must be prior to the whole order of predicamental accidents, and so contained somehow within the order of substance. Yet it is always outside the essence. In that sense it is always accidental. These considerations point in the direction of a notion of accident that is prior to, and not subsequent to, the notion of substance. This implication will have to be carefully investigated in the texts of St Thomas that give being a priority to essence in created things. There may well be a close connection between the assertions that being is not a predicamental accident, and the tenet that every nature is essentially a being.

As they stand, however, these statements regarding *esse* as an accident or not an accident bear directly upon being as the act of a subject and not as the subject itself. In fact, in all the texts considered so far, the infinitive *esse* has been used only to denote the act of being. It has never been used to signify the subject of being. The participle *ens* is used in both senses, but the infinitive *esse* has been restricted to one sense, that of the act. This usage of *esse* in the one sense only is regular throughout the texts of St Thomas. True, he recognizes the current, and in point of fact traditional, use of the infinitive to signify also the essence or nature:

> Sed sciendum, quod esse dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo dictur esse quidditas vel natura rei, sicut dicitur quod definitio est oratio significans quid est esse;

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accidit ei: quia ab alio sibi est: . . ." Albertus Magnus, *De Causis et Proc. Univ.*, I,8; ed. A. Borgnet, X,377b. On the sense of "following upon" that the Arabian notion bore, see A.-M. Goichon, *La Distinction de L'Essence et de l'Existence d'après Ibn Sina* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937), pp. 90-91.

[20] Aristotle, *Top.*, I,5 ff.

> definitio enim quidditatem rei significat. Alio modo dicitur esse ipse actus essentiae; sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus, est animae actus; non actus secundus, qui est operatio, sed actus primus. Tertio modo dictur esse quod significat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod 'est' dicitur copula: et secundum hoc est in intellectu componente et dividente quantum ad sui complementum; sed fundatur in esse rei, quod est actus essentiae (*In I Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.1, ad 1m; ed. Mandonnet, I, 766).

In this passage the senses of being are basically the same as those expressed by the participle *ens* in the texts already analyzed. True, there are three senses mentioned now instead of the two previously used to embrace the four ways in which being was expressed for Aristotle. However, one sees readily enough that the second and third senses are joined together here as closely as they were in the other texts. The being that signifies truth in the composition of a proposition is ranged with the being that is the act of essence. It is grounded upon that actually exercised being, even more explicitly in this text than in the ones previously considered. The being that is expressed by the copula "is" is indeed found in the intellect in so far as the completion of the proposition is concerned; but it is based upon the being that is the act of the essence and that is found in the thing. The second and third senses, accordingly, are concerned with being as act, and not with being as subject. They denote being as taken *in abstracto.*

The first sense listed is being as quiddity or nature. It means the nature that is or exists. It seems to correspond to what was expressed by the participle *ens* in the sense in which being is wrapped in nature, the sense in which every nature is essentially a being. It denotes the form or nature, whether substantial or accidental, that is actuated by the act of being. It signifies the subject of being, being as taken *in concreto.* But here, instead of being designated by the participial form, the subject of being is expressed by the infinitive *esse.*

The same usage is reported in the third book of the commentary on the *Sentences* as follows:

> ". . . *esse duobus* modis dicitur. *Uno modo,* secundum quod significat *veritatem propositionis* secundum quod est copula; et sic, ut Commentator ibidem dicit, *ens* est *praedicatum accidentale.* Et hoc esse non est in re, sed in mente quae conjungit subjectum cum praedicato, ut dicit Philosophus in VI *Meta.* . . . *Alio modo* dicitur *esse quod pertinet ad naturam rei,* secundum quod dividitur secundum decem genera. Et hoc quidem esse in re est, et est actus entis resultans ex principiis rei, sicut lucere est actus lucentis. *Aliquando* tamen *esse* sumitur *pro essentia,* secundum quam res est; quia per actus consueverunt significari eorum principia, ut potentia vel habitus" (*In III Sent.,* 6, 2, 2, Resp.; ed. Moos, III, 238).

In the first sense mentioned in this text, *esse* is described synonymously with *ens* as an accidental predicate, and in the second sense it is the act of a being (*actus entis*). These senses, accordingly, express being as taken *in abstracto,* and not as subject of the act. The third sense reported is that of essence. The reason given for the legitimacy of using the infinitive *esse* to signify essence is that by custom the potency may be designated by the act. This would mean that being primarily denotes act, but secondarily may denote the potency to that act. The potency or subject of being may therefore be called a being, an *esse.* Just as the thing that is may be called an *ens,* so may it also be called an *esse.*

St Thomas seems merely to be reporting this usage of the infinitive *esse* to denote the essence or nature. In expressing his own thought he appears to avoid very carefully any use of the term *esse* in this sense of the subject of being. It is difficult, though perhaps not impossible, to indicate texts where he takes advantage of this custom of using *esse* to signify essence. Yet there need be no doubt about the usage that he reports. William of Auvergne, in the immediate philosophical background at Paris, carefully explained the twofold sense of *esse*:

> Oportet autem te scire, quia esse duas habet intentiones, et una earum est residuum a circumvestione et varietate accidentium, et hoc est proprie quod nominatur essentia, sive substantia, . . . et significat illud solum quod diffinitiva oratione significatur sive nomine speciei. Hoc igitur est quod dicitur substantia rei, et ejus esse, et ejus quidditas: et hoc est esse, quod diffinitio significat, et explicat, et hoc ipsum dicitur rei essentia. Secunda autem intentio hujus quod est esse, est illud quod dicitur per hoc verbum est de unoquoque, et est praeter uniuscujusque rationem. In nullius autem ratione accipitur esse, quidquid imaginati fuerimus, sive hominem, sive asinum, sive aliud, ut in ratione ejus esse intelligamus; eo solo excepto de quo essentialiter dicitur; ejus namque essentia nisi per ipsum esse intelligi non potest, cum ipsa, et ejus esse omnimodo sint una re.” (*De Trin.*, c. II; ed. Paris, 1674, Supplementum, p. 2b).

The infinitive *esse*, as William explains it, has accordingly two senses. In one sense it expresses only what is signified by the definition of the thing, that is, it denotes the essence or substance or quiddity of the thing. William's tendency to use three different expressions where one would do, serves in this case at least to make his meaning triply clear. The second sense of the infinitive *esse*, he continues, is found in what the verb “is” denotes when it is predicated of anything whatsoever. This is something not contained within the essence of anything except God. It is outside (*praeter*) the essence of every other thing. Imagine anything you wish, a man, a donkey, or anything else, and examine its notion or essence.. You will not find that being in this second sense is contained within any such essence. The only exception is God. Of Him it is predicated essentially, for His essence and His being are entirely one in reality. His essence can be understood only as being in this second sense of the term.

William, accordingly, had no difficulty in accepting the infinitive *esse* in a sense that definitely meant essence, along with the other sense in which it meant something outside the essence. He sees nothing strange in the use of *esse* to denote just what is expressed in the definition of a thing. Boethius, whose writings served to fix so much of the Scholastic vocabulary, had identified the *esse* of a thing with its definition: “Quod est autem esse rei? nihil aliud est nisi definitio” (*In Isog. Porphyr.*, editio secunda, IV, 14; ed. Brandt, p. 273.13). The definition signifies what the thing is, and so its essence or nature. In the *De Hebdomadibus* Boethius uses the term *esse* consistently to denote natures, substantial and accidental: “Diversum est, tantum esse aliquid, et esse aliquid in eo quod est; illic enim accidens, hic substantia significatur” (*PL*, LXIV, 1311C). He distinguishes these natures, under the designation of *esse*, from the *quod est* or composite that is the creature: “Diversum est esse, et id quod est: ipsum enim esse nondum est. At vero id quod est, accepta essendi forma, est, atque consistit.” (1311B). *Esse* is understood as having a formal sense.

The use of the infinitive of the verb “to be” to denote a form or formal aspect of a thing goes back, in point of fact, to Aristotle. The infinitive was regularly used by the Stagirite with a possessive dative to designate the form of a thing as distinguished from the matter and the composite in instances like “the being of man” or “the being of blood.” In such expressions the Greek infinitive “to be” means the form of man or the form of blood. It designates only the form. This use of the infinitive seems to have originated from the technical Aristotelian phrase *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*. Literally translated, the phrase would read in English "the what-was-being,"[21] although the imperfect tense of the Greek verb ("was") has to be understood as signifying not past being but timeless being. The infinitive of the verb "to be" in this formal sense was extended in Aristotle to express any formal aspect of the thing, even though that formal aspect did not involve a real difference. The "now" of time, for instance, both divides and joins past and future. The dividing and uniting in this case are the same thing, but express different formal aspects of it; they differ from each other in "being" (*Ph.,* IV 13, 222a19-20).

That St Thomas has the Aristotelian formula in mind as he reports the usage of the infinitive *esse* in the sense of essence, appears from the way in which he introduces that meaning of the term: "Uno modo dicitur esse ipsa quidditas vel natura rei, sicut dicitur quod definitio est oratio significans quid est esse; . . ." (*In I Sent.,* d.33, q.1, a.1, ad 1m; ed. Mandonnet, I, 766). He is reporting the tradition that uses *esse* to signify what is expressed in the definition of a thing. The definition gives formal characteristics, the proximate genus and the specific differentia. The phrase "quid est esse" has its unmistakable Aristotelian background.

The use of the infinitive *esse* to signify the essence of a thing was therefore quite traditional. Nor was there any grammatical reason why the Latin infinitive of the verb "to be" could not have continued to express this meaning. As it developed into the Italian form *essere* it retained such usage. One says in Italian "un essere umano" in the sense of a man, just as in French one speaks of "un être humain." The infinitive of the verb "to be" in these languages derived from Latin may readily denote the thing itself, and not directly the act or characteristic of being. It can signify the nature or essence, which is the subject of being. In St Thomas' phrase, it can signify *in concreto.*

There is no compelling historical reason, then, either in philosophical or in grammatical tradition, why St Thomas himself should not have used the infinitive *esse* to express both subject of being and act of being, just as he uses the participle *ens* in both senses. Philosophically as well as grammatically both forms of the verb are open to the same ambiguity. Both may be equally translated by "being" and "a being" in English, and express in the former way the act of being, and in the latter way the nature that exists. Both grammatical forms may signify either *in abstracto* or *in concreto.* Yet St Thomas uses the infinitive *esse* to signify only *in abstracto.* That is his regular custom. Why? No compelling reason is forthcoming. It looks as though he is arbitrarily restricting the infinitive in his own vocabulary to just one of its two possible usages. Yet in the whole history of philosophy it would be hard to find a first-rate thinker who resisted better than St Thomas the temptation to coin his own philosophical vocabulary. He employed the traditional terminology in current use at the time, no matter how difficult it was for that old terminology to express radically new thought. For posterity, this practice of St Thomas has perhaps been singularly unfortunate. It has made his thought difficult to grasp, and has rendered the astonishing freshness and newness of his metaphysical procedure and its deep-rooted separation from that of his contemporaries and predecessors imperceptible at first glance. In the particular case of the infinitive *esse,* however, there seems to be not the coining of a new philosophical term, but the arbitrary restriction of an old one to just one of its current philosophical meanings.

Does this restriction indicate a new and vitally important role of the actuality of being in the metaphysical thought of St. Thomas? If the act of being is to have an altogether distinctive and unprecedented function in his thinking, it could be expected to give rise to a more or less unconscious tendency to reserve one particular term for its expression. The usage would be formed of denoting this function regularly by the same term. So in the texts of St Thomas, while the participle *ens* is used in both its senses, the infinitive *esse* seems arbitrarily confined to signifying the act of being. Such a departure from current usage calls for special attention from the student of St Thomas, and is sufficient ground for a presumption that the act of being will be a focal point of metaphysical interest as Thomistic thought unfolds its innermost meaning.

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[21] See W. Marx, *The Meaning of Aristotle's 'Ontology'* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1954), p. 43.

What St Thomas, in fact, has been saying in the texts just quoted from the commentary on the *Sentences* is, that being in the sense of a thing's actuality is the very act of the essence just as living is the act of the soul (sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus,[22] est animae actus) and illuminating is the act of a thing that gives light (sicut lucere est actus lucentis). Just as operation is recognized as the act of any nature, so being, in the sense of actuality, is likewise the act of all such natures. There is an important difference, however. Living and illuminating and all such activities are predicamental accidents. They are secondary acts. They presume and require the primary act of the thing. That primary act of the thing, according to this doctrine of St Thomas, is being. Being in this particular sense is the act of the essence or nature, and not a secondary act but the primary act: "non actus secundus, qui est operatio, sed actus primus" (*In I Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.1, ad 1m.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 766).

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[22] In Aristotle, *De An.*, II 4,415b13, the context of this expression was that the soul is the formal cause of living things, because according to the Aristotelian doctrine form is the cause of the being of each thing (cf. *Metaph.*, Z 17,1041a28-b28, which shows how the form is the cause of a thing's being flesh or a syllable or anything else; similarly H 2,1043a2-2-3). It is in this formal sense that life is called the being of living things. It is the formal characteristic that distinguishes animate from inanimate things (*De An.*, II 2,413a21-22). "Being" in this context clearly has the meaning of what a thing is. The formal Aristotelian notion of being is brought out definitely enough in the Oxford translation. As "the essence of the whole living body" the soul is its cause: "for in everything the essence is identical with the ground of its being, and here, in the case of living things, their being is to live, and of their being and their living the soul in them is the cause or source. Further, the actuality of whatever is potential is identical with its formulable essence." *De An.*, II 4,415b11-15: Oxford tr.

St. Thomas, however, from the time of his first use of the text in the commentary on the *Sentences*, interprets this being that is the life of the soul as something different from the essence and as the act of the form. As the *actus primus* of the soul it is different from the essence or quiddity just as operation (*actus secundus*) is different from essence. In the *Contra Gentiles*, the notion "life" in the Aristotelian formula is interpreted as meaning the kind of being that proceeds from a special kind of form, namely vital form: "*Vita* enim viventis est ipsum *vivere* in quadam abstractione significatum: sicut *cursus* non est secundum rem aliud quam *currere*. *Vivere autem viventium est ipsum esse eorum*, ut patet per Philosophum in II de Anima: cum enim ex hoc animal dicatur vivens quod animam habet, secundum quam habet esse, utpote secundum propriam formam, oportet quod vivere nihil sit aliud quam tale esse ex tali forma proveniens." *CG*, I,98; ed. Leonine, XIII, 263a3-12. This interpretation requires that *vivere* be given as its proper sense an existential meaning, instead of its commonly understood sense of operation: "Illud ergo esse quod habet res prout est movens seipsam ad operationem aliquam, dicitur proprie vita rei, quia vivere viventis est esse, ut in II *de Anima* dicitur. In nobis autem nulla operatio ad quam nos movemus, est esse nostrum; unde intelligere nostrum non est vita nostra, proprie loquendo, nisi secundum quod *vivere* accipitur pro opere, quod est signum vitae; . . ." *De Ver.*, IV,8c; ed. Spiazzi, *Quaest. Disp.*, I,87b. The difference between the originally accepted meaning of "life" and its proper philosophical sense is explained in the *Summa Theologiae:* "Nam *vitae* nomen sumitur ex quodam exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est movere seipsum: non tamen est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc significandum, sed ad significandum substantiam cui convenit secundum suam naturam movere seipsam, vel agere quocumque modo ad operationem. Et secundum hoc, *vivere* nihil aliud est quam esse in tali natura: et *vita* significat hoc ipsum, sed in abstracto; sicut hoc nomen *cursus* significat ipsum *currere* in abstracto. . . . Quandoque tamen *vita* sumitur minus proprie pro operationibus vitae, a quibus nomen vitae assumitur; . . ." *ST*, I,18,2c; ed. Leonine. In a subsequent passage, the two senses are merely given as though readily accepted: ". . . vita dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, ipsum esse viventis. Et sic beatitudo non est vita: ostensum est enim quod esse unius hominis, qualecumque sit, Every created nature or essence, according to this doctrine, will have two kinds of act. It will have its own activities or operations. These are added to it as predicamental accidents. They presuppose the essence complete in its substantial being. The actuality expressed by *esse* is not an act of this kind. It actuates the essence within the order of substance, and not in the order of predicamental accidents. It is properly the act of essence as such, and not, as are the operations, an act of the essence's powers: "Actio enim est proprie actualitas virtutis; sicut esse est actualitas substantiae vel essentiae" (*ST*, I, 54, 1c; cf. 79, 1c).

Any created nature, then, has to be actuated in two different ways, namely by its being and by its operation. The teaching that a thing has to be before it can operate would be a more or less commonplace observation, and need not carry any special metaphysical implications. But the insistence that the actuality of being has, without being a predicamental accident, correspondingly the same relation to the nature that operations have, points to a new metaphysical approach. It suggests that the nature is something different from its own being just as it is something different from its own operations. This is quite at variance with traditional Aristotelian teaching. But it differs also from Avicenna, for it maintains that being is not a predicamental accident and so is not something that is subsequent to essence. It indicates a new metaphysical conception of being.

Upon being as the act of essence, then, the interest of the present study will have to centre. In what sense is this act required by created essence, and so will be called necessary or essential to it? In what sense is it outside the essence, different from and accidental to the essence? In what sense does it flow from the essence, as do the operations, and in what sense is it something that does not flow from the essence but comes from outside? There are sufficiently numerous texts in St Thomas that assert both of these latter possibilities, contradictory as they seem at first sight. These texts will have to be examined before proceeding to a study of the doctrine in itself. As regards St Thomas' use of the infinitive *esse*, however, the texts already seen show that in the presentation of his own doctrine it is regularly used to denote only the act of being, and not the subject of being. Yet St Thomas records the traditional use of *esse* to signify the nature or essence that is the subject of being, and thereby acknowledges that the infinitive form carries in itself the same equivocity as the participle *ens*. There is no real advantage, then, in attempting to preserve the infinitive form in English translation. Of its nature the infinitive does not necessarily mean the act as distinct from the subject. The participial form expresses the notion correctly and idiomatically. "The being of a thing" is normal English and carries all the force of the Latin *esse rei* just as well as does the unidiomatic phrase "the 'to be' of a thing." There is very rarely any danger of confusion with the English use

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non est hominis beatitudo: solius enim Dei beatitudo est suum esse.—Alio modo, dicitur vita ipsa operatio viventis, secundum quam principium vitae in actum reducitur; . . ." *ST*, I-II, 3, 2, ad 1m; ed. Leonine.

"Life," therefore, is given by St Thomas a technical philosophical sense that is different from its ordinary sense of vital operation. This special philosophical meaning is placed in the being of the soul, which is other than the soul itself. The Aristotelian passage is then explained by saying that the soul is the principle of its own being, just as form in general is the principle of being: ". . . anima dicitur forma corporis in quantum est causa vitae, sicut forma est principium essendi: vivere enim viventibus est esse, ut dicit Philosophus in II de Anima." *Q. de An.*, a. 15, ad 8m; ed. Calcaterra-Centi, *Quaest. Disp.*, II,335a. The clearest explanation of all is found in the *Summa Theologiae:* ". . . propria forma uniuscuiusque faciens ipsum esse in actu, est principium propriae operationis ipsius. Et ideo vivere dicitur esse viventium ex eo quod viventia per hoc quod habent esse per suam formam, tali modo operantur." *ST*, II-II,179,1, ad 1m; ed. Leonine. Living things operate in such and such a way because they have being through their form. The activities are specified by the form that gives being. This vital specification is considered sufficient to justify the Aristotelian dictum that life is the being of living things.

of "being" in sense of a subject, like "a human being." The indefinite article makes the sense abundantly clear. It is of course possible to think up instances where the sense is not clear once the phrase has been detached from its context. "The being to which I just referred" could mean either the act of being with which I was dealing in a philosophical lecture, or it could mean the thing about which I was talking. But when read in its context the phrase should not occasion any misunderstanding. The English language is supple enough to express these meanings of being without having to be twisted or strained. "Being," then, is the correct translation of both *ens* and *esse* when they signify the act of being. In English it signifies *in abstracto,* just as the participle "running" expresses the act of running that in Latin is signified by the infinitive *currere.*

The word "entity" has also been used by St Thomas to denote being in the sense of act—"secundum quod importat entitatem rei, vel veritatem propositionis" (*Quodl.,* II, 3c; ed. Mandonnet, p. 43). The abstract form of this term satisfies the one condition that he has laid down for expressing the act of being, namely that it signify *in abstracto.* Similarly "natura entitatis" is used synonymously with *esse* in this sense: "Invenitur enim in omnibus rebus natura entitatis, . . . ita tamen quod ipsarum rerum naturae non sunt hoc ipsum esse quod habent: alias esse esset de intellectu cujuslibet quidditatis" (*In II Sent.,* d.1, q.1, a.1, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, II, 12). In the same synonymous way "natura essendi" is found: ". . . quodcumque ens creatum participat, ut ita dixerim, naturam essendi: quia solus Deus est suum esse" (*ST,* I, 45, 5, ad 1m). "Natura essendi" is used here somewhat apologetically for the act of being that all creatures participate and that is predicated as a nature of God alone. In St Thomas' regular usage "nature" in creatures means essence as contrasted with being (*esse*). Yet being may from one point of view be referred to as a nature that is participated by all beings just as human nature is participated by all men. It may accordingly be termed the *ratio essendi* or the *ratio entis*: ". . . natura essendi convenit Deo absque omni limitatione et contractione; unde ejus virtus activa se extendit . . . ad omne id quod potest habere rationem entis."[23] However, St Thomas does not ordinarily speak of being as a nature or an aspect (*ratio*) or a form. He usually reserves such terms for the order of essence as contrasted with being. Being itself is referred to as an act, an actuality, a perfection, and is usually expressed by the infinitive *esse.*

Existentia is also found at times,[24] though rarely, to denote the actuality of being. It satisfies the condition of signifying *in abstracto.* Though from its etymology it has more the meaning of "appearing" or "standing out" and may be found used in that sense by St Thomas (e.g., sicut aliquid non existens de essentia rei—*Quodl.,* II, 3c; ed. Mandonnet, p. 43), it had already taken on the modern sense of "existence." However, like the abstract forms just noted, it is not his regular way of signifying the act of being. This point of form is worth keeping in mind. It seems to indicate that though there is one viewpoint from which the act of being may be thought of as a nature that is participated, the preponderant way in which it has to be treated requires that it be kept in contrast to nature and regarded as an act that is not a nature. In other words, the act of being, though a nature in God, is spoken of by St Thomas as though it is not a nature in creatures.

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[23] *Quodl.,* III, 1c; ed. Spiazzi, p. 40a. Cf.: ". . . ita quod quamcumque rationem essendi aliquid habeat, non sit sibi nisi a Deo, sed defectus essendi sit ei a seipso." *In II Sent.,* d.37, p.1, a.2, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, II,946. "Ratio autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi, . . ." *De Ver.,* I,1, ad 3m in contr.; ed. Spiazzi, I,4a.

[24] ". . . de existentia eius in rebus: attribuitur enim Deo quod sit ubique et in omnibus rebus, . . ." *ST,* I,7, Prooem. "Dant enim occasionem falsitatis, eo quod similitudinem eorum gerunt, quorum non habent existentiam." *ST,* I,17,1, ad 2m; ed. Leonine. "Logicus enim considerat modum praedicandi, et non existentiam rei. . . . Sed philosophus qui existentiam quaerit rerum, . . . " *In VII Metaph.,* lect. 17, no. 1658; ed. Cathala.

These considerations are sufficient to establish being as an equivocal that can be taken either as the subject that is or as the act that makes the subject be. In either sense it can be expressed by both the Latin participle *ens* and the Latin infinitive *esse*. St Thomas ordinarily uses *ens* to signify the subject of being, though often enough he uses it to signify the act. *Esse* he uses regularly to signify the act, though acknowledging that it may be used also to signify the subject. This infinitive *esse* is his preferred form for denoting the act of being, though on occasion he may refer to the act of being in terms or phrases that signify a nature participated. The order of this act to its subject has already been seen described as both accidental and not accidental. A further aspect of the same question is whether or not the act of being is caused by the principles of the thing's essence. Under this aspect the texts show the same ambiguity. According to some, being is a consequence of the thing's essential principles. According to others, being does not follow from the principles of the essence. These texts have to be examined to see what light they throw upon the general problem of the accidental and essential character of being in the metaphysical doctrine of St Thomas.

ESSE—A RESULT AND NOT A RESULT OF ESSENCE

On the one hand, being is for St Thomas the terminus of efficient causality.[25] Without being, a thing cannot exercise any efficient causality at all, and so cannot be the cause of its own being: "Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma uel quiditate rei, causatum dico sicut a causa efficiente, . . ." (*De Ente et Essentia*, c. IV; ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 35.6-8). Accordingly, the essential principles of a thing are not sufficient to give rise to its being: "Impossibile est autem quod esse sit causatum tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, quia nulla res sufficit quod sit sibi causa essendi, . . ." (*ST*. I, 3, 4c). This way of thinking is developed at sufficient length by St Thomas.[26] and is too clear to require comment. Being (*esse*) has to come to a thing by way of efficient causality, which a thing cannot exercise until it has being. The being of a thing, then, cannot be caused by the principles of its essence.

On the other hand, in a considerable number of texts the opposite seems stated just as clearly. The doctrine may be summed up in the formula "esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, . . ." (*ST*, I, 104, 1, ad 1m). This is reminiscent of the Aristotelian doctrine that form is the cause of being. For Aristotle it meant that the form was the primary instance of being in the thing, and that from the form being was derived to the matter and to the composite.[27] In the Thomistic doctrine, where form is one of the constituents of essence while being lies outside (*praeter*) the essence, the Aristotelian formula will have to take on a considerably different meaning. It is in fact used with a certain reservation by St Thomas. It is allowed to state that the form is indeed the cause of being, but only in its own way, as though, absolutely speaking, the formula needs restriction: ". . .

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[25] ". . . ei quod fit faciens dat esse." *De Pot*, III, 1, arg. 17m; ed. Mandonnet, II.42a. "Unicuique autem competit habere causam agentem, secundum quod habet esse." *ST*, I,44,1, ad 3m; ed. Leonine.

[26] ". . . sequitur quod aliquid sit sibi ipsi causa essendi. Hoc autem est impossibile: quia prius secundum intellectum est causam esse quam effectum; si ergo aliquid sibi ipsi esset causa essendi, intelligeretur esse antequam haberet esse, quod est impossibile:—nisi intelligatur quod aliquid sit sibi causa essendi secundum esse accidentale, quod esse est secundum quid. Hoc enim non est impossibile: invenitur enim aliquod ens accidentale causatum ex principiis sui subiecti, ante quod esse intelligitur esse substantiale subiecti. Nunc autem non loquimur de esse accidentali, sed de substantiali." CG, I,22; ed. Leonine, XIII,68b9-21. Cf. *ST*, I,3,4c.

[27] *Metaph.*, Z 17,1041a10-b28.

quamuis huius esse suo modo forma sit causa" (*De Ente,* c. II; ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 10.7). It looks as though the form in its own way or its own order, that is, in the order of formal causality, may be a cause of the thing's being, but not in the order of efficient causality, of which being is the proper terminus. This is brought out more clearly in other passages. St Thomas speaks of God as the immediate efficient cause of natural being, but of the form of the creature as the immediate formal cause and principle: ". . . esse naturale per creationem Deus facit in nobis, nulla causa agente mediante, sed tamen mediante aliqua causa formali; forma enim naturalis principium est esse naturalis: . . ." (*De Ver.,* XXVII, 1, ad 3m; ed. Mandonnet, I, 693a). As formal cause, therefore, the form is an immediate principle of the thing's being. It is through its form that the thing has being: "Deus . . . unicuique dedit formam per quam esset" (*De Car.,* 1, ad 13m; ed. Mandonnet, III, 272b).

Is it in this formal sense that St Thomas can speak of the thing's being as a result of the principles of the thing? He states without reservation that the being (*esse*) results from these principles: "Et hoc quidem esse in re est, et est actus entis resultans ex principiis rei, sicut lucere est actus lucentis" (*In III Sent.,* d.6, q.2, a.2, Resp.; ed. Moos, III, 238). The thing's being is described as though it followed from the principles that make up the nature or essence. This is brought out more forcefully in the best-known text of all:

> Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab ejus essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae (*In IV Metaph.,* lect. 2; ed. Cathala, no. 558).

The being that is meant here is clearly the being that is other than the essence, and so the act of being that lies outside the essence. It is different from the essence. Yet it is not something superadded by way of accident to the essence. It is not an accident added to an already complete essence, as a predicamental accident would be. It is as it were constituted by the very principles of the essence. Once the principles of the essence are there, the being of the thing is also there. They do not then require anything superadded to make them be.

What can this doctrine mean? It is intended as a defence of the Aristotelian teaching that the addition of the participle "being" does not denote anything new in the thing, and that every substance is of its very nature a being. It is meant as a refutation of the Avicennian tenet that being is something accidental and subsequent to created essences. It understands being as a principle that is indeed other than the essence, yet not an accident in the sense of a predicamental accident, as the Avicennian doctrine had been represented in Averroes' critique. Being is not subsequent to the essence, even though it is other than the essence. It is something different from the essence, yet is as it were constituted by the same substantial principles that make up the essence.

To Siger of Brabant this formulation of the Thomistic doctrine appeared as an open contradiction. Siger regarded it as an attempt at a middle of the road position between the Aristotelian teaching that being was essential to everything, and the Avicennian tenet that being was a superadded accident in created things:

> Ponunt autem quidam modo medio, quod esse est aliquid additum essentiae rei, non pertinens ad essentiam rei, nec quod sit accidens, sed est aliquid additum quasi per essentiam constitutum sive ex principiis essentiae.[28]

This sketch of Siger's presents clearly enough the Thomistic doctrine in its main outlines. It uses St Thomas' own expressions, though contrasting them in a sharp way calculated to emphasize their apparently contradictory character. With the final statement considered as the conclusion, Siger has no quarrel. That the being of a thing is constituted by its essence is correct Aristotelian doctrine. Since this is the ultimate conclusion of the Thomistic treatment, it can render the main burden of the teaching acceptable. But the way of expressing it seems incomprehensible: "Etsi conclusio vera sit, modum tamen ponendi non intelligo" (*Metaph.*, Introd., q. VII; ed. Graiff, p. 16.25). As he is reported by Godfrey of Fontaines, Siger regards the statement of the doctrine as self-contradictory. What is constituted by the principles of the essence is nothing other than the essence itself. To say that it is not the essence, yet is constituted by the principles of the essence, is to affirm and to deny the same thing: "Dicere quod esse non est essentia rei, sed aliquid constitutum per essentiae principia, est idem affirmare et negare: cum constitutum per essentiae principia nihil aliud sit quam ipsa res ex illis constituta (Ibid., p. 16. [14]-[17]). What is constituted by the principles of the essence is the thing itself. The thing is therefore its own being. Being is of its very essence. One cannot say without contradiction that being is not of its essence.

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[28] *Quaest. in Metaph.,* Introd., p. VII; ed. Graiff, p. 16.21-24.

Siger, however, is sufficiently intrigued to speculate on what such an addition to the essence would have to be. It would not be of the essence of the thing, yet it would not be one of the accidents. It could not be the thing itself, nor could it be either of the parts of the thing's essence, matter or form. It is an entirely new notion, and fits under none of traditionally accepted constituents of reality. It would not have the character of matter, or of form, or of the accidents. It would have the nature of none of those three, but would constitute a different and fourth nature in reality: "Sed dicere quod esse sit aliquid additum essentiae rei, ita quod non sit res ipsa, neque pars essentiae ut materia vel forma, et dicere quod non sit accidens, est ponere quartam naturam in entibus" (Ibid., p. 16.29-32).

Siger is undoubtedly putting his finger on a sensitive spot in this new notion of being. It is described as something that cannot be ranged under the traditional Aristotelian classifications of matter, form, and accidents. It is a notion that places being before any of the predicamental accidents. In that sense being is not accidental to a thing's nature. Yet it is not the thing nor any of its essential parts. But it is as it were constituted by those essential principles. Once those principles are there, it also is there, without having to wait for any further addition. The only conceivable way in which this doctrine can make sense is to regard being as somehow prior to essence. If being were subsequent to the essence it would be a predicamental accident. If it were simultaneous, it would be the essence or part of the essence. It is none of these, yet it is other than the essence. It must therefore be prior to the essence. Such a possibility does not occur to Siger. Yet, if such be the relation envisaged in the Thomistic texts, it does not in the least attenuate Siger's observation that a fourth nature is being added to the traditional classifications. There is nothing in the Aristotelian background to account for any real principle prior to the substantial form.

This suggestion that being is understood as somehow prior to essence is, however, not without its *prima facie* difficulties as one reads the texts. If St Thomas actually means that being is prior to nature, how can he speak of being as at all constituted by the thing's essential principles? If those principles in any way constitute the thing's being, are they not envisaged precisely from that point of view as prior to the being? How can St Thomas say without any reservation that being (*esse*) is an act resulting from the principles of the thing? He speaks of it plainly as "actus entis resultans ex principiis rei" (*In III Sent.*, d 6, q.2, a.2, Resp.; ed. Moos, III, 238). If the act of being is looked upon as a *result* of the thing's essential principles, it is hardly taken as prior to the essence.

Could the difficulty here lie in the two types of causality that are involved in the production of being? As already noted, being for St Thomas is the terminus of efficient causality,[29] but always by means of a formal cause. The form is in this way the cause of the thing's being. It is the formal cause of being, just as the agent is the efficient cause of being. Is the whole problem, then, merely a question of the reciprocal relations of the different types of causality? Does it hinge on the doctrine that *causae sunt invicem causae*? Is the act of being a result or effect of the thing's essence in the line of formal causality, even though it is a prior effect of the efficient cause?

Should this turn out in fact to be the meaning of St Thomas' teaching, it will nevertheless be an innovation in the bearing of the maxim *causae sunt invicem causae*. As applied to formal cause, that saying ascribed reciprocal causality to form and matter only. Form exercised it proper causality on matter by informing and specifying it, and thereby underwent the proper causality of matter by being sustained and multiplied. They were reciprocally cause and effect, each in its own order. If the maxim is extended to the reciprocal relations of form and being, it will mean that form is specifying being and is thereby in some way actuated by that being. But this would mean a radical change from the Aristotelian notion of act. For the Stagirite form and act coincided. To actuate and to inform and to specify were the same. In this new instance, however, the potency, that is, the essence, would do the specifying. The essence would specify as potency, not as act.[30] The being would actuate, but would not specify, and could hardly be described as informing. The form would be thrown into the role of potency or matter, from the Aristotelian point of view, and yet would thereby be exercising formal causality. A profoundly new explanation of act and of formal causality would be required.

Does the Thomistic doctrine of being make essence in this way a potency to the act of being without giving it the role of matter? Does it make being an act without allowing it to specify or determine in a formal manner? If it succeeds in establishing these points, will it not provide a ready framework in which being may appear as both essential and accidental to created natures, according to the texts already considered? If the form is the cause of being in its own special way, that is, as formal cause, it will in its own order necessarily determine the essence to being. Formal causality is a necessary type of causality. All formal results follow necessarily from their formal causes, as may be seen in the procedures of mathematics. If its form determines every nature to be a being, then every nature is essentially a being. There is nothing in the form itself, however, that requires its submission to any efficient causality. That it is acted upon by another efficient cause does not follow with necessity from its own formal nature. If its act of being has to be given in this way by an external efficient cause, that act can only be accidental to it in this order of causality.

There is a possibility, therefore, that from the viewpoint of formal causality every nature is necessarily determined by its form in the direction of being, and so, as far as its essence is concerned, is essentially stamped as a being. Yet if the nature has to be produced through efficient causality, that formal determination will not be actual by itself, but only through the work of an agent other than itself. Its actuality will be other than itself, and so will lie outside its essence or nature. Its act of being will from this point of view be accidental to it. From different standpoints, then, every created nature will be essentially a being, and yet none will be essentially being. It will be other than the essence, and nevertheless will result from and so be constituted by the principles of the essence.

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[29] Supra, n. 25.

[30] "Unde non sic determinatur *esse* per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut actus per potentiam." *De Pot.*, VII,2; ed. Mandonnet, II,254a.

Such seems to be the framework indicated by the foregoing texts for the solution of this Thomistic problem. Does the general doctrine of being found in the works of St Thomas allow one to proceed along these lines and to establish successfully both the accidental and the essential character of created being? An examination of the Thomistic notion of essence and the Thomistic notion of being may be expected to yield the answer to this question.

ESSENCE

The texts already considered use the term "essence" to denote what is expressed by the definition of a thing. They make it signify consistently the subject of being, in contrast to the act of being. Etymologically there is no reason why "essentia" should not mean the act of being, just as *esse* and *ens* may designate it. It is an abstractive form derived from the same root as they. It is apparently formed from a supposed participle *essens,* which would add the participial ending to the infinitive *esse* somewhat as *patiens* does to *pati.*[31] It was coined, according to Quintilian (*Inst. Or.,* II, 14, 2; III, 6, 23) to translate the Greek philosophical term *ousia.* There is nothing, then, in its morphology or in its original historical background to prevent it from signifying *in abstracto.* Morphologically, in fact, it is better adapted to express the act of being than the subject of that act. St Augustine claimed that the Latin *essentia* should properly be reserved to God alone, signifying as it did the being that had no subject, no mutable *substantia:* "Res ergo mutabiles neque simplices, proprie dicuntur substantiae. . . . ita ut fortasse solum Deum dici oporteat essentiam. Est enim vere solus, quia incommutabilis est, . . . (*De Trin.,* VII, 5, 10; PL, XLII, 942). Yet the Greek term that *essentia* was coined to translate, *ousia,* could be used to express the subject. It was regularly translated *substantia* by Boethius, and *substantia* accordingly became its Latin equivalent. In this way *essentia* became in actual philosophical usage a synonym for *substantia* in expressing one of the meanings of the Greek *ousia,* namely the subject of the accidents.

One need not be surprised, therefore, to find that in spite of its morphology the term *essentia* is restricted in the usage of St Thomas to denote the subject of being, and does not occur in the sense of the act of being. Unlike the apparently arbitrary restriction of *esse* to just one of its two current philosophical meanings, this reservation of *essentia* to the opposite meaning has the full sanction of centuries-old tradition. However, the general conformity with its current usage as a subject of accidents and as expressing the content of the definition need not at all imply that St Thomas' notion of essence adds nothing new to the traditional conception. He has left a work on the subject entitled *De Ente et Essentia.* It is an early work, being dated some time between the years 1254-1256, when he was little more than thirty years old. Yet it is a treatise that is surprisingly rich in its doctrine of being, and it explains the notion of essence so carefully and so explicitly that comparatively few texts from the later works are required to supplement its teachings as far as essence is concerned. It has to be considered, of course, as an early expression of St Thomas's doctrine on the relations of essence and being. It leaves open the question of whether or not that doctrine was developed further or even changed in the later phases of his teaching. A radical change in the Thomistic notion of essence between the time of the *De Ente et Essentia* and the more mature periods has in fact been proposed,[32] but is not supported directly by any texts describing essence in these later years. It is based rather upon a special interpretation of texts concerning being in the later works, an interpretation that involves a fundamental change in the notion of essence as set forth so clearly an unambiguously in the *De Ente et Essentia*. The description of essence in this earlier work may therefore safely be studied for what it is in itself and as supported by later texts that deal with essence. Whether or not the doctrine of being that is found in the more mature works is consistent with this notion of essence is a further and different question.

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[31] See E. Gilson, "Notes sur le Vocabulaire de l'Etre," *Mediaeval Studies,* VIII (1946), 152-155.

[32] "Certainly in the *De ente et essentia* the essence from which the existence is said to be distinct is the essence expressed in the definition and as this is a positive reality, . . . it seems clear that St. Thomas did not

In the short Proem of the *De Ente et Essentia*, St Thomas quotes Avicenna[53] for the assertion that being and essence (*ens autem et essentia*) are what the intellect first conceives. He proposes to treat of what is meant by the term "essence and being" (*quid nomine essentie et entis significetur*—ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 1.7-8). He is evidently considering these two notions as closely bound up with each other. In which of the two senses is he understanding the participle *ens*? Does he mean it to signify *in abstracto* or *in concreto*? At first sight he would appear to be taking it *in concreto*. In the opening lines of the first chapter of the work he proceeds as though *ens* denotes a composite and essence one of its components. In conformity with the method of analysis, which takes the composite and divides it in order to reach its components, he proposes to take first the composite *ens* and examine it with a view towards isolating the notion of essence (c.I; p. 2.4-7).

This procedure would indicate that *ens* is being taken *in concreto*, as a composite of essence and the act of being. It is to be analyzed into these two components, and from that starting point essence is to be considered as far as possible in isolation. Yet St Thomas at once goes on to state that *ens per se* has a twofold meaning. It can signify the being that is divided into the ten categories, or the being that is expressed in the truth of propositions (c. I; p. 2.8-11). These two senses of being are immediately recognizable as those already considered in other texts of St Thomas. They are sketched against the Aristotelian background of the four ways in which being is expressed.[54] Here, however, being *per se* is understood as excluding the first Aristotelian sense, being *per accidens*, but as including the second sense, being as the true. The other two Aristotelian senses are grouped as before under being as in the categories. The division, then, has the same general background as in the previously considered texts.

Does this mean that *ens* in the opening lines of the first chapter of *De Ente et Essentia* signifies equivocally both *in concreto* and *in abstracto*? Does it have to be taken ambiguously as both the subject of being and the act of being? But as the act of being, how could it be considered as a composite that includes essence as one of its components? When it signifies the act of being it does not signify *in concreto* but only *in abstracto*. It does not denote a composite. Yet the procedure of St Thomas in this chapter requires that it designate a composite. It has to express a composite notion that includes the notion of essence. Accordingly, the difference between the two meanings of being is here described in a somewhat different way than in the other texts. It leads up to the special purpose now in mind, namely that essence has to express something positive. The being that signifies the truth of propositions is presented as anything about which an

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hold the doctrine that we shall attribute to his maturity when he wrote that work. In his maturity, we shall argue, the essence in the definition would be really indentified with the act of being or existence considered as affected by the limit; but the limit itself would be the essence that is really distinct from the act of being." A. Little, *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism* (Dublin Golden Eagle Books, [1951]), p. 193.

[53] "Dicemus igitur quod ens et res et necesse talia sunt quae statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione . . ." Avicenna, *Metaph.*, I,6A; ed. Venice (1508), fol. 72r2.

[54] See supra, nn. 5-11.

affirmative proposition can be formed, even though it expresses nothing positive in reality. In this way even privations and negations are called beings or are said to be (*entia dicuntur*—c.I, p. 3.3-4). One says, for instance, that blindness is in the eye.[35] In the other sense, however, namely as in the categories, being (*ens*) means something positive in reality (*aliquid in re ponit*—c. I, p.3.6). In this sense blindness and the like are not beings (*entia*—p. 3.7).

The force of the distinction here is that true propositions can be formed even about things that have not any positive status in reality. True propositions can be formed about negations and privations. In this way negations and privations are spoken of as being, as blindness for instance is said to *be* in the eye, and accordingly they are called beings. But such things have no essence. A necessary requirement for essence is a positive status in reality. Only in being as divided in the ten categories is essence to be found. Only beings of the latter kind are composites that have essence as one of their constituents.

According to this reasoning, however, negations and privations seem also to be looked upon as beings, in the sense of composites of a subject and its act. Of what, then, are they composed, if essence is not one of their constituents? In the *Commentary on the Sentences,* a work that originates from the same period as the *De Ente et Essentia,* a clearer explanation is given. In answer to the argument "de quocumque vere potest dici quod est, ipsum est ens", St Thomas states:

> . . . ens dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo quod significat essentiam rei extra animam existentis: et hoc modo non potest dici ens deformitas peccati, quae privatio quaedam est: privationes enim essentiam non habent in rerum natura. Alio modo secundum quod significat veritatem propositionis; et sic deformitas dicitur esse, non propter hoc quod in re esse habeat, sed quia intellectus componit privationem cum subjecto, sicut formam quamdam. . . . Sed hoc esse non est nisi esse rationis, cum in re potius sit non esse, et secundum hoc quod in ratione esse habet, constat quod a Deo est (*In II Sent.* d. 37, q.1, a.2, ad 3m; ed. Mandonnet, II, 947).

This parallel passage describes clearly enough the constitution of a privation. The intellect takes the privation as though it were a form and combines it with a subject. In doing so it gives a type of being that is found only in itself (*esse rationis*). This type of being is not being in the world of external reality (*in re potius sit non esse*). Considered as a being (*ens*), then, a privation or a negation is taken by the intellect as though it were a form and is composed with a subject; and this composite of quasi-form and subject is given being of reason (*esse rationis*) in the intellect but not in external reality. Quite evidently *ens* in this sense means a composite of being and subject of being. But that subject of being is not an essence, because it is not a positive reality.

The Aristotelian divisions of the way in which *ens per se* is expressed are invoked in the present context, therefore, not in order to establish the distinction between being as act and being as subject of that act, but to show that being as the true has an extension beyond being as found in the categories. In that further extension it does not enter into composition with an essence, because it is not composed with something positive, that is capable of existence outside the mind. In this case *ens* does not signify an essence. When one speaks of privations and negations as beings, one is not thereby implying that they have an essence. But *ens* in the other sense signifies an essence (*significat*

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[35] For Aristotle, *Metaph.*, Γ 2,1003b5-10, privations and negations were called beings on account of their reference to the primary instance of being, *ousia*.

essentiam rei extra animam existentis). Essence, accordingly, is something positive that can exist in reality. It is something expressed affirmatively: "Non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente, nisi essentia ejus, . . ." (*De Ver.*, I, 1c; ed. Mandonnet, p. 3b). To this extent St Thomas is following the Avicennian description of essence as the notion of affirmative being (*intentionem esse affirmativi*).[36]

With the positive status of essence made clear, St Thomas gathers the different descriptions of it that were current at the time, and the terms used to designate it. It is considered to be what is expressed by the definition of the thing. It is therefore *what* the thing is, and so may be called the quiddity. Since it is the being that is divided into the ten categories, it has to signify something common to all the natures by which the different beings are placed in the predicaments. Just as humanity, for instance, is the essence of man and places man in his proper genus and species in the category of substance, so essence in general will be that which places anything whatsoever in a category. It is identified by St Thomas with the Aristotelian what-is-being (*hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid*), which for the Stagirite meant form alone. St Thomas accordingly states that essence is also called form in so far as "form" signifies the "certitude" of anything, in the Avicennian sense of the term "certitude." He is making no special effort to distinguish very clearly the form from the essence. He speaks as though he is concerned for the moment only with what is conceptually intelligible in the thing; and the matter in itself is unintelligible. So essence may be called "nature" in the Boethian sense of what is intelligible through the definition of the thing (c. I, p. 4.6-9). But the reason why it is called "essence" is that *through* it and *in* it the being in question has its proper act—*per eam et in ea ens habet esse* (p. 4.15-16). In conformity with it does the thing have being—*essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur* (p. 10.4-5).

St Thomas, then, understands by essence something of positive meaning like the nature of a man or a horse or a tree. It is something that is expressed in the definition of the thing by means of genus and specific differentia. It is the content of the definition, when that content is positive. Anything outside the content of the definition will be outside the essence. The essence, accordingly, is what can be conceptualized in the manner of a definition. It is *what* the thing is. It is able to be in reality. In fact, through that order to being it is called essence, which is a term formed, as has been seen, from the Latin infinitive of the verb "to be." Its order to being is described as twofold. It is that *in* which a thing has being, and so is the subject of being. It is also that *through* which a thing has being, and so is a principle or cause of being. Since it is something according to which a thing has being (*secundum quam res esse dicitur*), it will apparently function as a sort of formal cause of being

In this description essence is represented both as identified with the concrete being and as one constituent of it. *Ens* as found in the categories is spoken of as though it were the same as essence,[37] and yet is considered as a composite of which essence is but one of the constituents. What does this imply? Is essence, like being, of its very nature an ambiguous term? Does it have to denote in one sense the whole composite being, and in another sense only one constituent of that being? When you speak of an essence can you mean a man or a tree that actually exists in reality and is endowed with the act of being, although it is something other than that act? If so, you are designating a composite, and you are having essence signify *in concreto*. Can you also abstract the essence from the concrete being and represent it by itself in abstraction? This would seem to be making it signify *in abstracto,* even though it is in this case the subject rather than the act. Or is the subject of being so wrapped in its proper act that it cannot be represented apart from the act? If it is represented as without any being at all, how can there be anything to represent? Or can it in some way abstract from being without entirely dissociating itself from that act? The answers to these questions will have to be sought through the text of St Thomas. But from the start it seems clear that as a matter of fact he is representing essence in both these ways. The Aristotelian background against which he has made his divisions of being should keep this from causing surprise. The Aristotelian senses of being as in the categories and being as act and potency were combined, as has been seen, in the one classification of predicamental being whether actual or potential (. . . ipsas naturas decem generum secundum quod sunt actu vel potentia—*In X Metaph*., lect. 3; ed. Cathala-Spiazzi, no. 1982). A nature or essence, accordingly, is placed in the categories whether it is considered as actual or as potential. When considered as actual, the essence would be considered along with its proper act of being, and so would denote the concrete being. When considered as potential, it would be taken without that act, and so as just one constituent of the composite. This way of speaking, then, fits in with the manner in which St Thomas combines the Aristotelian senses of being. Can it be justified by his doctrine of essence?

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[36] ". . . unaquaeque enim res habet certitudinem qua est id quod est, sicut triangulus habet certitudinem, qua est triangulus, et albedo habet certitudinem qua est albedo: et hoc est quod fortasse appellamus esse proprium. Nec intendimus per illud nisi intentionem esse affirmativi . . ." Avicenna, *Metaph.*, I,6C; ed. Venice (1508), fol. 72v1.

[37] "Set primo modo non potest dici ens nisi quod aliquid in re ponit; . . . sed sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo dicto; vnde Commentator in eodem loco dicit quod ens primo modo dictum est quod significat essentiam rei." *De Ente*, c. I; ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 3.5-12. W. Norris Clarke, *The New Scholasticism*, XXXII (1958), 266, points out that the first line of this text refers to "*ens*, the composite of essence and existence." The precise difference placed between *ens* in the first sense and *ens* in the second sense, however, is that *ens* in the

In examining the notion of essence, St Thomas shows that in material things the essence itself is composite. It consists of matter and form. This was accepted Aristotelian doctrine, and called for no further explanation as long as essence

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first sense has an essence, and *ens* in the second sense has not. This is explained by the consideration that *ens* in the first sense "aliquid in re ponit," while *ens* in the second sense "in re nichil ponat." The intelligible nature that is able to be found in reality provides the whole basis for the distinction as sketched here. This intelligible content is positive in the sense of furnishing an object that can be understood or at least known in itself and that can exist in reality. It is "omne illud quod intellectu quocumque modo capi potest" (p. 4.6-7), for instance, a substance. St. Thomas for the moment is primarily interested in dealing with essence as one of the components of *ens*, but at the same time he cannot avoid speaking of it as something that is placed in a category just as *ens* is placed in a category. He accordingly has no hesitation in quoting with approval the statement of Averroes that *ens* in the first sense signifies the essence of the thing (Cf. *In II Sent.*, d.37, q.1, a.2, ad 3m; *Quodl.*, II,3c). To infer, then, that because the first line of the above-quoted text refers to *ens* it "is actually not speaking of essence," seems to leave out of consideration the doctrine of the *De Ente* and the *Commentary on I Sent.* (d.22, q.1, a.1, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 555-557) that essence can be abstracted both with precision and without precision, and the fact that here there is no special reason for remaining strictly within the one type of abstraction. Taken with precision, the essence or nature is not entirely identical with the thing that exists; but taken without precision, it is identical with the same thing, and is what is placed in the category. It can never prescind from its being. One may therefore say indifferently, according to this doctrine of St. Thomas, that an essence or nature is what is placed in a category, and that an *ens* is what is placed in a category. The positive character of essence, however, is not sufficient to give an essence the status of a reality when it is considered in abstraction from its being. The Thomistic notion of essence is very different from that of Giles of Rome, who allowed created essence its own intelligibility in priority to the further actuality of existence: "Dicimus enim quod natura creata, licet sit tantae actualitatis quod possit per se intelligi: non sit tamen tantae actualitatis quod possit existere in rerum natura, nisi superaddatur ei actualitas aliqua, quae commini nomine vocatur esse." *Quodl.*, V,3, (ed. Louvain, 1646), p. 273a.

was considered merely as a nature. But when taken as a principle of being it gives rise to a more complicated situation. One of the elements, matter, was in itself something that had the function of subject, and so could without difficulty be looked upon as combining with form in the role of the subject of being. But from the viewpoint of essence as the formal principle or cause of being, how could matter play any part? Of itself it has nothing formal in its nature, and so could hardly be conceived as exercising any formal causality. St Thomas, accordingly, gives the form a special role in this respect. Essence is that by which a thing is denominated a being (*essentia qua res denominatur ens*—p. 10.5-6), and so presents as it were the formal pattern of being. That essence is neither form alone nor matter alone, but both. Yet a restriction has to be made—the form is in its own way the cause of this being (*quamuis huius esse suo modo forma sit causa*—p. 10.7). Although the two principles constitute the essence, only one of them functions as the formal cause and the denominating principle. The same doctrine is stated (. . . *quamvis forma sit principium esse*) and illustrated in the same way in the *Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences* (d.23, q.1, a.1, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I,555).

Matter, then, is part of the essence in material things, even though it has no formal function in regard to being. But if the essence is what is signified by the definition, how can it contain matter? The definition is of the universal, and matter is considered to individuate. St Thomas answers this objection by distinguishing matter just in general from designated matter (*materia signata* —p. 11.1-3). Designated matter is matter considered under determined dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness, as though it is something that can be "pointed out" or designated with the finger.[38] The notion is quite clear. If you consider any matter as under this particular length and breadth and thickness that you indicate with your finger, such matter is individuated and is limited to the one particular thing. If on the other hand you consider matter in general, without indicating any particular dimensions, you are considering matter universally, and nothing hinders it from forming part of a universal notion.

In its essential points this doctrine had been outlined by Aristotle. The same notions, like man or horse, could be taken either universally or singularly. They remained the same notions, composed of the same genus and specific differentia. " 'Man' and 'horse' and the like applied to singulars, but universally, are not *ousia* but something composed of this particular formula and this particular matter, as taken universally; but as taken singularly, it is from the ultimate matter that 'Socrates' has already been constituted" (*Metaph.,* Z 10,1035b27-31). What is expressed by the definition—i.e. in Scholastic language the essence—can be taken either singularly or universally. It contains both matter and form in either case, and so is the same notion, regardless of the individuation.

From this doctrine St Thomas concludes that the essence of Socrates and the essence of man differ only according to the designation or non-designation of the matter. The essence of man as such contains matter, but non-designated matter. To change that essence into the essence of Socrates, you do not add anything at all to the essence except the designation of the matter to certain determined dimensions. Socrates is "rational animal," not just "rational animal" in general, but this particular rational animal that you point out with your finger. By so doing you are adding nothing to what was already contained in the essence "rational animal." You are merely pointing it out in a particular instance.

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[38] See Roland-Gosselin's edition of *De Ente et Essentia*, p. 11, n. 1. Cf. use of "materia demonstrata" in *In I Sent.*, d.22, q.1, a.1, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 555-556.

From this consideration St Thomas draws a general, and for the present problem an extremely important, conclusion. As individual and species differ only according to designation and non-designation, so also do species and genus. The species adds nothing that is not already contained in the genus, but merely designates something already there. The type of designation, however, is different in each of these two cases. The designation of the individual is through matter when considered under determined dimensions. The designation of the species in the genus, on the other hand, is through the constitutive differentia, which is taken from the form. The designation of the species, then, takes place through the expressing of a new formal characteristic; while no new formal element is expressed in the designation of the singular individual. Yet the parallelism evidently means that the species, in spite of the new formal designation, contains nothing that was not already contained in the genus.

From this doctrine of the knowledge of species and individuals through designation, St Thomas develops a teaching that has been strangely neglected or forgotten in later Scholasticism, including Neoscholasticism. It is the doctrine of abstraction with precision and without precision. From the time of Suarez the notions of abstraction and of precision have been regarded as the same.[30] It is difficult today to realize how vital is the notion of abstraction without precision for understanding the Thomistic doctrine of essence and being. It means that something can be contained within a notion and yet not be expressed by that notion. What limits a generic notion to a specific one, for instance, is already contained within the generic notion: "Hec autem determinatio uel designatio que est in specie respectu generis, non est per aliquid in essentia speciei existens, quod nullo modo in essentia generis sit"—p. 11.19-21). It is in the genus as something that is not determined. It needs only the designation or determination by the differentia, in order to constitute the species. St Thomas' point is that this designation or formal determination does not add any content to the genus. It does not make the genus contain anything that was not contained in it before. All that happens is that what is in the genus becomes limited or determined to just one of its species.

This doctrine, of course, leaves all Thomistic generic and specific concepts confused concepts, taking the full weight of the Cartesian attack upon such concepts. They all confuse many different things or objects within the same concept, and leave the task of sorting these out to the specific differentiae or the individual designations. Yet in that very confusion lies the key to their serviceability and their power to ward off any wedge of Nominalism. After several centuries of thinking, consciously or unconsciously, against the background of clear and distinct ideas, it is hard to realize that metaphysical thought and in fact all scientific thought is rendered possible only because these concepts are able to confuse many objects into one and so provide the framework for predication. Aristotle had long before shown, in arguing against the Platonic Ideas, the impossibility of a self-contained generic notion that had the status of a unit in itself: "Now, if the 'animal' in 'the horse' and in 'man' is one and the same, as you are with yourself, how will the one in the things that exist 'apart' be one, and how will this 'animal' escape being divided even from itself?" (*Metaph.*, Z 14,1039a33-b2; Oxford tr.).

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[30] E.g.: Est ergo advertendum, abstractionem seu praecisionem intellectus non requirere distinctionem rerum, seu praecisionem alicujus rationis, vel modi, quae ex natura rei antecedat in re ipsa praecisionem intellectus, sed in re simplicissima posse fieri hujusmodi praecisionem variis modis, scilicet, vel per modum formae a subjecto, vel e contrario per modum subjecti a forma, vel per modum formae a forma, . . . Sic igitur abstrahit et praescindit intellectus aliquid ab aliquo tanquam commune a particulari, . . ." Suarez, *Disp. Metaph.*, II,2,16; ed. Berton (Vivès), XXV. 75b.

St Thomas explains this doctrine with the example of "body." It can be taken either as a part of an animal or as a genus. As a part of an animal it is contrasted with soul. In this sense it cannot be predicated of a man, for a part cannot be predicated of the whole. You cannot say that a man is his body. You have to say, in this meaning of the word, that a man has a body, just as he has a soul. Any composite has its integral parts. They are not predicated of it, for it is not completely identical with any one of them. On the other hand, "body" can be taken as meaning corporeal substance. In this case it has living and non-living corporeal things as its species. In this sense "body" is predicated of its inferiors as a genus. You can say that a man is a body, just as a stone is a body, or a plant or a horse is a body. In this way "body" signifies everything in a man, including his substantial form or soul. It is not at all contrasted with soul, but signifies a whole of which the soul is a part. Because it signifies the whole thing, it is completely identified with the thing and so can be predicated of it.

How are these two so different notions of "body" formed? They are both formed by abstraction. In each case the notion of a nature in which three dimensions can be designated is abstracted. The dimensions themselves, of course, pertain to the category of quantity.[40] Body, in the sense of a substance, has to be defined in terms of the possibility of having the three dimensions. This notion of a substance capable of the three dimensions is abstracted from the individual sensible things. But it can be abstracted in two different ways. It can be abstracted in such a manner that it does not exclude the addition of further perfections, that is, the perfections of animate, sensitive, and rational nature. One can say that man is a body, and still be able to see in him those further perfections. One is not excluding them from the notion "body." One is not prescinding from them. In this way one is taking body as a genus. It excludes nothing that is in a man, not even the individual designation, and so it can be predicated of a man, as for instance when one says "A man is a body." As a genus, "body" does not indeed express the further perfections of living, animal, and rational nature. It contains them, however, implicitly: "Et sic forma animalis in forma corporis continetur implicite, prout corpus est genus eius" (*De Ente*, c.II; p. 14.10-11).

In this way a genus implicitly contains its inferiors. It signifies indifferently any form whatsoever that can be denoted by the names of its species: ". . . et ideo, cum dicebatur corpus est quod habet talem formam ex qua possunt designari tres dimensiones in eo, intelligebatur quecumque forma esset, siue animalitas siue lapideitas siue quecumque forma alia."—p. 14.6-10). The genus contains implicitly everything that these more specific natures express. It denotes the whole thing, and not just a part of it. "Body" as a genus signifies any substance in which three dimensions can be designated, whether it be a stone or a horse or a man or any other corporeal thing. Because it excludes nothing in the individual and so is completely identified with that individual, it can be predicated of every individual to which its generic character extends. It signifies everything that is contained in its species and their individuals. It denotes the *totum* of which it is predicated, and not just a part of that *totum*. It includes all its inferiors in a unity that is based upon the very indifference by which it signifies them (*unitas generis ex ipsa indeterminatione uel indifferentia procedit*—p. 19.16-17). A genus, then, cannot be conceived as a self-contained nature to which something outside itself is added to constitute the species, as form, for instance, would be added to matter. Rather, it signifies a plurality of forms and individuals, indifferently, and can be applied in predication as completely identical with any one of them. Genera and species, accordingly, abstract from their inferiors without prescinding from them.

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[40] The geometrical solid, nevertheless, is called a body: "ipse uero tres dimensiones designate sunt corpus quod est in genere quantitatis." *De Ente*, c. II; p. 12.11-13. It is looked upon as informing an intelligible matter: "Sed accidentia superveniunt substantiae quodam ordine. Nam primo advenit ei quantitas, deinde qualitas, deinde passiones et motus. Unde quantitas potest intelligi in materia subiecta, antequam intelligantur in ea qualitates sensibiles, a quibus dicitur materia sensibilis. Et sic secundum rationem suae substantiae non dependet quantitas a materia sensibili, sed solum a materia intelligibili." *In Boeth. de Trin.*, V,3,Resp.2; ed. Bruno Decker (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955), p. 184.12-18.

On the other hand, the notion "body" may be abstracted in such a way that it does not signify the whole nature or individual, but only an integral part. In this sense a man is said to be composed of body and soul. Body is regarded as excluding from its own content the higher aspects of the soul. The composition of the two constitutes the nature of man. How does the abstraction now take place? The notion of a substance capable of the three dimensions is abstracted as before, but now the addition of further perfections is expressly excluded. If something else is later added, it is understood as something outside (*preter*) the signification of body in this sense (p. 13.5-10). The notion is closed off at the stage of corporeal substance capable of the three dimensions, and is represented as a complete and finished nature. Whatever else may be added lies outside that notion. In this sense, soul is not contained in the notion of body, whereas it was contained, though implicitly, in the notion of body as a genus.

In this second and non-generic sense, then, body excludes or prescinds from soul. It is a notion obtained by abstraction with precision, in contrast to the generic and specific notions that were obtained by abstraction without precision. The difference is that abstraction with precision excludes the residue from which it abstracts, while abstraction without precision does not exclude that residue but continues to keep it within the notion abstracted, though implicitly. The essence or nature of a thing can be abstracted in either of these two ways. The nature "man" can be abstracted without precision, and so will exclude nothing that is found in any individual man. On account of this complete identity it can be predicated of any individual, as when one says "Socrates is a man." It signifies in this way the *totum* that is Socrates. On the other hand, it can be abstracted with precision. It can be abstracted in such a way as to exclude the individual designation. In this way it is expressed by the word "humanity," and cannot be predicated of the individual man. One cannot say "Socrates is humanity." Rather, it functions as an integral part, and so one says that Socrates has humanity or human nature, just as one says that he has a body and has a soul. Taken with precision, the essence has the role of a part. It is looked upon as combining with the individuation to compose the singular. In this case it is not completely identical with the thing, as it was when abstracted without precision.

This means that for St Thomas "essence" can have a twofold sense. Essence may be abstracted without precision. It then means the thing itself. It is that which is. In this sense, to speak of a distinction between essence and being is the same as to speak of a distinction between a thing and its being. Essence so taken includes implicitly everything that is in the thing itself, even the individual designation. An animal is an essence, a man is an essence, Socrates is an essence, when "essence" is understood as abstracted without precision. Essence in this sense is predicated of all its individuals, and is completely identified with every one of them.[41]

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[41] "Et quia, ut dictum est, natura speciei est indeterminata respectu indiuidui, sicut

On the other hand, essence for St Thomas can be abstracted with precision. Taken in this way it excludes the individuating principles and so is represented as a part of the thing even though it includes the whole of the nature, both material and formal principles. It conceives these principles as functioning in a formal way with regard to the individual subject: "Et ideo humanitas significatur ut forma quedam, et dicitur quod est forma tocius; non quidem quasi superaddita partibus essentialibus, scilicet forme et materie, sicut forma domus superaddita partibus eius integralibus; set magis est forma que est totum, scilicet formam complectens et materiam, tamen cum precisione eorum per que nata est materia designari" (*De Ente,* c. II; p. 22 12-18). When abstracted in this way the essence is not completely identified with the individual but functions as a part of the individual. One says that a thing has an essence, that Socrates has human nature. In this sense it is strictly not the essence that exists. Rather, the existing thing is such and such a kind through its essence, or because of its essence.

When the essence is abstracted without precision, therefore, essence and thing are identical. One may say indifferently that Socrates exists or that a man exists. In this case it is the essence that exists. On the other hand, when the essence is abstracted with precision, it is not the individual:

> Sic igitur patet quod essentiam hominis significat hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen humanitas sed diuersimode, ut dictum est, . . . Et propter hoc eciam nomen essentie quandoque invenitur predicatum de re, dicitur enim Socratem esse essentiam, et quandoque negatur, sicut dicitur quod essentia Socratis est Socrates" (*De Ente*, c. II; pp. 22.18-23.7).

The essence abstracted with precision, then, does not exist as such. Only the individuals exist properly speaking. When one speaks of humanity (i.e. human nature) as existing, one means that it exists in individuals. Avicenna, for instance, distinguishes humanity and equinity from the being that either has in reality or in the mind. St Thomas also, in places where his language reflects the Latin translation of Avicenna, will speak in the same way; e.g. "humanitati enim ex hoc quod est humanitas, non debetur esse in actu; potest enim cogitari humanitas et tamen ignorari an aliquis homo sit" (*In I Sent.,* d.8, q.4, a.2; ed. Mandonnet, I,222). It is always the individual (*aliquis homo*) that is represented as existing, even when one is speaking of the relation between humanity and being. When it is predicated, however, the essence has to be taken as abstracted without precision, and so as containing implicitly and confusedly all that is in the individual: "Et ideo relinquitur quod ratio generis uel speciei conueniat essentie secundum quod significatur per modum tocius, ut nomine hominis

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natura generis respectu speciei, inde est quod, sicut id quod est genus prout predicatur de specie implicabat in sua significatione, quamuis indistincte, totum quod determinate est in specie, ita eciam et id quod est species, secundum quod predicatur de indiuiduo, oportet quod significet totum illud quod est in indiuiduo essentialiter licet indistincte; et hoc modo essentia Socratis significatur nomine hominis, vnde homo de Socrate predicatur." *De Ente*, c. II; p. 20.12-21.1. The problem had been clearly outlined by Plato: "Then while it is one and the same, the whole of it would be in many separate individuals at once, and thus it would itself be separate from itself." *Prm.* 131B; tr. Fowler. ". . . and the third, how in the infinite number of things which come into being this unity, whether we are to assume that it is dispersed and has become many, or that it is entirely separated from itself—which would seem to be the most impossible notion of all—being the same and one, is to be at the same time in one and in many." *Phlb.*, 15B; tr. Fowler.

In the commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate*, the doctrine of abstraction is expressed as follows: "Et ita sunt duae abstractiones intellectus. Una quae respondet unioni formae et materiae vel accidentis et subiecti, et haec est abstractio formae a materia sensibili. Alia quae respondet unioni totius et partis, et huic respondet abstractio universalis a particulari, quae est abstractio totius, in qua consideratur absolute natura aliqua secundum suam rationem essentialem, ab omnibus partibus, quae non sunt partes speciei, sed sunt partes accidentales." *In Boeth. de Trin.*, V,3,Resp.; ed. Decker, p. 185.20-26. Cf. also *In I Sent.*, d.23, q.1, a.1, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I,555-556.

uel animalis, prout implicite et indistincte continet totum quod in indiuiduo est" (*De Ente*, c. III; p. 23.25-28).

Taken in this way, that is, as abstracted without precision and so as containing everything that is in the individual, the essence can be considered in two ways. It can be considered either just in itself, or as existing. Considered in the first way, it is not able to receive the predication of anything accidental to it: "Uno modo secundum rationem propriam, et hec est absoluta consideratio ipsius, et hoc modo nichil est uerum de ea nisi quod convenit sibi secundum quod huiusmodi, . . ." (*De Ente*, c. III; p. 24.2-5). Considered in the second way, it has a twofold existence, that is, in reality and in the mind: "Hec autem natura habet duplex esse: unum in singularibus et aliud in anima; . . . (p. 25.9-10). Neither existence, however, belongs to the nature in its absolute consideration: "Et tamen ipsi naturae secundum primam considerationem suam, scilicet absolutam, nullum istorum esse debetur."[42] Of itself the essence does not require either type of existence. The reason is that if existence in this particular individual was of the essence of man, it would limit man to the one individual. If it were essential to human nature to exist in Socrates, then it could never be found anywhere else. It could never be in any other individual or in the mind. Conversely, if it were of the essence of human nature not to be in Socrates, it could never be found in him. In its absolute consideration it simply abstracts from being in Socrates or in any other individual or in the mind. It can be in any of these, it need not be in any of them. No such being is required by it in its absolute consideration: "Set uerum est dicere quod homo in quantum est homo non habet quod sit in hoc singulari uel in illo uel in anima" (*De Ente*, c.III; p. 26.6-8).

The abstraction in which this absolute consideration of the essence takes place is abstraction without precision. It does not prescind from being in any individual or in the mind "Ergo patet quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat precisio alicuius eorum" (p. 26.8-10). St Thomas mentions this as though it is entirely evident. If a nature had to be conceived as excluding all being by way of precision, it just would not be at all. There would be nothing there to be conceived. To think of something and prescind from all being would be impossible. Being, therefore, is not excluded from the essence in its absolute consideration. It is included implicitly in it. In fact, none of the ways in which the essence can be is prescinded from in its absolute consideration. Under that consideration it is able to be in this individual or in that individual or in the mind. But it thereby abstracts from all those existences. If any being whatsoever were of its essence absolutely considered, it would be bound to that being and so could never be completely identified with anything else.[43] Predication would be rendered impossible. In its absolute consideration, consequently, essence abstracts from all being—*a quolibet esse*.[44] Yet it prescinds from none of the existences that are possible to it. It remains open to them all.

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[42] *De Ente*, c. III; pp. 25.2-26.1. Cf.: "*Tertia* vero est consideratio naturae absoluta, prout abstrahit ab utroque esse; secundum quam considerationem consideratur natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque alterius, quantum ad ea tantum quae per se competunt tali naturae." *Quodl.*, VIII,1; ed. Spiazzi, p. 158b. Although the nature in its absolute consideration is prior to its existing in individuals and in the human mind, in so far as it furnishes the ground for these two states, nevertheless its existing in the divine intellect is prior to it in its absolute consideration: ". . . et inde est quod hoc quod competit naturae secundum absolutam considerationem, est ratio quare competat naturae alicui secundum esse quod habet in singulari, et non e converso. . . . Similiter etiam intellectus divinus est ratio naturae absolute consideratae, et in singularibus; et ipsa natura absolute considerata et in singularibus est ratio intellectus humani, et quodammodo mensura ipsius." *Ibid.*, p. 159a. Being is its act whether it is considered as abstracted with precision or without precision from its individuals: "Esse enim est actus alicujus ut quod est, sicut calefacere est actus calefacientis; et est alicujus ut quo est, scilicet quo denominatur esse, sicut calefacere est actus caloris." *In I Sent.*, d.23, q.1, a.1, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, 1,555. This holds even though simply speaking being is found only in individuals: ". . . et esse simpliciter non est nisi individuorum; sed determinatio essendi est ex natura vel quidditate generis vel speciei; et ideo quamvis genera et species non substent nisi in individuis, tamen eorum proprie subsistere est, et subsistentiae dicuntur . . . sicut et species substantiae dicuntur." *Ibid.*, ad 2m; pp. 557-558.

Naturally, such a way of conceiving essence is only a "consideration." Essence is never a direct object of the intellect as absolute. The intellect always sees it either in an individual or as intentionally existent in the mind. It never sees it without some existence. But it can reason that the same essence is found in all those existences and so absolutely in itself it is bound to none of them. In that way it is considered absolutely, as the conclusion of a reasoning process. But directly it is always perceived in some existence. From such being it can never prescind, no matter how much it abstracts from it.

Since essence can never prescind from or exclude being, but has to include it implicitly while abstracting from it, every nature is therefore essentially a being. In its very essence it has to include being implicitly and so of its very essence it is a being. Through this doctrine one side of the equivocity of being, namely that every nature is essentially a being, is justified by the very process in which the notion of essence is obtained, that is, by abstraction from being without precision from being.

Being

That, however, is only one side of the problem. On the other side, abstraction from being involves a peculiar consequence. Since the essence abstracts from being, it of course does not express anything about the particular existence the essence may happen to have: "Omnis autem essentia uel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo; possum enim intelligere quid est homo uel fenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura. Ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia uel quiditate" (*De Ente*, c. IV; p. 34.10-15). Naturally, when you are thinking about the man or the phoenix, the essence has existence in your mind. But if it also can have existence in a real individual instance or in another mind, it is not bound to any one existence and so abstracts from all being, according to the principles just considered. So far there is nothing peculiar. The argument would apply equally well to any characteristic. But

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[43] For this reason the whole logical order follows upon natures according to the being that they have in the intellect, and not upon those natures according to their absolute consideration: "Non tamen potest dici quod ratio uniuersalis conueniat nature sic acepte, quia de ratione uniuersalis est communitas et unitas, nature autem humane neutrum horum conuenit secundum absolutam suam considerationem. . . . Similiter eciam non potest dici quod ratio generis uel speciei accidat nature humane secundum esse quod habet in indiuiduis, quia non inuenitur in indiuiduis natura humana secundum unitatem ut sit unum quid omnibus conueniens, quod ratio uniuersalis exigit. Relinquitur ergo quod ratio speciei accidat humane nature secundum illud esse quod habet in intellectu." *De Ente*, c. III; pp. 26.11-28.2. The nature according to its absolute consideration, therefore, is proper neither to the metaphysical nor to the logical order, but is common to both. It is difficult to see how in the doctrine of St. Thomas it could be called the "ontological aspect" as opposed to the "logical aspect of the universal"—E. D. Simmons, "In Defense of Total and Formal Abstraction," *The New Scholasticism*, XXIX (1955), 434. On the other hand it is equally difficult to see that the study of the nature in its absolute consideration is "a logical preparation explaining the notion of essence"—W. Baumgaertner, "Metaphysics and the Second Analytics," *The New Scholasticism*, XXIX (1955), 425; or that it can give rise to a "logical" argument for the existence of God or to an argument "che si può chiamare logico-metafisica"—C. Fabro, *La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione* (2nd ed., Turin: Soc. Edit. Internaz., 1950, p.218). The argument of St. Thomas to prove the existence of the primary being and the entitative composition of creatures does not start in the logical order and pass over into the metaphysical. It starts with really existent sensible things and sees in them natures that are common to both the real and the logical orders. There is no question here of a procedure that passes from the logical into the metaphysical order. It merely uses a consideration of nature that is common to both orders.

[44] Cf. *De Pot.*, V,9, ad. 16m.; *Quodl.*, VIII,1, ad 1m.

St Thomas goes on to show that this reasoning in the case of being applies to all things with one possible exception. If there is a thing whose very nature is its being, it would be a unique nature. It could not coalesce with any other nature in reality as a generic or specific aspect does: "Si autem ponatur aliqua res que sit esse tantum ita ut ipsum esse sit subsistens, hoc esse non recipiet additionem differentie quia iam non esset esse tantum set esse et preter hoc forma aliqua" (*De Ente*, c.IV; p. 34.24-27). If being is a nature, it cannot be differentiated either formally or materially, and so cannot be either a generic or specific aspect of any other nature. If being is found multiplied, it has to be first of all in itself as a unique and primary instance. In all other instances it will be found outside the natures of the things and merely participated by them (*—non potest esse nisi una et prima*—p. 34.16).

The reasoning then goes on to show that there is such a nature in reality. It finds that the being of creatures is not caused by the principles of their natures but comes from an extrinsic principle as does light from the influx of the sun—*aduenit ab aliquo principio extrinsico sicut lumen in aere ex influentia solis* (*De Ente*, c. IV; p.35.4-6). Ultimately such being has to come from subsistent being. Being is in this way established as a subsistent nature in reality.[45] It is a real nature, and so, as the foregoing reasoning has demonstrated, it will never coalesce in reality with the natures that participate it. Unlike the generic and specific perfections it will not be absorbed in reality with the essence, but will remain really other than the essence and in that sense outside (*praeter*) the essence. Since it is in this way outside the essence of the thing, it will belong to the thing only accidentally:" . . . quidquid est in aliquo praeter essentiam ejus, inest ei accidentaliter" (*Comp. Theol.*, c. LXVI). The being of creatures is therefore an accident.

The being from which essence cannot prescind is in this way accidental to the essence. It is an act that is received into the essence as into a potency, and that remains really distinct from the potency in all real created things.[46] Even in the angels there will be this composition[47] of act and potency, of being (*esse*) and subject of being (*quod est*):

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[45] In the subsistent being that is reached as a result of this reasoning process, nature and being coincide. To prove that being so exists in itself, is to prove that it is in itself a real nature. It is both *what* exists and the existence. It is both the *what* and the *is*. Hence it is true to say that both subject and predicate coincide in meaning in the statement "Subsistent being exists." Both denote nature as well as existence, when they are reached as a result of the Thomistic argument. But this in no way implies an immediate intuition of the divine existence or nature. "Subsistent being" is not something immediately known by the human intellect, but is attained only through the above reasoning process. Once one knows what it means as a result of the demonstration, however, one thereby knows that it exists in reality. It pertains to the propositions "per se notae, apud sapientes tantum, ut *incorporalia in loco non esse*." (*ST*, 1,2,1c; ad. Leonine).

[46] The "real" character of the distinction between essence and being is not mentioned by St. Thomas in passages where he is professedly treating the distinction, as for instance in the *De Ente et Essentia*. It is called "real" only several times when it occurs on the occasion of treating other topics. In the commentary on the *Sentences*, on the occasion of explaining the differences between the "now" of eternity, aevum, and time, St. Thomas states: "Actus autem qui mensuratur aevo, scilicet ipsum esse aeviterni, differt ab eo, cujus est actus, re quidem, . . . Esse autem quod mensuratur aeternitate, est idem re cum eo cujus est actus, sed differt tantum ratione; et ideo aeternitas et nunc aeternitatis non differunt re, sed ratione tantum, inquantum scilicet ipsa aeternitas respicit ipsum divinum esse, et nunc aeternitatis quidditatem ipsius rei, quae secundum rem non est aliud quam suum esse, sed ratione tantum." *In I Sent.*, d.19, q.2, a.2, Solut.; ad. Mandonnet, I,471. This text states that the angelic being (*esse aeviterni*) is an act different from its subject in reality (*re quidem*). The difference is in the thing. By contrast, the difference between the two in the case of God is only a difference of reason (*tantum ratione*). In reality the act is the same as the subject of the act. There is no difference in the thing itself. The difference is set up by human reason in its endeavor to represent the eternal being. The divine being (*divinum esse*), therefore, is not other in reality than its quiddity.—The contrast in this text places its meaning beyond any shadow of doubt. The difference between a finite thing's essence and being is not a difference that is set up by the workings of the human intellect, but is explicitly contrasted with such distinction. It is a difference in the thing itself, independently of any construction of the human intellect in trying to understand that thing. The

> Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab aliquo est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc quod receptum in eo est est actus ejus. Ergo oportet quod ipsa quiditas uel forma que est intelligencia sit in potencia respectu esse quod a Deo recipit, et illud esse receptum est per modum actus" (*De Ente*, c. IV; p. 35.19-23).

In so far as abstraction without precision means that the being is implicitly contained in the essence, it does not at all imply that being is actually contained. The essence absolutely considered is entirely potential in regard to being, and so can be thought of as containing being only in the sense that potency involves act. It is potential towards being, of its very notion it is a potency to being, even when in its absolute consideration it abstracts from all being. Its very name "essence" implies its order to being. It can never prescind from being, even though the act of being always remains outside it and other than it. The act of being inheres[48] in it and adheres[49] to it, in the manner of an accident.

It is, however, an accident that is not subsequent to the essence, but prior to it. What has to be regarded as the first effect produced is the very being of the thing: "Primus autem effectus est ipsum esse, quod omnibus aliis effectibus praesupponitur et ipsum non praesupponit aliquem alium effectum" (*De Pot.*, III,4c; ed.Mandonnet, II,52a). Unless the being is regarded as first produced, no other effect or aspect of the thing can be there. Every other aspect presupposes being. Being itself comes first, it presupposes no other effect in the thing. It has therefore priority over all else that is produced. All other effects or aspects are grounded upon being: ". . . ipsum esse, quod omnes alii effectus praesupponunt, et supra quod fundantur" (*Comp. Theol.*, c. LXVIII). Being is what is most basic in anything. In this sense St Thomas interprets the saying of the *Liber de Causis* "prima rerum creatarum est esse" (*In Lib. de Causis,* lect. IV, init.; ed. H.D. Saffrey, pp. 27 ff.). To produce the being of the thing, however, is thereby to produce the thing itself or its essence. Speaking of creation, St Thomas states: ". . . ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur" (*De Pot.*, III,5, ad 2m; ed. Mandonnet, II,56b). By the very fact that being is given to a thing, the thing itself is

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doctrine here is definite enough, yet it is mentioned in a merely occasional treatment.

Similarly in *De Veritate* St. Thomas writes: ". . . omne quod est in genere substantiae, est compositum reali compositione; . . . et oportet quod esse suum sit aliud quam ipsum, . . ." *De Ver.*, XXVII, 1, ad 8m; ed. Spiazzi, I,513a. Again the statement is definite, though it is made on the occasion of treating a problem regarding grace. Further, in the commentary on Boethius' *De Hebdomadibus*, the explicit contrast of a real with an intentional distinction is repeated: ". . . sicut esse et quod est differunt in simplicibus secundum intentiones, ita in compositis differunt realiter; . . . in simplicibus . . . necesse est quod ipsum esse, et id quod est, sit unum et idem realiter. Si enim esset aliud realiter id quod est et ipsum esse, jam non esset simplex, sed compositum." *In de Hebd.*, c. II; ed. Mandonnet, I,175-176. Real difference is contrasted with a distinction set up by different *intentiones* or concept of the intellect. The statement is made on the occasion of explaining a text of Boethius.

These texts leave no doubt that for St. Thomas the distinction between essence and being in real finite things may be called a "real distinction." But the occasional nature of these assertions and the lack of mention of it in the passages that professedly treat of being, may well occasion a doubt about how operative the notion "real" is in explaining the distinction. It is a distinction that holds for intentional being (*esse in anima*) just as well as for real being (*esse in re*), and so cannot be narrowed to the characterization of "real distinction."

[47] . . . et propter hoc a quibusdam dicuntur huiusmodi substantie composite ex quo est et quod est, uel ex quod est et esse ut Boecius dicit." *De Ente*, c. IV; pp. 35 32-33.3.

[48] . . . in rebus inferioribus a quibus scientiam capit, in quibus esse non est subsistens, sed inhaerens." *De Pot.*, VII,2, ad 7m; ed. Pession, p. 192a.

[49] "Si ergo in angelo est compositio sicut ex essentia et esse, non tamen est compositio sicut ex partibus substantiae, sed sicut ex substantia et eo quod adhaeret substantiae." *Quodl.*, II,3c; ed. Spiazzi, p. 24b.

produced: ". . . Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit" (Ibid., a.1, ad 17m; p.45a). To give it being, then, is to produce the essence and the thing. Even though the act of being has always the priority, it and the essence are not represented by St Thomas as though they were two realities, but rather as two distinct constituents of the one and the same reality or thing. In order to have any created reality whatsoever, the two constituents have to be presupposed.

In this quite unparalleled way, then, the act of being is accidental to every created thing. It is accidental, not as an accidental reality subsequent to the essence, but as a prior constituent necessary to make the essence a reality. Without it the essence is not a reality but only a consideration that abstracts from it but cannot prescind from it. Such is the doctrine in the Thomistic texts. But how can any nature have an essential order to an act that is so accidental to it?

EFFICIENT AND FORMAL CAUSES OF BEING

St Thomas does not seem to feel any contradiction in these apparently opposite assertions. Rather, he speaks as though the formal causality of the essence, in essentially requiring being, thereby presupposes the extrinsic efficient causality that produces an act over and above the essence: "... esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito tamen influxu Dei: sicut lumen sequitur diaphanum aeris, supposito tamen influxu solis." (*ST*, I,104,1, ad 1m). The *diaphanum* was understood as a quality that enabled the air to receive the illumination of the sun. It was the proximate or immediate potency to light.[50] Its whole purpose was to be a potency to light. In this way it was the proper subject of light.[51] *Per* se, or of its very nature, it was meant to be the cause of light. Of its very nature it was what enabled the air to become luminous. It was conceived as a form, an accidental form, that constituted the air immediately in potency to light and made it the proper subject of light. It was therefore the formal cause of light in the air, presupposing, however, the influx of the sun as the efficient cause. In a word, it could not actually exercise its formal causality unless the sun were exercising efficient causality upon the same effect, namely upon the light in the air.

In a corresponding way, St Thomas teaches, being follows upon the form *per se*. The form is of its very nature a potency to being. Its direction is essentially towards being. Of itself it therefore determines the creature to being. It is accordingly the formal cause of its own being, and so determines the kind of being that the thing possesses. That is not some accidental function of the form, that is its very nature as essence. *Per se* it is the cause of being in the creature, in its own line of causality, namely, formal causality. So much is this so, the text just quoted goes on to say, that the form taken just in itself is directed to being only, and not to non-being. In incorruptible creatures like the angels any order to non-being is from the side of the existential act that is accidental to the form: "Unde potentia ad non esse in spiritualibus creaturis et corporibus caelestibus, magis est in Deo, qui potest subtrahere suum influxum, quam in forma vel in materia talium creaturarum."[52]

The form, however, cannot exercise this function of essentially determining anything to being in the line of formal causality, unless it is made to be by the influx of another, as efficient cause. But in being made to be by a causality that is outside itself and accidental to its nature, it thereby exercises its formal causality in determining its own being. To exercise its determining function in the line of formal causality, it has to be, to exist, for of itself it is actually nothing and cannot exercise any causality whatsoever. Yet in being made to exist it thereby determines formally the being that is its proper act and complement. The form in its very role of subject of being or potency to being (*habens esse*) thereby determines that being: ". . . quia tamen qualibet forma est determinativa ipsius esse, nulla earum est ipsum esse, sed est habens esse" (*In de Hebd.*, c. II; ed. Mandonnet, I,176). As essentially the determinative principle of being, it exercises this formal causality upon an act that is added to it and is other than it.". . . esse enim quod hujusmodi est, est aliud secundum essentiam ab eo cui additur determinandum" (*De Pot.,* VII,2, ad 9m; ed. Mandonnet, II,254a).

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[50] ". . . diaphanum semper est in ultima dispositione ad lucem, . . ." *CG*, II,19; ed. Leonine, XIII,308b22-23.

[51] ". . . diaphanum est aeri principium lucendi quia facit eum proprium subiectum luminis." *CG*, II,54; ed. Leonine, XIII, 392a23-25.

[52] *ST*, I,104,1, ad 1m; ed. Leonine. Cf. *De Pot.*, V.3c.

In determining the being of a thing, nevertheless, the form does not function as an act. It determines the matter as act, and accordingly form and act coincided for Aristotle. But in the Thomistic doctrine the form of itself, independently of its being, is not actual. Without that being, it is actually just nothing, and could not do any determining whatsoever. So in determining its act of being, it does not function as act. Rather, it functions as potency. The text last quoted continues: "Unde non sic determinatur *esse* per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut actus per potentiam" (p. 254a). No actuality, then, need be considered as functioning in the form in its priority to being, that is, in the priority in which it determines the being by way of formal causality. In that priority it is functioning as potency, and not as act. It is made actual only by its being, and cannot function as an actuality in any priority whatsoever to that being. In determining and limiting that being it functions only as potency. Any actuality that it has comes from that being and has to be considered as subsequent to that being. In this way being is the effect upon which all other effects are based, as the texts have stated. In giving a metaphysical account of a thing, one cannot think of the essence as something already constituted by its form and matter and then having the act of being added to it. Rather, from a metaphysical viewpoint, one has to start with the act of being that the primary efficient cause gives by participation, and consider that in being participated it has to be limited and thereby gives rise to the essence that determines it. The act of being is accordingly not a thing that is produced, but is the constituent that exercises the most fundamental priority in the thing that is produced.

The form is indeed the act and the complement of its matter, though it is made actual only through its being. It makes the essence something definite and something positive, something that is placed in one of the ten categories of being. It constitutes the essence, for instance, a man or a tree or a metal or some other definite type of thing that presents a positive object to the intellect's conceptualization. The positive character of the essence, however, is actually positive only through the being that actualizes the essence. Considered in priority to that actualization by being, the form can function only as potency. It determines being in its role as the subject of being, and in that role it is not exercising any actuality whatsoever. Rather, it is *receiving* its actuality. Its role is receptivity and potency. But in receiving being, an act that of itself is absolutely unlimited, it necessarily limits being to its own capacity and thereby determines formally the act of being.

The determining or limiting principle of a created being, then, is something positive even though everything positive about it actually comes from the act of being that is receives. Without that act it is just nothing, it is not actually anything positive but only potentially so. Such potentiality is sufficient to make it a positive limitation of being. It is the thing that is, the man or the tree or the metal—all positive enough notions. The being of a created thing cannot be considered as though it were a thing in its own right and then limited by having something of itself cut off, as a board is limited to the size of a table. Once being is posited as a thing, all the Parmenidean consequences follow—it is unique, all-embracing, and immutable. Being, therefore, cannot be considered as limited in any privative or negative way.[53] It can be limited only by a positive thing. What exists in creatures is properly speaking not the act of being, but the created thing: "Unde in compositis ex materia et forma nec materia nec forma potest dici ipsum quod est, nec etiam ipsum esse" (*CG*, II,54; ed. Leonine, XIII,39a26-28).

In its very functioning as potency to being, therefore, the form is in its own way the principle and cause of being, and in so functioning it is made actual. From the viewpoint of the subject of being it is the ultimate determination of the thing to being: "Per hoc enim in compositis ex materia et forma dicitur forma esse principium essendi, quia est complementum substantiae cuius actus est ipsum esse: sicut diaphanum est aeri principium lucendi quia facit eum proprium subiectum luminis" (*CG*, II,54; XIII, 39a20-25). As subject and as potency the form is a principle of being. Considered just in itself, it determines the thing to being and not to not-being. In this way being follows from the principles of a thing's essence, in the line of formal causality, presupposing, of course, the influx of an efficient cause: ". . . esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito tamen influxu Dei" (*ST*, I,104,1, ad 1m). The order to being is of the very essence of the thing. The essence is *per se* a potency to being, and *per se* a subject of being. In this way being is not something accidental to it, but is required by its very nature. When ascending through the widening predicates man, animal, living thing, body, substance, one finally comes to "being", one is not thereby passing over to an accidental category. One is remaining within the same category, even though the act that makes the thing a being is other than the thing's essence.

Conclusion

With these considerations in mind, one is in a position to bring together what may have seemed so many loose ends in the Thomistic texts on being. Being in creatures is neither just accidental nor just essential. It is both. It has to be viewed from both standpoints, if the doctrine of St Thomas is to be understood. Created essence is of its own very nature an order to being, and so far as it itself is concerned being is essential to it. But "as far as it itself is concerned" is not enough. In order to be, it also has to be produced efficiently by something other than itself, and from that viewpoint its being is accidental to it. Neither of these viewpoints can be dispensed with, and neither can be reduced to the other. They stand as ultimate, irreducible ways in which finite being is caused. Human intellection in spite of all its wishes and efforts cannot reduce its object to any one simple principle. The basis to which all thoughts and conceptions and principles are ultimately reduced is being (*ens*).[54] But being as originally known by the human intellect is not something simple. It is being as found in sensible things, and so is an object that is equivocal. Yet in its light the simpler components, essence and existence, have to be understood. The result is that the equivocity cannot be entirely eliminated in human thought. It can only be carefully recognized, and so kept from being a cause of deception. One always has to think in terms of things and realities, even when reducing these to principles neither of which is in itself a reality.

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[53] Being is, of course, itself a positive act in the existential order, and is received into a subject that is a positive nature in the essential order. On account of this positive character it is, like goodness, a participated perfection. Unity, on the other hand, is negative in character and so is not considered as participated, but as already present with the very positing of the essence as well as of the being. Transcendental unity is a negation that follows upon *ens*, the essence already constituted as a being: ". . . unum quod convertitur cum ente, dicitur secundum rationem negationis, quam addit supra ens" (*De Ver.*, XXI,5, ad 7m; ed. Mandonnet, p. 521a). In the same context in which St. Thomas defends against Avicenna the doctrine that everything is essentially one (*unaquaeque res per suam essentiam est una*—ibid., arg. 7; p. 519a), he attributes unity to the essence through itself, and not on account of the accidentally added being: ". . . unum indifferenter se habet ad hoc quod respiciat essentiam vel esse: unde essentia rei est una per se ipsam, non propter esse suum: et ita non est una per aliquam participationem, sicut accidit de ente et bono" (Ibid., ad 8m; p. 521a). The equivocity signalized in the case of unity, therefore, is grounded on unity as a transcendental and unity as the principle of number in the category of quantity. The equivocity of being, on the other hand, stems from the combined essential and accidental character of being in regard to created things. Transcendental unity, on account of its negative aspect, cannot be regarded as a further accident as is the case with being and goodness. The positive character of essence constitutes a ground upon which the unity of a being (*ens*) follows. This does not mean, however, that essence in its absolute consideration has a unity of its own. The unity follows, negatively, when it is constituted as a being.

The ambiguities that follow from the consideration of being, therefore, cannot be done away with by human cognition. They are too fundamentally rooted in the first notion of being that is directly attained by the human intellect and to which all other conceptions have to be reduced, even the notions of the principles of created beings, essence and existence. If either side of the equivocity is left out of consideration, the doctrine of St Thomas will be misunderstood and will be ranged with some other metaphysical tradition. If only his teaching that being results from the principles of the essence and so is as it were constituted by those principles is taken seriously, his doctrine of being will be judged orthodox Aristotelianism, as it appeared to Siger of Brabant, and his statements that being is an accident in creatures will be set aside as inexplicable or inconsistent. His assertions, however, that being in creatures is other than their essence, are too frequent and too sharply phrased to be dismissed today without serious consideration. In another and different background that arose within two or three years after his death, and appears sketched in the controversies of Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent, the two phases of his doctrine have been taken as applying respectively to different realities. There is a being that is essential to the thing, the *esse essentiae*; it is a reality constituted by the essence and identical with the essence. There is another really distinct being, the *esse existentiae,* that is accidental to the thing and that is the result not of the principles of the essence but of the activity of an external efficient cause. Yet in the doctrine of St Thomas the being (*esse*) that is other than the essence is the being that results from and is as it were constituted by the principles of the essence. It is the same *being* that is caused formally by the essence and efficiently by the external cause. As Suarez proved so convincingly, the *esse existentiae* is the *esse essentiae*.[55]

It is the same being, in a word, that is both accidental and essential to creatures. It is the act of being that results from the principles of the essence by way of formal causality, yet only when it is caused efficiently by a different and external agent. It is the act in regard to which every nature is essentially a being, and yet it is identified as a nature only with the divine essence. In all other natures it is an accident, though it is not subsequent to the essence like predicamental accidents, but prior to it. It is accordingly both accidental and essential. The composition of essence and being in every created reality leaves a fundamental equivocity in the basic notion of being as it is originally attained by the human mind, and that ambiguity may be expected to follow through in all subsequent metaphysical thinking.

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[54] "Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio *Metaphysicae* suae. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens." *De Ver.*, I,1c; ed. Spiazzi, I,2b.

[55] *Disp. Metaph.*, XXXI,4,4-6; Vives, XXVI, 236a-237a.

A Study in the Sacramentology of Alger of Liége

NICHOLAS M. HARING S.A.C.

NICHOLAS of Liége[1] has put it on record that Alger, a native of the same city, is the author of two "very useful" tractates the first of which is entitled *Liber de misericordia et justitia.*[2] The second work deals with the sacrament of the Eucharist[3] in such a way that Peter the Venerable[4] considered it far superior to the works of both Lanfranc (d. 1089) and Guitmund of Aversa (d. 1095) on the same subject. Nicholas of Liége calls it an opus laudabile in quo nihil invenitur sanctorum dictis dissonum, nihil catholicae fidei contrarium.[5] A considerable number of years must have passed between the composition of these two tractates. For that reason we shall first treat them separately to prepare the ground for a better evaluation and appraisal of the progress made by Alger during the intervening years. Certain repetitions will therefore be inevitable but it will become apparent that especially Ivo's *Decretum* exerted a decisive influence on the formation of ideas in Alger's sacramentology. Then we shall endeavour to describe, by way of comparison, Alger's contribution to the development and clarification of sacramental doctrines.

I.

ALGER'S LIBER DE MISERICORDIA ET JUSTITIA

G. Le Bras[6] maintains that the approximate date of the *Liber de misericordia* is 1095-1121. The *terminus a quo* (1095) of this rather lengthy period is based on the assumption that Alger's prologue to this work and his first seven chapters were inspired by the famous prologue composed by Ivo in 1094-1095. However, the evidence offered by Le Bras is not particularly impressive and, in addition, is weakened by his concession that "there is no other text in the *Liber de misericordia* that might suggest the idea of his (Alger's) dependence on Ivo's collections."[7] Some ten years later, Le Bras proposed 1105 as the approximate date.[8]

As there is little doubt that, following the general and largely inevitable practice of his age, Alger drew on canonical collections and patristic *florilegia,* one cannot help asking the question why he did not use Ivo's collections in compiling his *Liber de misericordia.* He certainly did not mean to ignore Ivo's works because, as we shall see, he used Ivo's *Decretum* freely and copiously in his *De Sacramentis corporis et sanguinis Dominici,* written some time between 1110 and 1121. Alger's dependence on Ivo's prologue is moreover so dubious that A. Amanieu[9] claims that Alger was rather influenced by Hincmar[10] in conceiving his plan for publishing a canonical collection and reconciling apparently contradictory canons: ut nullam contrarietatis discordiam pararet aliqua eorum diversitas.[11] Hence we may deem it at least possible that Alger already composed his *Liber de misericordia* at a date prior to Ivo's collections, broadly speaking about and before 1095. Internal evidence raises this possibility to the point of probability.

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[1] PL 180, 737 f. J. Mabillon, *Vet. Analecta* I (Paris 1723) 129. Cf. C. Oudin, *Comm de script. ecclesiae antiquis* II (Leipzig 1722) 1118.

[2] PL 180, 857-968, a reprint of the edition by Martène-Durand, *Thes. nov. anecd.* V (Paris 1717) 1022-1138. Alger's preface to this work had already been published by J. Mabillon, *Vet. Analecta* I, 130-131.

[3] *De Sacramentis corporis et sanguinis Dominici;* PL 180, 739-836, a reprint of the edition by J. B. Malou (Louvain 1847). The best text is that of H. Hurter in *Sanctorum Patrum Opuscula Selecta* XXIII (Innsbruck 1873) 58-370.

[4] *Tract. contra Petrobrussianos;* PL 189, 788CD. According to A. J. MacDonald, *Berengar and the Reform of sacramental Doctrine* (London 1930) 379, this praise is "too fulsome, especially as the influence of Guitmund upon Alger's book appears on every part of the work."

[5] *Elogium·* ed. J. Mabillon, *Vet. Analecta* (Paris 1723) 130.

[6] 'Le Liber de misericordia et just. d'Alger de Liége', *Nouv. Rev. Hist. de Droit fr. et étr.* 45 (1921) 960.

[7] *Ibid.*, 105.

[8] 'Alger de Liége et Gratien', *Rev. des sc. phil et théol.* 20 (1931) 15.

[9] *Dict. de Droit Can.* I (Paris 1935) 394.

[10] Cf. *De Praed. diss. post.*, 37, 11; PL 125, 413CD.

We know that Alger was "an old man"[12] when he wrote his work on the Eucharist, though he was, at the time, in clericatu adhuc positus, as we learn from his contemporary, Nicholas of Liége.[13] He entered the monastery of Cluny in 1121 and died there some ten years later. But he wrote his *Liber de misericordia* at a time when he considered the teaching of St. Peter Damian still worthy of refutation. St. Peter Damian died in 1072. A critique of his doctrine by Alger becomes so much more understandable the smaller the interval between Damian's death and the date of Alger's *Liber de misericordia.* In view of these facts the date of this work should be placed before the publication of Ivo's canonical collections (1094-1095).

More important than the date of composition is the study of Alger's relation to St. Peter Damian. His rather bold and partly sarcastic critique of Damian's doctrine should not blind us to the perhaps surprising fact that he learned and accepted a great deal from Damian without openly acknowledging it. That Alger knew and used Peter's *Liber gratissimus* is obvious from the following reference: Sed objicit Petrus Damianus: Moderni temporis simoniacos quantum ad fidem integros esse quia, cum miraculis se clarescere desperent, non sunt simoniaci (eo) quod Spiritum sanctum vel ejus dona emere desiderant sed quia ambitiosi eo quod ad terrenae dignitatis culmen anhelant.[14] To see how accurate Alger's presentation is, here are St. Peter Damian's own words: Moderni autem temporis simoniaci, quia miraculis se clarescere posse non sperant, non Spiritum sanctum, non ejus dona desiderant sed, obtinendi principatus ambitione succensi, ad culmen tantummodo dignitatis anhelant. Itaque quantum ad fidem integri sunt.[15]

Another objection quoted by Alger reads: Sed objicit Petrus Damianus quod, etsi malum sit ecclesiastica emere, tamen saepe sinistra principia ad felices proveniunt exitus ut Jacob per supplantationem pervenit ad benedictionem.[16] St. Peter Damian had written the following heading over the 19th chapter: Saepe sinistra principia ad felices proveniunt exitus. He actually refers to Jacob to illustrate his principle.[17] In addition, Alger criticizes some patristic arguments put forward by Damian: Addit tamen Petrus Damianus ad eorum, qui a simoniacis ordinantur, excusationem vel defensionem Acacium Constantinopolitanum episcopum haereticum . . .[18] Alger's[19] strong verdict on Pope Anastasius II (496-498), later copied by Gratian,[20] is based on the conviction that both Anastasius II and St. Peter Damian went too far in their recognition and defence of sacraments administered outside the Church. According to Alger, they were both wrong in defending not only the validity of such sacraments but also their spiritual effectiveness.

In this matter, Alger looked upon himself as a faithful disciple of St. Augustine's whereas he rejected Damian's teaching as contrary to that of the great Bishop of Hippo. Alger contrasts the teaching of St. Augustine and of St. Peter Damian in the following manner: Sacramenta simoniacorum sicut et caeterorum haereticorum, licet sint vera quantum ad formam, inania tamen et falsa sunt quantum ad effectum . . . Approbat ergo Petrus Damianus illa sacramenta valere in quibus Augustinus testatur ignem Spiritus sancti non lucere.[21] No doubt, Alger knew quite well that St. Peter Damian[22] refused to class simoniacs as heretics. For that very reason our scholar is most anxious to establish and repeat his own conviction that simoniacs are indeed heretics. Yet despite this conviction and disagreement with Damian he holds that the sacraments administered by simoniacs are *valid* but do not—as, to Alger's mind, Peter Damian erroneously believed—confer spiritual grace.

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[11] PL 180, 858A.

[12] *De Sacr.* I, 18; PL 180, 792A: Ego senex . . .

[13] PL 180, 733A.

[14] *De Mis.* III, 39; PL 180, 949BC.

[15] *Lib. grat.*, 6; MGH *Lib.* I, 23.

[16] *De Mis.* III, 41; PL 180, 950C.

[17] *Lib. grat.*, 19; p. 45.

[18] *De Mis.* III, 59; PL 180, 958B. *Lib. grat.*, 25; pp. 53 f. Compare also *De Mis.* III, 53 (PL 180, 956A) and *Lib. grat.*, 27; p. 57.

[19] *De Mis.* III, 59; PL 180, 958BC.

[20] *Decr.* D. 19 c. 8 dict. and C. 1 q. 1 c. 96 dict.

One detects a note of sarcasm in the otherwise clear statement of doctrine dividing him from Peter Damian: Eant ergo ad Petrum Damianum et in die judicii eum habeant patronum qui commendant sacramenta simoniacorum quae nos quidem—ita ut ipse—approbamus vera quidem quantum ad formam sed tamen inania quantum ad spiritualem gratiam quia, etsi quantum ad se bona sunt quae ad invocationem divini nominis celebrantur, mala tamen fiunt his a quibus indigne vel perfide administrantur, mala etiam his quibus ex consensu vel approbatione atque ideo indigne vel perfide communicant.[23]

The fact that Alger stigmatizes simoniacs as heretics and still recognizes the validity of their sacraments shows that, in one respect, he was willing to grant even more than Peter Damian meant to concede in affirming that simoniacs have their faith intact. As far as Alger is concerned, faith has very little to do with sacramental validity. Of great import for an analysis of Alger's thought is the remark: quantum ad se bona sunt, quae ad invocationem divini nominis celebrantur, for it represents Alger's basic principle in determining sacramental validity.

It is well known that the controversies of the Gregorian Reform Movement had demonstrated the need of a principle applicable to all sacraments then recognized as such. The principle that "the invocation of the divine name" safeguards the validity of Baptism had been employed for many centuries. It is quoted by Alger in connection with Baptism which he considers *verum et fructuosum* even when knowingly received from a pagan minister in case of emergency. He tells us that the reason why no trinitarian Baptism must ever be repeated is "the name of the Trinity" which cannot be annulled: Ex canonica auctoritate idcirco prohibetur rebaptizatio fieri, ne sanctae Trinitatis nomen in quo baptizatum est videatur annullari.[24]

Alger does not disclose to his readers that he copied this rule from St. Peter Damian who had written: Huc accedit quod, sicut canonica testatur auctoritas, idcirco prohibetur rebaptizatio fieri, ne sanctae Trinitatis nomen in quo baptizatum est videatur annullari.[25] This proves that Peter Damian drew Alger's attention to a principle determining *baptismal* validity which Alger then broadened into a general principle of *sacramental* validity. In the same context, Alger utilises a story allegedly found *in ecclesiastica historia* but directly borrowed from St. Peter Damian.[26] In contrast to Damian he holds that the *Church-History* of Rufinus is what he calls *minus authentica*. Accordingly, so we learn from Alger, the story that the bishop of Alexandria considered the Baptism performed by a pagan boy "valid and fruitful" (*ratum*) should likewise be judged "less authoritative" if we did not have the clear testimony of "St. Isidore" to support it.[27]

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[21] *De Mis.* III, 42; PL 180, 951B.

[22] *Lib. grat.*, 6; MGH *Lib.* I, 23: Itaque quantum ad fidem integri sunt.

[23] *De Mis.* III, 50; PL 180, 954C.

[24] *De Mis.* I, 52; PL 180, 880B. Concerning the origin of this formula see N. M. Haring, 'The Augustinian axiom: Nulli sacramento injuria facienda est', *MedSt* 16 (1954) 89. In his *De Sacr.* III, 13 (PL 180, 851A) Alger attributes a slightly different version of this rule to Augustinus de ecclesiasticis regulis. Cf. Ivo, *Decr.* I, 160; PL 161, 96C.

[25] *Lib. grat.*, 5; MGH *Lib.* I, 23. Cf. J. J. Ryan, *Saint Peter Damian and his Can. Sources* (Toronto 1956) 37.

[26] *De Mis.* I, 52; PL 180, 880AB. *Lib. grat.*, 34; p. 66. Rufinus, *Hist. eccl.* XI, 14; PL 21, 487. A reference to this story is already found in Auxilius, *Infensor et Defensor*, praef.; PL 129, 1075A. It is later used by Rolandus, *Sentences;* ed. A. M. Gietl (Freiburg 1891) 206 and Gandulphus, *Sent.* IV, 68; ed. J. de Walter (Wien 1924) 427. His source may have been Gratian, *Decr.* C. 1 q. 1 c. 58.

Alger's relationship to St. Peter Damian is thus solidly established. In one respect, he agrees with Damian on the validity of sacraments administered by simoniacs. He strongly opposes the opinion voiced by Damian that they confer the Holy Spirit. Where Alger disagrees with St. Peter Damian, he is generally rather outspoken and frank. He even mentions Damian's name repeatedly, a rare occurrence in those days. But if Alger was bold enough to take Pope Anastasius II to task, he might be expected to voice his disagreement with a Cardinal.

While it is beyond doubt that, despite opposition to certain points of doctrine, Alger is deeply indebted to St. Peter Damian, his relation to Bernold of Constance (d. 1100), who was probably still living when Alger wrote the *Liber de misericordia,* is much more difficult to trace. Le Bras[28] suggests that Alger borrowed from Bernold the distinction between *sacramentum* and *effectus sacramenti*, or between *veritas* and *virtus sacramenti.* Bernold proposes this distinction in his *De Sacramentis excommunicatorum,*[29] dated 1084-1088, and admits that he derived it from St. Augustine.[30] But Alger, who offers no less than 124 excerpts from St. Augustine in his *Liber de misericordia*, may well have come to the same conclusion by way of personal study. If Alger, moreover, had known this work of Bernold's he would hardly have quoted from a letter of "Pope Paschasius"[31] after Bernold had rejected it as a forgery of "that musician Guido".[32] Le Bras also points to two excerpts from an Augustinian letter in Bernold's *Apologeticus* both of which are quoted by Alger in the same sequence.[33] This coincidence may well be due to a *florilegium* used by both. In addition, it should be noted that, although Bernold admired St. Peter Damian to some extent,[34] he did not think so highly of the theory that Baptism cannot be repeated on account of the invocation of the Trinity. We read in a letter co-authored by Bernold: Nam illa objectio quae dicit invocationem sanctae Trinitatis, licet ab haereticis factam, non esse annullandam facile refellitur, cum ecclesias item ab haereticis per invocationem sanctae Trinitatis consecratas reconsecrare jubeamur.[35] In this form, at least, the objection must have been unknown to Alger. Otherwise he would have proposed a solution.[36]

Another possible point of contact may be seen in Bernold's sentence: Est quidem etiam peccatoribus et indigne sumentibus vera Christi caro verusque sanguis: sed essentia, non salubri efficientia.[37] Bernold does not say that he owes the statement of Lanfranc.[38] Alger also distinguishes between *Christi essentia* and *salutis efficientia,*[39] but it is reasonable to assume that he, too, had read Lanfranc's work on the Eucharist, though we shall find that Lanfranc's teaching as reflected in Alger's later work reached Alger mainly through Ivo's *Decretum.*

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[27] *De Mis.* I, 52; PL 180, 880AB. See also Gratian, *Decr.* C. 1 q. 1 c. 58 dict. N. M. Haring, 'A brief historical Comment on St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* III q. 67, a. 5', *MedSt* 14 (1952) 157.

[28] Le *Liber de misericordia*, pp. 94 and 109.

[29] MGH *Lib.* II, 90: (Effectus sacramenti) qui nusquam extra ecclesiam esse posse veraciter asseritur . . . (Veritas sacramentorum) quae eadem integritate et bonis et malis adesse creduntur.

[30] *Ibidem*, p. 91: Hujusmodi distinctionem inter sacramentum et ejus effectum, cum quidam ex antiquis partibus minus attenderent, ad hoc devenerunt, ut et baptismum in haeresi susceptum nihil esse putarent, beato Augustino testante in libro VI *contra Donatistas*: Non ob aliud . . . non esse putabatur. Cf. *De Bapt.* VI, 1, 1; CSEL 51, 297 f.

[31] *De Mis.* III, 39; PL 180, 949C. Cf. *Epistola Widonis ad Archiep. Mediol.;* MGH *Lib.* I, 6.

[32] *De Sacr. excommunicatorum*, 7; MGH *Lib.* II, 92. The letter was generally attributed to Paschalis rather than Paschasius. Cf. Gerhoh, *Lib. de simon.;* MGH *Lib.* III, 266. The variants Paschalis and Paschasius are also found in Ivo, *Decr.* II, 84; PL 161, 179C.

[33] *Apologeticus;* MGH *Lib.* II, 164. Alger, *De Mis.* I, 48,; PL 180, 876AC.

[34] Cf. *De Sacr. excomm.*, 7 and 17; MGH *Lib.* II, 92 and 119.

[35] Adalbert and Bernold's letter to Bernard, *Ep.* III, 26; MGH *Lib.* II, 56.

[36] In his *De Sacr.* III, 13; PL 180, 850B, Alger answers the objection that the divine invocation is really "annulled" if we refuse to recognize the validity of Baptism conferred only *in nomine Dei*.

[37] *De Sacr. excomm.*, 5; MGH *Lib.* II, 91.

[38] *Lib. de corp. et s. Domini*, 20; PL 150, 436D: Hinc et S. Gregorius in quarto *Dialogi* libro (c. 59): Tunc . . . salubri efficientia. Ivo, *Decretum* II, 9; PL 161, 157C: Unde

This preliminary investigation into the background of Alger's theological formation[40] has already shown two important sacramental principles: first of all, the invocation of the Trinity as irrevocable element in the administration of sacraments; secondly, the distinction between *sacramentum* and *effectus.* A closer study of St. Augustine's writings had led both Bernold and Alger almost simultaneously to the discovery that this distinction provided the answer to some serious sacramental problems that had arisen during the Gregorian Reform Movement. In the theological field, this movement had begun with a powerful revival of Cyprianic ideas.

Bernold and Alger belong to those who arrested the dangerous advance of Cyprianism and returned to or pointed to the more logical teaching of St. Augustine.[41] The basic premise of St. Augustine's doctrine was that, if sacramental validity depended on the minister's merit or state of grace, the sacramental order *within* the Church itself would be no less at stake than the validity of sacraments administered outside. No one within the Church could be given assurance that his Baptism was validly given or received because he could never be certain that the minister was in the state of grace. The only way to dispel doubts would be re-Baptism within the Church. Yet, as St. Augustine insisted, re-Baptism was not even practised or demanded in the case of apostates returning to the fold. Hence, so he concluded, it was implicitly believed in the entire Church and consequently true that the *sacramentum* of Baptism remains, and is separable from grace. Of St. Cyprian and of others who failed to note the distinction between the lasting *sacramentum* and its separable *effectus,* St. Augustine wrote: Non distinguebatur sacramentum ab effectu vel usu sacramenti.[42] For various reasons, however, sacramental theology as a whole made very little progress after St. Augustine had laid down his pen. At the same time, Cyprianism maintained a strong appeal among later theologians.

In the Augustinian statement just quoted the word *usus* refers to the lawful or unlawful use of the sacrament. *Effectus* designates the separable spiritual benefits derived from its reception. What St. Augustine meant by *sacramentum* Alger knew just as vaguely as most of his contemporaries. They were, to say the least, uncertain and a great deal of work remained to be done to arrive at a satisfactory definition.

In his *Liber de misericordia* Alger makes no attempt to propose a definition of the word *sacramentum* though he must have known through Lanfranc and others, if perhaps not through personal verification, that Berengar had cited several more or less authentic Augustinian definitions. They entered Ivo's

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s. Gregorius in quarto *Dialogorum*: Tunc vera . . . salubri efficientia. Abelard, *Sic et Non,* 117; PL 178, 1525A: Idem (Gregorius) in IV *Dialogo*: Tunc . . . salubri efficientia. Only the first sentence of the passage belongs to Gregory. See also the *Summa sent.* VI, 5; PL 176, 142B: Gregorius in *Dialogi* libro quarto: Est quidem . . . salubri efficientia. Lombard, *Sent.* IV, 9, 2; ed. Quaracchi (1916) 794: Gregorius ait: Est quidem . . . salubri efficientia. Gandulphus, *Sent.* IV, 107; ed. J. de Walter (Wien 1924) 445: Ostendit Gregorius dicens: Est quidem . . . salubri efficientia.

[39] *De Mis.* I, 62; PL 180, 885B.

[40] We have noted above (note 4) that, according to A. J. MacDonald, "the influence of Guitmund upon Alger's book appears in every part of the work." On the same page (379) we are told that "Alger follows Guitmund in the plan of his work and in method of treatment, although on some points he arrives at more definite conclusions than the earlier writer." I have not yet been able to confirm MacDonald's view on Guitmund's influence on Alger.

[41] J. A. MacDonald, *Berenger,* p. 386, writes: "Alger expresses the liberal view that all sacraments which are properly administered are valid. He repudiates the teaching of Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome and Gregory wherever they appear to teach the contrary."

[42] *De Bapt.* VI, 1, 1; CSEL 51, 297.

Decretum where Alger found them later when he wrote his treatise on the Eucharist. Until then his thinking was dominated by the distinction between *sacramentum verum* and *non verum* to which corresponds our present distinction between valid and invalid sacraments. The *sacramentum verum* or valid sacrament is subdivided into *sacramentum ratum* and *non ratum* or *irritum*. The former designates a valid sacrament given and received with spiritual benefits. The latter, too, means a valid sacrament but one given or received without spiritual benefits and sinfully. The noun corresponding to *sacramentum verum* is *veritas sacramenti*, sometimes called *forma*. What makes the valid sacrament *ratum* or *irritum* is the presence or absence of the *virtus* or *effectus sacramenti*,[43] occasionally called *spiritualis gratia*.[44]

It is here of interest to note that, in 1135, Gerhoh of Reichersberg defined his terms in the same manner: Ratum vero id dicimus quod firmum et viribus plenum significamus, et irritum quod a virtute vacuum viribus carere demonstramus.[45] He interprets in this sense the terminology of the synod of Piacenza (1095) condemning the Ordinations of simoniacs: eorum ordinationem omnino irritam esse decernimus.[46] If we remember that Alger most probably composed his work in the early nineties, Gerhoh's interpretation is not so improbable as it might appear to be otherwise.

The verb corresponding to *ratum* and *irritum* is *valere* and *non valere*. When Alger, as we have seen, writes: Approbat ergo Petrus Damianus illa sacramenta valere in quibus Augustinus testatur ignem Spiritus sancti non lucere,[47] he is not speaking of the validity of these sacraments but of their spiritual value, their spiritual usefulness or rather uselessness. When Alger[48] asks the rhetorical question: Extra ecclesiam non est fides neque meritum, quid potest valere sacramentum?, he means to say: "Outside the Church there is neither faith nor merit; what then can be the use of receiving a valid sacrament"?

L. Brigué cites this text in his work on Alger to show that, in his *Liber de misericordia*, Alger expressed contradictory views on heretical sacraments: De tels sacrements ne valent rien, dit parfois Alger; ils ne sont pas nuls, indique-t-il ailleurs.[49] If properly understood, Alger does not contradict himself by any means when he later declares: Simoniacus . . . damnationem, quam habuit, per pravam manus impositionem dedit, a qua non esse sed dici "sacerdos" inaniter possit.[50] In other words, such a candidate is a priest but does not deserve to be called a priest. Brigué[51] says of this text: On ne saurait mieux faire comprendre la non-valeur d'un tel rite; il est conféré tout à fait en vain, il est donc complètement inutile. Indeed, such a rite was, to Alger's mind, not only useless but harmful. But that does not at all imply that Alger considered it invalid.

When Alger wondered how the pagan boy, whose story he allegedly found in Rufinus' *History of the Church*, could administer a Baptism recognized as *ratum* by Bishop Alexander, he did so because it meant to him that the administration was not only valid but also spiritually fruitful. He had difficulty in understanding this and would have rejected the implication if it had not been confirmed by "Isidore", as we have previously noted.

Alger was fully aware of the fact that the sense in which he used his terms was not always identical with the sense adopted by earlier writers. In a chapter heading Alger affirms: Quod nulla haereticorum sacramenta sunt rata.[52] This means that, as a rule, no sacraments administered by heretics confer the sacramental *virtus* or *effectus* which alone would make them *rata*. We misunderstand Alger if we translate the sentence in the sense that no sacraments administered by heretics are valid. *Ratum* designates a valid and spiritually profitable sacrament.

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[43] *De Mis.* I, 49; PL 180, 877A.

[44] *De Mis.* III, 20; PL 180, 940C.

[45] *Lib. de simoniacis;* MGH *Lib.* III, 253.

[46] Cf. Mansi 20, 805. A. Schebler, *Die Reordinationen* (Bonn 1936) 276, note 83, doubts whether the terminology was used in that meaning by Gerhoh's contemporaries. It certainly agrees with the terminology of Alger who explains in *De Mis.* III, 54; PL 180, 956B: Quomodo irrita et non vera dicantur haereticorum sacramenta, cum sint vera et sancta.

[47] *De Mis.* III, 42; PL 180, 951C.

[48] *De Mis.* I, 70; PL 180, 887B.

[49] L. Brigué. *Alger de Liége* (Paris 1936) 169.

[50] *De Mis.* III, 38; PL 180, 947B.

[51] *Alger de Liége*, p. 170.

However, in a famous decretal to Alexander, Bishop of Antioch, Pope Innocent I (401-417) refuses to receive Arian clerics with the concession: Solum baptisma ratum esse permittimus.[53] If Innocent had said *ratum fieri*, Alger could have accepted the statement without any difficulty. But to Alger's meaning of the term, *ratum* would imply that their Baptism was not without the sacramental *virtus* or *effectus*. Yet the same decretal denied this in the sentence: Nec sanctum Spiritum eos habere ex illo baptismate illisque mysteriis arbitramur.[54]

It was difficult for Alger to see how such Baptism could still be classified as *ratum* since without the Holy Spirit it would be deprived of its *effectus*. To overcome the difficulty he points out that the statutes of the Church are relative and vary. They must be judged and interpreted accordingly. Otherwise they will only lead to confusion: Alioquin si immutabiliter sine discretione tenenda sunt, maxima contrarietatis confusio nascitur.[55] In an attempt to reconcile at least his terminology with Innocent's decretal, Alger somehow contradicts his earlier claim (Nulla haereticorum sacramenta sunt rata) and declares that some of them are *rata*, others not: Quia ergo haereticis solum baptisma permittitur esse ratum et verum—quod tamen, cum sit sine sanctificatione Spiritus, inutile et noxium (est)—vitanda sunt revera omnia eorum sacramenta tam rata quam non rata.[56] Alger's warning that even the *sacramenta rata* of heretics must be avoided reveals that he was (like Pope Innocent) convinced of their spiritual uselessness; but he adopts the word *ratum* in the sense of the papal letter. On a later occasion, he makes a similar concession to Innocent's decretal: Unde Innocentius, cum haereticorum baptisma concedat esse ratum, non tamen ex illo baptismate concedit haberi Spiritum sanctum.[57]

Another inconsistency in the use of his terminology is noticeable in the remark that Baptism conferred by Paulianists is *irritum* which in this case means completely invalid, as the context shows.[58]

Convinced that simoniacs are heretics, Alger condemns the sacraments of both groups as equally useless and harmful. The sacraments of both are vera quantum ad formam, inania tamen et falsa quantum ad effectum.[59] In other words, sacraments administered by both heretics and simoniacs are valid in their administration (quantum ad formam), but empty and deceitful in their spiritual effect. A translation of the phrase *quantum ad formam* would be entirely inadequate if we rendered *forma* by "form". Neither Alger nor his contemporaries suggest an explanation of the term. Although of Augustinian origin,[60] the formula had gained wide acceptance through St. Leo.[61] The *forma* of Baptism comprises all that belongs to Baptism, except the *virtus* or spiritual grace. In more modern terminology, *forma* as applied to Baptism includes sacramental matter and form and the imprinted character. In this sense, as we have seen, Alger writes of the sacraments administered by simoniacs: quae nos quidem—ita ut ipse (i.e. Damian)—approbamus: vera quidem quantum ad formam sed tamen inania quantum ad spiritualem gratiam.[62]

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[52] *De Mis.* III, 13; PL 180, 940B. That Alger himself is responsible for the chapter headings of this work is stated in the introductory letter: Suis ergo titulis quaslibet sententias adnotare curavi. PL 180, 860B.

[53] *Ep.* XXIV, 3, 4; PL 20, 550A. Ph. Jaffé, *Regesta* I, 310. Date: about 415.

[54] *Ibidem.* Cf. *De Mis.* III, 23; PL 180, 941C.

[55] *De Mis.* III, 24; PL 180, 942C.

[56] *Ibidem.*

[57] *De Mis.* III, 52; PL 180, 955C.

[58] *De Mis.* III, 9; PL 180, 936D. Cf. *De Sacr.* III, 13 f.; PL 180, 851D and 852B.

[59] *De Mis.* III, 42; PL 180, 951C.

[60] See, for instance, his *Ep. ad Cath.*, 13, 34; CSEL 52, 276: Inest in eis quaedam forma pietatis cujus virtutem abnegant.

[61] See the two excerpts in *De Mis.* III, 18; PL 180, 940A: Quoniam ab haereticis baptizati quolibet modo formam baptismi acceperunt, baptizandi non sunt sed per manus impositionem virtute Spiritus sancti, quam ab haereticis accipere non poterant, catholicis copulandi sunt . . . (2): Hi qui baptismum ab haereticis acceperunt . . . confirmandi sunt quia formam baptismi tantum sine sanctificationis virtute sumpserunt. The first passage is taken from *Ep.* 167, 18 to Rusticus; PL 54, 1209A. Jaffé, *Reg.* I, 544. The second text is found in *Ep.* 149, 7 to Nicetas; PL 54, 1139A. Jaffé, *Reg.* I, 536.

To explore the full meaning of Alger's *sacramentum ratum* we may now turn to his distinction between sacraments of necessity and sacraments of dignity. "Since necessity knows no law and makes its own law, those sacraments that are necessary for salvation are allowed to become fruitful (*rata*) through penance."[63] Unfortunately, Alger does not tell us which sacraments are sacraments of necessity. But we know from his contemporary, Pope Urban II (1088-99), that Baptism ranks first in this regard and is thus entitled to special consideration.[64] If therefore Baptism is for some reason received without its *effectus*, penance will change it from a *sacramentum irritum* into a *sacramentum ratum*.

Sacraments of dignity require more. They cease to be such if they are not administered "to worthy candidates, in a worthy manner, by worthy ministers": *dignis, digne, a dignis*.[65] This, we learn, does not mean that the *validity* of the sacrament is impaired (non ut minuatur veritas sacramenti) but that the office ceases. Hence the sacrament of Holy Orders must be conferred *rite, i.e.*, worthily not only as far as candidates and ministers are concerned but also in the manner of administration. This sacrament ceases to be *ratum* or spiritually profitable to the same degree as it lacks complete perfection.[66]

Alger stresses these requirements to prepare the ground for his verdict on Pope Anastasius II (496-498). If, so he tells his readers, St. Peter Damian claims that Pope Anastasius defended the Ordination of the heretic Acacius not only as valid but also as fruitful (*ratam*), he should not overlook the fact that Anastasius was repudiated by the Roman Church and smitten by God, as we read in the *Gesta Romanorum Pontificum*.[67] Alger declares openly that it is beyond his comprehension how Pope Anastasius could hold that the Ordination of the condemned heretic Acacius was canonically correct (*canonice ratam*).[68] Here again we should not neglect to note that Alger's lengthy and detailed criticism does not aim at the question of sacramental validity. What disturbs him is Damian's reliance on Anastasius to show that it was an *ordinatio rata*. He does not question its validity.

In this regard he is thoroughly Augustinian. He tells us that the problem how the sacraments administered by any sinful priest, by a heretic or even by a person condemned by the Church, can be at once valid (*vera*) and without spiritual benefits (*non rata*) was solved by St. Augustine. To illustrate this, Alger offers two excerpts the first of which is taken from *De Bono conjugali*,[69] though wrongly attributed to *Augustinus in Genesi ad litteram*.[70] The passage reads: Etsi aliqua culpa quisquam ab officio removeatur, sacramento semel imposito non carebit, quamvis ad judicium permanente.[71] As used in this sentence, the word *sacramentum* designates a lasting reality. To prove that the

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[62] *De Mis.* III, 50; PL 180, 954C.

[63] *De Mis.* III, 55; PL 180, 956D: Et notandum quod alia sunt sacramenta necessitatis, alia dignitatis. Quia enim necessitas non habet legem sed ipsa facit sibi legem, illa sacramenta, quae saluti sunt necessaria, cum paenitentia rata esse permittuntur.

[64] *Ep ad Lucium*; PL 151, 533A.Jaffé, *Reg.* I, 5743.

[65] *De Mis.* III, 55: PL 180, 956D.

[66] *De Mis.* III, 58; PL 180, 957D: Nisi rite fuerit collatum, eo desinit esse ratum quo non fuerit perfecte effectum.

[67] *De Mis.* III, 59; PL 180, 958BC. Cf. *Liber Pontificalis;* ed. L. Duchesne I (Paris 1886) 258: Anastasius . . . voluit occulte revocare Acacium et non potuit. Qui nutu divino percussus est.

[68] *De Mis.* III, 63; PL 180, 959C.

[69] *De Bono conjugali*, 24, 32; CSEL 41, 226.

[70] This indicates that he copied it from a secondary source.

[71] *De Mis.* III, 83; PL 180, 965D.

sacramentum continues to persevere even in condemned heretics, Alger quotes a long text from Augustine's *Contra Epistolam Parmeniani.*[72] The continuation of this unusually long passage in the next chapter of Alger's tractate contains an illustration from the military character to demonstrate how firmly the Christian sacraments cling to the recipients.[73] Alger's own conclusion is worth recording in view of the terminology: Ex quibus verbis beati Augustini caeterorumque sanctorum constat in omnibus tam apostatis quam haereticis vel damnatis permanere Christi sacramenta: vera quantum ad se et sancta. Sed, nisi paenitentia vel indulgentia subventum fuerit, ad damnationem usurpatoris pervenient vel habentis vel dantis vel accipientis.[74]

This means that, once received, Christ's *sacraments* stay in the recipient. They are in themselves not only valid but also holy even if the recipient is an apostate, a heretic or a person condemned by the Church. At the same time, Christ's sacraments harm him who has, gives or receives them, unless penance or indulgence intervenes. The reader will agree that the meaning of the phrase *vera quantum ad se* is not different from the formula *vera quantum ad formam.*

The reason why the sacraments are valid and holy is the invocation of the Holy Trinity, no matter who administers them: Omnia sacramenta, a quocumque in Trinitatis nomine consecrata, sunt quantum ad se vera et sancta.[75]

One can hardly go wrong in assuming that Alger had mainly two sacraments, *i.e.*, Baptism and Holy Orders in mind when he wrote the sentence just quoted, though there is no denying that he worded it as a universal principle. With regard to the Eucharist, where the trinitarian invocation does not play such a role, he speaks of the *verba solemnia* in a similar sense: cum imprecantis verba solemnia sacramenti perficiant veritatem.[76] In the same context, he speaks of the priest's "solemn prayer which brings about the valid sacrament" of the Eucharist.[77]

The heavy stress on the deprecatory nature of what we may call the sacramental form in a broad sense is, in Alger's way of thinking, somehow related to the minister of those sacraments, not in the order of validity but of spiritual benefits. If those very same sacraments are ministered by schismatics or heretics, they are with regard to their effects (*quantum ad effectus*) neither true (*vera*) nor holy but defiled and sacrilegious because they confer damnation, not salvation.[78] In other words, while the minister's merits or demerits have no bearing on sacramental validity, they do affect the spiritual effectiveness of his action in the recipient. The phrase *quantum ad effectus* corresponds, in this case, to what Alger occasionally calls *quantum ad virtutem* or *gratiam spiritualem.* The meaning of *effectus* is therefore Augustinian and was known to Alger through the distinction: *aliud sacramentum ab effectu sacramenti est.*[79]

We have seen that, according to Alger, the *veritas sacramenti* is above the recipient's and the minister's personal merits. The *effectus,* on the other hand, is related to their faith and merit, but in a different way within and without the Church. Baptism, however, enjoys a privileged position. It is valid and fruitful

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[72] *De Mis.* III, 83; PL 180, 965C-966C: *Contra ep. Parmeniani* II, 13, 28 f.; CSEL 51, 79-80.

[73] *De Mis.* III, 84; PL 180, 966D: *Contra ep. Parm.* II, 13, 29; CSEL 51, 80-81. The expression "dominicus character" from *De Bapt.* VI, 1, 1; CSEL 51, 298, occurs in *De Mis.* III, 4; PL 180, 934C. See my paper: 'Character, signum und signaculum', *Scholastik* 31 (1956) 46 f. Alger uses the term twice in his work on the Eucharist. *De Sacr.* I, 7; PL 180, 759B: Hujus sacramenti visibilem figuram et characterem sanguinis sui. *De Sacr.* I, 22; PL 180, 805D: Quatenus memoriae nostrae arctius Passionis suae characterem imprimeret.

[74] *De Mis.* III, 84; PL 180, 966D-967A: Gratian, *Decr.* C. 1 q. 1 c. 97 dict.

[75] *De Mis.* III, 2; PL 180, 932B.

[76] *De Mis.* I, 49; PL 180, 877C.

[77] *Ibidem*: Solemnis enim oratio sacerdotis sacramenti efficit veritatem.

[78] *De Mis.* III, 2; PL 180, 932B: Sed quantum ad effectus suos neque vera neque sancta sed polluta et sacrilega (sunt), quia non conferunt salutem sed damnationem.

[79] *De Mis.* III, 4; PL 180, 934C. Cf. Augustine, De Bapt. VI, 1, 1; CSEL 51, 297 f.

(*verum et fructuosum*) when conferred by a sinful minister or by known sinners and heretics.[80] Because of its necessity Baptism is *ratum* even if given by lay people and pagans in case of emergency.[81] Although St. Augustine would seem to disagree, a minister's *known* wickedness does not deprive him of the power to baptize.[82] Yet a distinction must here be made: if without anybody's fault or carelessness it is unknown that he confessed his wickedness and was canonically convicted, though not yet condemned, his Baptism is received fruitfully: quia suo ministerio, quamvis indigne, tamen utitur catholice.[83] After his condemnation this rule holds no longer; his condemnation affects even the fruitful administration of Baptism: damnatus sicut sibi indigne ita aliis inutiliter ministrat.[84] Otherwise, in the case of Baptism, no spiritual harm accrues to the recipient if the minister's sinfulness is publicly known.[85]

On a later occasion, Alger establishes a more general principle: a sacrament administered by an unworthy minister *within* the Church bears spiritual fruit in the recipient if the minister acts in an official capacity: quidquid cum fide pro officio suo facit, licet indignus, cooperante divina gratia ratum esse creditur.[86] With regard to the power of consecrating the Eucharist Alger puts this doctrine as follows: Quantum enim ad veritatem sacramenti nec a bono melius nec a malo pejus conficitur sacerdote. Quantum vero ad virtutem sacramenti et effectum pro fide et meritis sumentium datur aliis ad salutem, aliis ad judicium.[87] The first part of this statement refers to sacramental validity which, as the context already quoted shows, is guaranteed by the *verba solemnia* pronounced by the priest: solemnis enim oratio sacerdotis sacramenti efficit veritatem.[88]

Within the Church, a sinful priest consecrates the Eucharist "truly and usefully" (*vere et utiliter*).[89] But Alger's language grows strong where he turns to the sacrifice of the Mass celebrated by heretics: "Within the unity of the Church the word of Christ brings about the true Sacrifice, not in view of the priest's personal merits but on the strength of his office accompanied by the faith of the bystanders. For, as St. Augustine says, outside the Catholic Church—that is to say among heretics—there is no place of sacrifice because their sacrifice is completely useless (*prorsus irritum*)".[90]

One may be inclined to refer *prorsus irritum* to the *veritas* or validity of the Eucharist and translate it by "completely invalid", but it is in keeping with Alger's terminology to translate it by "utterly useless". In a later chapter Alger points out that such terms as *sacramenta irrita, damnanda, non vera* do not refer to the validity of heretical sacraments.[91] He wants us to understand in this sense an often-quoted phrase from St. Jerome condemning their sacrifice as "bread of sorrow".[92] One reason why Masses celebrated by heretics are useless is, we may repeat, the lack of faith and merit: Extra ecclesiam non est fides neque meritum, quid potest valere sacramentum?[93] We have shown that this lack of faith and merit does not affect the validity of their sacraments.

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[80] *De Mis.* I, 52; PL 180, 879D.

[81] *De Mis.* I, 55: PL 180, 882C. Cf. *De Mis.* I, 52; PL 180, 879D-880A.

[82] *De Mis.* I, 54; PL 180, 880D.

[83] *De Mis.* I, 54; PL 180, 881C.

[84] *Ibidem.*

[85] *De Mis.* I, 53; PL 180, 880B: Quod per malos ministros, etiam cognitos, baptisma rite celebretur.

[86] *De Mis.* III, 23; PL 180, 942B. Gratian, *Decr.* C. 1 q. 1 c. 75 dict.

[87] *De Mis.* I, 49; PL 180, 877A.

[88] *De Mis.* I, 49; PL 180, 877D.

[89] *De Mis.* I, 56; PL 180, 882D: Unde Augustinus *De Corpore Domini*: Intra catholicam . . . transfundit in sanguinem. *De Sacr.* III, 8; PL 180, 840D: Ait Augustinus in libro *De Corpore Domini*: Intra . . . sanguinem. The text dates back to Paschasius Radbertus, *Liber de corp. et sanguine Domini*, 12; PL 120, 1310BC. Abelard, *Sic et Non*, 117; PL 178; 1530D: (Ex sermone quodam Augustini): Intra catholicam . . . sanguinem. Gratian, *Decr.* C. 1 q. 1 c. 77. Lombard, *Sent.* IV, 13, 1: p. 815.

[90] *De Mis.* I, 57; PL 180, 883B: In quo notandum est quod infra unitatem ecclesiae non pro merito sed pro officio sacerdotum ad fidem adstantium sermo Christi verum efficit sacrificium, cum, ut ait Augustinus, extra ecclesiam catholicam, apud haereticos scilicet, non sit locus sacrificii quia eorum sacrificium prorsus irritum est. The quotation is from Prosper, *Lib, sent.*, 15; PL 51, 430A: Veri sacrificii extra catholicam ecclesiam locus non est. Cf. Deusdedit, *Lib. contra invasores*, 5; 7; 4, 10; MGH *Lib.* II, 323; 325; 364. *Tract. de schismaticis;* MGH *Lib.* III, 128. Its author attributes the text to Leo. Humbert, *Adv. simon.* III, 30; MGH *Lib.* I, 237. *Epist. Widonis; Ibid.;* p. 6. Cf. Ivo, *Decr.* II, 84; PL 161, 180C. Wido, *De schismate Hillebrandi*, 17; MGH *Lib.* I, 547. Gerhoh of Reichersberg, *Ep. ad Innoc. papam;* MGH *Lib.* III, 226. See *ibid.;* pp. 266, 268, 425.

II.

Alger's Liber de Sacramentis Corporis et Sanguinis Dominici

Certain sacramental problems occupied Alger for years as is evident to the student of his work on the Blessed Eucharist. He was firmly convinced that the sacraments of heretics are valid. He was less capable of determining to what extent they confer grace if any. It is safe to say that the publication of Ivo's *Decretum* marks a mile stone in the history of sacramental doctrine. Ivo devoted the bulk of the second part to texts related to the Eucharist. Alger made ample use of this material. The *Decretum* was not his exclusive source, of course, but it accounts for much more than is generally admitted by authors dealing with Alger. As a rule, the number of Alger's sources is exaggerated.

Concerning the origin of some texts in Alger's treatise L. Brigué[1] asserts: L'écolâtre de Liége les tire directement de Bérengar ou de Ratramne. This statement is far from being acceptable for it is unreasonable to multiply Alger's sources without necessity. There is no evidence to prove that Alger ever saw Berengar's work[2] or the tract written by Ratramnus. Hence it is not accidental that Brigué does not cite a single text derived from Berengar. Although it is often stated[3] that Alger wrote against Berengar, it is very doubtful to me whether such was Alger's intention. The mere mention of Berengarians or of Berengar's name and *confessio*[4] does not make him an anti-Berengarian any more than, say, Lombard who likewise refers to Berengar.[5]

In order to prove that Alger used the work of Ratramnus Brigué points to a text from Jerome and Augustine respectively. But the excerpt taken from Jerome[6] occurs in the same length in Ivo's *Decretum*[7] where we also find the (interpolated) Augustinian text.[8] Brigué also suggests that the well-known passage from St. Augustine's letter to Boniface[9] was copied by Alger either from Paschasius Radbertus or from Ratramnus.[10] Again Alger's source was Ivo's *Decretum*.[11] It is true that the work of Paschasius was often copied up to the twelfth century[12] but it is equally true that Paschasius is not mentioned even once by Alger. In addition, Alger attributes to *Augustinus in libro de corpore Domini*[13] a text which actually comes from Paschasius.[14] He had already quoted a longer paragraph containing this very same passage in his *Liber de misericordia*[15] where the work is given the same title. This shows that Alger did not discover the text when he was preparing his treatise on the Eucharist.[16] Abelard[17] also has it in an excerpt allegedly copied *ex sermone quodam Augustini*. From this we may conclude that there was a *florilegium* where the text was found under Augustine's name.[18] In fact, there is evidence to show that the attribution of the text to St. Augustine was made by other authors in Alger's time.[19]

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[91] *De Mis.* III, 54; PL 180, 956BC.

[92] *Ibid.;* PL 180, 956C: Unde etiam Hieronymus in Osee (9:4) sacrificium eorum "panem luctus" vocat. Cf. Jerome, *In Amos* II, 5, 21; PL 25, 1053A. Ivo, *Decr.* II, 108; PL 161, 189C. Gratian, *Decr.* C. 1 q. 1 c. 62. Deusdedit, *Coll. can.* IV, 129.

[93] *De Mis.* I, 70; PL 180, 887B.

[1] *Alger de Liége* (Paris 1936) 67.

[2] Only one handwritten copy of Berengar's *De Sacra Coena* has ever been found: eloquent proof that it was not widely read. Berengar's lasting influence on sacramentology is due to Ivo's canical collections, as I have shown in 'Berengar's Definitions of *Sacramentum*', *MedSt* 10 (1948) 109 ff. Berengar's *De Sacra Coena* was discovered in the library of Wolfenbüttel and ably discussed by its discoverer Gotthold Ephraim Lessing in *Berengarius Turonensis oder Ankündigung eines wichtigen Werkes desselben. wovon in der herzoglichen Biblothek zu Wolfenbüttel ein Manuscript befindlich, welches bisher völlig unerkannt geblieben* (Braunschweig 1770). Unfortunately, Lessing does not suggest how the manuscript reached the duke's library.

[3] A. J. MacDonald, *Berengar*, p. 380, declares: "Alger's chief aim in writing was the refutation of Berengar. He reminds his reader that at the Council of Rome in 1059 Berengar confessed his belief in the real presence of the body of Christ before Pope Nicholas and the hundred and thirteen bishops, and he quotes the oath in full."

[4] *De Sacr.* I, 7 and 17; PL 180, 760B and 796D.

[5] *Sent.* IV, 12, 3; pp. 810 f.

[6] PL 180, 790C.

[7] *Decr.* II, 5; PL 161, 141AB.

[8] PL 180, 760C: *Decr.* II, 8; PL 161, 151B.

[9] *Ep.* 98, 9; CSEL 34, 531. Guitmund, *De Corp.* II; PL 149, 146D.

[10] The suggestion is accepted by D. Van den Eynde, *Les Définitions des Sacrements* (Rome 1950) 11, note 8.

[11] *Decr.* II, 4; PL 161, 137AB.

Another recent writer[20] regrets Alger's "improper citations and the attribution of apocryphal matter to Fathers of the Church." He states that "one of the most curious instances of this sort of error in scholarship is that of Alger attributing to St. Augustine, *in libro sententiarum Prosperi,* a text of Lanfranc which Alger must have read, without attribution to St. Augustine, in Lanfranc's own work". Before dealing with the problem "of apocryphal matter" it may be noted that there are indeed many more excerpts from Lanfranc's work on the Eucharist in Alger's text. Brigué[21] points with surprise (la chose est curieuse) to two such texts attributed to *Augustinus in libro sententiarum Prosperi.*[22] However, their number is considerably larger and deserves a detailed examination to trace their literary history.

In the fifth chapter of the first book Alger writes: Augustinus in *libro sententiarum Prosperi* ita ea discernens: "Hoc est quod dicimus . . . i.e. Christi corpore.[23] The passage dates back to Lanfranc[24] but Alger quotes it as found in Ivo's *Decretum.*[25] The same chapter contains a text from Lanfranc, also found in Ivo's *Decretum,* though no source is given by Alger: Unde etiam in fine . . . quandoque capiatur.[26] In the next chapter Alger states: Ex quadam enim similitudine Augustini in *libro sententiarum Prosperi* suam sumunt et defendunt haeresim qua dicunt: Sacrificium ecclesiae . . . ex Deo et homine.[27] The sentence is part of the previous text.

In the following chapter Alger declares: Unde divus Augustinus in *libro sententiarum Prosperi*: Nos autem in specie . . . benedictio consecravit.[28] The variants show that Alger's immediate source was Ivo,[29] not Lanfranc.[30] In the eighth chapter we read: Ut ait Augustinus: Caro ejus est . . . sapore potamus.[31] He had already quoted part of this excerpt in a previous chapter where it is attributed to St. Augustine in *libro sententiarum Prosperi.*[32] Not Augustine but Lanfranc[33] wrote these words. They occur in Ivo's *Decretum.*[34]

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[12] Cf M. Manitius, *Gesch. der lat. Lit. des Mittelalters* I (Munich 1911) 410.

[13] *De Sacr.* I, 21; PL 180, 802C.

[14] *Lib. de corp.*, 12; PL 120, 1310BC: Intra ecclesiam catholicam . . . ad Christum pertineret.

[15] *De Mis.* I, 56; PL 180, 882D.

[16] The text is not in Ivo's *Decretum.* Gratian, *Decr.* C. 1 q. 1 c. 77 copied it from Alger, *De Mis.* I, 56.

[17] *Sic et Non*, 117; PL 178, 1530D.

[18] Peter Damian, *Lib. grat.*, 9; MGH *Lib.* I, 27, must have had this text in mind when he referred to what "Pascasius" has to say on the Eucharist *in libro suo*. A long excerpt is quoted by Humbert, *Adv. simon.* III, 39; MGH *Lib.* I 247: ex libello Pascasii *De Corpore Domini* (13, 3; PL 120, 1313A-1314A).

[19] In the *Tractatus pro clericorum conubio*, written about 1075-1080, we read (MGH *Lib.* III, 593): De qua re tractat beatus Augustinus sic: Vere et indubitanter inde scire debemus infra ecclesiam catholicam . . . cum fide communicatur. In a letter written by Marbod (MGH *Lib.* III, 693) an allusion to this text reads: Idem (Augustinus) alibi: Sacramenta ecclesiae neque bonus melius neque malus pejus implere potest. Nam quaecumque sit persona exterior, Spiritus sanctus operatur interior. The letter was written about the year 1105. Of uncertain date is the anonymous *Epistola de sacramentis haereticorum* (MGH Lib. III, 18), whose author also attributes the text to St. Augustine: De talibus dicit Augustinus: Intra. . . .

[20] Charles E. Sheedy, *The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century* (Washington, D.C., 1947 48.

[21] *Alger de Liége*, p. 68.

[22] PL 180, 758C and 767A.

[23] *De Sacr.* I, 5; PL 180, 752D.

[24] *Lib. de corp.*, 10: PL 150, 421BC.

[25] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 152D.

[26] *De Sacr.* I, 5; PL 180, 753A. Lanfranc, *Lib de corp.*, 20; PL 150, 436B. Ivo, *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 157B.

[27] *De Sacr.* I, 6; PL 180, 754B. He is speaking of the heretical teaching that there is no change of substance but an *impanatio*. References to this text are in *De Sacr.* I, 7 and 20; PL 180, 760A and 797C.

[28] *De Sacr.* I, 7; PL 180, 758C.

In the next chapter Alger quotes the text: Si quaeris modum . . . utiliter non potest.[35] Although Alger claims that it is taken from Augustinus in *libro sententiarum Prosperi* we know that it is found in Ivo's *Decretum.*[36] Later Alger makes a shorter reference: Item Augustinus: Hoc est quod dicimus . . . carne et sanguine.[37] It corresponds to the first text we have quoted where we were told that it comes from Augustinus in *libro sententiarum Prosperi.* Then Alger continues: Item idem: Nos autem . . . honoramus. In the seventh chapter he told us that these words are from Augustinus in *libro sententiarum Prosperi.*[38]

In the sixteenth chapter Alger writes: Augustinus in *libro sententiarum Prosperi*: Semel oblatus est Christus . . . fieri congruebat.[39] The text stems from Lanfranc[40] but Alger's wording is closer to the version given by Ivo.[41] In the following chapter Alger raises an objection: Dicit enim aliquis . . . corpus Christi.[42] He indicates no source but we know that he found it in Ivo[43] who had copied it from Lanfranc.[44] Also anonymous is a long passage in the eighteenth chapter: Sed tamen non juste . . in coelum ascensurum.[45] A comparison shows that Alger relied on Ivo[46] whose source had been Lanfranc's work on the Eucharist.[47] In the same chapter Alger again attributes to Augustinus in *libro sententiarum Prosperi* the text: Caro ejus est . . . divina majestate.[48] With the introduction: Item in eodem he quotes: Sicut ergo coelestis . . . fides est.[49] The text is contained in Ivo's *Decretum*[50] and goes back to Lanfranc.[51]

By way of contrast, we meet an authentic passage from Prosper's *Sentences* in Alger's quotation: Item idem in *libro sententiarum Prosperi*: Escam vitae . . . indifferenter accipiat.[52] It is also found under this accurate attribution in Ivo's *Decretum.*[53] In the third book of Alger's treatise we find the statement: Item in *libro sententiarum Prosperi*: Verus baptismus . . . interrogatio in Deum.[54] It dates back to Lanfranc[55] and was then copied by Ivo,[56] Alger's source.

L. Brigué[57] assumes that Alger found some extracts from Lanfranc's work "sous la forme des sentences détachées, et s'en est inspiré, comme le feront après lui Abélard et Gratien". Here again it would seem obvious that such an assumption is entirely unnecessary.

In order to propose a solution to this literary problem we must investigate Alger's sources. The fact that he used Ivo's *Decretum* could be proven on a wider basis by examining all his patristic quotations. But for our present purpose it is sufficient to consider the parts copied by Ivo from Lanfranc who, as is well known, had been Ivo's teacher at Bec.[58] Ivo's excerpts from Lanfranc are all found together in the ninth chapter of the second part of the *Decretum.*[59] Part of the tenth chapter is taken from the same source.[60] The ninth chapter thus constitutes an epitome of Lanfranc's work on the Eucharist and it should be added that no other source material has entered it.

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[29] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 153C.

[30] *Lib. de corp.*, 13; PL 150, 423C: Nos etenim . . . benedictio consecravit.

[31] *De Sacr.* I, 8; PL 180, 759D.

[32] *De Sacr.* I, 5; PL 180, 754A; Et ut ait Augustinus (in) *libro sententiarum.* Prosperi: Sanguis . . . potamus.

[33] *Lib. de corp.*, 14; PL 150, 423D.

[34] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 153D.

[35] *De Sacr.* I, 9; PL 180, 767A. The same attribution is found in Gerhoh of Reichersberg. *In Ps.* xxiii; ed. Van den Eynde, *Gerhohi Opera Inedita* II, 1 (Rome 1956) 160.

[36] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 153A.

[37] *De Sacr.* I, 11; PL 180, 772B.

[38] *De Sacr.* I, 7; PL 180, 758C.

[39] *De Sacr.* I, 16; PL 180, 787C.

[40] *Lib. de corp.*, 13; PL 150, 425B.

[41] *Decr.* I, 9; PL 161, 155A. Cf. *Panormia* I, 143; PL 161, 1077B.

[42] *De Sacr.* I, 17; PL 180, 791C.

[43] *Decr.* I, 9; PL 161, 157A.

[44] *Lib. de corp.*, 20; PL 150. 436A.

[45] *De Sacr.* I, 18; PL 180, 792A.

[46] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 154BC.

[47] *Lib. de corp.*, 14; PL 150, 424BD.

[48] *De Sacr.* I, 18; PL 180, 792D. *Lib. de corp.*, 14; PL 150, 423D. *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 153D.

[49] *De Sacr.* I, 18; PL 180, 792D.

[50] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 154D.

[51] *Lib. de corps.*, 14; PL 150, 425A.

[52] *De Sacr.* I, 21; PL 180, 798D. Prosper, *Lib. sent.*, 343; PL 51, 481C.

[53] *Decr.* I, 8; PL 161, 152BC.

[54] *De Sacr.* III, 7; PL 180, 839C.

[55] *Lib. de corp.*, 14; PL 150, 424D.

[56] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 154C.

[57] *Alger de Liége*, p. 68. Brigué cites M. Lepin, *L'idée du sacrifice de la Messe* (Paris 1926) 796.

The previous chapter in the *Decretum* ends with an authentic text from Prosper: Item in *libro sententiarum Prosperi*: Escam vitae . . . indifferenter accipiat.[61] We have seen that Alger used it.[62] In the printed edition of Ivo's *Decretum* Lanfranc's name is given and found immediately after the heading of the ninth chapter which begins with an anonymous text from St. Gregory quoted by Lanfranc: Si tanta vis . . . ante non erant.[63] Lanfranc's name occurs again later on in the printed text[64] and we may rightly assume that the editor copied it from the manuscript.

It is of importance to keep in mind that, in the *Decretum,* the text from St. Gregory is anonymous. The excerpt is followed by a number of passages, all culled from Lanfranc's tract on the Eucharist. These passages are occasionally abbreviated or slightly altered but the sequence is still the same as in Lanfranc's work. However, they appear to form two major sections. The first may be called doctrinal and begins with *Si tanta vis,*[65] found in the ninth chapter of Lanfranc's tractate.[66] It ends with *participaris alimento* from Lanfranc's eighteenth chapter[67] and covers three columns in the Migne edition. Then follow a number of patristic excerpts (Ambrose, Augustine, Leo), likewise copied from Lanfranc.[68]

Lanfranc's name, inserted in the (edited) text,[69] marks the beginning of the second section of excerpts from Lanfranc: *Dicet aliquis* . . .[70] It ends with the final word of Lanfranc's treatise: *verus sanguis quem potamus.*[71] The entire epitome thus covers over eight columns in Migne where we find Lanfranc's name once at the beginning and once in the middle, after a patristic section whose origin the reader of Ivo's *Decretum* could not even suspect.

As far as excerpts go, those passages from Lanfranc are of unusual length and one can easily anticipate the difficulties of Mediaeval readers or scholars trying to identify the author of texts they wished to quote. It would seem that, in compiling the *Panormia*, either Ivo himself (which appears unlikely) or rather his assistant fell victim to this very difficulty, for even the *Panormia* attributes to Augustinus in *libro sententiarum Prosperi*[72] four excerpts all of which date back to Lanfranc. By a similar error, another text in the *Panormia* is attributed to St. Gregory, though its real author is Lanfranc.[73] This would confirm our suspicion that Lanfranc's name was not inserted in the *Decretum* where we find it today, at least not in every handwritten copy. If we suppose that the handwritten copies did contain the name, the problem remained practically the same. How could a Mediaeval scholar determine the extent of the excerpt introduced by Lanfranc's name, unless he checked it with the original? Yet he probably owned or used the *Decretum* because he had no access to Lanfranc.

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[58] Cf. Franz Pl. Bliemetzrieder, 'Zu den Schriften Ivos von Chartres,' *Sitzungsber.* 182, 6 (Wien 1917) 3 and 29. Guitmund of Aversa had likewise studied under Lanfranc. See A. J. MacDonald, *Berengar*, p. 172.

[59] Bliemetzrieder (p. 25) writes: Die pars 2 des Dekrets de sacr. corporis et sanguinis Domini enhält als Kern das ganze 5. Buch des Dekrets Burchards c. 11-62. Vorne hat der Verfasser hinzugefügt Fragmente aus den Kirchenvätern Augustinus, Hieronymus und Ambrosius und rückwärts eine Reihe von Dekretalen der Collectio A . . . Bei genauer Vergleichung stellte sich mir heraus, dass nicht ein ganzes Stück einfach aus Lanfranks Schrift herübergenommen wurde, sondern dass aus den Kapiteln 9-23 von Ivo bei der forschreitenden Lesung die passenden Sätze ausgehoben und sentenzenartig aneinandergereiht wurden, und auch wieder nicht wörtlich, sondern mit mannigfacher, meist aber geringfügiger Veränderung, teils zur Verkürzung, teils zur Verdeutlichung unter Einfügung von Satzgliedern. One may criticize this last sentence from the point of view of elegance, but it is a perfect statement of all the pertinent facts.

[60] The texts in the tenth chapter seem to have escaped Bliemetzrieder's attention. The chapter accounts for Alger's familiarity with the Council of Rome and Berengar's oath. The excerpts begin with the ninth chapter in Lanfranc's tract (PL 150, 420D). The oath in *Decr.* II, 10 is taken from the second chapter in Lanfranc's work (PL 150, 410D). The borrowings from Lanfranc end with the words: reverso atque converso (*Decr.* II, 10; PL 161, 161C).

[61] PL 161, 152BC. The text is quoted by Berengar, *De Sacra Coena*, 44; ed. W. H. Beekenhamp (S-Gravenhage 1941) 152. Prosper, *Lib. sent.*, 343; PL 51, 481C. Bliemetzrieder (p. 30) shows that Ivo made use of Berengar's *De S. Coena*, though he admits the possibility of a *florilegium* used by both. Then he declares: Wahrscheinlicher scheint es mir, dass in der Tat Ivo die Schrift *de s. coena* als Fundgrube ausgebeutet hat.

[62] *De Sacr.* I, 21; PL 180, 798D.

[63] *Decr.* II, 0; PL 161, 162C: Lanfranc, *Lib. de corp.*, 9; PL 150 420D.

[64] PL 161, 157A.

[65] *Decr.* II, 9· PL 161, 152C.

[66] PL 150, 420D.

[67] PL 161, 155D: PL 150, 432C.

[68] PL 161, 155D-157A: Ambrosius . . . ore cordis hauritur. Lanfranc, *Lib. de corp.*, 18 f.; PL 150, 432D-435C.

[69] PL 161, 157A.

[70] *Lib. de corp.*, 20; PL 150, 436A.

[71] PL 161, 160D. PL 150, 442D.

As a consequence, a scholar wishing to quote a text from the *Decretum* would look back for the closest previous reference to an author. Alger as well as the compiler of the *Panormia* must have thought that a least the first section of Ivo's ninth chapter dated back to Prosper's *Sentences* from which, as we have seen, Ivo quotes an authentic text at the end of the previous chapter.[74] If Ivo had noted the author, viz., St. Gregory, of the very first excerpt, history would most likely have taken a different turn. On account of this omission both Alger and the compiler of the *Panormia* initiated a chain of errors which Mediaeval writers were rarely in a position to correct. The doctrinal implications of these errors are not insignificant for it is quite obvious that the name of St. Augustine added considerable prestige to the excerpts culled from Lanfranc. The assumption that St. Augustine's name was deliberately substituted for Lanfranc's is unworthy of consideration.

Although we have seen that Alger quotes Lanfranc from Ivo's epitome (*Decr.* II, 9), the question could be raised whether or not Alger knew Lanfranc and his work. To begin with, he never mentions Lanfranc's name. But there is evidence that he knew Lanfranc's work. To offer an example, Alger writes in his chapter dealing with the definition of sacrament: Unde Ambrosius in *libro ad Gratianum* apparuisse dicit hominibus Unigenitum Patris per sacramentum assumpti hominis, quasi diceret "per hominem quem sibi sacravit", quia homo non signum sed potius occultatio divinitatis fuit.[75] Lanfranc had written: Denique sanctus Ambrosius in *libro ad Gratianum* apparuisse dicit hominibus Unigenitum Patris per sacramentum assumpti hominis, quod tantumdem significat quantum si diceret apparuisse eum per hominem quem assumpsit et quem divinitati suae

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[72] *Pan.* I, 125; PL 161, 1071D: Nos autem in specie . . . benedictio consecravit (*Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 153 CD). *Pan.* I, 128; PL 161, 1073C: Si quaeris modum . . . utiliter non potest (*Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 153A). *Pan.* I, 137; PL 161, 1075D-1076B: Hoc est quod . . . fides est (*Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 152D; 153D; 154D). *Pan.* I, 139; PL 161, 1076C: Cum frangitur hostia . . . designatur (*Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 153C). Abelard, *Sic et Non*, 117: PL 178, 1524A, copied *Pan.* I, 137; PL 161, 1075D-1076B.

[73] *Pan.* I, 132; PL 161, 1074AB is taken from Lanfranc but attributed to St. Gregory because the closest name mentioned is Sanctus Gregorius in homilia paschali. *Pan.* I, 143; PL 161, 1077B, is attributed to St. Augustine (*Ep.* 23, ad Bonif.), found in *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 155A, written by Lanfranc, *Lib. de corp.*, 15; PL 150, 425B. Alger, *De Sacr.* I, 16; PL 180, 787C, attributes it to Augustinus in *libro sententiarum Prosperi.*

[74] The first author to suggest this solution for the false attributions in the *Panormia* was P. Fournier in *Bibl. de l'Ecole des chartes* 58 (1897) 300. Bliemetzrieder, who was not particularly fond of the French historian, thinks little of the theory and proposes a solution which amounts to an insinuation of a deliberate, if well-intentioned, forgery on the part of the compiler of the *Panormia*. He writes (p. 30): Darf ich die Vermutung aussprechen, dass möglicherweise unter dem 'Prosper' dieser Ueberschriften gerade Lanfrank sic verbarg, d. h. ein 'Prosper', der getreue und echte Anhänger Augustins? Gerade in dieser Zeit lebte wieder die Sitte auf, Namen berühmter Personen des heidnischen und christlichen Altertums als ehrende Beinamen beizugeben. This *Vermutung* is really too far-fetched to be taken seriously.

[75] *De Sacr.* I, 4; PL 180, 752B. Cf. *De Sacr.* I, 6; PL 180, 754C.

dignum habitaculum consacravit.[76] As Ivo did not transcribe this particular text, we must assume that Alger copied it directly from Lanfranc at a time when he had access to the treatise. In the same context Alger tells us that "in the sacred codices" the word *sacramentum* does not always designate a sacred sign but sometimes an oath, sometimes a consecrated object.[77] Alger did not obtain this information from Ivo but rather from Lanfranc who had written: Dicitur namque sacramentum etiam jusjurandum . . . dicitur quoque sacramentum alicujus rei sacratio.[78] In a later chapter we read: Sacramentum sane in divinis codicibus non una tantum significatione positum reperitur.[79]

After this preliminary investigation into Alger's sources we should be prepared to find other traces of Ivo's *Decretum* in Alger's work on the Eucharist. We have already noted that, in his *Liber de misericordia,* he makes no attempt to define the word *sacramentum.* Thanks to Ivo's *Decretum,* he now asks the question: What is a *sacramentum* and in how many ways do we use the word? The first definition he proposes is adroitly adapted from St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* and reads: Sacramentum visibile invisibilis rei sacramentum est i.e. sacrum signum.[80] Perhaps he owes this definition to Lanfranc[81] rather than to Ivo [82] who offers the strange reading: Sacrificium visibile invisibile sacrificii sacramentum i.e. sacrum signum est.[83]

For the original *sacrificium* Alger substituted *sacramentum,* and instead of *rei* St. Augustine had written *sacrificii.* We shall discuss the reasons for this change on a later occasion. He then adds Augustine's definition of *signum,*[84] serving as an interpretation of the word *sacrum signum* in the definition. Alger found the definition of *signum* in Ivo's *Decretum*[85] where he also copied another definition: Item alibi: Sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma.[86] Berengar had first proposed this definition, allegedly found *in quadam epistola* (*Augustini*), as he put it in his letter to Adelman.[87] In later writings Berengar simply refers to Augustine as its author without referring to an Augustinian letter. When Ivo indicated its source by *et alibi* he set an example followed by innumerable later scholars, including our Alger.

We are told by Alger that there is a difference between *sacramentum* and *mysterium*: while the former is a sign signifying something, the latter is something hidden signified by the sign. Since one term is often used in place of the other, we have a *sacramentum signans* and a *sacramentum signatum* or a *mysterium occultans* and a *mysterium occultum.*[88] In other words, *sacramentum* is sometimes used *pro signo,* sometimes *pro signato,* as Alger puts it. Sometimes, he tells us, it is used for both.

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[76] *Lib. de corp.*, 20; PL 150, 437D-438A. Cf. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Grat.* II, 7, 50; PL 16, 624C: Sacramentum suscepti corporis.

[77] *De Sacr.* I, 4; PL 180, 752A.

[78] *Lib. de corp.*, 13; PL 150, 423B.

[79] *Lib. de corp.*, 20; PL 150, 437D.

[80] *De Sacr.* I, 4; PL 180, 751C: *De Civ. Dei* X, 5: CSEL 40, 1, 452: Sacrificium ergo visibile invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum i.e. sacrum signum est.

[81] *Lib. de corp.*, 12; PL 150, 422D. It agrees to the letter with St. Augustine's definition.

[82] *Decr. II*, 8; PL 161, 148C. *Pan.* I, 130; P.L. 161, 1074A. A. Amanieu in *Dict. de Droit can.* I, 391, claims that Gratian (*Decr.* D. 2 c. 32 de cons.) copied this definition from Alger. But Gratian has Ivo's, not Alger's reading.

[83] Regarding the effects of Ivo's faulty transcription see N. M. Haring, 'Berengar's Definitions of Sacramentum', *MedSt* 10 (1948) 125.

[84] *De Doctr. christ.* II, 1, 1; PL 34, 35.

[85] *Decr.* II, 8; PL 161, 148C.

[86] *De Sacr.* 1, 4: PL 180, 751C. *Decr.* II, 8 and *Pan. I*, 131; PL 161, 148C and 1074A.

[87] Martène-Durand, *Thes. nov. anecd.* IV (Paris 1717) 112E.

[88] *De Sacr.* I, 4; PL 180, 751D. L. Brigué, *Alger de Liége* (Paris 1936) 95, holds that Alger was opposed to St. Isidore's definition of sacrament. There is, however, no evidence that Alger knew the Isidorian definition. Concerning the word *mysterium*, Lanfranc, *Lib. de corp.*, 17; PL 150, 429A, had already stated: Mysterium namque, sicut beatus Augustinue in libro *De Catechizandis rudibus dicit*, a secreto nomen accepit. Cf. Paschasius, *Lib. de corp.*, 3, 2; PL 120, 1275C. See also Abelard, *Expos. in Rom.* IV; PL 178, 935A (Haimo): Mysterium est res occulta et secretum aliquod in se continens.

We need not stress the conclusion that the admission of so many mutually opposed meanings aimed at the wide use of the word *sacramentum* in the past. These meanings were definitely not all in accordance with the two definitions quoted above. But Alger is not perturbed: Nec mirum, si sacramentum pro sacramento et re sacramenti saepius ponitur, quia et corpus Christi pro sacramento et corpore Christi invenitur.[89] The reason why the word was found with these two different meanings was Lanfranc's refusal to accept Berengar's clear distinction between the visible *sacramentum* and the invisible *res*. Finally, Alger points out that, as already mentioned, "in the sacred codices" the word *sacramentum* does not always designate a sacred sign but sometimes an oath,[90] sometimes a consecrated object (*res sacrata*).[91]

After enumerating the various meanings of the word *sacramentum* Alger states his own use of the term in relation to the Blessed Eucharist: the form of bread and wine and the other remaining visible qualities of the elements are only the *sacramentum*. But the invisible substance which is covered by the *sacramentum* and into which the substance of bread and wine has been changed is truly and properly speaking the Body of Christ.[92] Under the name of St. Augustine[93] (*in libro sententiarum Prosperi*), Alger then cites a passage from Lanfranc and concludes: Quae ergo *duo* esse approbat, *visibile* scilicet *sacramentum* et *invisibilem rem* sacramenti, non unum et idem sed aliud et aliud esse demonstrat.[94] Alger thus professes two components: the visible *sacramentum* and its invisible *res*. Among the patristic excerpts favouring or proving this view he also adopts Lanfranc's[95] liturgical argument based on the prayer: Perficiant in nobis Domine, quaesumus, sacramenta tua quod continent ut, quod nunc specie gerimus, rerum veritate capiamus.[96] He probably found it in Ivo's *Decretum*[97] but other authors[98] had already made use of this popular argument.[99]

Despite his clear division between the visible *sacramentum* and its invisible *res*, Alger teaches in a later chapter that "the true Body of Christ, invisible after the resurrection, is the *sacramentum* of the visible Body."[1] He makes this statement in view of a text derived from Lanfranc[2] (through Ivo) but attributed to Augustine in *libro sententiarum Prosperi*.[3] However, Alger was keenly aware of some inconsistency in applying the word *sacramentum* to the invisible Body which he had defined as *res sacramenti*. His awareness of a certain inconsistency is implied in the words: Et est alia item confusio quia, cum corpus Christi tripliciter dicatur, corpori Christi in altari panis et vini attribuunt sacramenta

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[89] *De Sacr.* I, 4; PL 180, 752A. He adds: Augustinus, *De Sacramentis Altaris* Corpus Christi et veritas . . . exterius sentitur. This text is an adaptation from Paschasius, *Lib. de corp.*, 4, 1 f.; PL 120, 1278B.

[90] Lanfranc, *Lib. de corp.*, 13; PL 150, 423B.

[91] *De Sacr.* I, 4; PL 180. 752A.

[92] *De Sacr.* I, 5; PL 180, 752B: Formam panis et vini et caeteras elementorum remanentes et visibiles qualitates "sacramentum" tantummodo vere dici et esse: substantiam autem illam invisibilem quae ipso sacramento operta est et in quam panis et vini substantia translata est, vere et proprie dici et esse corpus Christi testatur Augustinus in *libro sententiarum* Prosperi ita ea discernens: Hoc est quod . . . Christi corpore.

[93] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 152D.

[94] *De Sacr.* I, 5: PL 180, 752D. Lanfranc, Lib. de corp., 10; PL 150, 421BC.

[95] *Lib. de corp.*, 20; PL 150, 436B.

[96] *De Sacr.* I, 5; PL 180, 753A: Sacram. Rom. Postcommunio sabbato quatuor temporum Septembris. See *Sacram. Gregorianum;* ed. H. Lietzmann (Münster 1921) 95. Alger refers to it in *De Sacr.* I, 7; PL 180, 759D. The text was already invoked by Ratramnus, *Lib. de corp. et sanguine Domini*, 88; ed. J. N. Bakhuizen van den Brink (Amsterdam 1954) 56 or PL 121, 164A: Item alibi: Perficiant in nobis . . . rerum veritate capiamus.

[97] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 157AB.

[98] Guitmund of Aversa, *De corp. et s. Christi veritate* II; PL 149, 1467D. Guitmund accuses Berengar of misusing this prayer to corroborate his error. See also Ascellinus, *Ep. ad Berengarium;* PL 150, 67B. G. Morin, 'Bérenger contre Bérenger', *RTAM* 4 (1932) 118. Both authors simply ascribe it to St. Gregory.

[99] Cf. Gratian, *Decr.* D. 2 c. 34 de cons. Peter of Poitiers, *Sent.* V, 13; PL 211, 1253B.

[1] *De Sacr.* I, 18; PL 180, 792C. Cf. A. J. MacDonald, *Berengar and the Reform of sacramental Doctrine* (London 1930) 385.

[2] *Lib. de corp.*, 14; PL 150, 423D-424A.

[3] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 153D: Caro ejus est . . . divina majestate.

ipsumque corpus Christi in altari "sacramentum" faciunt corporis in humana forma.[4] "Since, therefore", he continues, "the form of bread and wine is called the *sacramentum* of the Body of Christ on the altar, and since that same Body of Christ on the altar is called the *sacramentum* of Christ's human Body, they argue that one is not the other."[5]

Without indicating his source, Alger now quotes a passage which Ivo had copied from Lanfranc.[6] In this particular text, Lanfranc takes up Berengar's argument that such words as *mysterium, signum, sacramentum,* and others are relative terms in the sense that they refer to something else and for that reason cannot be that to which they are related. Hence the Body of Christ should not be called *sacramentum.* However, in order to reconcile his use of *sacramentum* as applied to the invisible Body with his former statements, Alger refers us to Augustine and claims: Quod autem *invisibile corpus* sacramentum visibilis corporis Christi dixit, intelligibiliter tantum per exteriorem aliquam actionem et non sensualiter accipiendum est.[7]

He does not tell his readers how this agrees with the concept of a sacramental *signum* which, by definition, includes the senses. An external operation may well have a symbolic, sacramental meaning. But how could the invisible Eucharistic Body have a sacramental significance? Alger proposes that some external action is required to justify the use of the term *sacramentum* in speaking of the invisible Eucharistic Body. Here again he presents a text under St. Augustine's name, though it stems from Lanfranc as epitomized by Ivo.[8] It expresses the thought that the breaking of the sacred Host and the pouring of wine are external operations signifying Christ's immolation on the Cross and the shedding of His Blood. As external symbolic actions pointing to the visible Body of Christ they deserve to Alger's mind to be called *sacramentum.*

The reason, however, why such a distinction should be felt necessary was not the same for Lanfranc and Alger. The former was confronted with an Augustinian text quoted by Berengar,[9] while the latter felt that the "saints" had spoken varie sed non contrarie of the Lord's Body and Blood. Thus, we learn, St. Jerome had distinguished between the "spiritual and divine" Body in the Eucharist and the human crucified Body. In addition, so Alger tells us, St. Augustine speaks of that mystical Body which is the Church.[10] We learn from Alger that "great confusion" arises when what is said of one Body is transferred to the other since there is Christ's Body *in humana forma*, then *in sacramento*, and finally the mystical Body.[11] Concerning the first two parts of this distinction Alger explains that they must not be taken to refer to a dual substance but to a dual form of the same substance: Quod (Hieronymus) non dixisse quantum ad duplicem substantiam credendus est sed quantum ad duplicem ejusdem substantiae formam qua nunc in humana, nunc in panis et vini intelligitur forma.[12] On the strength of this dualism they say that the Eucharistic Body is the *sacramentum* of Christ's physical Body. To cite Alger's own words again: Ipsumque corpus Christi in altari sacramentum faciunt corporis Christi in humana forma.[13]

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[4] *De Sacr.* I, 17: PL 180, 791BC.

[5] *De Sacr.* 1, 17; PL 180, 791C: Dum ergo forma panis et vini sacramentum corporis Christi in altari et ipsum corpus Christi in altari "sacramentum" dicitur humani corporis Christi, quod ipsum est, non idem ipsum esse contendunt.

[6] *De Sacr.* 1, 17; PL 180, 791C: Dicit enim aliquis . . . Ivo, *Decr.* II, 9: PL 161, 157A. Lanfranc, *Lib. de corp.*, 20; PL 150, 436A.

[7] *De Sacr.* I, 18: PL 180, 193D. A. J. MacDonald, *Berengar*, p. 382, explains: "When the invisible body of Christ is called the sacrament of the visible body of Christ, it is to be accepted mentally only on account of the external operation (i.e. because mediated through bread and wine) and not materially".

[8] *De Sacr.* I, 19; PL 180, 795B: Augustinus in libro sententiarum Prosperi: Dum frangitur hostia . . . designatur. Ivo, *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 153C. Lanfranc, *Lib de corp.*, 14; PL 150, 423D.

[9] *Lib. de corp.*, 14; PL 150, 423D.

[10] *De Sacr.* I, 17; PL 180, 190BD.

[11] *De Sacr.* I, 17; PL 180, 791B. Concerning the corpus triforme see H. de Lubac, *Corpus Mysticum* (Aubier 1944) 303 ff.

[12] *De Sacr.* I, 17; PL 180, 790CD.

As we have seen, our author holds that such external actions as the breaking of the Host are required to produce a visible sign by which a sacramental link between Christ's Eucharistic Body and His physical Body is established. Alger's justification is interesting: Quomodo enim—more ceterorum sacramentorum visibilium—id, quod videri *non* potest, rei invisibilis[14] esse poterit signum, nisi per exterioris alicujus actionis circa se imaginem?[15] There is no denying that Alger saw the problem caused by his texts and tried to remain loyal to his original position according to which *sacramentum* was defined as visible sign and well distinguished from its *res* or from that of which it is the visible sign. But the uniform meaning and use of terms required for this task did not exist in his sources. If Alger had realized that the "Augustine" who caused him most of his difficulties was no other than Lanfranc, the result might well have been entirely different.

At the same time, we should not expect too much from the logical application of definitions. When Alger writes: Quidquid fit in officio Missae, sacramentum est Christi et ecclesiae,[16] he does so in full agreement with his definitions of *sacramentum* both of which were broad enough to justify his statement. Its restriction to the septenary number was the result of other considerations.

Despite the vagueness of these definitions Alger succeeded in elucidating some rather important points of sacramental doctrine. We may recall that, in his *Liber de misericordia*, he generally distinguishes between *sacramentum* and *effectus*. Only the sacrament of the Eucharist, he taught, consists of three components: the *sacramentum*, i.e. the visible species; the *res sacramenti*, i.e. the true substance of the Lord; the *effectus sacramenti*, i.e. the effect on the recipient.[17] It was common knowledge that in Baptism the *sacramentum* was separable from its *effectus* or *res* and that both could be received separately. In Alger's time there existed a theory that, in the reception of the Eucharist, the *sacramentum* was equally separable from Christ's Body. It was thought and apparently taught that those who receive unworthily receive the Body of Christ not in reality, but only *sacramento tenus*, a term which was more widely used in reference to Baptism and Holy Orders as sacraments deprived of grace. Alger also uses the expression *purum sacramentum* signifying a sacrament without spiritual contents.[18]

The solution advocated by Alger hinges on the distinction between *substantia* and *effectus gratia*. Those who are unworthy truly receive the Body of Christ *quantum ad substantiam*, not truly *ad effectus gratiam*.[19] However, to reach a fuller understanding of the term *purum sacramentum* as applied to the Eucharist, we must examine Alger's question why the Sacrifice of the Church does not consist *in solo sacramento* or in Christ's Body and Blood *sine sacramento*. The obvious supposition is that the *sacramentum* may exist by itself and that the real Presence may be brought about "without the sacrament", in other words, without the cover, as it were, by which it is veiled. Alger adds that in such a case the *sacramentum* by itself would consist in "bread and wine consecrated and not changed".[20] Taken in this sense, the *purum sacramentum* of the Eucharist is not entirely identical with the *sacramentum* as opposed to its *res*, for the Eucharistic *sacramentum*, as opposed to its *res*, includes the visible form of bread and wine and all other remaining qualities. It does not include the substance of bread and wine still present in the *purum sacramentum.*

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[13] *De Sacr.* I, 17; PL 180, 791B.

[14] Migne reads visibilis but the context calls for invisibilis.

[15] *De Sacr.* I, 18; PL 180, 794A.

[16] *De Sacr.* I, 19, PL 180, 796B.

[17] *De Mis.* I, 62; PL 180, 884D.

[18] *De Sacr.* I, 21; PL 180, 798C.

[19] *De Sacr.* I, 21; PL 180, 798D.

[20] *De Sacr.* II, 3; PL 180, 815B: Solo sacramento i.e. pane et vino consecrato et non mutato.

It seems that the idea of the *purum sacramentum* in the Eucharist dates back to the days of the Berengarian controversy. Alger cites Berengar's oath (1059) renouncing the heresy that "the bread and wine placed on the altar are, after the consecration, only a *sacramentum* and not the true Body and Blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ".[21] Berengar then professed that "the bread and wine placed on the altar are, after the consecration, not only a *sacramentum* but also the true Body and the true Blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ". The oath continues: et sensualiter non solum in sacramento sed etiam in veritate manibus sacerdotum tractari, frangi, et fidelium dentibus atteri.[22] Although, at a later date, Lombard maintained that this passage in Berengar's *confessio* meant *in sacramento tantum*,[23] neither Lanfranc nor Alger offer such an interpretation, although there is no doubt that Alger did not take it in a material sense.[24] He simply declares: . . . corpus Christi in sacramento manibus fidelium tenetur, frangitur, dentibus atteritur et ipsis incorporatur.[25] Whatever the interpretation of this statement may be, the Berengarian debate shows that the concept of a Eucharistic *sacramentum* deprived of its contents was not entirely new in Alger's time.

With reference to the visible species of bread and wine, Alger speaks of two *sacramenta*[26] or of "this twofold sacrament".[27] Even the title (if authentic) of the treatise uses the plural (*De Sacramentis . . .*).[28] At the same time, Alger insists that the two visible species are one because they have one and the same signification,[29] notwithstanding the fact that they are consecrated and named separately. This, as Alger puts it, is done ad discretionem figurae ut panis, dum dentibus teritur, carnem Christi in Passione attritam, et dum vinum in ore fidelium funditur, sanguinem de latere fusum signaret.[30] Hence we also call, separately, the bread "Body" and the wine "Blood", not as if we meant a lifeless body or believed in the Eucharistic Blood as being separated from its Body, but in commemoration of Christ's Passion.[31]

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[21] *De Sacr.* I, 19; PL 180, 797A. Cf. Ivo, *Decr.* II, 10; PL 161, 161A. Lanfranc, *Lib. de corp.*, 2· PL 150, 410A. Alger, *De Sacr.* I, 7; PL 180, 760BC.

[22] *De Sacr.* I, 19; PL 180, 797B. A. J. MacDonald, *Berengar*, p. 130, translates as follows: "and perceptibly not only in the Sacrament, but in reality, are touched and broken by the hands of the priest and ground by the teeth of the faithful.

[23] *Sent.* IV, 12, 3; ed. Quaracchi (1916) 811. MacDonald, *Berengar*, p. 400: "Peter Lombard challenged the formula submitted by Berengar by Humbert in 1059. The formula had said that the actual body of Christ was broken by the hands of the priest and torn by the teeth of the faithful. To this Peter refused to assent."

[24] On an earlier occasion (*De Sacr.* I, 13; PL 180, 785B), Alger writes that Augustine meant the visible form or the visible *sacramentum* when he said: per partes manducatur (*Ivo, Decr.* II, 8; PL 161, 151B). Alger explains: Fieri enim hoc dicit (Augustinus) in sacramento quod videtur, non in re sacramenti, quae non videtur, corpore scilicet Christi quod invisibile est.

[25] *De Sacr.* I, 19; PL 180, 796B. Cf. *De Mis.* I, 62· PL 180, 885A.

[26] *De Sacr.* I, 13; PL 180, 785C.

[27] *De Sacr.* 1, 19; PL 180, 796A: Hoc duplici sacramento.

[28] The manuscript which belongs to the library of Berlin has the title: Algerus scholasticus Leodiensis *De Sacramento corporis et sanguinis Domini.* Cf. Val. Rose, *Verzeichnis der lat. Handschriften* II, 1 (Berlin 1901) 184.

[29] *De Sacr.* II, 8; PL 180. 826B: Dicuntur autem duo diversa sacramenta panis et vinum quantum ad diversas suas species, cum tamen sint unum quantum ad unam eandemque suam significationem. Unde Augustinus sacrificium ecclesiae dicit doubus confici . . . Cf. Lanfranc, *Lib. de corp.*, 10; PL 150, 421B. Ivo, *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 152D. Alger, *De Sacr.* 1, 5; PL 180, 752C.

[30] *De Sacr.* II, 7; PL 180, 826A.

[31] *De Sacr.* II, 8; PL 180, 826B. J. A. MacDonald, *Berengar*, p. 382, makes the strange statement: "With Bruno of Köln and Guibert of Nogent, Alger holds that not only does the consecrated bread become flesh, but the wine becomes the soul of Christ." The passage quoted by MacDonald does not substantiate such a claim: . . . per sanguinem qui est sedes animae . . . ut sumpto corpore et anima Christi, toto Christo totus homo in anima et corpore vivificatur . . . nec caro sine sanguine nec sanguis sine carne, jure communicatur (*De Sacr.* II, 8; PL 180, 826D). Concerning this last sentence see the criticism voiced by St. Robert Bellarmine, *De Script. ecclesiasticis* (Brussels 1719) 246.

This symbolism and its sacramental explanation is another important aspect of Alger's sacramentology. It rests on the assumption or premise that, in some way, the entire celebration of the Mass is a *sacramentum*. The consecration is only part of this celebration. Here we may find the reason why Alger has so little to say about the form or forms of consecration. He touches upon them in passing where he shows that Christ is "substantially and truly" present in the Eucharist: Non futurum praedico, non absens aliquid denuntio, sed *Hoc* quod praesentialiter do *est corpus meum*, non figuratum seu verum ipsum quod pro vobis tradetur. *Hic est sanguis meus*, idem ipse qui pro vobis effundetur.[32]

Generally speaking, greater emphasis is placed by Alger on the material sacramental sign and its signification. Thus we learn that the baptismal water signifies the Holy Spirit as cleansing; the oil symbolizes the same Holy Spirit as strengthening and enlightening.[33] The material element is summed up in the following manner: In quatuor speciebus ecclesiae sacramenta maxime consistunt: aqua scilicet oleo pane et vino.[34] In these sacramental elements God did not seek their dignity but their "aptness".[35]

The sacramental form is more or less taken for granted with the exception of the baptismal form. Alger deals with it in the third part of his work on the Eucharist where he discusses a number of questions concerning sacramental validity. The problems of sacramental validity and form converge in such a way that we may treat them together. We have already noted Alger's stress on the divine invocation in his *Liber de misericordia*. In his treatise on the Eucharist this stress becomes perhaps even stronger. In the prologue, he refers to some erroneous opinions regarding the Eucharist. One of these errors is, to Alger's mind, based on the notion that a priest's sinfulness annuls the effect of the divine invocation and thus invalidates his power of consecration: Alii autem, gratiae Dei derogantes, dicunt sacerdotum malis meritis ita invocationem divini nominis annullari, ut eorum indigna consecratione non debeat panis in Christi carnem converti.[36]

The wording of this remark shows that "the invocation of the divine name", taken as a principle governing the question of sacramental validity, had been under debate. Its defenders must have held that it was just as applicable to the Eucharist as to Baptism. Its opponents, however, could not deny its application to Baptism because it was too well established in tradition; but they contended that, in the case of the Eucharist, a minister's demerits annulled the efficacy of the invocation. Yet Alger became more and more convinced that this principle offered the best means of placing the sacraments above all considerations of moral shortcomings. For Alger it is a crime to think that the invocation of the divine name might be annulled in the sacraments: Invocationem divini nominis in suis sacramentis annullari credere nefas est.[37]

In addition, Alger now begins to underline the importance of Christ as the true minister of sacraments. Thus he continues a line of development initiated mainly by St. Augustine's exegesis of *Hic est qui baptizat*. The Carolingian Paschasius Radbertus extended this idea in the following manner: Sicut ipse est qui baptizat, ita ipse est qui per Spiritum sanctum hanc suam efficit carnem et transfundit vinum in sanguinem.[38] In the succeeding century, Auxilius applied the principle to Ordination when he wrote: Sicut hic est qui baptizat i.e.

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[32] *De Sacr.* I, 12; PL 180, 776A. The form (Hoc est corpus meum) occurs in some quotations in *De Sacr.* I, 9 f.; PL 180, 767D; 768B; 769A; 771A.

[33] *De Sacr.* I, 8; PL 180, 761A.

[34] *De Sacr.* III, 4; PL 180, 836C.

[35] *De Sacr.* III, 4; PL 180, 837A: In sacramentalibus enim speciebus (Deus) non quaesivit dignitatem sed aptitudinem.

[36] *De Sacr.* prol., PL 180, 740C.

[37] *De Sacr.* III, 2; PL 180, 833B. Cf. *De Sacr.* II, 10; PL 180, 828A: . . . ad invocationem divini nominis quae in nullo sacramento annullari creditur.

[38] *Lib. de corp.*, 12, 1; PL 120, 1310C.

Christus, ita et hic est qui sanctificat.[39] He attributes these words to St. Jerome.[40] The text came early to Alger's attention for it is already found in his *Liber de misericordia*.[41] He now makes use of it to prove that heretics have a true priesthood.[42]

St. Peter Damian expressed the idea in a similar way: Sicut unus est qui baptizat, ita unus idemque est qui principaliter consecrat.[43] Damian holds that there are many ministers who baptize by virtue of their office, yet there is but one who really baptizes.[44] In the same fashion, there are many priests, yet there is but one who properly consecrates. In a truly Augustinian spirit, Damian declares of Christ: Hic est qui consecrat.[45]

In the belief that it was the teaching of St. Augustine, Alger cites the text derived from Paschasius on two occasions.[46] However, it contains an expression restricting the power of consecration to the minister *within* the Catholic Church: Intra catholicam ecclesiam . . . Even more serious was the traditional objection that outside the Church there is no place of sacrifice and that neither Christ nor the Holy Spirit is found among heretics.[47] Alger questions the usual interpretation of those texts and maintains that, without any exception, all sacraments come from the Church even among heretics who are, in this regard, connected with the Church because and in so far as they administer them properly (*rite*). Alger proposes his conclusion in the form of a question: Who can therefore doubt that no matter where it takes place the sacrament of the divine Sacrifice is *within* the Church because it is *of* the Church? Yet, as Alger insists, this concession refers only to the validity, not to the spiritual benefits, of the divine Sacrifice.[48] To the objection that there is no priesthood among heretics, Alger applies his distinction between *sacramentum* and *res* and declares that they have the priesthood only *sacramento tenus*.[49] But this distinction, we are told, is not applicable to the sacrament of the Eucharist. If the Eucharist is a "true sacrament" (*sacramentum verum*) among heretics, it cannot at the same time be void and deceitful (*inane et falsum*).[50]

Once the principle is accepted that, if performed properly, the valid administration of the sacraments is not dependent on personal merits, the question could be raised to what extent defects in the utterance of the "solemn words" affect sacramental validity. This mild form of casuistry is something distinctly new in the history of the sacraments and it appears that, at least materially speaking, Ivo's *Decretum* promoted this development. Alger poses the problem as follows: Quaeritur autem, cum solemnia verba et invocatio divini nominis tantae virtutis sint, ut omnia ecclesiae sacramenta perficiant, si in ipsis ex industria vel negligentia proferentis aliquod erroris vitium sonet, utrum etiam tunc sacramenta rite perficiant.[51] Alger replies with a distinction: those who by silence or poor articulation omit what is necessary in uttering the solemn words commit a serious sin. Hence the Church condemns their sacraments in such a way that she either repeats them (considering them non-existent) or completes them as she considers them imperfect. Yet she does this in such a manner as to acknowledge and approve what is valid in them.[52]

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[39] *In def. s. ordinationis* I, 9; ed. E. Duemmler (Leipzig 1866) 69.

[40] Sanctus denique Hieronymus in *Altercatione contra Luciferanos* ita disputat: Sicut hic . . . sanctificat.

[41] *De Mis.* I, 23; PL 180, 942A: Innocentius . . . videtur esse contrarius Hieronymus qui dicit ad Luciferanum: Sicut hic . . . sanctificat. Item ad eundem: Oro te . . . ad altare peccator.

[42] *De Sacr.* III, 10; PL 180, 843C: Ait Hieronymus ad Luciferanum: Sicut . . . sanctificat. Et paulo post: Oro te . . . peccator.

[43] *Lib. grat.*, 3; MGH Lib. I, 21.

[44] *Lib. grat.*, 4; p. 21: Sicut enim multi sunt qui baptizandi funguntur officio, et tamen unus est qui baptizat: ita, licet multi sint sacerdotes, unus tamen est qui proprie et specialiter consecrat.

[45] *Lib. grat.*, 5; p. 22.

[46] *De Mis. I*, 56; PL 180, 882D. *De Sacr.* III, 8; PL 180, 840AD. He attributes it to Augustinus in libro *De Corpore Domini*. Cf. *Marbodi epistola;* MGH Lib. III, 693 (date: about 1105). *Tract. pro clericorum conubio;* ibid.; p. 593: De qua re tractat beatus Augustinus sic: Vere et indubitanter inde scire debemus infra ecclesiam catholicam . . . cum fide communicatur. Gratian, *Decr.* C. 1 q. 1 c. 77. Lombard, *Sent.* IV, 13, 1; 815. Gandulphus, *Sent.* IV, 13; ed. J. de Walter (Wien 1924) 456. Robert Courçon, *Summa* (Ms. Bruges 247, f. 141): Unde Augustinus in libro *De Corpore Domini*: Intra . . .et sanguinem.

[47] *De Sacr.* III, 9; PL 180, 841D: Sed opponunt quia extra ecclesiam non est locus sacrificii nec est Christus nec Spiritus sanctus apud haereticos. Cf. *De Mis.* I, 57; PL 180, 883B.

[48] *De Sacr.* III, 9; PL 180, 842AB. Cf. A. Landgraf, 'Zur Lehre von der Konsekrationsgewalt des von der Kirche getrennten Priesters im 12. Jahrhundert', *Scholastik* 15 (1940) 204-227.

[49] *De Sacr.* III, 10; PL 180, 842C.

[50] *De Sacr.* III, 1; PL 180, 832C.

It is characteristic that, whenever possible, Alger endeavours to formulate a general principle. He tries to show his readers the root of or reason for the different treatment accorded to such sacraments by the Church. We learn from him that, since we have to utter the words and must have faith while administering the sacraments, both the words and faith are required in all sincerity, most of all faith, even if our tongue should err in its speech because of carelessness.[53] God examines our intention and faith rather than our external actions.[54] If an omission or an addition which gives rise to heresy is made, the sacrament is either invalid or useless.[55] If we insert some wrong words through carelessness, negligence or ignorance, the sacrament does not suffer because God looks at "the root of faith, not at the flower of speech".[56]

Alger heavily underlines the importance of faith. We may recall the passage: Extra ecclesiam non est fides neque meritum; quid potest valere sacramentum?[57] By faith, he said in the same work, are all the sacraments of the Church brought to completion.[58] Yet Baptism is *ratum* even if administered without faith, provided it is conferred "in the name of the Trinity".[59] The reason given by Alger is perhaps too general: ut omnia sacramenta suae gratiae esse deputentur. But it is particularly in the use of the trinitarian name that he sees the perfection and sum total of the Christian faith.[60] However, for Baptism to be *ratum* in the sense of spiritually profitable, the recipient has to be Catholic.[61] Alger never discusses the case of children baptized by heretics. Although the question was not yet fully clarified in Alger's day, those children are not necessarily included in the word "heretic", for a heretic is one "who does not follow the Catholic truth".[62]

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[51] *De Sacr.* III, 13; PL 180, 847CD.

[52] *De Sacr.* III, 13; PL 180, 847D: Unde sciendum est quia qui tacendo vel male proferendo quod debent in solemnibus verbis perfide peccant, eorum sacramenta ita damnat ecclesia, ut ea vel pro nullis reputando iteret vel pro imperfectis consummet: ita tamen ut quae in eis vera sunt agnoscat et approbet.

[53] *De Sacr.* III, 13; PL 180, 848B: Constat ergo quia, cum in sacramentis conficiendis et dicendum sit et credendum, utrumque sincere fieri oportet, maxime ne mens in fide titubet, etiam si lingua per incuriam in sermone erret.

[54] *Ibidem.*

[55] *De Sacr.* III, 13; PL 180, 848C.

[56] *De Sacr.* III, 13; PL 180, 848D.

[57] *De Mis.* I, 70; PL 180, 882B.

[58] *De Mis.* III, 7; PL 180, 936A: Quod fides sit necessaria facientibus sacramenta vel miracula . . . Fide enim omnia sacramenta ecclesiae complentur. He cites the famous Augustinian passage from *In Joh. Tract.* 80, 3: Detrahe . . . aliud est virtus manens.

[59] *De Sacr.* III, 14; PL 180, 852B: Quaeritur autem quare Christus prae caeteris Dei nominibus maxime in nomine Trinitatis baptisma consecrari voluerit adeo ut baptisma caeteris Dei nominibus praeter fidem factum sit irritum, in nomine autem Trinitatis etiam praeter fidem Trinitatis consecratum sit ratum . . .

[60] *Ibidem*: Quod autem in nomine Trinitatis hoc maxime voluit, ideo factum est quia in eo christianae fidei perfectio summaque consistit. Alger holds that martyrdom and faith may take the place of the Baptism of water: *De Sacr.* III, 7; PL 180, 838D.

[61] *De Sacr.* III, 12; PL 180, 846B: Astructum est haereticorum sacramenta, quia Christi sunt, catholicis, si eis discrete utantur, esse utilia, quae tamen pro certo sciendum est, ipsis haereticis vel eorum complicibus noxa esse et lethifera . . .

[62] *De Mis.* III, 2; PL 180, 931D. H. Weisweiler, *Die Wirksamkeit der Sakramente nach Hugo von St. Viktor* (Freiburg 1932) 88, n. 77, draws attention to a remark in a letter addressed to a monk (William) by Walter of Mortagne: Dixistis mihi, si dicta vestra bene recolo, quod non credatis firmiter peccatorum remissionem conferri parvulis ante tempus discretionis ab haeretico Christi baptismo baptizatis (L. d'Achéry, *Spicilegium* III (Paris 1923) 520. The text is here quoted as revised by L. Ott, 'Unters. zur theol. Brieflit. der Frühscholastik', *Beiträge* 34 (1937) 146.

We have already mentioned that one reason why we discover a certain amount of casuistry in Alger's discussion is Ivo's *Decretum*. Almost all the patristic texts collected by Alger to substantiate his principles are taken from Ivo's canonical collection.[63] Through the same source Alger knew that there was no uniform teaching on Baptism administered "in the name of Christ". Its validity was still defended by some contemporary scholars and the argument in its favour appealed to a principle dear to Alger. They reasoned: if Baptism administered in the name of God without the name of the Trinity is considered invalid (*irritum*), the invocation of the divine name is annulled as soon as we repeat such a Baptism.[64]

Alger retorts: Non est sacramentum Christi quod in errorem positi contra institutionem Christi faciunt; nec est vera divini nominis invocatio quia contra Christi praeceptum christianae fidei periclitatur perfectio.[65] The invocation, we learn, is not enough in itself. To be valid it must be trinitarian as prescribed or instituted by Christ. The rite of the Church must be observed and not changed.[66] As soon as a change in the ecclesiastical or liturgical rite is introduced by outsiders, Catholics can no longer approve, for such procedure would be heretical: Si haereticorum sacramenta ab eo ritu mutantur quem ecclesia instituit et obtinet, non sunt a catholicis approbanda quia mutata jam non sunt ecclesiastica sed haeretica.[67] It is worthy of note that in Alger's exposition the institution by Christ and the *ecclesiastica institutio* gradually merge into one. As long as the exact execution of the liturgical rite and especially the proper use of the "solemn words" are observed, heretical "perfidy" does not affect sacramental validity: Si autem solemnia verba non mutantur sed rite proferuntur et ipsa executio sacramenti rite perficitur, tunc haereticorum perfidia sacramenti veritatem non impedit quia, quod haeretici aliter non habent nec agunt quam vera ecclesia, non emendatur a catholicis sed approbatur.[68]

While changes made outside the Catholic communion are rejected by Alger as innovations destroying sacramental validity, regional differences in the liturgical customs of the Church are harmless: In una fide non nocet diversa consuetudo ecclesiae.[69] In such local differences as single and triple immersion the unifying element is the unity of faith.[70] Whenever we are faced with liturgical discrepancies in the Church, we should judge them according to the intention of those responsible for them. Therefore, a change of words or of the sacramental practice deemed valid among the faithful is considered invalid if encountered among heretics.[71]

III.

REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

A study of the general aspects of Alger's sacramentology should serve to determine and evaluate his achievements in relation to those who influenced his thought; it should also aid us in the appraisal of Alger's immediate or remote influence on later doctrinal developments. It has been estimated that Gratian borrowed about one hundred texts from the *Liber de misericordia*.[1] Much more valuable than this contribution of source material is the fact that the *dicta Gratiani* contain numerous explanations copied more or less *verbatim* from Alger's work.[2] Although Gratian had opinions of his own, especially with regard to the validity of sacraments, his teaching ought to be scrutinized in the light of Alger's doctrines, for it seems obvious that Gratian would not have copied Alger's personal comments on a number of patristic texts, had he not been at least in basic agreement with Alger's views. The fact that Gratian used the work shows that, at an early date, a handwritten copy of the *Liber de misericordia* had travelled as far as Bologna.

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[63] *De Sacr.* III, 13; PL 180, 848D ff.: *Decr.* I, 115, 237; 148; 161; 153; PL 161, 88C; 116C; 94A; 97B; 95A.

[64] *De Sacr* III, 13; PL 180, 850B: Sed opponitur quia, si baptisma Dei nomine sine Trinitatis nomine consecratum irritum judicatur, ergo divini nominis invocatio annullatur.

[65] *De Sacr.* III, 13; PL 180, 850BC.

[66] *De Sacr.* III, 13; PL 180, 850C: Illi nomen Domini non invocant qui contra fidem, mutato ecclesiae ritu, hoc faciunt.

[67] *De Sacr.* III, 13; PL 180, 850D-851A.

[68] *De Sacr.* III, 13; 180, 851A. The text is followed by: Unde Augustinus *De Ecclesiasticis regulis*: Si qui apud . . . ne santae Trinitatis invocatio vel confessio annulletur. Cf. N. M. Haring, 'The Augustinian axiom: Nulli sacramento injuria facienda est', *MedSt* 14 (1954) 89.

[69] *De Sacr.* III, 13; PL 180, 851B. Cf. St. Gregory, *Ep.* I, 41; MGH *Epp.* I, 57: In una fide nihil officit sanctae ecclesiae consuetudo diversa. Ivo, *Decr.* I, 130; PL 161, 91A. Abelard, *Sic et Non*, 112; PL 178, 1510C.

[70] *De Sacr.* III, 13; PL 180, 851BC.

[71] *De Sacr.* III, 13; PL 180, 851D: Mutatio verborum vel executionum sacramentalium quae fidelibus rata conceditur, apud haere-

The location of manuscripts is some indication of the popularity of a work. The first printed edition[3] of the *Liber de misericordia* is based on a manuscript which once belonged to Clairvaux and is now preserved at Troyes.[4] Another copy was known to be extant at the Cistercian abbey of Villers in Brabant. Mabillon used it for the publication of Alger's preface.[5] A third transcript was owned by the monastery Aulne-sur-Sambre (Belgium), a Cistercian community since 1147.[6] Casimir Oudin personally examined the manuscript and noted that Alger's name in it was spelled *Augerus*.[7] The library of Cambrai still possesses a copy which once belonged to the cathedral of that city.[8]

Did Alger's treatise on the Eucharist ever reach Bologna and attract Gratian's attention? The question is still open. G. Le Bras leans toward the view that Gratian did not make use of the work.[9] A list of texts common to both is given by A. Amanieu who seems to disagree with Le Bras.[10] Although it is uncertain whether Gratian was familiar with the work, we know that a copy of it entered the *Biblioteca Medicea Laurentiana* in Florence.[11] It is found there among works of St. Anselm of Canterbury and ends with the rubric: Explicit liber Anselmi Cantuarensis Archiepiscopi de corpore et sanguine Domini.[12] The date assigned to it is the thirteenth century, and its existence did not escape the notice of the great B. Hauréau.[13]

A close examination of texts common to Lombard's *Sentences* and Alger's tract on the Eucharist shows no direct interdependence, though some authors have expressed a contrary opinion.[14] Neither Hugh of St. Victor nor the author

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ticos irrita judicatur. The context shows that, in this case, *rata* and *irrita* mean valid and invalid. The same would seem to hold for *De Sacr*. III, 14; PL 180, 852B: . . . ut baptisma caeteris Dei nominibus praeter fidem factum sit irritum; in nomine autem Trinitatis, etiam praeter fidem Trinitatis consecratum sit ratum.

[1] G. LeBras, 'Alger de Liége et Gratien', *Rev. des sc. phil, et théol.* 20 (1931) 5-26. Cf. St. Kuttner,'Zur Frage der theol. Vorlagen Gratians', *Zeitschr. der Savigny-Stiftung*, Kan. Abt. 23 (1934) 243-267.

[2] See A. Amanieu's article on Alger in *Dict. de Droit can.* I (Paris 1935) 397 ff.

[3] Martène-Durand, *Thes. nov. Anecd.* V (Paris 1717) 1019-1138. The edition in PL 180, 857-968 is a reprint from the *Thesaurus.* J. Mabillon (1632-1707) had already planned an edition as announced in the *Vetera Analecta* (1675-85). He published Alger's preface in the *Vetera Analecta* I (Paris 1923) 130 f. Cf. C. Oudin, *Commentarius de script. ecclesiae antiquis* II (Leipzig 1722) 1118.

[4] Troyes, Bibl mun., *lat.* 443, fols. 1-138 (including the *Liber de Sacramentis*). Shelf-number in Clairvaux: 0.54. Date: s. XII. Cf. *Cat. Gén.* II (Paris 1855) 198 f.

[5] C. Oudin, *Commentarius*, p. 1118.

[6] PL 180, 857. Brigué, *Alger*, p. 19.

[7] C. Oudin, *Commentarius*, p. 1118.

[8] Cambrai, Bibl, mun., *lat.* 562, fols. 4-48. Date: s. XII ex. Previous library number: 311. See *Cat. Gén.* XVII, 215 f.

[9] Alger de Liége et Gratien, p. 26.

[10] *Dict. de Droit can.* I, 391-393.

[11] Plut. XIII, cod. VIII, fols. 104-127. See Angelo Maria Bandini, *Cat. cod. lat. Bibl. Medic. Laurentianae* IV (Florence 1777) 432-437.

[12] Bandini, p. 436. In addition the volume contains works of St. John Damascene and St. Bernard.

[13] *Notices et extr.* XXXVIII, 2 (Paris 1906) 419.

[14] With reference to O. Baltzer, *Die Sent. des P. Lombardus* (Leipzig 1902) 5, J. de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique* (Paris 1914 and 1948) 146 and 242 (in the respective editions) declares rather sweepingly: Paschase, Lanfranc, Alger de Liége sont souvent transcrits sans être nommés.

of the *Summa sententiarum* appear to have used the work. But this does not mean that it was not read at all.

It is mentioned in the early library catalogues of Pontigny (13th century), Mettlach (*anno* 1243), and Corbie (*anno* 1200).[15] Before the year 1127, that is to say before Alger's death, the copy now belonging to the library of Berlin (*Ms.* theol. lat. quart. 120), at present preserved at the library of the University of Tuebingen, was sent by Osto from Afflighem (Belgium) to Maria Laach (Germany).[16] A contemporary entry tells the reader the donor's name: Liber sanctae Mariae in Lacu quem dedit ecclesiae Osto Monachus. Pro hoc memor sit eius Deus.[17] At some date during the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries the following information was added: In quo (libro) continentur tres libri domini Algeri scholastici monachi coenobii Corbeyensis de sacramento altaris. Item tractatus eiusdem de gratia et libero arbitrio.[18]

We have already mentioned the twelfth-century manuscript of Troyes which contains both works.[19] The library of Cambrai also owns a copy containing the two treatises.[20] In the Public Library of Arras we find an incomplete copy written in the thirteenth century.[21] It once belonged to Saint-Vaast[22] in the same city, as the entry reveals: Bibliothecae monasterii Sancti Vedasti Atrebatensis. 1628. B. 48. Also incomplete (if still extant) is the twelfth-century manuscript (766.40) of Darmstadt.[23] Likewise incomplete is the transcript found at Nîmes.[24] We also find the tract in the Latin manuscript 812 of the Bibliothèque Nationale. It was written at the end of the thirteenth century and later bound together with a lectionary of an earlier date.[25] The same library possesses an anonymous copy (lat. 3482), written in the second half of the twelfth century and analyzed rather summarily by B. Hauréau.[26] It belonged to the abbey of Clairmarais[27] and formed part of the Colbert collection (Colbert, No. 3650). Alger's work on fols. 1-50 is followed by an incomplete collection of sentences

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[15] M. Manitius, *Gesch. der lat. Lit.* III (Munich 1931) 104.

[16] Osto's letter accompanying it has been edited by C. Coppens in *Ons geest. Erf* 21 (1947) 92-98. Part of it is transcribed by Val. Rose, *Die Handschriften-Verzeichnisse der k. Bibl. zu Berlin*, Bd. XIII: *Verzeichnis der lat. Handschriften* II, 1 (Berlin 1901) 184 f. The letter covers four folios. V. Rose ascribed the manuscript and the letter to the second half of the twelfth century but the writer of the letter says: Itaque misi vobis hunc *De Corpore Domini* librum, a viro erudito nunc nostri ordinis domestico luculenter editum.

[17] I owe this information to the kindness of Dr. Virneisel, Tübingen. See also Val. Rose, *Handschriften-Verzeichnis der kgl. Bibl. zu Berlin* XIII, n. 358. Jul. Wegeler, *Das Kloster Laach* (Bonn 1854) 13, says of Osto who sent the manuscript: Butzbach hat uns den Namen eines gleich anfänglich in Laach verweilenden, eigentlich aber dem Kloster Haffligem angehörigen Mönches aufbewahrt, nämlich den des sich durch seine Kenntnisse in geistlichen und weltlichen Schriften, durch seine Beredsamkeit und seine Sprachkunde auszeichnenden Mönches Osto.

[18] A previous entry has been erased; it read: Liber Algeri scholastici De Corpore Christi. The erroneous entry which makes Alger a monk of Corbey may have caused the error found in Trithemius, *De Script. eccl.*, c. 382, ed. Fabricius, *Bibl.* (Hamburg 1718) 84. See also V. Rose, p. 184.

[19] Troyes, Bibl, mun. *lat.* 443, fols. 1-138, according to *Cat. Gén.* II (Paris 1855) 198 f.

[20] Cambrai, Bibl. mun. *lat.* 562, fols. 4-84 (*De Mis.*) and 84-159 (*De Sacr.*). Cf. *Cat. Gén.* XVII, 215 f., and *Notices et extr.* XXXVIII, 2 (Paris 1906) 420.

[21] Arras, Bibl. publ. 664, fols. 37-52. Owner: Bibliothecae monasterii Sancti Vedasti Atrebatensis 1628. B. 48.

[22] *Cat. Gén.* IV (Paris 1872) 264 f. The manuscript contains the work on the Eucharist by Guitmund of Aversa, a sermon by Ivo of Chartres (*De sacramentis nephytorum habitus in synodo*), an explanation of the Lord's Prayer by bishop Goslenus and a sermon on penance (Augustine?).

[23] F. W. E. Roth, 'Mitteil. aus Darmstaedter Handschriften', *Neues Archiv* 13 (1888) 595. Previous owner: Baron Huepsch. Its provenance is of special interest because it once belonged to St. James's in Alger's native city of Liége. It contains only the first two books of the work on the Eucharist.

[24] Ms. Nîmes 52, 8, s. XII and XIII. *Cat. Gén.* VII (Paris 1885) 559; Incipit liber *de corpore Christi* in sacramento altaris. The work is preceded by the eulogy of Nicholas of Liége. The catalogue states: La fin manque à partir du milieu de la seconde partie. PL 180, 741-850.

[25] Ph. Lauer, *Cat. Gén.* I (Paris 1939) 282 f.

[26] *Notices et extr.* XXXVIII, 2 (Paris 1906) 419-420.

[27] On fol. 106: Liber Sanctae Mariae de Claromaresc. with anathema.

Prima rerum origo (fols. 50v-106), the explicit of which reads: sub habitu regulari vel clericali religiose famulari decretum est.[28] We should finally mention a copy written in the thirteenth century and preserved at Alençon.[29] It was once owned by the monastery of Saint-Evroult (No. 97). The first printed edition was brought out by Erasmus.[30] Many others followed.[31] We have previously noted that the edition reproduced by Migne (PL 180, 739-856) is that of J. B. Malou, published at Louvain in 1847.

If we recall that already during Alger's lifetime a copy of this work was sent from Afflighem to Maria Laach we may well conclude that it was in demand. And if we remember the warm recommendation accorded to it by Nicholas of Liége and Peter the Venerable, we understand why such a demand was not restricted to Alger's immediate fellow monks. Comparatively speaking, it was indeed an excellent piece of work, written by Alger in clericatu adhuc positus,[32] i.e., before entering the monastery of Cluny (1121). Although Alger's direct and immediate influence on the development of Eucharistic doctrines seems to have been negligible, the exposition in itself constitutes a remarkable achievement.

While his work on the Eucharist remained relatively unknown, his *Liber de misericordia et justitia* lived on, not so much in itself as in its influence on Gratian and, through Gratian, on Peter Lombard and his numerous commentators. Its author was convinced that the canons used in it were occasionally different from, not contrary to, one another. This conviction proved to be very useful in its application not only to canon law but also to theology. The remote origin and general choice of Alger's source material[33] interested us in the present study less than the background of his theological education and formation. Thanks to extensive personal studies Alger became deeply and genuinely Augustinian in his approach to sacramental problems but we found that, despite some vigorous criticism, he was quite strongly influenced by St. Peter Damian who was, it seems, more Augustinian in disposition than in reality.

It was Damian who inspired him to stress the fundamental importance of what had been called "the invocation of the divine name" in Baptism. Yet it was Alger who went further by proposing it as a general sacramental principle regulating the question of validity. He formulated it in different ways. On one occasion he states: Quantum ad se bona sunt quae ad invocationem divini nominis celebrantur.[34] On another occasion he declares: Omnia sacramenta, a quocumque in Trinitatis nomine consecrata, sunt quantum ad se vera et sancta.[35] We have been able to show that this general principle is nothing but a skilful extension of an ancient rule in which re-Baptism is rejected ne sanctae Trinitatis nomen, in quo baptizatum est, videatur annullari.[36] Neither St. Peter Damian nor any contemporary theologian[37] dared to propose as precise and succinct a general formula as Alger did when he maintained: "All sacraments, no matter who administers them in the name of the Trinity, are in themselves true and holy." In fact, it must have struck Alger's contemporaries as a rather bold formula since it includes all sacraments (as understood in his time) and places no restriction whatever on the moral quality of the minister. On the contrary, he stressed it even more in later years when its applicability to the Blessed Eucharist had apparently been denied.[38] He tells us that "it is a crime to believe that the invocation of the divine name in His sacraments may be frustrated."[39]

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[28] I owe this information to the courtesy of Mlle d'Alverny who notes that "the script seems circa 1200. It is quite possible that the ms. was copied in Clairmarais". Concerning the collection *Prima rerum origo*, see H. Weisweiler, 'Das Schrifttum der Schule Anselms von Laon', *Beiträge* 33 (1936) 4 ff.

[29] Bibl. mun. 24, fols. 25-86. *Cat. Gén.* II (Paris 1888) 499 f. B. Hauréau refers to this manuscript in *Notices et extr.* XXXVIII, 2 (Paris 1906) 420.

[30] Basel-Freiburg 1530. Cf. *Hist. litt. de la France* XI (Paris 1869) 164 and *Realencycl. für prot. Theol. und Kirche* I (Leipzig 1896) 364.

[31] Brigué, *Alger de Liége*, pp. 24 f.

[32] PL 180, 738A.

[33] See M. Manitius, *Gesch. der lat. Lit. des Mittelalters* III (Munich 1931) 101 f. L. Brigué, pp. 65 ff.

[34] *De Mis.* III, 50; PL 180, 954C.

[35] *De Mis.* III, 2; PL 180, 932B.

[36] *De Mis.* I, 52; PL 180, 880B.

[37] Abelard was no exception. However, in his *Theologia 'Scholarium'* I, 15; PL 178, 1007A he writes: Qui (Deus) et per indignos ministros gratiae suae dona non deserens, quotodie sacramenta ecclesiae ad invocationem sui nominis spiritualiter conficit in salutem credentium. The same statement occurs in his *Theologia 'Summi Boni'* I; PL 178, 1140D. In the passage preceding both statements we should note that, in the former, we read: quibus utitur tamquam ministris (1007A), while, in the latter, the word *ministris* is changed to instrumentis.

We can truthfully say that Alger never wavered in the defence of a general rule for which St. Peter Damian had given him the starting point. The principle was held up against him in his defence of the unleavened Eucharistic bread in opposition to the Greek custom. He writes: Astruunt etiam quia sicut ad invocationem divini nominis, quae in nullo sacramento annullari creditur sed sola per Dei gratiam omnia in omnibus operatur, non obsunt vel prosunt sacerdotum merita quo magis vel minus fiant ecclesiastica sacramenta, sic nec color vel species aliqua panis obest vel prodest quo minus vel magis corpus Christi fiat, dum tantummodo sit panis et vinum quorum substantia, ut Christus praecipit, in substantiam corporis et sanguinis transeat.[40] In retrospect one may be able to point to weaknesses in Alger's general sacramental principle. Yet what is much more significant is Alger's search for a rule which would put an end to many vexatious questions in sacramentology. A later generation laid greater stress on the sign of the Cross. Thus we read in Gandulphus: Quod omnia sacramenta cum signo crucis perficiuntur.[41] A text attributed to Pope Stephen and presumably copied from Gratian[42] leads him to the following conclusion: Patet ergo sacramentum aliquod sine crucis signaculo in ecclesia confici non posse.[43]

To St. Peter Damian Alger also owes the insistence on the basically Augustinian principle that the valid administration of sacraments is above human merits or demerits because it is Christ who baptizes, ordains and consecrates. He is the "invisible Priest"[44] and, as a consequence, even heretics have a true priesthood, if only *sacramento tenus*, i.e., a priesthood without grace.[45] It has justly been regretted that the role of the mystical Body as reflected in Alger's doctrine was later overshadowed by other considerations.[46] St. Augustine repeats again and again that it is Christ who baptizes. But in Damian's and Alger's time it took courage to defend the position that it is Christ who consecrates and that, for this very reason, even heretics could truly consecrate the Holy Eucharist, the sacrament of Christian unity.[47]

However, theological opinion was about to change in Alger's favour. In the second quarter of the twelfth century, Gerhoh of Reichersberg noted in a letter to Pope Innocent II (1130-1143): Confutavimus haereticum sensum quorundam asserentium Christi corpus extra ecclesiam etiam ab excommunicatis confici.[48]

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[38] Cf. *De Sacr.*, prol.; PL 180, 740C.

[39] *De Sacr.* II, 10; PL 180, 828A.

[40] *De Sacr.* III, 2; PL 180, 833B: Invocationem divini nominis in suis sacramentis annullari credere nefas est.

[41] *Sent.* IV, 87; ed. J. de Walter (Wien 1924) 434.

[42] D. 5 c. 10 de cons.

[43] *Sent.* IV, 87; p. 435.

[44] *De Sacr.* I, 10; II, 3; III, 8; PL 180, 771A; 820A; 841A. In dependence on Ivo, *Decr.* II, 4; PL 161, 140A, Alger attributes the text to Eusebius Emissenus. The original reading is *visibilis sacerdos* as in Pseudo-Jerome (PL 30, 281A). The reading *invisibilis sacerdos* was very common, however. See the text in PL 67, 1053A (Caesarius of Arles) and PL 83, 1225C (Isidore). Cf. E. M. Buytaert, *L'Héritage litt. d'Eusèbe d'Emèse* (Louvain 1949) 159.

[45] *De Sacr.* III, 10; PL 180, 842C.

[46] H. Weisweiler, *Die Wirksamkeit*, p. 3 f.

[47] The Augustinian rule: Nulli sacramento injuria facienda est is not quoted by Alger. He may have been aware of the fact that, in his time, its applicability to Holy Orders was controversial. An interesting echo of such an controversy is found in the collection *Dubitatur a quibusdam*; ed. H. Weisweiler, *Beiträge* 33 (1936) 351 and 353.

[48] *Ep.* 21; PL 193, 585A. Cf. H. Weisweiler, pp. 352 f.

But he had to admit that his view was outdated and met with strong resistance: O quantos in hac sententia contrarios habui.[49] Gerhoh's view was shared by Hugh of Amiens (d. 1164) who adopted the principle: Qui minister non est, nihil facit.[50] The author of the *Tractatus de scismaticis,* written in 1165 or 1166, also sides with Gerhoh and proposes the following distinction: Sciendum itaque est aliud esse sacramentum, aliud rem sacramenti, atque aliud effectum sacramenti. Panis igitur et vinum, quae a catholicis sacerdotibus in altari ponuntur, ante consecrationem est tantum sacramentum, post consecrationem et sacramentum est (i.e. signum sacrae rei, hoc est corporis Christi) et res sacramenti, i.e. verum corpus Christi: sacramentum in specie, res in corporis veritate.[51] It should be noted that the phrase *tantum sacramentum* is here applied to the Eucharistic species prior to its consecration, an important distinction for understanding the author's theory concerning the reception of the Eucharist. He teaches that those who are worthy receive the *sacramentum,* its *res* and *effectus*, i.e., the remission of sins. Catholics who are unworthy receive only the *sacramentum* and its *res*. Heretics and schismatics receive the *sacramentum* only as it does not contain the Eucharistic Body.[52] The supposition was that their ministers could not consecrate the Eucharist validly.

In Alger's day, the number of theologians holding similar views was still large as can be gathered from the many objections he endeavours to answer.[53] His solution of the problem again reminds us of St. Peter Damian who had insisted on two elements viz., on what he calls the "Catholic or ecclesiastical administration" and the invocation of the divine name, both of which he considers prerequisites at once necessary and sufficient for valid Orders.[54] Alger, too, finds here the vital link between the Church and heretics who still adhere to her liturgical rites: Ex ea parte ecclesiae connectuntur, quia ea rite celebrant.[55] But Alger would not agree that, as a general rule, valid sacraments are also useful outside the Church. "Since the Son of God finds no place among them where to rest His head, neither Christ nor the Holy Spirit is among them by grace."[56] Here is indeed the fundamental point of disagreement between Alger and St. Peter Damian. Even if Alger had granted that simoniacs are not heretics but only schismatics, his stand would have been the same,[57] for he felt that, in this matter, Damian's teaching was not in accord with that of St. Augustine.

Only with regard to Baptism was Alger ready to make concessions, especially in the case of necessity because "necessity knows no law".[58] Hence he raises the question: Videamus de baptismo si, dum ministratur a malo, sit verum et fructuosum, etiamsi cogniti fuerint peccatores vel haeretici.[59] He holds that it is *ratum* even if administered by a layman or a pagan in case of necessity.[60] In such cases Alger granted not only the *veritas* or validity of Baptism but also its *utilitas*. When therefore Alger declares in the same work: Nulla haereticorum sacramenta sunt rata,[61] he means to deny that their sacraments confer grace, except in the case of Baptism conferred in the case of emergency. Such would presumably be the case of an infant baptized by a heretic.

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[49] *Ep.* 21; PL 193, 577C.

[50] *Dial.* V, 11; PL 192, 1204C. See also his letter in PL 192, 1227B and MGH *Lib.* III, 285.

[51] MGH *Lib.* III, 127.

[52] *Ibidem.*

[53] *De Sacr.* III, 1 ff.; PL 180, 831A.

[54] *Lib. grat.*, 6; MGH Lib. I, 24. Cf. N. M. Haring, 'The Augustinian axiom', p. 98.

[55] *De Sacr.* III, 9; PL 180, 842B.

[56] *De Sacr.* III, 9; PL 180, 842B: Cum Filius hominis apud eos non inveniat ubi caput suum reclinet. Nec ipse Christus nec Spiritus sanctus apud eos est per gratiam. A. J. MacDonald, *Berengar,* p. 387, has this to say about Alger's doctrine: "Heretical Eucharists are therefore valid, as in the case of Baptism. But having made this generous concession he tries to draw a distinction between the sacramental validity of heretical Eucharists and the general effect of grace mediated by Christ and the Holy Spirit."

[57] Cf. *De Mis.* III, 4; PI 180, 932D: Quod schismaticorum baptisma verum quidem est sed non prodest quamdiu sunt in schismate.

[58] *De Mis.* III, 55; PL 180, 956D.

[59] *De Mis.* I, 52; PL 180, 879D.

[60] *De Mis.* I, 55; PL 180, 882C: Quod baptisma est ratum etiam a lacis pro aliqua necessitate datum.

Although Alger does not pose or discuss this particular question, we know that shortly before the synod of Piacenza (1095) Bernold was asked by the Apostolic Legate Gebehard to state his doctrine "on the salvation of infants baptized by excommunicated ministers."[62] Bernold holds that they receive the remission of sins as those adults do who are baptized by heretics *non ficto corde sive ignoranter*.[63] Alger touches the problem in his tract on the Eucharist: sola fide sine baptismo salvantur homines ut latro; et solo baptismate sine fide ut pueri, sed tunc tantum cum non contemptus religionis sed articulus necessitatis alterutrum excludit.[64] It would be an exaggeration to say that Alger is clear on this point but his exposition agrees with his opinion that a certain amount of emergency or necessity is required to accept "Baptism without faith" as sufficient for salvation. The difficulty, it would seem, was caused mainly by the notion that the minister's or sponsor's faith somehow affected not the validity but the spiritual efficacy of Baptism. We may recall Alger's words: "Outside the Church there is neither faith nor merit; what then is the use of sacraments?"[65] We have also noted that, on the strength of a papal decretal, Alger distinguishes between *sacramenta rata* and *non rata* among heretics. As a consequence he speaks of a *baptisma ratum* which is at the same time "useless and harmful because it is without the sanctification of the Spirit."[66] This theory hardly applies to infant Baptism but Alger could have said that infants are not heretics and consequently not affected by this rule. Yet this would not have settled the issue entirely. As far as the *utilitas sacramenti* is concerned he was dominated by the centuries-old conviction that its author, the Holy Spirit, is not found outside the Church.

In this sense, Bruno of Segni wrote in his *Libellus de symoniacis* during Alger's life time: Ubi autem fides catholica non est, ibi baptisma non operatur. Unde et qui extra ecclesiam baptizatur, priusquam ad ecclesiam redeat, non solvitur a peccatis. Numquam enim nisi infra ecclesiam fit remissio peccatorum.[67] He concedes the possibility of one exception: Potest tamen fieri, ut aliquis fidelis quacumque occasione extra ecclesiam baptizetur qui, quoniam mente in ecclesia est, extra quoque recipiat remissionem peccatorum.[68] He does not explicitly except infants, which would have been so easy, had he been certain that they were an exception. After referring to *Rom.* 14:23, Hugh of Amiens declares in a letter: Christianus igitur, licet habeat baptismi sacramentum, dum aberrat a fide, nullum facit bonum. He is fully convinced that "he who is without faith performs no good work."[69] These views were by no means rare in Alger's day. They reflect a certain Cyprianism of which even St. Augustine found it hard to free himself.

For Alger "the devil is better than a heretic" because the former believes and the latter does not.[70] However, he admits that there are varying degrees of unbelief. Faith outside the Church may be imperfect or corrupt or reduced to nothingness (*annullata*). As for sinful ministers within the Church, Alger pronounces the rule: Perfecta fides perfectum sacramentum tribuit. But concerning heretics he states the rule: Corrupta fides imperfectum sacramentum tribuit.[71] Since the Paulianists rejected the very name of the Trinity, all their sacraments, including Baptism, were condemned as non-existent. Since, on the other hand, Arians have a corrupt faith, the Church accepts their (imperfect) Baptism but completes it by penance and imposition of hands.[72] Wherever the faith in the Trinity is intact, the Church only completes or perfects what corrupt faith was unable to accomplish. She acknowledges the *sacramentum semel impositum* of Baptism or Holy Orders.

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[61] *De Mis.* III, 19; PL 180, 940B.

[62] *De Reordinatione vitanda et de salute parvulorum qui ab excommunicatis baptizati sunt;* MGH Lib. II, 150.

[63] *Ibidem,* p. 155. The objection reads in typical fashion: Sed obicitur quod haeretici nec Spiritum sanctum dare valeant nec peccatorum remissam . . . Et hoc obicitur quod sancti patres parvulos in haeresi baptizatos per manus impositionem in catholicam recipiendos fore non dicerent, si penitus illos inculpabiles esse judicarent.

[64] *De Sacr.* III, 7; PL 180, 839D. See Augustine, *De Bapt.* IV, 22, 29; CSEL 51, 257. Ivo, *Decr.* I, 177; PL 161, 104BC.

[65] *De Mis.* I, 70; PL 180, 887B.

[66] *De Mis.* III, 24; PL 180, 942D.

[67] *Lib. de symon.*, 11; MGH *Lib.* II, 555.

[68] *Ibidem.*

[69] *Ep. ad Matth.*; MGH Lib. II, 286 or PL 192, 1229C: Qui fide caret, nullum bonum opus habet.

[70] *De Mis.* III, 6; PL 180, 935D.

Although, as we have seen, the younger Alger makes no attempt to define the meaning of either *sacramentum* in general or of this Augustinian use of the word in particular,[73] he clearly teaches that it is a reality which remains even in apostates, in heretics and in those condemned by the Church.[74] Bernold had already pointed out that St. Augustine's doctrine included those condemned by the Church[75] whereas others taught that in condemning a person the Church exercised the power to annul valid sacraments, except Baptism.[76] But both the Augustinian doctrine and terminology were soon commonly accepted. To quote Ivo of Chartres: Sicut enim sacramentum ordinationis . . . semel acceptum manet in ordinatis sic sacramentum conjugii.[77] We may also quote Hugh of Amiens who distinguishes carefully between the priestly office and the lasting *sacramentum* when he writes: Quod si (sacerdos) per ecclesiam ab officio deponitur, manet ei sacramentum semel impositum.[78] In the school of Laon the theory is recorded: Alii vero (dicunt) semel suscepto ordinis sacramento numquam postea carere nec conficiendi potestate . . . sed ab officio suspendi posse. Et hi auctoritatem Augustini in multis locis habere videntur. Dicit enim: Nulli sacramento facienda est injuria.[79] The opposition proclaimed the principle: Sicut per ministerium hominis (potestas) collata est, ita per ministerium hominis potest auferri.[80] Such ministers, they maintained, must be considered laymen after the priestly power is taken away from them.[81] There was a rather practical aspect to the distinction between the office and the power of the priesthood. Hugh of Amiens states it bluntly: "The priestly office is interdicted to so many, yet the *sacramentum* is not taken away from them."[82] The permanence of Holy Orders is likewise aimed at in Hugh's sentence: Sacramentum semel susceptum in susceptore manet.[83] The same terminology is adopted by Robert Pulleyn: Notandum autem quod sacramentum semel impositum cum vita permaneat: bono utique bonum, malo autem ad malum. Unde rebaptizari aut reordinari non licet.[84] The distinction between grace and the lasting *sacramentum* of Holy Orders is also indicated in Alger's expression: sacerdos . . . solo sacramento,[85] which is of Augustinian origin and adopted on several occasions by Ivo of Chartres.[86]

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[71] *De Mis.* III, 6; PL 180, 935D.

[72] *De Mis.* III, 8; PL 180, 936BC.

[73] See *De Mis.* III, 83; PL 180, 965D: *De Bono conjugali* 24, 32; CSEL 41, 226. Cf. Ivo, *Ep.* 73; PL 162, 93D: Sacerdotii autem ordinem, sicut dicit idem Augustinus in libro *De Bono conjugali,* qui semel acceperint, non privantur, licet aliqui pro aliquibus culpis ab officio removeantur. Alger attributes the text to Augustinus in *Genesi ad litteram.* Cf. *De Sacr.* III, 10; PL 180, 842D.

[74] *De Mis.* III, 84; PL 180, 966D: . . . Constat in omnibus tam apostatis quam haereticis vel damnatis permanere Christi sacramenta.

[75] *De Damnatione schism.,* 30; MGH *Lib.* II, 58. Date: 1076. Cf. *De Sacr. excomm.,* 10; p. 93.

[76] *Ep. Bernardi ad Adalbertum,* 35 MGH *Lib.* II, 43.

[77] *Ep.* 153; PL 162, 160A.

[78] *Epistola;* MGH Lib. II, 285.

[79] The collection *Dubitatur a quibusdam;* ed. H. Weisweiler, *Beitraege* 33 (1936) 351.

[80] H. Weisweiler, pp. 352 f.

[81] H. Weisweiler, p. 353: Illumque, cui aufertur (potestas), dicunt postea inter laicos reputari.

[82] MGH *Lib.* II, 285: Officium enim sacerdotale quam multis interdicitur sed eis sacramentum non aufertur.

[83] *Ibidem;* p. 286.

[84] *Sent.* VII, 14; PL 186, 927C.

[85] *De Sacr.* III, 11; PL 180, 844C.

[86] Ivo, *Ep.* 73; PL 162, 93C: Augustinus contra scripta Petiliani. It occurs twice in

In his work on the Eucharist, Alger takes up an Augustinian term describing this lasting *sacramentum* as "a certain consecration" given in both Baptism and Holy Orders.[87] Ivo of Chartres writes in the same sense: Sacramenti tamen accepit sanctitatem.[88] As a result of this consecration even heretics have what Alger calls a *sacerdotium omnino integrum* with the power of celebrating Holy Mass.[89] Alger knew quite well that others derived the power of consecration from the priestly office.[90] Although heretics have the priesthood, as we have seen, only *sacramento tenus*,[91] their Sacrifice of the Mass can be *salutare* for well-meaning Catholics attending it.[92] Alger explicitly states and proves that such is the teaching of St. Augustine.

Alger's deliberate return to the sacramental doctrines of St. Augustine is equally apparent in his definition of the word *sacramentum*. We have noted that in this respect the Berengarian controversy had revealed a deplorable lack of well-defined terms. When Berengar proposed his definitions of *sacramentum* and used them to argue his point, the theologians opposing him were not sufficiently prepared to discuss the speculative value of those definitions. However, they did not deny their Augustinian origin.[93] Yet they could have pointed out that Berengar had selected them for a definite purpose and that St. Augustine and the other Christian writers had known and used the word *sacramentum* in a much wider sense. The theologians who opposed Berengar either ignored his definitions or refused to accept them. Lanfranc especially clearly expressed his unwillingness to accept Berengar's restriction on the current usage.

Alger's difficulties were aggravated by his principal source, Ivo's *Decretum*. Ivo had incorporated most of Berengar's definitions all of which were chosen to determine the "visible sign" as *sacramentum* to contradistinguish the *sacramentum* from its invisible *res*. We may assume that Alger examined the accuracy of Ivo's[94] first definition which Alger proposes as: Sacramentum visibile invisibilis rei sacramentum est i.e. sacrum signum.[95] The changes made by Alger are very skilful and far from trivial. The first word (*sacramentum*) replaces Augustine's *sacrificium*. The word *rei* is a substitute for the original *sacrificii*. Thus Alger arrived at two elements: the visible *sacramentum* and its invisible *res*. And Alger "demands that the distinction be kept clear."[96]

The second definition proposed by Alger plainly points to Ivo's *Decretum* where we find the same vague reference to its origin: *Item* or *et alibi*. The definition reads: Sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma.[97] Both Ivo and Abelard [98] must have used Berengar's writings. Abelard, however, follows Berengar's letter rather than his *De Sacra Coena*. This accounts for the fact that both Berengar and Abelard claim to have found this definition in an Augustinian letter: *in quadam epistola*.[99]

These definitions were bound to lead to conflict in any attempt to reconcile them with texts erroneously attributed to the same St. Augustine. Lanfranc,

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Ivo's *Ep.* 224; PL 162, 229A.

[87] *De Sacr.* III, 10; PL 180, 843AD: Augustine, *Contra ep. Parm.* II, 13, 28, CSEL 51, 79.

[88] *Ep.* 224; PL 162, 228D.

[89] *De Sacr.* III, 10; PI 180, 843D.

[90] *De Sacr.* III, 10; PL 180, 842C. Cf. Paschasius, *De Corp.*, 12, 3; PL 120, 1313B.

[91] *De Sacr.* III, 10; PL 180, 842B.

[92] *De Sacr.* III, 11; PL 180, 844B.

[93] See 'Berengar's Definitions of Sacramentum', *MedSt* 10 (1948) 112.

[94] *Decr.* II, 8; PL 161, 148C: Sacrificium visible invisibile sacrificii sacramentum i.e. sacrum signum est.

[95] *De Sacr.* I, 4; PL 180, 751C. See Augustine, *De Civ. Dei* X, 5; PL 41, 283: Sacrificium ergo visible invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum i.e. sacrum signum est. Lanfranc, *Lib. de corp.*, 12; PL 150, 422D. See also Abelard, *Sic et Non*, 117; PL 178, 1534C: Idem in libro X *De Civitate Dei*: Sacrificium visible invisibilis (sacrificii) sacramentum i.e. sacrum signum est.

[96] A. J. MacDonald, *Berengar*, p. 385.

[97] *De Sacr.* I, 4; PL 180, 751C.

[98] *Sic et Non*, 117; PL 178, 1534C-1535A.

[99] PL 178, 1535A. Berengar, *Ep. contra Almannum;* ed. Martène-Durand, *Thes. nov. anecd.* IV (Paris 1717) 112E.

we have noted, refused to restrict the use of *sacramentum* as advocated by Berengar. He continued to use it in a wider sense.[1] Without being illogical he could say of the Eucharist: Christus ergo est Christi sacramentum,[2] a statement which would neither be compatible with Berengar's definition nor with the logical use of the terminology by those who accepted them. Lanfranc could agree with Berengar's interpretation of an Augustinian text "provided that the word *sacramentum* is taken in the same sense as we understand it at this moment".[3] On a later occasion Lanfranc declares: Porro signum, mysterium, sacramentum, et si quid hujusmodi est, Dominicae Passionis nomina sunt si tamen sacramentum ea significatione accipiatur qua sacrum esse signum in libro *De Civitate Dei* a beato Augustino definitur.[4]

There is no doubt that Ivo was free to incorporate in his collections texts from both Berengar and Lanfranc despite the risk of contradictory passages. When Lanfranc wrote of the Eucharist: Caro videlicet carnis, et sanguis sacramentum est sanguinis. Carne et sanguine utroque invisibili, intelligibili, spirituali significatur Redemptoris corpus visibile et palpabile,[5] he did not use the word *sacramentum* as defined in the definitions selected by Berengar. When Ivo copied the text,[6] he could leave it to others to reconcile it with the Berengarian definitions found in the same collection.[7] As we have seen, Lanfranc had written: "The Flesh is the *sacramentum* of the Flesh, and the Blood is the *sacramentum* of the Blood. By the Flesh and Blood, *both invisible, intelligible, spiritual,* is signified the visible and palpable Body".[8] Augustine's name added enormous weight to this text: neither Alger nor his successors knew its true author and its historical background. To any one to whom a *sacramentum* was by definition a visible sign the problem was obvious: How can something invisible be the *sacramentum* of something else? How can the "visible and palpable Body" be signified by the invisible, intelligible and spiritual Flesh and Blood? Or how can the invisible Flesh and Blood in the Eucharist be the *visibilis forma* of the visible and tangible Body?

Yet Alger agrees with what he erroneously thought to be the words of St. Augustine: Christus itaque . . . sacramentum est Christi.[9] He found it in Ivo's *Decretum*[10] as copied from Lanfranc.[11] Alger then reaches the conclusion that the Eucharistic Body is at once a *sacramentum significans et signatum.*[12] Thus he introduced the distinction between *sacramentum* taken in the active and in the passive sense. He had clearly announced the possibility of such a distinction in the chapter dealing with the various definitions[13] but he warns us now: Ne ergo, in re tanta, fide rudes titubent, divina gratia aspirante, quid de hac re sentiendum sit, sanctorum auctoritates ostendent.[14] Then he quotes two texts from Augustinus in *libro sententiarum Prosperi,*[15] both copied from Ivo.[16] The textual variants show that he did not copy them from Lanfranc.[17] To the two quotations Alger adds an often-quoted paragraph from St. Augustine's letter to Boniface, also found in Ivo's *Decretum.*[18]

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[1] One can hardly agree with Sheedy (p. 100) who finds it "altogether remarkable that the Berengarian writers on both sides should have returned with one accord, as it were to the Augustinian concept of the sacrament as sign." The truth is that they widely ignored Berengar's definitions. We have already pointed out that even Alger "defined" *sacramentum* in such a wide sense that the concept of the sacrament as sign was only one of its many significations.

[2] *Lib. de corp.*, 14; PL 150, 424C.

[3] *Lib. de corp.*, 13; PL 150, 534A: . . . si tamen sacramenti nomen eo intelligatur modo quo nunc intelligimus.

[4] *Lib. de corp.*, 19; PL 150, 437C.

[5] *Lib. de corp.*, 14; PL150, 423D-424A.

[6] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 153D: Caro videlicet . . . significatur corpus visibile Domini nostri et palpabile. Gratian, D. 2 c. 48 de cons.

[7] *Decr.* I, 8; PL 161, 148BC.

[8] Franz. Pl. Bliemetzrieder, *Zu den Schriften Ivos*, p. 26, says of this text: Wer sie in dieser abgeleiteten Form gut verstehen kann, ist glücklich zu nennen.

[9] *De Sacr.* I, 18; PL 180, 792B.

[10] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 154B.

[11] *Lib. de corp.*, 14; PL 150, 424C.

[12] *De Sacr.* I, 18; PL 180, 792C.

[13] *De Sacr.* I, 4; PL 180, 751D.

[14] *De Sacr.* I, 18; PL 180, 792C.

[15] *De Sacr.* I, 18; PL 180, 792D.

[16] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 153D; 154D.

[17] Cf. *Lib. de corp.*, 14; PL 150, 423D; 425A.

As was to be expected, Alger's final solution is not easy to grasp—if it can be grasped at all. He tells us that "Augustine's" statement to the effect that the invisible Body is the *sacramentum* of Christ's visible Body must not be taken *sensualiter* but, as he puts it, *intelligibiliter tantum per exteriorem aliquam actionem.*[19] In other words, he eliminates the human senses by saying that the statement must not be understood *sensualiter* but *intelligibiliter*. However, Alger knew that the definition of *signum,*[20] as used in sacramentology, includes and requires the human senses. For that reason he speaks of "some exterior action" and in doing so restores the human senses to their function in the sacramental rite. Alger thought principally of the external liturgical actions at the Mass as visible symbols of Christ's Passion and Death. Yet the question to be answered was how the *invisible* Eucharistic Body and Blood could, in an exterior, visible manner, symbolize the Passion and Death of Christ's physical Body.

Alger was not the only scholar faced with this problem. The text that caused it is also found under St. Augustine's name in Abelard's *Sic et Non.*[21] At a later date, Peter Lombard had to cope with it when he copied Lanfranc's text either from Gratian [22] or the *Summa sententiarum.*[23] It is more probable that he found it in the *Summa sententiarum* whose author explains the terminology ea consuetudine scripturae qua solent sacramenta earum rerum nomina sortiri quarum sunt sacramenta.[24] We learn, in other words, that there was a certain usage according to which the *res* of a sacrament was called *sacramentum*. Peter Lombard must have seen this explanation before he wrote: Tropo quodam utitur hic Augustinus quo solent res significantes rerum sortiri vocabula quas significant.[25] Since a *tropus* is a free or figurative use of a word, Lombard means to say that a sign (*res significans*) is often named after the thing signified by the sign.

The fact that Lombard was keenly aware of the difficulty is evident in his introduction to the passage: Deinde (Augustinus) addit quod magis lectorem movet. Such a formula used by Lombard and others generally heralds a troublesome text. And Lombard's solution is hardly a happy one. "Here", we are told by Peter, "the visible species of bread is called flesh and the visible species of wine is called blood. But Christ's Flesh is said to be invisible and intelligible because the Flesh is not seen through the species but only understood; and so is the Blood. Hence the invisible Flesh is said to be the *sacramentum* of the visible Flesh because the species of bread . . . is the *sacramentum* of the visible Flesh".[26]

If Peter Lombard had known that the troublesome text was spurious, he would not have laboured as much as he did in his attempt to reconcile it with the definition of *sacramentum.* He goes as far as to tell us that St. Augustine was conscious of the obscurity of his own words (quia obscure dixerat), a fact which prompted him (i.e. Augustine) to say that "the bread is called the Body of Christ although, in reality, it is the *sacramentum* of Christ's Body . . . just as the *sacramentum* of faith is called faith.[27] Alger[28] had appealed to the same illustration once offered by St. Augustine[29] and repeated by Lanfranc,[30] Ivo,[31] Abelard[32] and others.

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[18] *De Sacr.* I, 18; PL 180, 793AB: *Decr.* I, 4; PL 161, 137AB: Augustine, *Ep.* 98, 9; CSEL 34, 530 f.

[19] *De Sacr.* I, 18; PL 180, 793D.

[20] *De Sacr.* I, 4; PL 180, 751C: Item Augustinus in libro secundo De Doctrina christiana: Signum est res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cognitionem venire (*De Doctr. chr.* II, 1, 1; PL 34, 35).

[21] *Sic et Non,* 117; PL 178, 1524B: Idem in libris sententiarum Prosperi.

[22] D. 2 c. 48 de cons.: Item Augustinus in libro sententiarum Prosperi.

[23] *Summa sent.* VI, 7; PL 176, 144AB: Augustinus in libro sentiarum Prosperi.

[24] *Summa sent.* VI, 7; PL 176, 144B.

[25] *Sent.* IV, 10, 1; ed. Quaracchi (1916) 799.

[26] *Ibidem.*

[27] *Sent.* IV, 10, 1; pp. 799 f.

[28] *De Sacr.* I, 18; PL 180, 792D-793A.

Before the time of Peter Lombard's Sentences a solution of a sort had already been proposed by the author of the *Summa sententiarum,* who introduced a tripartite division in the Eucharist: the *sacramentum tantum,* viz., the visible species; the *sacramentum et res,* viz., the true Body of Christ; the *res tantum,* viz., the spiritual efficacy.[33] The writer justifies the first part of the division by saying: Sacramentum enim est sacrae rei signum.[34] Then we learn that the second part of the division contains two terms applied to one and the same Eucharistic Christ but under two different aspects: He is called *res* in relation to the visible sacramental species. This very same *res* is the *sacramentum* of something else, viz., the unity of Head and members.[35] Lanfranc[36] had first elaborated this dual aspect *secundum aliud atque aliud.* His text occurs in Ivo's *Decretum*[37] and undoubtedly contributed to the formation of the tripartite division. The author of the *Summa sententiarum* makes no attempt to show how the definition of *sacramentum* should be applicable to the invisible Eucharistic Body.

According to Hugh of St. Victor we believe that the (Eucharistic) Body and Blood is a *sacramentum* of spiritual grace.[38] William of St. Thierry strikes an apologetic note when he writes: Nemo autem novitatis me arguat praesumptorem quod corpus Christi "sacramentum" appellem corporis Christi.[39] He justifies this terminology by referring the reader to St. Paul's letter to Timothy and to the expression "sacramentum assumpti hominis" used by St. Ambrose. Lanfranc,[40] we have noted, had already called on the authority of this Ambrosian text. Alger quoted the same example.[41] Another trace of uncertainty can be detected in the *Eucharistion* of Honorius who expresses a view similar to that of Hugh of St. Victor in the statement: Licet in veritate caro et sanguis Christi credatur, tamen non incongrue "sacramentum" vel "figura" nominatur.[42] Lombard adopted the tripartite division as a matter of course.[43] Hence its lasting influence was assured.

The severest critic was Gerhoh of Reichersberg who wrote about the year 1136: "Since a sacrament is a *visible* sign of invisible grace, I dare not apply the word "sacrament" to Christ's Body, which is secret and hidden from our eyes. I dare not call it a *sacramentum* because it does not signify something sacred unless perhaps it be called *sacramentum* by virtue of its effects as it sanctifies the worthy recipient . . . For that reason I cannot but feel amazed at the view of some *magistri* who affirm that through Christ's Body and Blood—both of which are invisible, intelligible—is signified the visible and touchable (*palpabile*) Body of Christ. After all, as a rule, invisible things are signified by visible things rather than visible things by invisible ones."[44] Gerhoh then cites St. Augustine's definition of *signum*. Gerhoh's wording (carne et sanguine Christi utroque invisibili, intelligibili, significetur corpus Christi visible ac palpabile) dates back to Lanfranc,[45] as found in Ivo's *Decretum* and *Panormia*,[46] both of which served as popular source books for later writers. And since they often quote the text under St. Augustine's name, Gerhoh's criticism is rather remarkable.[47]

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[29] *Ep.* 98, 9; PL 33, 364.

[30] *Lib. de corp.,* 14; PL 150, 425A.

[31] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 154D-155A.

[32] *Sic et Non,* 117; PL 178, 1524C.

[33] *Summa sent.* VI, 3; PL 176, 140A. Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* II, 3, 7; PL 176, 466C.

[34] *Summa sent.* VI, 3; PL 176, 140A.

[35] PL 176, 140B: Haec res iterum sacramentum est alterius, scillicet unitatis capitis et membrorum, quam efficit fides corporis et sanquinis Domini.

[36] *Lib. de corp.,* 14; PL 150, 424B.

[37] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 154B.

[38] *De Sacr.* II, 3, 7; PL 176, 466D.

[39] *De Sacr. altaris,* 9; PL 180, 355C.

[40] *Lib. de corp.,* 20; PL 150, 437D-438A: Denique s. Ambrosius in *libro ad Gratianum* apparuisse dicit hominibus unigenitum Patris per sacramentum assumpti hominis.

[41] *De Sacr.* I, 4; PL 180, 752B: Unde Ambrosius in *libro ad Gratianum* apparuisse dicit hominibus unigenitum Patris per sacramentum assumpti hominis.

[42] *Eucharistion,* 8; PL 172, 1254D. See also the Tractatus on the Eucharist attributed to Stephen of Baugé, bishop of Autun (1112-1135) but actually written at a date after his death, probably in 1139 or 1140. Its author explains the tripartition as follows: Primum apparet sensui, secundum revelatur fidei, tertium efficit virtus sacramenti. He notes no conflict with his definition: Sacramentum i.e. sacrae rei et invisibilis visibile signum. *Tract. de sacr. altaris,* 17; PL 172, 1295D. Cf. D. Van den Eynde, 'Le *Tract. de sacr. altaris* faussement attribué à Etienne de Baugé', *RTAM* 19 (1952) 225-243.

[43] *Sent.* IV, 8, 7; p. 792.

[44] *Lib. de simon.*; MGH *Lib.* III, 267.

No less remarkable is the interpretation of the same passage given by Peter of Poitiers. He also attributes it to St. Augustine and submits first the explanation offered by Lombard: Utitur hic quodam tropo loquendi.[48] But then he proposes what appears to be an entirely novel interpretation: Utroque ergo significatur corpus Christi visibile in altari non hominibus sed angelis qui assistunt.[49] The purpose of Peter's proposition is clear. He knows that the definition of *sacramentum* as sign requires some function of the human senses. So he tells us that, although the Eucharistic Body is not visible to human eyes, it is "visible" on the altar to the angels surrounding it. We need not prove that this solution suffers from considerable weakness.

A similar difficulty had previously presented itself to Peter of Poitiers in the objection: Corpus Christi est sacramentum unitatis. Ergo est visibilis forma invisibilis gratiae.[50] Peter's answer is rather short and categorical: Corpus non est visibilis forma quia non est generalis illa definitio.[51] Thus the tripartite division, originated by the author of the *Summa sententiarum*[52] and inspired by a pseudo-Augustinian text, finally led to a critique of generally accepted definitions of *sacramentum*.[53] The confusion could have been avoided by ignoring the allegedly Augustinian text which had occasioned the tripartition. Although the problem was one of terminology rather than doctrine, the difficulties experienced by the ecclesiastical writers were caused mainly by their loyalty to St. Augustine. The appearance of spurious texts created a situation in which this loyalty was put to a severe test. We may remember that Alger was anxious to define his terms "lest they bring about error."[54] The *sacramentum* of the Eucharist, as we learn from Alger, is *only* the form of bread and wine and the other remaining and visible qualities of the elements. This visible *sacramentum* "covers" the invisible *res sacramenti* or invisible substance, i.e., the Body of Christ into which the substance of bread and wine has been changed.[55] The elements are visible, changeable and transitory. They are, as St. Augustine says, *sacramenta corporalia* and as such "like visible words, holy indeed, yet changeable and temporal".[56] Alger knew this text through Ivo's *Decretum*[57] and Berengar had already made use of it.[58]

If then, so Alger reasons, the species of bread and wine is sometimes called the Body of Christ, we must not take this literally but *nuncupative et non vere*. He tells us that there has to be a certain likeness between a *sacramentum* and its *res* according to St. Augustine who points out that precisely because of this likeness the *sacramentum* of Christ's Body is occasionally called Christ's Body.[59]

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[45] *Lib. de corp.*, 14; PL 150, 424A.

[46] *Decr.* II, 9; PL 161, 153D. *Panormia* I, 137; PL 161, 1076A.

[47] See Abelard, *Sic et Non*, 117; PL 178, 1524A: Idem in libro sententiarum Prosperi. *Summa sent.* VI, 7; PL 176, 144A: Augustinus in libro sententiarum Prosperi. Lombard, *Sent.* IV, 10, 1; p. 798: Ait enim Augustinus.

[48] *Sent.* V, 12; PL 211, 1250B. Lombard, *Sent.* IV, 10, 1; p. 799: Tropo quodam utitur hic Augustinus.

[49] *Sent.* V, 12; PL 211, 1250C.

[50] *Sent.* V, 10; PL 211, 1242D.

[51] *Ibidem.*

[52] Peter of Poitiers mentions this division in *Sent.* V, 10; PL 211, 1241D, but does not enlarge on the second part (res et sacramentum).

[53] Cf. D. Van den Eynde, *Les Définitions des Sacrements* (Rome 1950) 68 ff.

[54] *De Sacr.* I, 5; PL 180, 752B: ne errorem generent.

[55] *De Sacr.* I, 5; PL 180, 752C.

[56] *De Sacr.* I, 5; PL 180, 753C: Augustine, *Contra Faustum* XIX, 16; PL 42, 356.

[57] *Decr.* II, 8; PL 161, 148B. Cf. Abelard, *Sic et Non*, 117; PL 178, 1535A.

[58] *De S. Coena*, 26; ed. W. H. Beekenkamp (S-Gravenhage 1941) 55; 150.

[59] *De Sacr.* I, 5; PL 180, 753CD: Augustine, *Ep.* 98, 9 to Boniface; CSEL 34, 531.

Berengar[60] and other authors had previously used this Augustinian passage[61] to reconcile an apparently contradictory terminology. Accordingly Alger admits that the *divina pagina* will call the bread the Body of Christ but only in a figurative sense.[62]

The two elements, viz., the visible *sacramentum* and the invisible *res* suffice for Alger to elaborate the doctrine of the Real Presence. It is not until the 18th chapter that he makes the statement "that the invisible Body of Christ in the sacrament is the *sacramentum* of the visible Body of Christ in its human form."[63] This concession is the root of the tripartite division which Alger does not yet know in the form proposed by the author of the *Summa sententiarum*. Alger was well aware of the patristic teaching concerning the relationship between the Eucharist and the mystical Body of Christ.[64] Yet he does not apply or use the term *sacramentum et res* to describe this relationship.

It would be superfluous to note that the burden of Alger's theological arguments consists in a judicious choice and presentation of the testimonies of the Fathers. This is particularly evident in his *Liber de misericordia*. A modern author, however, claims that "Alger belongs to the school of the orthodox dialectic writers. He uses the syllogism, and his method includes statement, demonstration and proof. But he is ready to abandon the assistance of dialetics when it conflicts with orthodox opinion, and he criticizes the conclusions of the dialecticians freely."[65] Alger's strong emphasis on tradition which reveals itself in the numerous quotations is, it would seem, much more important than the method used to interpret them where the need to do so occurs.

In his search for testimonies of the past Alger relied perhaps more than was usual on liturgical books. We have already drawn attention to his use of the liturgical prayer: Perficiant in nobis . . . rerum veritate capiamus,[66] a prayer already invoked by Ratramnus.[67] Alger openly refers to his liturgical source when he writes: Unde Augustinus in sermone 229 de sacramentis fidelium feria secunda paschae: Quia (qui) passus est . . .[68] The passage is cited again on a later occasion.[69] Although Durandus of Troarn makes use of the same text from the same immediate source,[70] Alger quotes from liturgy more frequently. Thus we read of St. Augustine: Item idem in sermone de quarta feria[71] or Item Augustinus in sermone de quarta feria.[72] A text from St. Ambrose bears the introduction: Item Ambrosius dominica quinta post Epiphaniam: Singuli accipiunt . . . se praebet in singulis.[73] The Canon of the Mass had been used by Lanfranc when he wrote: Unde in Canone Missae sacerdos dicit: Ut nobis corpus et sanguis fiat . . .[74] And Alger reasons: Unde etiam sacerdos vice Christi . . . orat in Canone Deum Patrem dicens: Jube haec . . .[75]

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[60] *De S. Coena*, 44; ed. Beekenkamp, p. 150. *Ep. ad Adelm.*, ed. Martène-Durand, *Thes. nov. anecd.* IV (Paris 1717) 110C. By inadvertence, D. van den Eynde (*Les Définitions*, p. 5) affirms that Berengar's letter to Adelman does not contain this text. See also M. Matronola, *Un testo inedito di Berengario* (Milano 1936) 119.

[61] Lanfranc, *Lib. de corp.*, 13; PL 150, 422D; 423D. Guitmund of Aversa, *De Corp.* II; PL 149, 1465A. Ivo, *Decr.* I, 4; PL 161, 1374B. See Abelard, *Sic et Non*, 117; PL 178, 1534C. William of St. Thierry, *De Sacr. altaris*, 9 and 12; PL 180, 356D; 364C.

[62] *De Sacr.* I, 6; PL 180, 755D.

[63] *De Sacr.* I, 18; PL 180, 792A.

[64] Cf. *De Sacr.* I, 3; PL 180, 747C-751B.

[65] A. J. MacDonald, *Berengar*, p. 380.

[66] *De Sacr.* I, 5; PL 180, 753A: *Sacram. Gregorianum;* ed. Lietzmann, p. 95.

[67] PL 121, 164A.

[68] *De Sacr.* I, 3; PL 180, 749C.

[69] *De Sacr.* I, 19; PL 180, 794C: Unde Augustinus in sermone de sacramentis fidelium feria secunda paschae: Quia (qui) passus . . . ipsi sumus. Et post pauca: Ad aquam venistis . . . Cf. *De Sacr.* I, 3; PL 180, 750A.

[70] *Lib. de corp. et sanguine Christi*, 7, 24; PL 149, 1414C: Unde et alibi de sacramentis feria secunda Paschae disputans ait (Augustinus): Unus panis . . . quia qui passus . . .

[71] *De Sacr.* I, 12; PL 180, 779A.

[72] *De Sacr.* I, 16; PL 180, 789A.

[73] *De Sacr.* I, 15; PL 180, 784B. Cf. Abelard, *Sic et Non*, 117; PL 178, 1525B: Praefatio de dominica quinta post Theophaniam.

[74] *Lib. de corp.*, 20; PL 150, 436C.

[75] *De Sacr.* I, 14; PL 180, 781C.

The fact that the liturgy was carefully examined for doctrinal evidence is well illustrated by Guitmund of Aversa: In quodam missali hispano quod dicunt sanctum dictasse Isidorum, in hebdomade ante Pascha in quadam Missa sic inveni: Totum hoc, Domine, divinum est . . .[76] The remark that St. Isidore was supposed to have dictated the Missal is meant to add weight to the argument. Guitmund then continues: Unde et ecclesia consequenter a se eosdem separat, cum in ipso Canone Missae ex apostolica traditione ita orat: Quam oblationem tu, Deus . . .[77] The aim of such quotations is to show the continuity of an ancient doctrinal tradition. How deeply conscious of that tradition Guitmund was is shown by his conclusion: Hac oratione Cyprianus, Hilarius, Ambrosius, Augustinus, Hieronymus, Gregorius et caeteri omnes ecclesiastici auctores istos uno ore percutiunt.[78]

Even the lives of the Saints were searched for doctrinal testimonies. Thus Alger quotes from a *Passio beati Dionysii*.[79] On a later occasion he writes: Legitur Tharsitius martyr corpus Domini ferens . . .[80] Durandus writes: In libro *de vita sancti Basilii* legitur . . .[81] He had previously stated: In *dialogo* quoque *Basilii et Johannis* ita legitur: Qui sursum sedet . . . veneratione complecti.[82] The passage also occurs in Alger: Item Basilius in *dialogo suo*: Qui sursum sedet . . . manibus continetur.[83] Both he and Durandus were ignorant of the fact that the author was St. John Chrysostom.[84] In a previous chapter Alger writes: Nam Filii Dei vere adorandam carnem beatus Basilius admirans ait in dialogo suo de dignitate sacerdotii: O miraculum . . . sub oculis humanis. Item ipse: Cum sacerdos . . . illius qui immolatur.[85] The first section of the text was already quoted under St. Basil's name by Théduin of Liége in a letter against Bruno and Berengar.[86] More than a century later we read in the *Glossa Alexandri* the conclusion: Unde Basilius: O miraculum . . . benedictione complecti.[87]

The question might finally be raised whether or not Alger deliberately abstained from quoting the words and works of post-patristic authors. In the treatise on the Eucharist written by Durandus of Troarn we meet such names as Cassiodorus,[88] Bede,[89] Amalarius,[90] Paschasius,[91] Hincmar,[92] and even Fulbert of Chartres.[93] Guitmund mentions Lanfranc[94] and proudly calls him *magister meus*.[95] Alger, on the other hand, stays with the Fathers. And even there he is not given to such manifestations of oratory as we encounter in Durandus of Troarn who calls St. Hilary *divinus sophista rhetorque caelestis*.[96] While the younger Alger still quarrels with St. Peter Damian, the later Alger strikes us as the mature scholar who, far from ignoring the errors of his day, looks for and finds the answer in the testimonies of the distant past. We have seen that Ivo's *Decretum* served him well in the preparation of his work on the Blessed Eucharist, while his *Liber de misericordia* proves that he had burnt many a candle reading and studying the works of St. Augustine.

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[76] *De Corp.* III; PL 149, 1484B.

[77] PL 149, 1484C. Paschasius, *Lib. de corp.*, 14; PL 120, 1316C, introduced this argument.

[78] PL 149, 1484D.

[79] *De Sacr.* I, 5; PL 180, 753B. Cf. Abelard, *Sic et Non*, 117; PL 178, 1525B: Ex *Passione s. Andreae* . . . (1525C): Amphilochus, *De vita et miraculis sancti Basilii* . . . (1525D): Ex *vita patrum*, tract. de caritate, cap. 26 . . . See also the *Summa sent.* VI, 5; PL 176, 142B: In *vita sancti Basilii* . . .

[80] *De Sacr.* II, 1; PL 180, 813B.

[81] *Lib. de corp.*, 8, 30; PL 149, 1419D.

[82] *Lib. de corp.*, 6, 19; PL 149, 1404B. Cf. 7, 26; PL 149, 1417C: In *dialogo Johannis et Basilii* valde competenter disputatum est inveniri. Sic namque inter caetera reperitur scriptum: Fuerunt quidem . . . contueris. (1418A): Et item: Hoc igitur ministerium . . . Et paulo inferior Cum vero sacerdos . . .

[83] *De Sacr.* I, 14; PL 180, 781BC.

[84] *De Sacerdotio* III, 4; PG 48, 642.

[85] *De Sacr.* I, 12; PL 180, 777D-778A: Chrysostom, *De Sacerdotio* III, 4 and VI, 4.

[86] *Ep. ad Henricum;* PL 146, 1441B.

[87] *Glosa in Sent.* IV, d. 10, n. 7; ed. Quaracchi (1957) 162.

[88] *Lib. de corp.*, 7, 22; PL 149, 1409D.

[89] *Ibidem*, 6, 19; PL 149, 1404BC.

[90] *Ibidem.*

[91] *Ibidem.*

[92] *Lib. de corp.*, 7, 21; PL 149, 1407C.

[93] *Ibidem*, 6, 19; PL 149, 1405B.

[94] *De Corp.* I; PL 149, 1428B.

[95] *De Corp.* II; PL 149, 1449D.

[96] *Lib. de corp. et sanguine Christi*, 3, 4; PL 149, 1383.

Rent and Capital at St. Ives

J. AMBROSE RAFTIS C.S.B.

ALTHOUGH the commercial history of St. Ives opened at a relatively late date with the grant of a royal charter for a fair in 1110, the rapid rise to importance of this fair was not surprising. On the Ramsey manor of Slepe, but at a different site from the agrarian community which retained its separate identity over succeeding centuries, the shrine of Saint Ivo had grown to national importance over the eleventh century. As the area about this shrine, which was to become the market town of St. Ives, was also the location of a good bridge over the Ouse River from at least the end of the eleventh century, St. Ives provided a natural entrepot for the meeting of east midland traders with European merchants coming up the Ouse from the Wash. St. Ives would doubtless benefit from the increasing prosperity of the fen region which, to judge from Ramsey manors, was impressive over the hundred years after Domesday.[1] But it was the exceptional right to hold a fair, perhaps generations before even ancient boroughs of the area as Huntingdon and Peterborough received such grants,[2] that assured the commercial future of St. Ives. By the time of the vacancy rolls of King John, it is reported that the royal officials received over £100. in 1206, £97. in 1207, and £180. in 1211 from 'issues of the fair of St. Ives'. While these revenues were decidedly extortionate by contrast with other thirteenth-century accounts for St. Ives in which profit and rent totals would seem rarely, if ever, to have totalled £100.,[3] these amounts do point to the fact that St. Ives had become a commercial centre of major importance.

St. Ives ranked by this period with the great cloth fairs of Boston, Stamford, Winchester, and Bury St. Edmunds.[4] Merchants from Coventry, Stamford, Beverly, Lincoln, York, Leicester, and Northampton, had regular sections alloted to them during the Easter fairs in the thirteenth century.[5] The market area at

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[1] See *The Estates of Ramsey Abbey*, J. A. Raftis (Toronto, 1957), especially Table V, pp. 56-9. This book will be referred to hereafter as *Estates*.

[2] In a list of fairs granted in Huntingdonshire and Cambridgeshire prior to the death of Henry III, found in Appendix II of 'The Mediaeval Fair of St. Ives', in *Two Studies of Mediaeval Life* (Cambridge, 1953), Dorothy Usher lists the grant of fairs for 26 villages. Even claims to the grant of charter for fairs as early as the twelfth century were only made by five villages, beyond St. Ives. It is probably significant that these claims were being made when competition for 'fair' time was becoming intense in the thirteenth century, and the very vagueness of these thirteenth-century claims argues against the importance of these other fairs in the twelfth century. Peterborough apparently held a definite grant from 1189, but St. Neots and Ely were only able to claim fairs 'from the time of Henry I', St. Radegund (Cambridge) from the time of Stephen, and Barnwell from the time of Henry II. Miss Usher lists 12 more fairs granted in this area by Edward I, II, and III.

[3] A summary picture of revenues for St. Ives in the thirteenth century can be seen in the *Victoria County History of Huntingdonshire*, II, 217ff.

[4] Royal writs issued during the reign of King Henry III provide some of the best indications for the importance of various fairs. For example, on November 16, 1240, there was issued a 'Mandate to the bailiffs and good men of Winchester to make known to all merchants coming to their city the provision of the king and council that all the king's prises from merchants shall be paid at four terms of the year, to wit, the prises due in the fair of Northampton in the fair of St. Ives, the prises due in the latter in the fair of Boston, the prises due in the latter in the fair of Winchester, and those due in the latter in the fair of Northampton'. (*Calendar of Patent Rolls*, 3, pp. 238-9.)

Or, on July 6, 1254, an order concerning fines to be paid by all merchants of Lucca was addressed 'to the mayor and sheriffs of London and the wardens and bailiffs of the fairs of St. Ives, Winchester, Stanford, Boston, and St. Ives.' *Ibid.*, 4, p.308.

[5] Various references to such sections may be found in the court rolls of St. Ives. Again, the royal needs encouraged such groupings, as may be seen in a mandate of April 13, 1254, 'to the bailiffs and good men of the towns of York, Lincoln, Stanford, Oxford, Northampton, and to those of Leicester and Beverley to deliver to the said wardens all the cloths which the king lately commanded them to provide for him at the beginning of the fair of St. Ives.' (*Calendar of Patent Rolls*, 4, p.367.)

St. Ives was very extensive, and various sources give the impression that at least the native merchants were represented by a very large number of men each purveying a relatively modest amount of goods.[6] Of the overseas visitors merchants from the Low Countries and the Baltic States, carrying especially cloth and furs, were the more numerous. But for the time of Henry III there is also mention of merchants from France, Cologne, Scotland, Italy, and Spain. Royal patronage of the fair encouraged this commercial activity,[7] and Henry III was often in debt to foreign merchants.[8] But this is not to prove that foreign merchants were involved in the greater bulk of the royal purchases at St. Ives. The king's servants were often appointed to obtain corn, horses, luxury goods, and even English cloth, at this fair. In 1300, for example, the king's clerk, Ralph de Stokes, was appointed to make purchase for the Great Wardrobe at the fair of St. Ives of 1000 yards of English cloth, 8000 yards of canvas, and 10-dozen towels.

While sources for the twelfth and even thirteenth-century history of St. Ives are scattered and sparse, it is nevertheless clear that in contrast with the royal boroughs whose history extends far back into the dim Anglo-Saxon past,[9] or even by comparison with those monastic burgesses who sought to emulate urban development under royal jurisdiction over the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,[10] the constitutional growth of St. Ives was remarkably simple. Extant documents for this early period are largely confined to tracing two elements at work in the growth of the town, abbatial jurisdiction and the expansion of settlement.

Despite challenges over the thirteenth century from royal officials, and such jealous neighbours with less successful fairs as the burgesses of Huntingdon or the lord of Ely,[11] Ramsey Abbey retained its position over St. Ives. By the thirteenth century the Easter fair had extended far beyond the eight days granted by the original charter, so that around 1250 it was reported that royal bailiffs were appropriating profits for as much as a three week period after the eight days. Following a lawsuit, the abbot of Ramsey was granted by royal charter of 1258 all profits to an Easter fair of indefinite length for an annual farm of £50. The grant to the abbey of a weekly market at St. Ives by King John made it possible for St. Ives to cater to growing local trade. And in 1202 the same king had granted a charter to the abbey for a fair of St. Lawrence to handle autumn needs. Growth in administrative machinery accompanied these developments as extra servants were added for the holding of special merchant courts, the collection of stallage, alnage, tronage, and so forth. While we lack specific evidence on this score, it is possible that the ordinary monastic administration of Slepe, that is, through reeve, steward, and customary services, for a long period had attended to the administration of St. Ives also. But on the other hand such administrative dependence upon the agrarian village is highly unlikely in view of the fact that the extensive mid-thirteenth-century inquisition of Slepe is remarkably undistinguished from inquisitions for other villages of the district in so far as obligations to St. Ives were concerned. Tenants from Hemmingford, Houghton, Wyton, Wistow, Broughton, Abbots Ripton, Warboys, and Holywell owed the same services for the construction of booths and watching at fairs as the tenants from Slepe.[12] Nor did the services owed by tenants at St. Ives bear any real dependence upon the manorial complex of Slepe. According to the Hundred Rolls the tenant at St. Ives owed one day's work on the lord's meadow and one autumn work *ad cibum domini*. This work on the meadow merely assured the tenant some rights in the flats next to the town,[13] and the work on the lord's demesne, even if performed, was a nominal obligation less than the obligations usually owed to the demesne by freeholders on Ramsey lands. In addition, except for a few years after the Black Death, these services from St. Ives were commuted from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century. Yet the court entries continued to refer to 'traditional obligations', and no doubt such services failed to become incorporated in the annual money rent for the holdings owing to the value of such nominal services as signs of lordship.

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[6] For example, the work units required of villeins in constructing stalls at the fair indicate smallish compartments. In this context there is also an interesting letter in the *Close Rolls*, 5, p.362 (November, 1244), listing nearly one hundred persons to be paid for purchases made by the king's servants at the fair of St. Ives. About 70 men were concerned with the sale of cloth, usually to a value of 60 or 70 shillings. Some 25 men were involved in the sale of corn, and while there are a few large items in the range of 15-20 pounds, the usual amount is around 60 to 70 shillings. While it is not at all certain from this document as it stands that all these purchases were made at the fair of St. Ives, the structure of the purchases does nevertheless suggest that local freeholders of moderate wealth would be important in the fair as well as those merchants with goods of sufficient value to make a longer journey worth while.

[7] There was, for example, the following order for April, 1237: "Rex mittit ad nundinas Sancti Ivonis Willelmum Scissorem et Johannem le Flemeng ad emendum ad opus regis mille et centum ulnas de viridi et murice ad robas militum, et novies xx. ulnas de murice ad opus clericorum, et ccc. et xl. ulnas de murice et viridi ad opus servientum, et xl. robas burelli ad valettos, et viii^{xx} ulnas de murice et viridi ad dominas et domicellas, et quater viginti ulnas scarlette, et xviii. penulas et vi. furruras de minuto vario, et xi. furruras ad valletos, et cc. cendallorum et unum miliarium cere." (*Close Rolls*, 3, p.527.)

[8] In 1262 the king owed more than 600 pounds sterling to merchants of Douay and Lucca, according to entries in the *Calendar of Patent Rolls*, 5, pp.213, 218.

[9] See James Tait, *The Mediaeval English Borough*, Manchester, 1936.

[10] See N. M. Trenholme, *The English Monastic Boroughs*, The University of Missouri Studies, II, 1927.

[11] For some discussion of the conflict with the burgesses of Huntingdon and the bishop of Ely, see Usher, *op.cit.*, pp.18-20.

Of more significance than services was the unique quality of the structure of St. Ives that stands out clearly in evidence for settlement. A variety of evidence from charters and inquisitions reveals an urban development by the rows of houses and shops that gradually spread along Bridge Street from the crossing of the river Ouse and then in both directions along the 'King's Road' (*Regia Strata*) that ran, as it runs to-day, roughly parallel to the river for about one-half mile at this point. Court rolls for the late thirteenth century show that the eighty-three messuages assessed to the town of St. Ives in the Hundred Rolls of 1279 were actually units (*rengiae*) of constructed dwellings and shops. Who were the tenants? local villeins? local freemen? foreigners? Abbey purchases from the thirteenth century suggest that freeholds might have been important in the growth of the town.[14] But sources for the earlier period are too scarce to throw further light upon this problem, nor do they tell us how the commercial growth of the town was reflected in the value of land and in the system of rents employed.

However, St. Ives fortunately is listed among those Ramsey estates for which numerous account and court rolls are extant from the late thirteenth century, and the following study has attempted to reconstruct the economic life of the town as revealed in these documents.

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[12] *Cartularium Monasterii de Rameseia*, I, pp.281ff. In this thirteenth-century collection the inquisitors somehow refer to St. Ives although the inquest is largely rural, that is, of Slepe. In order to facilitate reference to this basic edition of the extent I have continued to employ St. Ives rather than Slepe at several places in Chapters VI and VII of the *Estates* where the obvious agrarian context obviates the possibility of confusion.

[13] *Cartularium*, I, p.289.

[14] See *Estates, Chapter* IV, especially Tables XX and XXI.

I.

A valuable set of entry fines for St. Ives preserved in the Public Record Office[15] is of primary importance for the economic history of the market town from the late thirteenth century. In addition to repetitions, 408 separate entries can be deciphered from the document in its present condition. These begin chronologically with 3 for the early 1260's, followed by 33 entries representing all but 5 years of the time of Abbot William of Godmanchester (1268-85). While entries for about one-half the years of Abbot John of Sawtrey (1285-1316) are missing, there are still 83 entries for this period. But from 1310 until the series becomes undecipherable in 1358 there are only 3 years for which entries have not been recorded. It seems certain both from the *lacunae* and disorderly chronology of earlier entries, as well as from the handwriting, that the present collection was begun around 1310.

One reason[16] for the collection beginning at this time may be seen in the policy of long term lease of the *rengiae* (which we shall call here rows or blocks of buildings), or some subdivision of the *rengia.* The short term lease was apparently widely used in the earlier period. In the year 1293, for example, 3 rows were let for periods of 10, 12, and 20 years respectively, while for at least two other holdings the tenant was given a 'licence for use' (that is probably tenure *ad voluntatem domini*). For the four remaining leases granted in this year the term is not mentioned in the summary entry, nor is the term given for any entry in the time of Abbot William of Godmanchester. From what is known of the abbey's direct administration of St. Ives, in particular the reservation of the right to rent the front and often the rear of shops during the fair, it is tempting to assume that a policy of short-term, competitive renting of the rows was the common practice throughout the time of the prosperous growth of St. Ives. On the other hand, the *rentier* history of the abbey with regard to agrarian estates suggests caution in generalization upon this point.[17] However, there is at least no doubt that from the early fourteenth century the policy became almost exclusively the practice of the long term lease. In so far as the scattered entries for the time of Abbot John of Sawtrey allow any precision it would appear that this policy began around 1300. Four at least of the entries in the year 1293, for example, were regranted for life around 1300. From 1300 no *rengiae* seem to have been rented for anything less than the period of one lifetime, and indeed the only properly 'time' leases over the following 48 years of the series were a curtilage in 1327 (12 years), two stalls in 1331 (10 years), and two stalls in 1334 (10 years). Furthermore, family leases seem to have been infrequent in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, but from the early 1320's especially the lease for two or three lives (husband, wife, and son or daughter) seems to have been encouraged whenever possible.

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[15] Court Rolls (SC 2): 178/95, 22 membranes, written front and dorse.

[16] Another, and probably a related reason, may have been the greater use of the bailiff rather than a reeve from this time. In the Public Record Office collection of Account Rolls (SC 6): 883, number one, the reeve of St. Ives (or Slepe?) seems to have received the major rents from the town along with rents from the manor of Slepe in a document probably of the late thirteenth century. However, the extant series of account rolls for Slepe run only from 1307 (SC 6: 884/1ff.), so it is not possible to ascertain whether the late thirteenth-century arrangement was regular or merely some administrative exception.

[17] Even in the heyday of 'direct administration' the steady flow of revenues demanded by the security-conscious conventional consumer body, the frequent failure of the abbots to maintain an adequate liquidity position, and the constant readiness of even villeins to farm monastic properties, all tended to preserve a considerable structure of long term rents at Ramsey. See *Estates*, Chapter IV, Section I, especially pp.112-13, and Chapter VIII, Section II. By the time of the Hundred Rolls 14 of the 83 messuages assessed to St. Ives had been let by Ramsey to its cell the Priory of St. Ives. The Priory seems to have leased such properties, but so far I have been unable to discover whether the Priory had any immediate commercial ventures in St. Ives. I have been able to discover about one dozen names of those from whom the abbey purchased holdings in St. Ives over the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century. But it does not seem to be possible to list these purchases specifically along with gifts, since on the one hand the *Inquisitiones post Mortem* do not always distinguish what properties were granted in St. Ives from those given on Ramsey manors, and on the other hand the court entries (See below, note 23) do not always distinguish purchase or gift of property from the mere concession of property by a former tenant of the abbey. In any case, as will be seen below, these newly acquired properties were being immediately let for long terms from early in the fourteenth century.

In contrast with the clipped entries of the thirteenth century, the entries from around 1310 painstakingly locate the tenement by reference to former tenants, or to present or former neighbouring tenants, and sometimes also in relation to the lie of the roads and the river.[18] Such information has made it possible to identify most of the tenements as they changed hands or were re-entered for various reasons, and to establish in the following tables a comparative list of rents and entry fines over this period. Since it would be impossible to present the names of the tenants within a reasonable space, the holdings have merely been numbered for the following tables. In Table I the year for each entry has been given in order to illustrate the variety in rents and fines; to facilitate rapid visual comparison most of the remaining entries have been grouped in three periods for Table II. Most of the holdings were rented as the complete *rengia,* although this is not at once evident since the term *rengia* is interchanged freely with *messuagium;* however, the two terms can usually be found identified in the clause upon services owed. Some difficulty arises from the fact that after 1348 the scribe attempted to classify the holdings according to the state of repair rather than the tenement proper. That is to say, whereas before 1348 a *rengia* is given as a holding that is completely or more or less built upon, after 1348 the scribe tried to classify the entry according to the amount of building so that a row one-half dilapidated becomes one-half row in the entry, and so forth. However, the scribes in the decade after the Black Death are careful to identify the holdings by earlier references, even to a generation or more previous rather than by the quick turnover of tenants in the 1340's, so that the precedents of dilapidated units can be for the most part recognized.

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[18] For example, in 1337 John of Catworth and his wife Matilda received 'unam rengiam domorum in vico Sancti Ivonis situatem in latitudinem inter illam rengiam quam Rogerus Falliwoll tenet ex una parte et rengiam quam Johannes le Taverner tenet ex altera, et in longitudinem a Regia Strata vici Sancti Ivonis ante usque ad le Thwertwey retro.'

Table I: Rents and Entry Fines[19]

No.	Year	Rent	Fine
1	1293	6.8	6.8
	1305	16.	2.
	1315	16.	2.
	1341	16.	6.8
2	1316	13.4	[13.4]
	1323	30.	3.4
	1333	26.8	
	1338	35.	13.4
	1340	30.	10.
	1343	44.	13.4
	1356	6.8	0
3	1313	10.	2.
	1325	5.	2.
	1343	5.	6.8
4	1303	66.8	0
	1325	66.8	20.
	1343	66.8	100.
5	1292	4.	1.
	1334	30.	13.4
	1337	13.4	13.4
	1342	13.4	3.4
	1349	13.4	13.4
	1355	13.4	20.
	1357	?	10.
6	1325	13.4	2.
	1327	12.	2.
	1338	12.	3.4
	1342	12.	?
	1349	13.4	6.8
	1351	13.4	5.
	1353	11.	.3
7	1312	20.	5.
	1334	20.	6.8
	1340	20.	6.8
	1343	20.	6.8
8	1330	20.	1.8
	1341	20.	2.
9	1301	[10.]	10.
	1311	5.	.1
	1317	9.	0
	1329	9.	20.
	1346	26.8	3.4
	1351	6.8	.6
	1356	13.4	0
10	1298	15.	2.
	1327	13.4	2.
	1342	20.	13.4
	1347	20.	[20.]
	1351	[10.]	3.4
11	1312	20.	10.
	1331	20.	3.4
	1346	20.	66.8
	1346	20.	6.8
	1348	20.	20.
	1355	10.	6.8
	1356	12.	.6
	1357	12.	[.6]
12	1292	?	6.8
	1305	20.	3.4
	1324	10.	2.
	1339	13.4	23.4
	1344	13.4	13.4
	1348	13.4	2.
	1351	10.	3.4
13	1316	66.8	0
	1327	17.	0?
	1332	15.	13.4
	1342	10.	3.4
	1348	26.8	20.
	1350	24.	3.4
14	1329	10.	3.4
	1332	[10.]	6.8
	1339	10.	8.
	1349	10.	5.
15	1333	8.	10.
	1344	8.	3.4
	1349	8.	3.4
	1350	8.	3.4
16	1313	16.	6.8
	1317	16.	1.
	1347	16.	13.4
17	1299	6.8	0?
	1311	14.	20.
	1348	20.	10.
18	1341	10.	3.4
	1344	10.	13.4
	1355	6.8	.6

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[19] The values in these tables are in shillings and pence, unless otherwise indicated. The rent is *per annum*. The bracketed figures are doubtful owing to stains or fading of the manuscript.

Table II: Rents and Entry Fines.

	Rents				Fines			
No.	Pre-1320	1320-40	1340-9	1350-8	Pre-1320	1320-40	1340-9	1350-8
1	20.		20.	20.	2.		6.8	2.
2		10.	10.	10.		10.	6.8	2.
				0?				.1
3			20.	13.4			10.	0
			20.				6.8	
4	10.	10.		10.	6.8	10.		13.4
5	?	16.	16.	15.	2.	0	13.4	3.4
		16.				6.8		
6	?	13.4	13.4	13.4	13.4	2.	40.	1.
7		13.4		13.4		6.8		6.8
		13.4				10.		
8	13.4	13.4	13.4	13.4	2.	2.	6.8	?
9		24.	30.			3.4	6.8	
10	16.	13.4			6.8	13.4		
11		5.	5.			1.	0	
12		[15.]	15.	15.		60.	6.8	5.
13			6.8	6.			3.4	0?
14			[16.]	4.			6.8	1.
15		6.8	15.			3.4	6.8	
16	6.8	10.	30.		1.	40.	13.4	
	10.				2.			
17	6.8	10.			4.	0?		
	?				2.			
18		26.8	26.8			40.	60.	
19	13.4		13.4		2.		6.8	
20	18.		18.		6.8		10.	
			18.				10.	
21	8.	12.			?	6.8		
	12.	12.			.6	3.4		
22	8.	20.			5.	10.		
	13.4				0?			
23	22.	22.			6.8	0.		
		22.				30.		
24	12.	8.	8.		2.	3.4	1.	
		8.				5.		
25	16.	8.	?		10.	2.	20.	
	13.4				0?			
26		10.				2.		
		10.				26.8		
27	26.8		20.		1.		?	
28	20.		20.		6.8		10.	
29		10.	10.			1.	3.4	
			10.				6.8	
30	3.4	3.4			0	3.4		
		3.4				1.6		

The entry fine in the above table provides a sensitive index to many economic factors in the evaluation of property at St. Ives. Unless some special circumstance obtained, the fine tended to vary with the (rent) value of the property. Number 4 in Table I, for instance, represents a valuable block of buildings at the entrance to the bridge whose tenant had the right to collect tolls at the bridge. Numbers 18 and 23 in Table II were well constructed buildings very well located in the market place. But the great variety in entry fines indicates the extent to which special circumstances did enter into the determination of this figure.

In nearly every instance the entry to holdings in the town of St. Ives for the first time by foreigners from the neighbouring district or afar was accompanied by a considerably heavier fine, no doubt to mark the greater insecurity from the lack of knowledge of the stranger.[20] This is particularly noticeable in 1349 when, perhaps due to the disturbances caused by the Great Plague, many new names were added to the tenants from outside St. Ives. A nominal fine was paid when the wife of the tenant received entry with her husband shortly after the latter, or when she received entry shortly before his death (in this latter case it being understood that some man would be paying the full entry fine before too long). Few of these nominal fines have been listed in the above tables. One example may be seen in Table II, number 24, where the wife of William of Dunton paid only one shilling for entry to one row in 1340 because, the entry tells us explicitly, William had paid the full entry (five shillings) only the year before.

As would be expected, the fine was the first payment to be condoned for repairs. Such was the reason for the payment of only three shillings four pence for number 13, Table I, as is given in explanation for this unusually low entry in 1342. Entry fines almost disappeared for this same reason in many cases over the decade after the Black Death. However, the fall in fines over the 1349-58 period cannot probably be separated from the more favourable position of the lessee with respect to property demand at this period. This is borne out by the fact that the obligation to repair was by specific arrangement in the entry, but even where the property was ruinous and the fine reduced there were many instances where there were no obligations upon the tenant to repair. Conversely, the intensified demand for property in the earlier 1340's was usually reflected in higher entry fines.

The entry for a short term or *ad voluntatem domini*, a number of which can be seen in the first period of Table II above, was usually marked by a much reduced fine. Such one or two shilling payments are more comparable to the traditional regular payments like the 'heusire' from agrarian holdings that had been fixed from time immemorial at Ramsey. Despite the variations that have already been noted, even the long term fine retained its legal significance as guarantee of seisin: 'hac gersuma non obstante', the entries state when warning against eviction for refusal to obey the lord's jurisdiction. Probably for this reason, and except for small nominal fines or where properties of extraordinary value were concerned, the fine tended to be one-quarter, one-half, or some multiple of the mark, in contrast with the greater variety among rent values.

In any case in the final analysis the entry fine remained too small in relation to the value of properties to adequately reflect the degree of the economic variations over this period. Even before the period of prolonged dilapidation after 1349 condonation of the fine for repairs was usually accompanied by a discount on rents. On the other hand the rent structure is ill suited to the measurement of economic change with any precision. The lack of uniformity in rents of the *rengiae*, in contrast with the data for *censa* and *arentata* which were usually standard for agrarian tenements on all Ramsey manors over this period,[21] points to the degree to which competition had established rents in St. Ives. It is all the more interesting, therefore, to find that the abbey had retired to a *rentier* position in this competitive area in the early fourteenth century to a degree perhaps more drastic than upon the agrarian estates of Ramsey.[22] Unfortunately these court entries fail to provide adequate information for the explanation of conditions either in the competitive or the *rentier* periods. At the same time these entries do provide a source for unusual information upon one aspect of the *rentier* structure, the problem of capital maintenance.

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[20] The frequent identification of tenants according to place of origin shows that men from a very wide area had settled at St. Ives. There was no apparent predilection for tenants from the manors of Ramsey, although men from local villages were most heavily represented among the tenants at St. Ives. A good number were from East Anglia, and a few from London. In only thirteen instances is it stated that the tenant was a *nativus* of Ramsey, but since this did not alter the conditions of entry given in the roll such identification may not have been important, or exhaustive.

[21] See *Estates*, pp.251-2 and 267.

[22] For the efforts to stabilize returns from manors over the early fourteenth century see *Estates, Chapter* VIII, Section I. The long term renting of agrarian holdings only become noticeable from later in the century, however; see, *ibid.*, pp.260, 265-6, 289-91.

Despite the long term lease, and the clause in every lease binding the lessee to maintain the property 'as when he received it, or better', the lord was unable to maintain the capital of St. Ives through the *rentier* system itself. The fact that rents as well as entry fines had to be condoned for repairs is itself evidence of this failure. Such cases, and the fact that no expulsion for dilapidation is mentioned throughout this whole collection, suggests that the cost of maintenance of property at St. Ives may have been peculiarly onerous. The rapid decay of buildings over a few years after the Black Death points to the temporary nature of the structures as adding greatly to the cost of maintenance. Approximately one-half the entries from 1353 to the end of the series mention the relevant property as being in a seriously ruinous condition. Along with this there is evidence that the cost of building was considerable. For instance John Galeys received a row in 1335 that he was to build to the value of £10; and Robert of Longtoft had to reconstruct houses to the same value in 1337 as a condition of entry.[23]

It is obvious of course that the value of the tenement in St. Ives was also determined by its commercial location. When economic conditions allowed the payment of a good rent from the property the capital problem could be easily met. It would be to the tenant's advantage to have a most servicable holding and the lord could readily commute rent to capital investment. Such would appear to have been the case on the valuable messuage that Thomas of Cranfield obtained in 1320 where for the promise to build a house and solar the fine was condoned and the rent (22s. *per annum*) cancelled for two years. At the same time there were disadvantages to such a simple 'ploughback' of rents. If the abbey was to be able to maintain rent revenues or to increase these according to the commercial *tempo* of the period, it might be more profitable to invest directly in building in order to maintain or to augment net total rent revenues. This was apparently the case in 1294 when the abbey was to take responsibility for repair of houses upon a row before Reginald of Houghton gained possession and agreed to pay the customary rent. Indeed in most instances where new buildings are mentioned before 1348 the cost of construction has been met apparently before the granting of the lease, although this fact has not been explicitly noted in the entry. From what is known generally of the abbey's policy of investment in land over the 1250-1350 period such direct investment is not surprising.[24]

As a heavy depreciation of property set in over the late 1340's and early 1350's, Ramsey at first attempted to convert rents to capital. In 1351 one-third of the entry fines were only one shilling or less, and none exceeded one-half mark. From 1353 much of the annual rent was being condoned in order that the tenant might build. Since these condonations of rent were not limited to a few years, as had been the case before 1348, it is unlikely that the abbey was very hopeful of the tenant's ability to rebuild. Gradually this fact became more clearly admitted. In 1355 Henry Newman and his wife Matilda received a place which, the entry goes on to say, had been a fully built row before the pestilence. Henry paid only sixpence as fine and one-half mark as annual rent, and could rebuild 'according to his greater convenience'. In the following year two more substantial holdings were granted on liberal terms with the understanding that repairs should be at the tenant's convenience. This series of court entries fades out from this time, but enough has been seen to indicate the pivotal importance of investment by even the *rentier* lord for the maintenance of capital in periods of economic stringency.

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[23] The purchase value of the rows would, of course, be much higher. Unfortunately purchase prices are seldom mentioned. One exception is the account of Abbot Robert of Nassyngton (1342-49), printed in the *Chronicon Rameseiensis* (ed. W. D. Macray, Rolls Series, 1886) where it is noted that one *rengia* of Robert Samenour was bought for £28 13s. 4d., one *rengia* of John Jacob for £16, and one *rengia* of Andrew Clericus for £26 13s. 4d. (*ibid.*, p.354).

[24] See *Estates*, pp.109ff.

Fortunately other documents are available to facilitate some measurement of this investment over the following period. Before leaving the court entries something may be said of their significance in terms of economic trends. Owing to the scattered nature of the data from the late thirteenth century, as well as to the fact that some increase in rent may have been associated with the transformation from short term to longer leases over the early fourteenth century, it is not possible to point to an economic 'recovery' in St. Ives after 1300 comparable to that upon the agrarian holdings of Ramsey.[25] However, despite the long term nature of the leases there is a parallel in the relative stability of the 1320's and 1330's, the prosperous upswing in the early 1340's, and then the gradual decline after the Black Death.

II.

A series of bailiffs' accounts for St. Ives are scattered over 26 years from the early fourteenth to the late fifteenth century.[26] It is not clear whether the bailiff handled revenues from all other sources in St. Ives as well as the *rengiae* in the only two years for which rolls have survived from the first half of the fourteenth century (1318 and 1324), but from 1355 such appears to have been the case. Although for this period rents from the rows amounted to over ninety per cent of the total abbey revenues from St. Ives, information upon other sources of revenue does show some elements of the gradual economic decline of the town. In particular, the abbey always[27] reserved in leases the right to rent for itself the frontages of the *rengiae* during the fair. From 1359 until the last roll of this series in 1475 there is the entry 'nothing is received for the frontages owing to the lack of merchants.' The shops in West Hall, and a few other shops and quays were also still being let at annual fairs and markets in the mid-fourteenth century.[28] Rents from these sources gradually dwindled to a pittance from the mid-fourteenth century, and all shops and quays were probably attached to neighbouring *rengiae* for a small rent from the third quarter of this century. So unexceptional had the Easter and St. Lawrence fair periods become that the ordinary manor court of Slepe was able to handle business issuing from these fairs from the last quarter of the century. The entry fines for the rows, as with the entry fines for agrarian tenants of Ramsey,[29] never regained their previous major importance after the Black Death. In the following table (III) these signs of dwindling commerce at St. Ives have been tabulated. The increase in revenues from stallage and tolls seems due to the fact that the bailiff now collected directly these payments which formerly had been farmed with suitably located properties near the bridge, that is to say, had been included in revenues from the rows. Since beyond minor fluctuations in revenues from stallage and entry fines the picture of these revenues remained much the same for the early fifteenth century until 1475, the following tabulation has been carried only to 1418.

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[25] *Estates*, p.239.

[26] Public Record Office, Account Rolls (Sc 6) 883/1-29. Numbers 24, 28, and 29 are accounts of the Priory of St. Ives.

[27] There was only one exception to this rule mentioned in all the court entries discussed in Section I, above. Exceptions from the late fourteenth, and over the fifteenth century seem equally rare.

[28] It was mentioned above that a few stalls alone were let on short term leases from the early fourteenth century. The court rolls did not mention, however, the number of properties that continued to be rented seasonally for competitive rents. As far as I have been able to ascertain these were only stalls, and not the complete *rengiae*. In a poor commercial year the inability to rent these stalls involved considerable loss. The account for 1324 (SC 6:883/3) offers a good example. In this year the lord cancelled to the bailiff a number of rents from *rengiae* that had been allowed for repairs, and also a large amount for properties not let—from other sources these would seem to include two or three rows that were too dilapidated to be let on long terms, as well as some of the seasonal stall rents: In relaxatione Willelmo Wythened per licentiam domini XVs. Item Johanni Kyng pro diversis expensis factis super domos ad pedem pontis ultra aquam Xs., IIIId. per licentiam domini. Item Ricardo de Stabulo dimidiam marcam per licentiam domini. Item Alice de Swanaseye XLd. de firma domorum eiusdem Alicie de hoc anno. Et in relaxatione facta eidem ballivo pro diversis domibus non locantur hoc anno domini Simonis octavo £VII Ss. IIIId. sicut continet in quedam cedula de particulis quibus postponatur vacat Summa £VIII Xs. IIIId. Item Xs. IIIIId.

Table III: Various Revenues in the Late Fourteenth Century[30]

Year	Frontages	West Hall	Shops & Quays	Tolls & Stallage	Fair Court	St. Ives Court	Entry Fines
1355	26.	100.	37.10	21.	6.8	3.	14.1
1356	12.	26.8	12.4	21.	6.1	5.	3.
1359	0	10.	12.	12.	0	3.	11.4
1362	0	6.8	10.3	7.	0	3.2	58.10
1371	0	4.	6.8	53.4	0	3.2	44.10
1378	0	6.8	0	40.4	0	0	5.4
1382	0	6.8	0	66.8	0	0	34.4
1394	0	6.8	0	66.8	0	0	30.
1395	0	6.8	0	66.8	0	0	56.8
1396	0	6.8	0	66.8	0	0	0?
1418	0	6.8	0	48.2	0	0	0?

Receipts from rents of *rengiae* appear at first to be remarkably stable in the rent rolls of the bailiff of St. Ives, as the first column in the following table (IV) indicates. The actual payments to the lord on the bailiff's account, however, may be seen in the cash livery column of the same table to have fluctuated considerably, so that a considerable debt (see the column Initial Debt) existed for most years when the accounts were first struck. The administration of St. Ives differed from that of Ramsey agrarian properties in that these debts were not allowed to accumulate over long periods. The seneschal attempted to balance the bailiff's account every year by condoning fines and small rents that could not be raised and by accepting liveries in kind and various arrangements to cancel larger outstanding obligations. While the initial debt does show, therefore, the bailiff's difficulties in collecting rents, it would seem that most of these debts were eventually collected. However, even where there were no condonations, it is often not clear whether the seneschal delivered such eventual payments to the lord, or applied such revenues to expenses in the town, so that differences between initial and final indebtedness have not been calculated with cash livery in Table IV.

[29] See *Estates*, p.261, Table LXII.

[30] The total profits from the manorial court of Slepe with St. Ives were received by the bailiff of St. Ives from early in the fifteenth century. The column designated 'Tolls and Stallages' is the entry: de stallagio et tolneto cum perquisitiis mercatorum carectorum et batellarum.

Table IV: Major Revenues and Indebtedness at St. Ives[31]

Year	Revenues from Rows £ s. d.	Cash Livery £ s. d.	Initial Debt £ s. d.	Final Debt £ s. d.
1318	59.11.10	45. 9.4	7.10.	3.
1324	47.15.8	19. 1.	5. 8.6	0
1355	63.14.8	54.17.9	17.13.5	17.13.5
1356	63.14.8	43. 9.8	15.17.9	3.8
1359	63.14.8	50.11.6	2. .5	2. .5
1362	63.14.8	45.13.4	5.18.2	0
1371	63.14.8	29.13.	50. 4.	0
1378	49.13.2	45. 5.4	3. 8.1	0
1382	54. 9.	48.13.4	6. 6.11	3.19.4
[ ]	59.19.10	56.13.1	6.12.3	6.12.3
1394	62.10.5	66. 8.	1.15.	1.10.8
1395	63.18.10	54. 4.	13. 9.1	0
1396	63.18.10	50.	0	0
1418	61.13.10	52.	12.18.2	11. 4.6
1442	48.17.8	33.	10. 8.3	10. 3.4
1443	48.11.1	34.	17. 6.2	1.
1445	51. 2.5	25.18.4	6.16.3	1.
1448	52. 4.6	33.	5.10.11	2. 9.
1449	52. 5.7	27.18.8	3. 9.2	2. 8.4
1451	52. 5.7	32. 3.4	4.13.2	2.10.
1453	55. 4.6	30.13.4	13. 6.2	3. 3.8
1456	55. 4.6	35.	11.17.4	8.13.4
1457	55. 4.6	35.13.4	12. 8.7	5.13.4
[ ]	58.12.1	42.	7.12.11	?
1473	59.19.3	23.	14.16.1	8. .2
1475	59.19.3	21.	21.14.	20.14.

Previous to the balancing of the account itself, however, other decisions had been named before or during the financial year with respect to the rents from St. Ives. These involved the steps already noted from the court entries in Section I, above, that is, the ploughing back of rents to investment in capital and (or) the discounts allowed to maintain and to re-build properties. For the following table (V) it has been possible to obtain from the accounts the amount of maintenance expenditure by the lord, the deductions allowed for repairs on rents, and the properties fallen back into the lord's hands. Over the generation after the Black Death the lord was gradually able to repair and to rent vacant holdings by discounts on rents. The entry for the year 1371 contains an unusual amount of detail upon this system of discounts. Over this year nine tenements had been in the lord's hands, and four had been paying rent at discount. Five of the tenements in the lord's hands were let at a discount from this year on the following terms: one row to pay 12d. in 1372, 2s. in 1373, 3s. in 1374, and then the regular value of 13s. 4d. *ad vitam;* two rows worth 17s. 6d. at full value were rented for ten years at 4s. *per annum*; one cottage worth 5s. in good repair was rented for 2s. 6d. in 1372, and thereafter at 5s.; one-half row was rented for 20s. in 1372, and thereafter for the regular return of 22s.; one burned place was rented, apparently for life, at 18d. (with no obligation to repair?) although worth ordinarily 13s. 6d. From other accounts it would appear that discounts for a three or four year period were the most common around this period. By the fourth quarter of this century conditions of fairly full employment of buildings obtained in St. Ives and discounts for repairs were not abnormal. The town, like the agrarian manors of Ramsey,[32] had been able to pull itself up by its own bootstraps after the disorganization of the mid-fourteenth century.

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[31] For the complete account picture, of course, various revenues of Table III above must be added to returns from the rows, and expense must be placed along with indebtedness to calculate the difference between revenues and cash livery.

[32] See *Estates,* Chapter IX, *passim.*

From the end of the fourteenth century a new recession gradually set in and henceforth discounts apparently were inadequate for the recovery of rents. The abbey was forced to invest directly in capital at St. Ives until these maintenance costs assumed the considerable proportions that can be seen in the table below. This investment kept the number of vacant tenements down in the first half of the century and by the third quarter of the century all holdings were let. However, even though this basic capital cost continued to be maintained by the lord from the mid-fifteenth century,[33] the rows in St. Ives were no longer of a commercial value to cover current repairs, so that the large number of discounts allowed by 1473-5 was really becoming tantamount to a general devaluation of rents. The discount upon actual rented holdings together with the expenditure upon maintenance of buildings represents the capital investment by the abbey in order to maintain rents at St. Ives. In the second last column of Table V these two amounts have been calculated as a percentage of the revenue of the *rengiae* (that is, of Table IV, col. I). While this percentage does provide some measure of the tremendous efforts required to maintain rents, it should not probably be calculated as any precise gauge of profit or loss. It may be recalled that the eventual disposition of some debt items is difficult to ascertain in relation to cash liveries to the lord, and in addition, returns from major capital investment on properties would have to be measured in terms of years—an impossibility with a broken sequence of documents.

Table V

Year	Maintenance Expenditure £ s. d.	Discounts No. of Tenements	Discounts Amount £ s. d.	Approx. %	Holdings [34] in manu domini No.	Holdings [34] in manu domini Value £ s. d.
1355	0	10	4.19.4	8	7	7. 8.5
1356	4. 7.11&	[8]	[3.14.4]	?	7	7. 9.8
1359	0	13	7.13.1	10	6	4. 9.4
1362	0	13	7.15.5	11	7	5. 8.4
1371	0	4	1.13.8	3	9	5. 9.10
1378	0	[3]	[1. 4.]	3	7	5.12.6
1382	0	4	12.	1	5	4.17.10
1394	0	2	4.3	.5	0	0
1395	2.	2	11.4	1	2	2.
1396	1. 2.1	1	1.4	2	3	3.10.
1418	8.10	1	6.8	1	2	18.
1442	15. 8.3	1	4.	31	7	5. 1.10
1443	2.12.8	4	16.2	7	6	4. 3.6
1445	18. .10	4	19.4	37	11	7.12.
1448	9.14.7	7	2.15.4	24	11	7. 8.8
1449	17.17.3	8	5. 5.	44	8	7. 1.4
1451	11. 4.2	3	11.8	22	15	7. 4.5
1453	10.19.11	17	3.18.11	27	[4]	4.12.2
1456	6.11.8	12	3. 5.3	18	8	3.12.3
1457	6. 8.3	11	12.10.5	34	10	4.10.10
1473	2.18.3	31	16. 3.2	32	0	0
1475	15. 1.1	31	17. 9.2	54	0	0

& this amount also includes some costs for repair of the bridge.

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[33] These expenditures come under the heading *Custos Domorum* in the accounts, but until 1445 there is little identification of the various properties involved, and in 1473 and 1475 there is no description. Some payments suggest that general maintenance obligations of tenants in the town of St. Ives and this district are being met by the bailiff of the lord. But the houses and rows were the main item. It is quite understandable that rows that were new or largely rebuilt were too costly for ordinary rent

From the nature of charter sources the question of capital investment remains one of the least known aspects of the economic development of many segments of the economy of mediaeval England. Without account rolls, for instance, it is difficult to measure the cost of establishing and maintaining the flocks and fields that brought so much revenue over the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In addition, at the agrarian estates of Ramsey the capacity and willingness of the lord to invest appeared again and again more crucial than problems of price or production in the eventual direction of economic changes over the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries. But even with manorial account rolls, there is usually no adequate gauge for the measurement of such important elements in agrarian production as the cost of various adjustments in crop rotation, or the contribution of villein stock and production to the village economy, so that it is difficult to give precision to an analysis of the place of capital in economic change. The sources for St. Ives are of more than local interest, therefore, in so far as these illustrate some types of domainal capital responsibility. Fourteenth and fifteenth-century documents for St. Ives show how entry fines and rents while being signs of property demand, can also, along with direct expenditure, vary with the investment for capital maintenance. Although nominally adapted from early in the fourteenth century to that method of isolation from unfavourable market conditions now generally called a *rentier* system, such 'stable rents' could usually be maintained by the lord only at some sacrifice for capital investment. Over a period of almost chronically adverse commercial conditions the cost of capital maintenance was too great for the tenant. In contrast with the usual implications of the term *rentier*, the degree of stability in returns from St. Ives over this period turned largely upon the investment policy of the lord.

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deductions. One new 'house' in Barkersrowe cost £3 9s. 9d. in 1445, and repairs to a row £8 9s. 9d. in the same year. One new place next the 'Bothe' cost £11 16s. in 1449. Over the 1450's many smaller repairs costing ten shillings or so were being financed by the lord, perhaps in an effort to avoid the widespread discounts finally adopted by 1473.

[34] The bailiff did occasionally make small profits from some holdings *in manu domini*, but such amounts are usually negligible.

Old-English Riddle 28 — Testudo (Tortoise-Lyre)

LAURENCE K. SHOOK C.S.B.

Biþ foldan dǽl   fǽgre gegierwed
mid þý heardestan   ond mid þý scearpestan
ond mid þý grymmestan   gumena gestréona,
corfen, sworfen,   cyrred, þyrred,
bunden, wunden,   blǽced, wǽced,
frætwed, geatwed,   feorran lǽded
tó durum dryhta.   Dréam bið in innan
cwicra wihta,   clengeð, lengeð,
þára þe ǽr lifgende   longe hwíle
wilna brúceð   ond nó wið spriceð,
ond þonne æfter déaþe   déman onginneð,
meldan mislíce.   Micel is tó hycganne
wísfæstum menn,   hwæt séo wiht sý.

THIS Old-English riddle falls into four clearly distinguishable sections: (1) Lines 1-3, describing the object in its primitive condition as possessing a beautiful treasure "most hard, sharp and grim"; (2) lines 4-7, describing in some detail the process by which this treasure is prepared for a domestic or social use; (3) lines 7-12, elaborating on the main motif of the riddle: joyous sound is made right inside something which was once alive, yet when alive was silent; (4) lines 12-13, asking a conventional riddle question: let a wise man think hard and see if he knows what this thing is.

The solutions offered for this very interesting riddle have always been regarded as doubtful. The most commonly suggested and therefore most traditional solution "John Barleycorn" was first offered by Thomas Wright in 1842.[1] Wright thought he saw in this riddle an early trace of the hero John Barleycorn. Wyatt[2] and Mackie[3] accepted this solution. Dietrich[4] also accepted it but in the modified form of "wine cask". Dietrich differed from Wright in taking lines 1-7a of the poem to describe a wine barrel or cask rather than a field of grain. Thus he solved the riddle in terms of container rather than content. This is in line with the procedure in many Latin riddles. Tupper[5] took his cue from Dietrich, but felt that the opening lines of the poem described the process of threshing barley, and thus solved "beer or ale".

In 1894 Moritz Trautmann came up with an alternative solution, at first accepted by no one, "harp".[6] He argued for some kind of musical instrument because the riddle seemed to turn upon the motif: When I was alive, I was dumb; now that I am dead, I speak."

The first result of Trautmann's suggestion was some amusing byplay with Tupper. In his brief account of the history of the scholarship on this riddle, Tupper dismissed Trautmann summarily, saying merely that Deitrich's suggestion of wine cask was "certainly better than Trautmann's 'Harfe'." Wright's answer, Tupper goes on to say, "which we may modify to Beer or Ale, seems to me distinctly the best, as the riming lines describe the threshing of the barley."[7] Trautmann hardly took his dismissal kindly: "Heil unserem Tupper, der aus dem Reimen nicht bloss den Klang der Flegel hört, sondern sogar, dass Gerste gedroschen wird! Dietrichs Antwort 'Weinfass' lasst sich zweifellos eher hören als 'Bier'. Fur 'Harfe' (oder ein andere Musikgerät) stimmen mich hauptsächlich Beziehungen zu andren Rätseln. In des Symphosius 20 *Testudo* heisst es: *viva nihil dixi; quae sic modo mortua* (als Leier) *canto*."[8]

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[1] Thomas Wright, *Biographia Britannici Literaria* (London, 1842) I, 79.

[2] A. J. Wyatt, *Old English Riddles* (Boston and London, 1912).

[3] W. S. Mackie, *The Exeter Book, Part II* (London, 1934).

[4] Franz Dietrich, "Die Rätsel des Exeterbuches, Würdigung, Lösung und Herstellung," *Zeitschrift für deutches Alterthum* XI (1859), 468.

[5] Frederick Tupper, *The Riddles of the Exeter Book* (Boston, 1910), p. 135.

[6] Moritz Trautmann, "Die Auflösungen der ae. Rätsel," *Anglia Beiblatt* V (1894), 46-51.

So Trautmann felt that the riddle described a musical instrument and was based on the *dum vixi tacui—mortua dulce cano* motif employed by Symphosius in his riddle on the tortoise. Trautmann did not claim that the Old-English riddle also referred to a tortoise. Indeed, he assumed that it described a musical instrument made of wood, citing as a parallel a riddle recorded in Reusner's collection.[9] Thus his note to lines 4-5 reads: "Alle diese Worte lassen sich von der Bearbeitung des Holzes verstehen."[10] Those who follow Trautmann in solving as "musical instrument" make the same assumption. Thus Koch writes: "A stringed instrument is meant; the whole rhyme-technique is a fine allusion to the pleasing chords. A tree (*foldan dǽl* 1) which long stands silent (*no wið spriceð* 10), goes through a long process of cutting and carving, forming and framing, and is eventually brought (as a *gléobéam* B.2263) to human dwellings."[11] Krapp and Dobbie feel that Koch argues "convincingly" for a stringed instrument, but have nothing to say about the material from which it is made.[12]

If, however, as Trautmann says, the Old-English riddle employs the main motif of Symphosius' riddle on the tortoise, it would seem quite natural to investigate whether it may not be in its entirety an elaboration of the same subject. And upon investigation, such seems actually to be the case. The first two sections of Old-English Riddle 28 apply in every detail to the tortoise or turtle, and its third section describes a motif which only fits a musical instrument made from the shell of what was once a living thing. The answer to the question put in the fourth section of the riddle would, accordingly, appear to be Latin *testudo,* meaning both 'tortoise' and 'musical instrument'. Before re-examining the poem in the light of this suggestion, it might be well to review briefly the intriguing, if very limited, background of the tortoise and his remarkable riddle in the literature of the Greeks and Romans.

In the Homeric *Hymn to Mercury* there is to be found an account of how Mercury, or Hermes, first came to make a lyre from a tortoise-shell.[13] It is told how Hermes took a chisel and scooped the viscera of the tortoise from its lovely shell, how he drilled holes through the hard surface, fastened reed-stems into them, and covered the large opening of the hollow of the shell with a piece of leather. He then fitted and fixed the bridge and strung the instrument with cords of sheep-gut. Hermes loved the music he produced from the lyre and treasured his newly-fashioned instrument. He only gave it up to Apollo in order to make good an injury and to cement their friendship.

The Greeks loved riddles and no doubt the "tortoise-lyre" riddle was a favourite with them. It would seem to have worked its way into drama and to have come to Rome during the second Century B.C. in Pacuvius' tragedy

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[7] *op. cit.*, p. 135.

[8] Moritz Trautmann, *Die Altenglischen Rätsel* (Heidelberg, 1915), p. 90.

[9] Nicolas Reusner, *Aenigmatographia sive Sylloge Aenigmatum et Griphorum Convivalium*, 2d ed. (Frankfurt 1602), p. 380.

[10] Trautmann, *op cit.*, p. 90.

[11] Ernst A. Koch, "Jubilee Jaunts and Jottings," *Lunds Universitets Aarsskift,* NF, Avd. 1, Bd 14, Nr 26, p. 63.

[12] G. P. Krapp and E. V. K. Dobbie edd., *The Exeter Book* (New York, 1936), p. 337.

[13] Homeric Hymns, IV, esp. lines 25 ff. See also lively translation by P. B. Shelley: Thomas Hutchinson, ed., *The Complete Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley* (Oxford, 1904), pp. 680-699.

Antiope, said by Cicero to have been translated from Euripides. It is Cicero, at any rate, who actually preserves, in his *De Divinatione,* II,64, the lines of *Antiope* containing the riddle. It runs as follows:[14]

Amphio. Quadrupes tardigrada agrestis humilis aspera
brevi capite, cervice anguina, aspectu truci,
eviscerata inanima cum animali sono.

Attici. Ita saeptuosa dictione abs te datur,
quod coniectura sapiens aegre contuit:
non intellegimus, nisi si aperte dixeris.
Amphio. Testudo.

Cicero, in the First Century B.C., and Tertullian[15] in the Third Century of the Christian era both refer to this "Pacuvian" riddle but in quite unrelated contexts. Cicero is discussing the perplexing problem of why, if indeed they do, the gods warn men through dreams which are at best obscure. Tertullian is concerned with changing fashions in clothes. Both refer quite casually to the Pacuvian tortoise as to something widely known and understood. Neither is dealing at the moment with riddles as such.

When Symphosius prepared his collection of Latin riddles in elegant verse somewhere between the third and fifth centuries, the tortoise riddle took on the tidy proportions so well known to medieval and renaissance scholars. It appears several times in Reusner's collection[16] in pretty much the same form as Symphosius gave it:

Tarda, gradu lento, speciosa praedita dorso;
Docta quidem studio, sed saevo prodita fato,
Viva nihil dixi, quae sic modo mortua canto.[17]

It will become fairly evident in the analysis to follow that the author of the Old-English riddle knew considerable about the historical riddle. He certainly knew, and in part drew upon Symphosius. But he seems also to have been familiar with, or at least to have sensed, some aspects of the story as a whole which antedate Symphosius. With this background, let us turn to the details of Riddle 28 of The Exeter Book.

SECTION 1, lines 1-3

Biþ foldan dǽl   fǽgre gegierwed
mid þý heardestan   ond mid þý scearpestan
ond mid þý grymmestan   gumena gestréona

(There is a thing on this earth   beautifully dressed
with the hardest   and with the sharpest
and with the fiercest   of the treasures of men.)

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[14] W. W. Merre, ed., *Selected Fragments of Roman Poetry,* 2d ed. (Oxford, , 1898) pp. 70-71; Otto Ribbeck, *Tragicorum Romanorum Fragmenta* (Lipsiæ, 1871), I, 77. The following translation may be useful in examining the Old-English riddle:
"Amphio. Four-footed, slow-paced, rude, lowly, fierce, with short head, snake-like neck, and aspect grim,
Though disembowelled and dead, with living voice I speak.
Athenians. You speak in words so obscure that a wise man hardly guesses what they mean:
we cannot understand, unless you speak plainly.
Amphio. *Testudo.*"

[15] *De Pallio,* III, 3; see *Tertulliani Opera* II, 738, *Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina* II, Turnholti, 1954.

[16] *Op. cit.,* pp. 149, 260. See also pp. 152, 173, 378.

[17] R. T. Ohl, *The Enigmas of Symphosius* (Philadelphia, 1928), pp. 52-55.

The first line of the poem makes specific reference to the beauty of the primary object described and thus seems to be utilizing a principal motif employed in Symphosius 20: *speciosa praedita dorso*. The expressions 'hardest' and 'sharpest' of line 2 suit the tortoise shell, although 'sharpest' applies equally well to a field of barley. Neither is strikingly applicable to wood. 'Grimmest' or 'fiercest' of line 3 has to be stretched rather far to cover a grain-field; but, granting the legitimacy of employing synecdoche, is perfect for the slow old reptile of land and water. Moreover, OE *grimm* 'fierce' echoes not only the *saevo* of Symphosius' *saevo prodita fato*, but much more tellingly the *aspectu truci* of the Pacuvian dialogue. Thus this first section of the Old-English riddle may very well be taken to deal with the tortoise shell in its natural setting on the back of a living tortoise.

SECTION 2, lines 4-7a

corfen, sworfen, cyrred, þyrred,
bunden, wunden, blǽced, wǽced,
frætwed, geatwed, feorran lǽded
tó durum dryhta.

(cut out, scoured, turned over, dried,
bound, strung, whitened, thinned,
decked, adorned, brought from afar
to the doors of princes.)

The second section of the poem, lines 4-7a is clearly devoted to a method of preparing the subject of the first three lines for some domestic or social use. Most scholars have felt that these lines describe the process of beer-making. Trautmann and Koch, however, take them as describing the preparation of wood for a musical instrument. In line with the present suggestion, they ought rather to provide a description of the process of preparing, not a piece of wood, but a tortoise shell for use as a sounding-board for a stringed instrument.

These lines certainly do not fully satisfy the demands of the process of beer-making. So taken, the terms are vague and colourless. They might just as well be describing the making of flour. No word drives its hidden message home. The case for processing wood is better, but not nearly so sharply defined as the preparation of a shell.

The tortoise is killed and the body cut out (*corfen*, cp. *eviscerata*) from the shell; the shell is then scoured (*sworfen*) or smoothed off; next, the shell is placed hollow-side-up (*cyrred*, cp. *cierran* 'to turn') to dry in the sun (*þyrred*); it is then bound, perhaps reinforced at the edges to prevent cracking, or as in Homer's hymn overlaid with a piece of leather (*bunden*); and strung (*wunden*) with gut or wire; the instrument is then whitened (*blǽced*) for appearance and thinned and pumiced (*wǽced*) until it returns a true sound; finally it is adorned and decorated (*frætwed, geatwed*) so as to be a fitting ornament even in a royal mansion. The second section of the riddle, though cast in five pairs of simple jingling English words, describes like the Homeric *Hymn to Mercury* the construction of the lyre from the gouging out of the reptile's body to the adorning and decorating of the finished instrument.

SECTION 3, *lines 7b-12a*

Dréam bið in innan
cwicra wihta, clengeð, lengeð,
þára þe ǽr lifgende longe hwíle
wilna brúceð ond no wið spriceð,
ond þonne æfter déaþe déman onginneð
meldan mislíce.

(Music is made right inside
living things, rings and resounds [in them],
which things, once living, long
used the precious [shell], but not to speak with;
then, after death, did they begin to speak;
to talk in a kind of way.)

Here is a somewhat mixed elaboration on the principal motif, or better perhaps, here are two motifs run together: melody is produced *inside living beings,* though when alive they made no sound. Scholars have thus far been inclined to render 7b-8a as "there is a sound of joy in the homes of men."[18] They have given too much significance to the *dréam* (recalling, for example, the *hæleða dréam* passage of *Beowulf*[19]) and not enough to the *in innan* which properly denotes something 'shut up within' like care in the breast or a man in prison,[20] and which may be followed by the genitive case. The words *clengeð, lengeð* which have bothered all editors are less troublesome in this interpretation. They can be taken as verbs, synonymous with each other in meaning, and sharing with *bið* (line 7) the common subject *dréam.* They are excellent onomatopoeic words for musical sounds plucked against a hard-shell sounding board.

The motif elaborated in these lines is, of course, lifted right out of Pacuvius (Cicero) and Symphosius. It makes for a happier riddle in Latin than English since the answer *testudo* can mean both 'tortoise' and 'musical instrument' (especially the lyre).[21] English does not supply the twofold answer in a single word.

SECTION 4, *lines 12b-13*

Micel is tó hycganne
wísfæstum menn, hwæt séo wiht sý.

(It takes a lot of thinking
for a wise man to discover what this thing is.)

The poem closes with a normal riddler's formula. One cannot help remarking, though it may mean very little, how close this question is to Pacuvius' *quod coniectura sapiens aegre contuit.* In any event, the answer must be returned as by Amphio to the Athenians: Gk. χέλυς, Lat. *testudo,* Eng. 'tortoise-lyre'.

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[18] Cp. Trautmann, *Die ae. Rätsel*, p. 90: "der Klang über den sich die Menschen freuen." Tupper, *The Riddles of the Exeter Book*, p. 137: "The *dréam* due to beer is similarly described, *Fates* 77 f., . . . Cf. Béow. 495."

[19] *Beowulf* 491-498.

[20] See Bosworth-Toller, *Anglo-Saxon Dictionary*, s.v.

[21] See Ohl, *op. cit.*, n. 2, p. 54.

Ockham's Conception of the Unity of Science

ARMAND MAURER C.S.B.

SOME thirty years ago Etienne Gilson described the fourteenth century as a "virgin forest" for research in mediaeval philosophy,[1] and although some excellent studies on this period have since been published his description is still apt today. The writings of the fourteenth-century philosophers and theologians are for the most part still in manuscripts or early printed editions, and we lack good monographic studies on even first-rate thinkers of this critical period of the middle ages. Much work still remains to be done before it can be adequately understood and seen in perspective to the centuries which preceded and followed it.

One of the most striking facts emerging from the studies which have been made on the fourteenth century is the profound change in the mediaeval mind during that period. The restlessness and insecurity characterizing that era were reflected in its philosophy and theology. Long-established notions were questioned, new problems were raised, and fresh approaches were tried; but deeper than this, there was a radical change in the intellectual atmosphere of the times. Anyone who passes from the writings of St. Bonaventure or St. Thomas Aquinas to those of William of Ockham or Robert Holcot cannot fail to realize that he is entering a different intellectual world. The *avant-garde* of the fourteenth century were well aware of this difference and contrasted their "modern way" with the "old way" of the previous century. Ockham is generally considered the initiator of the *via moderna* and its central figure, and in large part this is true. But for all its originality, his philosophy did not spring up unheralded nor in isolation. Others helped to pave the way for it by trying, each in his own way, to crystallize the half-formed notions and vague aspirations of the age. Ockham was the greatest figure in this circle because he did so with the surest insight and boldest execution.

These general remarks can be illustrated by an analysis of Ockham's doctrine of the unity of science. Ockham takes up this question at greatest length in the prologue to his commentary on the *Sentences,* where he is concerned with the nature of theology as a science. In Question 8 he asks in what sense theology is one science, distinct from other sciences. Some illuminating remarks on science and its unity are also found in the prologues to his commentaries on the *Physics* and on the logical works of Porphyry and Aristotle. Ockham's opposition to St. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus on the subject of science and its unity reveals the gulf separating his views from theirs. At the same time, his borrowings from Peter Auriol show to what extent his position was anticipated and prepared by his immediate predecessors.

Science and its Object

Ockham uses the term *scientia* in a broad sense to cover not only demonstrated scientific conclusions but also other types of knowledge and even belief. *Scientia* is defined in general as the "certain knowledge of any truth." This includes truths known only by faith. We may not have seen Rome, yet we know by the testimony of others that it is a large city. So too we know the identity of our father and mother, even though this is not evident to us. As long as we adhere to a statement without any doubt, and it is true, we can be said to know it. In a second sense of the term, *scientia* is the evident knowledge of some contingent fact known by experience; for example that a particular wall is white. Thirdly, *scientia* is the evident knowledge we have of necessary truths, whether they are principles or conclusions following from them. Fourthly, *scientia* is restricted to the evident knowledge of a necessary truth caused by the evident knowledge of necessary premises in syllogistic discourse. Ockham points out that it is in this latter sense that Aristotle uses the term "science" as distinct from understanding and wisdom. But Ockham does not restrict the meaning of science to these scientifically demonstrated conclusions. Science, he says, can also mean the whole knowledge involved in the demonstration.[2]

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[1] *Compte rendu, Revue d'histoire franciscaine* 3 (1926), 129.

Although Ockham includes under science the knowledge we have on the testimony of someone else, he makes it clear that this is not science in the proper sense of the term. Thus he refuses to call theology a proper science because it rests upon authority rather than upon evidence. The objects of our belief are not know self-evidently, nor are they deduced from self-evident knowledge; hence we cannot properly speaking be said to know them. Science in the proper sense is *evident* knowledge, whether the evidence is that of principles or of conclusions drawn from principles, or that gained directly or indirectly from experience.[3]

In no matter what sense *scientia* is understood—as simple belief in a truth or knowledge of a contingent fact or of a demonstrated conclusion—it is always a stable possession or *habitus* of the soul. To prove the point Ockham appeals to experience. We are aware, he says, that as a result of repeatedly knowing some object we are more able and ready to know it than before. This shows that our soul, or more precisely our intellect, has acquired something new, and this possession is called in Aristotelian language a habit (*habitus*). And since only qualities exist in the soul as in a subject, the habit which is science must be a quality of the soul.[4]

The soul is thus the subject of science, in the sense that science is a quality existing in it. But the term "subject of science" has another meaning which Ockham finds in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. In the Aristotelian sense the subject of science is that about which something is known. Science draws a conclusion from principles which is demonstrated of the subject. The subject of the conclusion of science is identical with the subject of science itself.[5]

We must inquire of Ockham in what sense, if any, a science has one subject. But before passing on to this question, let us observe Ockham's distinction between the subject and object of a science. This distinction became classic among the later scholastics and was adopted even by some Thomists. According to Ockham, the object of a science is the whole proposition which is known; the subject is only a part of the proposition, namely the term functioning as its subject. For example, when we know that every man is capable of learning, the object of this knowledge is the whole proposition "Every man is capable of learning"; the subject is the term "man".[6]

The full import of Ockham's making propositions the object of science cannot be appreciated without an understanding of his thorough-going nominalism. He was convinced with Aristotle that science concerns the universal and not the particular as such.[7] But where is the universal to be found? It was generally agreed by the Schoolmen of the thirteenth century that the individual things of our experience in some way contain natures which are the foundations of our universal concepts and the objects of science. Ockham set out to disprove this contention. It is axiomatic for him that reality is individual and in no sense common or universal. This meant, for him, the elimination of natures or essences from individual things. He was fully conscious of the novelty of his position. He writes:

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[2] Ockham, Prologue to the *Expositio super viii libros Physicorum*; ed. P. Boehner, *Ockham, Philosophical Writings* (London, 1957), pp. 4, 5. Hereafter cited as *Physics*.

[3] Ockham, *Sentences*, Prologue, q. 7 (Lyons, 1495), E. For Ockham's notion of theology, cf. R. Guelluy, *Philosophie et théologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham* (Louvain, 1947).

[4] *Physics*, pp. 3, 4.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 9. Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, 7, 75a39-b1.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 9. For a Thomist's use of this distinction, cf. John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus* I, q. 1, disp. 2, a. xi (Paris, 1931), I, p. 402.

> All those whom I have seen agree in the statement that there is really in the individual a nature which is in some way universal, at least potentially and incompletely, although some say that it is really distinguished (from the individual), some that it is distinguished only formally, some that the distinction is in no sense in reality but only according to reason and the consideration of the intellect.[8]

Having proved to his own satisfaction that universality is a property only of concepts, which are the terms of propositions, he drew the inevitable conclusion: propositions alone are the object of science. "Every science", he writes, "whether it be real or rational, is concerned only with propositions as with objects known, for only propositions are known."[9] In saying this, he does not mean that science in no way concerns individual things. The terms of the propositions in some sciences stand for real individuals; examples are natural science and metaphysics. For this reason they are called "real sciences", or sciences of reality. On the other hand, the terms of the propositions of logic stand for concepts in the mind; hence it is called "rational science." The terms of the science of grammar stand for written or spoken words, which are themselves individual but are used conventionally as universal signs. Consequently, science treats of individuals, but only in an improper sense, in so far as the terms of its propositions stand for them; properly speaking science concerns universals, which are the terms of propositions.[10]

The Unity of Science

Ockham's notion of the unity of science follows strictly from these nominalist presuppositions. In what sense is theology, metaphysics, logic, or the philosophy of nature one science? Each of them is made up of many propositions arranged in a definite order; and for each of the conclusions demonstrated in the science there is a numerically distinct habit in the intellect. Ockham attempts to prove this by showing that a man can possess the scientific habit of demonstrating one conclusion while being in ignorance or error with regard to others. So the habit by which we are disposed to demonstrate these conclusions must be numerically distinct. If we mean by science, then, the habit existing in the intellect, each of the sciences is not a habit one in number but a collection of habits. The unity of these habits is not numerical but collective.[11] The same is true if by science is meant the book written by an author, as we speak of Aristotle's book of *Metaphysics* or *Physics* as one science. The book contains a collection of terms, propositions, arguments with principles and conclusions, as well as refutations of errors and false arguments. Whether these sciences are understood as habits in the intellect or as written treatises, they are "a collection of many things pertaining to the knowledge of one object or many objects having a definite order."[12] As Ockham's commentator, Gabriel Biel, puts it, "science" in this sense is a collective name: *quasi nomen collectivum.*[13]

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[7] Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus, quod scientia non est de singularibus sed est de universalibus supponentibus pro ipsis singularibus. *Physics*, p. 11. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XI, 1, 1059b26.

[8] In conclusione istius quaestionis omnes quos vidi concordant, dicentes quod natura quae est aliquo modo universalis, saltem in potentia et incomplete, est realiter in individuo; quamvis aliqui dicant quod distinguitur realiter, aliqui quod tantum formaliter aliqui quod nullo modo ex natura rei, sed tantum secundum rationem vel per considerationem intellectus. *Sent.*, I, 2, 7; B.

[9] Scientia quaelibet, sive sit realis sive rationalis, est tantum de propositionibus tamquam de illis quae sciuntur, quia solae propositiones sciuntur. *Sent.*, I, 2, 4; M. Cf. *Physics*, p. 11.

[10] *Sent.*, *ibid.*, N, O; *Physics*, p. 12; *Expositio Aurea*, proem. (Bologna, 1496), fol. 1^{v}.

It will be noted that, for Ockham, one science can have many objects; the unity of a science does not rest upon the unity of its object or subject. Duns Scotus comes under his criticism for teaching the contrary. According to Scotus, a science has a primary subject or object which gives unity to the science since it virtually contains all the truths pertaining to the science. For example, the primary object of theology is God, and this object virtually contains all theological truths.[14]

Ockham opposed the Scotist explanation of the unity of science on several scores. In the first place, he did not think it true that one science, for example theology or metaphysics, has only one subject. The science has different parts, each of which has its own subject. As we have seen, the subject of a science is simply that about which something is known, and in a science with a collective unity there are many things about which we acquire knowledge. So it is meaningless to ask: What is the subject of logic, or of the philosophy of nature, or of metaphysics, or of mathematics? There is no one subject of the entire science: the different parts of the science have different subjects. To ask what is the subject of the philosophy of nature is like asking who is the king of the world. There is no one man who is king of the world; one person is king of one kingdom and another of another kingdom. It is the same with the subjects of the various parts of a science.[15] Ockham's comparison of a science with the world is an accurate one, for according to him both have the same kind of unity, namely the unity of order. He writes:

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[11] Ideo dicendum est, quod metaphysica non est una scientia numero, nec similiter philosophia naturalis. Sed philosophia naturalis est collectio multorum habituum, sicut dictum est. *Physics*, p. 7.

So too logic is not a habit one in number; it is "a collection of many knowledges." *Liber Predicabilium*, proem. (Bologna, 1496), fol. 8^{r}. Cf. *Physics*, p. 13.

[12] Ad primum istorum dico, quod scientia ad praesens dupliciter accipitur: Uno modo pro collectione multorum pertinentium ad notitiam unius vel multorum determinatum ordinem habentium. Et scientia isto modo dicta continet tam notitiam incomplexam terminorum quam notitiam complexorum, et hoc principiorum et conclusionum; continet etiam reprobationes errorum et solutiones falsorum argumentorum; continet etiam divisiones necessarias et definitiones ut frequenter . . . Et isto modo accipitur scientia pro compilationibus et tractatibus auctorum et philosophorum . . . Sic etiam accipitur scientia, quando dicitur liber Metaphysicae vel liber Physicorum esse una scientia. Et scientia ista non est una numero, sed continet multos habitus non tantum specie sed etiam frequenter genere distinctos ordinem tamen aliquem inter se habentes, propter quem ordinem specialem, qualem non habet aliqua alia scibilia vel cognoscibilia, possunt dici et dicuntur secundum usum loquentium una scientia . . . Alio modo accipitur scientia pro habitu existente per se in genere qualitatis distincto contra alios habitus intellectuales, scilicet contra intellectum, sapientiam etc. Et isto modo eadem veritas non pertinet ad distinctas scientias, quia unius conclusionis non est nisi una scientia isto modo dicta, quia quaelibet talis scientia est una res numero non continens notitiam plurimarum conclusionum. *Sent.*, Prologue, 1; H-I; ed. P. Boehner (Paderborn, 1939), pp. 10-12.

[13] *In primam quaestionem Prologi*; ed. P. Boehner, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[14] Si ulterius quaeritur, an theologia sit una scientia? patet quod sic, quia est unius subjecti sub una ratione, quia non ex unitate conclusionis sortitur scientia suam unitatem, sed ex unitate subjecti, in quo continentur virtualiter conclusiones et principia.

Ulterius si quaeritur, an sit maxime una? Dicendum quod sic, quia subjectum ejus est maxime unum; nam subjectum scientiarum physicarum est tantum unum secundum rationem et apprehensionem intellectus; subjectum vero hujus est maxime singulare, imo est ipsa singularitas, ut haec essentia divina, in quantum haec essentia. Duns Scotus, *Reportata Paris.*, Prol. 3, q. 2, n. 12 (Paris, 1894), XXII, p. 51. Cf. *Ordinatio*, Prol. 3, q. 1-3 (Vatican, 1950), I, p. 102, n. 151.

[15] *Physics*, pp. 9, 10.

> Hence we have to say that metaphysics is not a piece of knowledge which is numerically one. The same is true of the philosophy of nature, which is a collection of many *habitus*, as we have said before. It is one in the same sense that a city or a nation, or an army, which includes men and horses and other necessary things, or a kingdom, or a university, or the world, is said to be one.[16]

In the second place, Ockham denies, again in opposition to Scotus, that a science has a primary subject virtually containing all the conclusions which can be demonstrated about it. If there were such a subject, it would virtually contain the whole knowledge of these conclusions. In short, it would contain all the habits which go to make up a science; but a subject does not virtually contain a habit any more than a predicate does. Properly speaking, there is no primary subject of the whole science. Ockham contends that those who speak as though there were (for example, Scotus), mean that among all the subjects of the various parts of a science one may have some priority to the others. But this does not prevent some other subject in the science from having its own special kind of priority. For example, being can be said to have priority of predication in metaphysics, for the metaphysician primarily draws conclusions about being. But from the point of view of perfection, God is the primary subject in metaphysics, for he is the most perfect being known in it. So too, a concept like "natural substance" is the primary subject in the philosophy of nature as regards priority of predication; but as regards priority of perfection its first subject is man or the heavenly bodies.

A science, then, does not have strictly one primary subject to which everything in the science is referred, as Scotus contends. If it happens that everything in a science is attributed to one subject, this is only by accident; it is not essential to the structure of science.[17]

As a theologian, Ockham was especially concerned with the unity of theology, and he deals with it at length in the prologue to his *Sentences*. The question he raises is whether the *habitus* of theology is really one in number.[18] To settle the problem he first makes a distinction in the meaning of "theology". Theology in one sense includes infused faith, and this part of theology is, numerically, one habit. In another sense, theology includes acquired faith and other habits of evident knowledge, both concerning propositions and argumentations, as well as habits of apprehending terms and propositions. In this sense, theology is not numerically one.[19]

For the meaning of infused, as distinct from acquired faith, Ockham refers us to the third Book of his *Sentences*. There he tells us that infused faith is the supernatural habit which God gives to the soul at baptism. The immediate object of this habit is the proposition "Everything revealed by God is true." This is the premise and partial principle from which every particular article of belief can be inferred. For example, we can reason: "Everything revealed by God is true; but God has revealed that he is both three and one; therefore this is true."

[16] Ideo dicendum est, quod metaphysica non est una scientia numero, nec similiter philosophia naturalis. Sed philosophia naturalis est collectio multorum habituum, sicut dictum est. Nec est aliter una nisi sicut civitas dicitur una vel populus dicitur unus vel exercitus comprehendens homines et equos et caetera necessaria dicitur unus, vel sicut regnum dicitur unum, vel sicut universitas dicitur una, vel sicut mundus dicitur unus. *Physics*, p. 7. Trans. P. Boehner.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 10. Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, Prol., 3, q. 3; pp. 94 ff.

[18] *Sent.*, Prol. 8.

[19] *Ibid.*, G.

The habit of infused faith inclines us, by means of this principle, to elicit an act of belief regarding every article of belief. In this way there is one faith concerning all the articles we believe as Christians.

But this infused *habitus* of faith is obviously not sufficient to elicit particular acts of belief concerning the various articles of the Creed. A child, baptized but never instructed in the articles of faith, will have infused faith and the use of reason, but he cannot elicit an act of belief regarding any article of faith. Over and above infused faith, an acquired faith regarding the particular articles is necessary. This acquired faith comes through hearing or sight, by hearing the word of God preached or reading it in the Bible. Acquired faith is produced by eliciting many acts of belief regarding the same article. Indeed, acquired faith is necessary, along with infused faith, to elicit an act of belief in the primary object of infused faith, namely the proposition that everything revealed by God is true. For unless a baptized person is instructed, he cannot elicit an act of belief regarding this most general proposition. In short, without acquired faith, infused faith remains without an object.[20]

Theology, then, is possible only if acquired faith is added to infused faith. And even though the latter is a habit one in number in an individual Christian, acquired faith is not. There is a habit of acquired faith for each of the articles of the Creed. As proof of this Ockham offers an argument we have already met and which he borrowed from Duns Scotus. If someone is disposed to believe one article of the Creed and not another, nay more is in error regarding another article, his acts of belief and the habits from which they spring are distinct. Now it is obvious that one can have acquired faith regarding one article and not regarding another. He can even be in error about one article while believing another, as in the case of heretics. So these acts and habits are distinct not only in species but also in number.[21]

Ockham concludes that theology, including both infused and acquired faith, is not a habit one in number; rather it is a collection of many habits of faith differing numerically and specifically. And this is not all. Besides habits of belief, theology includes others which Ockham calls "evident habits" because they dispose us to acts of evident knowledge. As examples of evident habits Ockham gives the dispositions to apprehend terms and propositions evident to us, and to judge propositions and to reason from premises to conclusions, all of which are included in the work of the theologian.[22]

CRITICISM OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

In the prologue to his commentary on the *Physics* Ockham sets forth his notions of science, its object and its unity, principally in opposition to those of Duns Scotus. As is often the case, the Subtle Doctor is here his *bête noir*.[23] When he takes up the problem of the unity of the science of theology in his prologue to the *Sentences*, he criticizes the views of both St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent, both of whom, he says, agree that theology is a habit one in number and base its unity upon the unity of its formal object.[24] Ockham's criticism of St. Thomas in this work merits special attention for the fresh light it throws on the foundations of the Ockhamist doctrine of science.

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[20] *Sent.*, III, 8; L-M.

[21] *Ibid.*, K. Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* VI, 1, n. 4 (Paris, 1892), VII, p. 305.

[22] *Sent.*, III, 8; G. For the distinction of these acts and the proof of the existence of habits of apprehension as well as of judgment, cf. *Sent.*, Prol., 1; O-P; p. 15.

[23] The expression is applied to Scotus by E. Gilson, *Compte rendu*, *Revue d'histoire franciscaine* 3 (1926), 131.

[24] After stating St. Thomas' opinion and arguing against it, Ockham says: Alia est opinio tenens eamdem conclusionem, quia

The contention is made that theology is one science, Ockham tells us, because of the unity of its formal object. According to this view, the unity of a science is to be judged by the unity of the faculty and of the object of the scientific habit: not the object materially understood, but under the formal aspect in which it is an object of the science. Now theology treats of some or all things in so far as they are divinely revealed. Since all things divinely revealed share in the one formality of the object of this science, the science itself is one.[25]

Ockham is here paraphrasing a passage from St. Thomas Aquinas. Basic to St. Thomas' notion of the unity of theology (or, as he prefers to call it, sacred doctrine) is the distinction between a material and a formal object. As an example of this distinction he says that man, ass and stone have in common the one formal characteristic (*ratio*) of being colored. Hence, although they are different things, they all fall under the one faculty of sight, whose formal object is "that which is colored." It is the same with sacred Scripture: it considers many things, but all in so far as they are divinely revealed. So everything that is divinely revealable shares in the one formal object of this science and is included in sacred doctrine as in one science.[26]

This is in line with St. Thomas' general doctrine of habits and their distinction by formal objects. He considers a habit to be a simple quality; it is not made up of many habits: *habitus est qualitas simplex non constituta ex pluribus habitibus.*[27] A simple habit, like the faculty which it completes and perfects, may extend to many things, but as long as they have something in common and present a general aspect (*ratio*) under which they can be viewed, they can fall under one habit.[28] This is the case with sacred doctrine or any other science. It is one simple habit of the intellect with many things as its object, but all of them share in one characteristic which is the formal object of the science.

Ockham finds St. Thomas in error on several counts. To begin with, the unity of a faculty or habit cannot be established by the unity of its formal object, nor can the distinction of faculties or habits be based upon the distinction of their formal objects.[29] Ockham strikes at the very basis of St. Thomas' doctrine of the unity and distinction of habits and faculties by simply denying the distinction between a material and a formal object, and this for reasons which take us to the heart of his nominalism.

St. Thomas contends that the sense powers and the intellect can know the same reality but under different formal aspects (*rationes*); the senses under the aspect of singularity, the intellect under the aspect of universality. Sense and

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scientia quae considerat quantumcumque multa attributa ad unum subiectum secundum unam rationem formalem considerandi tanta simplicitate est unus habitus secundum numerum, quanta quaecumque habitus affectivus. *Sent.*, Prol., 8; D. Ockham is here referring to Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* IX, 4 (Paris, 1518), fol. 355^r; *Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum*, 6, 3 (Paris, 1520), fols. 44^v-46^r.

[25] Ad quaestionem dicitur quod theologia est una, quia unitas scientiae est consideranda secundum unitatem potentiae et habitus secundum obiectum, non quidem materialiter, sed secundum rationem formalem obiecti. Sed theologia considerat aliqua vel omnia secundum quod sunt divinitus revelata; et omnia ista divinitus revelata communicant in una ratione formali obiecti huius scientiae. Et ideo est una scientia. *Sent.*, Prol. 8; B.

[26] Dicendum sacram doctrinam unam secundum quod sunt divinitus revelata; et habitus consideranda secundum obiectum, non quidem materialiter, sed secundum rationem formalem obiecti; puta homo, asinus et lapis conveniunt in una formali ratione colorati, quod est obiectum visus. Quia igitur Sacra Scriptura considerat aliqua secundum quod sunt divinitus revelata, secundum quod dictum est, omnia quaecumque sunt divinitus revelabilia, communicant in una ratione formali obiecti huius scientiae. Et ideo comprehenduntur sub sacra doctrina sicut sub scientia una. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, 1, 3.

[27] *Op. cit.*, I-II, 54, 4.

[28] *Op. cit.*, I-II, 54, 2.

[29] Sed ista ratio sicut sonat intellecta, peccat multipliciter. Primo quia nec ex ratione unitatis formalis obiecti potest concludi unitas potentiae vel habitus, nec ex distinctione formali obiecti potest concludi distinctio habitus vel potentiae. *Sent.*, Prol. 8; C.

intellect are thus distinct faculties because of the distinction of their formal objects. Ockham does not agree. One and the same reality, under the same aspect (*ratio*), is the object of both sense and intellect. Otherwise an inferior power would extend to something beyond the reach of a superior power. In fact, the intellect can know an object of sense under the same formality as the sense. Again, both intellect and will have the same object, under the same aspect; otherwise we could will an object under some aspect unknown to the intellect, which is impossible.[24]

St. Thomas' basic error, according to Ockham, is to imagine that within one reality there are many distinct *rationes* which can be the formal objects of distinct faculties and habits. Now if this were so, the *rationes* themselves would be distinct realities and the unity of the original reality would be destroyed, as Ockham promises to prove later in his book: *in re non sunt tales distinctae rationes, quia tunc essent res distinctae, sicut alias patebit.*[25]

Ockham here refers the reader to his *Sentences*, I, d. 2, q. 3, where he takes up the question, crucial for the present issue, of the nature of a distinction or identity *secundum rationem*. He defines this type of distinction as purely conceptual or notional. A *ratio* is a being produced by the intellect (*ens rationis*), for example a concept. Hence a distinction between *rationes* is only a distinction between mental constructs. It differs from a real distinction, which is present between two or more realities. If we are to respect the difference between the world of concepts and that of realities, we will not speak of a reality being distinct from, or identical with another reality as regards *ratio*. Only beings of reason (*entia rationis*) can be said to be distinct or identical according to reason (*secundum rationem*). He writes:

> In reply to the question I say, in conformity with my previous statements, that no reality can be distinct from, or identical with another reality in *ratio*. Just as a distinction and identity in *ratio* has to do with beings of reason, so a real distinction or identity has to do with real beings. So I affirm that no reality can be distinguished from itself or from any other reality, nor be identical with itself or any other reality in *ratio*.[26]

This is a denial of the Thomistic distinction of reason with a foundation in reality. For St. Thomas, as for Ockham, *ratio* is a logical term, roughly equivalent to the term "definition." More precisely, St. Thomas defines it as the meaning (*intentio*) of a concept.[27] Now neither a concept nor its meaning exists in reality, but only in the mind. However, they may be said to exist in reality when something in reality is signified by, and corresponds to the mind's conception. If one reality is signified by different concepts, a plurality of *rationes* may be said to exist in it. We form many concepts of God when we think of his wisdom, power, goodness and so on. The plurality of these concepts exists not only in the part of our intellect but also on the part of God himself. Of course, there is no corresponding real plurality in God, but rather the fulness of his perfection, which makes it possible for all these concepts to apply suitably to him.[34]

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[24] *Primum patet*, tum quia idem sub eadem ratione formali est objectum sensus et intellectus, quia nihil est sensibile quin potentia superior possit in illud sub eadem ratione . . . tum quia idem est objectum intellectus et voluntatis, quia impossibile est quod aliquid sub aliqua ratione ignoratum sit volitum. *Ibid.*

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] Ad quaestionem respondeo secundum praedicta in praecedenti quaestione quod nulla res realis potest distingui nec esse idem ratione cum aliqua re, ita quod sicut distinctio rationis et identitas rationis se habent ad entia rationis, ita differentia realis et identitas realis se habet ad entia realia . . . Ideo dico quod nulla res nec a seipsa nec a quacumque alia potest distingui, vel esse eadem, ratione. *Sent.*, *I*, 2, 3; B.

[27] Secundum est quod ratio, prout hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit intellectus de significatione alicujus nominis; et hoc in his quae habent definitionem, est ipsa rei definitio . . . Nec tamen hoc nomen "ratio" significat ipsam conceptionem, quia hoc significatur per nomen rei; sed significat intentionem hujus conceptionis, sicut et hoc nomen "definitio", et alia nomina secundae impositionis. St. Thomas, *Sent.* I, 2, 1 (Paris, 1929), I, p. 66.

Moreover, St. Thomas does not consider it incongruous to say that many beings agree in one *ratio,* if they share in one nature or characteristic which is the foundation of one concept. For example, man, ass and stone agree in the one formal *ratio* of being colored, and all the objects studied in sacred doctrine share in the one formal *ratio* of being divinely revealed. Hence there is one formal object of the faculty of sight, namely "that which is colored", and there is one formal object of the science of theology, namely "the divinely revealable."[35]

Ockham's nominalist conceptions of reality and knowledge make it impossible for him to agree with St. Thomas on either of these points. He does not admit that several distinct concepts can be formed of precisely one reality, nor that several realities have anything in common which would serve as the basis of one concept. The unity of any item of reality prevents us from forming several significantly different concepts of it. That is why Ockham does not agree with St. Thomas that the many concepts we form of God differ in meaning precisely as concepts of God. They differ only in so far as they include a reference to different created effects of God. For example, "wisdom" and "goodness" do not differ in meaning as concepts of God, since they both signify one and the same divine reality; they differ only in so far as they connote created wisdom and created goodness. In short, for Ockham a plurality of concepts requires a plurality of realities; the unity of any one reality prevents it from being the basis of several concepts.[36]

The same unity of any item of reality seals it off from every other and prevents it from sharing anything in common with them. Consequently, it is absurd to speak of a number of materially different objects presenting to the intellect a common formal object proper to one faculty or science. In the nominalist perspective of Ockham, a distinction in material objects is identical with a distinction in formal objects, so that it is perfectly correct to say that one faculty has distinct formal objects; for example, the faculty of sight apprehends both whiteness and blackness, which are formally distinct. St. Thomas' distinction between a material and a formal object thus breaks down, and along with it the notion that faculties and sciences are distinguished by their formal objects.[37]

Turning specifically to the science of theology, Ockham criticizes St. Thomas' statement that its formal object is "the divinely revealable." If this were true, he contends, every conclusion in geometry would belong to theology, for all conclusions of this sort are possible objects of revelation. In short, there would be no knowledge outside the scope of theology, since its object would embrace all knowledge.[38]

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[34] Unde patet quod pluralitas istarum rationum non tantum est ex parte intellectus nostri, sed etiam ex parte Dei, inquantum sua perfectio superat unamquamque conceptionem nostri intellectus. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

[35] *Summa Theologiae* I, 1, 3.

[36] Illud quod secundum se est unum simplicissimum, si consideretur secundum se tantum, sicut est unum simplicissimum, ita habet considerari secundum unam simplicissimam rationem. Ergo si debeat considerari in eo plura ratione, hoc erit illud considerando in comparatione ad plura extra . . . in creaturis ratio generis et ratio differentiae, quae solum ratione differunt, accipiuntur a diversis rebus in comparatione ad diversas res. Ergo a simili differentia rationis inter attributa (Dei) accipitur in comparatione ad diversas res. *Sent.*, I, 2, 2; B.

This implies a radically different conception of being or reality from that of St. Thomas. On this point, cf. A. C. Pegis, "The Dilemma of Being and Unity", *Essays in Thomism* (New York, 1942), 151-183.

[37] Secundum patet, quia ipsius visus sunt obiecta formalia, puta albedo et nigredo, et tamen potentia est una. Quod autem ista sint obiecta formalia patet, quia nihil potest apprehendi ab aliqua potentia nisi obiectum ipsius formale apprehendatur. *Sent.*, Prol. 8; C.

[38] Minor sua est falsa, quia esse divinitus revelabile non est ratio formalis obiecti theologiae; tum quia tunc quaelibet conclusio goemetrica pertineret ad theologiam cum quaelibet talis sit divinitus revelabilis . . . *Ibid.*

Ockham realizes that St. Thomas does not confine the formal object of theology to what has actually been revealed, but extends it to include whatever can be revealed by God, which is an object absolutely universal in scope. It is in this way that St. Thomas justifies the inclusion in theology of natural knowledge, such as philosophy. Everything in his *Summa Theologiae* is theological science, even though it has not actually been revealed but may in fact have been culled from the wisdom of Aristotle or Avicenna. As long as this knowledge is used to further the work of theology, it is related to its subject, which is God, and comes under the formal object of theology.[39] St. Thomas did not think this in any way detracted from philosophy or the natural sciences, each of which has its own formal object and unity. As a superior science, theology has a formal object which embraces the materials treated of by the lower philosophical sciences. This is in keeping with the law that inferior faculties or habits are diversified by objects which nevertheless have something in common by which they fall under a superior faculty or habit. For example, each of the five senses has its own formal object, yet these objects are alike in that they are sensible. Under this common aspect they can be the object of the superior sense, called the *sensus communis*. So too, sacred doctrine can, without ceasing to be one science, treat of the objects of the various philosophical sciences under one aspect, namely in so far as they are divinely revealable. In this way sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of God's science, which is one and simple, yet extends to everything.[40]

With Ockham, theology loses this superior, and what can almost be called sacral, unity. It loses also the universality attributed to it by St. Thomas, as Ockham moves in the modern direction of separating philosophy from theology.

Not only does Ockham find fault with St. Thomas for calling the formal object of theology "the divinely revealable", but he finds him inconsistent in saying at the same time that the subject of theology is God. How can theology treat of all things under the aspect of God (*sub ratione Dei*), who is its subject, and also under the aspect of revelation, which is its object? Ockham writes: "To be divinely revealable is not the formal object of theology . . . because according to him (i.e. St. Thomas) God, under the aspect of deity, is the subject of theology."[41]

The answer to this seeming contradiction must be sought in the light of the Thomistic distinction between the subject and object of a science, which is quite different from that of Ockham. In the language of St. Thomas, a science has a subject, whereas a faculty or habit has an object: *Sicut enim se habet subiectum ad scientiam, sicut obiectum ad potentiam vel habitum.* The subject of a science is the end or terminus of the processes of the science, which in the case of theology is God, since this science proposes principally to know him. Theology considers other beings only in so far as they are related to the end of theology, which is God.[42]

Inasmuch as a science is a habit, however, it has an object, which is the formal aspect under which things fall under that habit.[43]

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[39] On St. Thomas' notion of "the revealable", cf. E. Gilson, *The Christian Philisophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York, 1956), pp. 9-14. For the controversy over its meaning, cf. M.-J. Congar, *Compte rendu, Bulletin thomiste* V (1937-1939), 490-505.

[40] Et similiter ea quae in diversis scientiis philosophicis tractantur, potest sacra doctrina una existens considerare sub una ratione, inquantum scilicet sunt divinitus revelabilia, ut sic sacra doctrina sit velut quaedam impressio divinae scientiae, quae est una et simplex omnium. *Summa Theologiae* I, 1, 3, ad 2^m^.

[41] *Sent.*, Prol. 8; C.

[42] *Summa Theologiae* I, 1, 7. For the meaning of the subject of science, cf. St. Thomas, *In I Post. Anal.*, c. 28, lect. 41; ed. Leonine I (Rome, 1882), p. 305. For the subject of theology, cf. G. F. Van Ackeren, *Sacra Doctrina. The Subject of the First Question of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Rome, 1952), p. 108.

[43] *Summa Theologiae* I, 1, 7.

In Thomistic terms, "the divinely revealable" is the object of theology, considered as a habit of the intellect; whereas God is the subject of theology, considered as a science whose movement and processes tend towards a certain end. Far from contradicting each other, these two aspects of theology blend into one, for it is the same God who is the subject of theology and whose revelation, actual or possible, is its object. Moreover, theology is strictly one, both by reason of its subject, which is God, and by reason of its object, which is divine revelation.

The difference between these two points of view is lost to Ockham, for he has re-defined the notions of the subject and object of a science. For him, as we have seen, the object of a science is the conclusion demonstrated in the science, and its subject is the conclusion's subject-term. This alters at the same time the notion of the unity of a science. Since any one science, like theology, contains many conclusions, with many subject-terms, it has many subjects and objects. And since Ockham maintains that there is in the intellect a single habit of demonstrating each scientific conclusion, as well as habits of apprehending terms and propositions in the science, any one science is a collection of many habits.

St. Thomas recognizes the difficulty which weighs so heavily with Ockham in determining the unity of a scientific habit. Undoubtedly there can be scientific knowledge concerning one conclusion of a science. Since many conclusions are contained in one complete science, like geometry or arithmetic, it would seem that each of these sciences is not a habit one in number but is composed of many habits.[44]

In reply, St. Thomas agrees that a person who, in any science, acquires by demonstration a scientific knowledge of one conclusion has indeed the habit of that science, although imperfectly. But he insists that when that person gains the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is produced in him. His previous habit simply becomes more perfect, for it extends to more objects. Consequently, a scientific habit, like that of geometry, is one in number; it is not a complex of many habits.[45]

Ockham did not think this problem could be solved in the Thomist manner by appealing to the imperfection or perfection of the scientific habit. With his usual sureness of insight, he saw clearly the consequences of his nominalism for the unity of science. If the universe is composed of individual realities from which all community in nature is rigorously excluded, the science related to this universe cannot have a greater unity than that of a collection or ordered whole. If science is understood as a mental habit, a total science is an ordered collection of such habits; if understood as a written book, it is an ordered collection of propositions. In either case, science has only a unity of order; it is not something one in number.

Ockham very exactly compares the unity of science to that of an army, or a city, or the world. Like them, it is made up of many parts integrated into a whole, but in themselves these parts do not belong to the whole. An item of knowledge may be integrated into a science, but it does not by nature belong to that science to the exclusion of another science. For example, the truth "God is one", or the habit of knowing it, is neither a theological nor a metaphysical truth or habit. It does not in itself belong to theology or metaphysics, any more than a man in himself is part of a people or army. As a man can be included in a given populace or army, or both, so a truth can be integrated into one science or many.[46]

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[44] *Op. cit.*, I-II, 54, 4, obj. 3.

[45] *Ibid.*, ad 3^{m}

[46] Dico secundum praedicta, quod accipiendo habitum metaphysicum et theologicum,

This does not mean that every truth will fit into every science. Theology considers many subjects and attributes of subjects which are not the concern of metaphysics. Sciences are thus distinguished by both their subjects and the attributes demonstrated of them. Natural science, for example, is distinguished from other sciences either by its subjects or by its predicates. But what determines the "special order" among these subjects and predicates which makes them one science? Since, as Ockham claims, the same truth may belong to different sciences, there does not seem to be anything in the nature of certain subjects or predicates which determines them to belong to one science. Ockham realized that further explanation was needed on this point, and he tentatively promised to give it in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[47] Unfortunately we do not have that explanation, for if he wrote this commentary it has not come down to us.

Theology is a special case for Ockham, for besides being a science only in an improper sense, it is, according to him, practical in its end. It directs man to his eternal happiness.[48] Consequently all truths necessary for the attainment of this end are theological, whether they can be known naturally or only by a supernatural revelation.[49] Thus the end of theology gives unity to the truths it contains. In this case it is the final cause of the science which determines its "definite order" and gives unity to its various items of knowledge.

It is more difficult to find a basis for the unity of the speculative sciences such as metaphysics and physics.[50] Both are sciences of reality, in the sense that their terms stand for realities outside the mind. This distinguishes them from logic, whose terms stand for concepts, and from grammar, whose terms stand for words. But Ockham's doctrine of the substitutive value of terms does not enable him to explain how each of the sciences of reality is one science distinct from all

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sicut communiter accipitur et quomodo loquimur modo, neuter est unus numero, sed continet multos numero, specie et genere distinctos. Et ideo habitus ille, quo cognoscitur ista veritas: Deus est unus, qui pertinet et ad metaphysicam et ad theologiam, nec est habitus metaphysicus nec theologicus, sicut nec est metaphysica nec theologia. Unde sicut non est concedendum, quod homo est populus vel exercitus, nec domus est civitas vel villa, ita habitus ille nec est metaphysicus nec theologicus. Si tamen per habitum esse metaphysicum vel theologicum intelligatur illum habitum pertinere ad metaphysicam vel theologiam, sic potest concedi quod idem habitus est metaphysicus et theologicus. Concedo tamen quod idem habitus numero est pars habitus metaphysici et etiam theologici, sicut homo est pars populi vel exercitus. *Sent.*, Prol., I; L.

Ockham is here opposing Scotus's strict demarcation between theological and philosophical truths. Scotus writes: ". . . de naturaliter nobis cognitis non potest stare theologia nostra revelata." *Ordinatio*, Prol. 3, q. 1-3; p. 138, n. 205. Cf. E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot*, p. 51.

[47] Circa secundum sciendum, quod ista scientia (*scil.* naturalis) distinguitur ab aliis vel penes subiecta sua vel penes praedicata; quia hic tam distinctio subiectorum quam praedicatorum conclusorum de subiectis sufficit ad distinctionem scientiarum. Tamen, qualiter hoc sit intelligendum, magis forte super *Metaphysicam* ostendetur. Verumtamen sciendum est, quod aliqua eadem veritas potest pertinere ad distinctas scientias, sicut alibi est ostensum. *Physics*, p. 15.

[48] *Sent.*, Prol., 12.

[49] Circa tertium dico quod omnes veritates necessariae homini viatori ad aeternam beatitudinem consequendam sunt veritates theologicae. Hoc patet per beatum Augustinum 14° Trinitate, cap. 1° (PL 42, 1037), ubi dicit sic: "Non utique quidquid sciri ab homine potest in rebus humanis, ubi plurimum supervacuae vanitatis et noxiae curiositatis est, huic scientiae tribuo, sed illud tantummodo, quo fides saluberrima, quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur et roboratur." Ex isto sequitur quod aliquae veritates naturaliter notae seu cognoscibiles sunt theologicae, sicut quod Deus est, Deus est sapiens, bonus etc., cum sint necessariae ad salutem; aliquae autem sunt supernaturaliter cognoscibiles, sicut: Deus est trinus, incarnatus et huiusmodi. *Sent.*, Prol. q. 1; F; p. 9.

[50] Ockham rejects the traditional distinction between practical and theoretical sciences according to their ends or final causes. Both can have the same final cause, according to him, since there is no difference between the end of the science and that of the one possessing the science. A person can acquire a practical science for the sake of truth or a speculative science for personal gain. Yet, right reason dictates that the end of practical science should be different from that of speculative science. Properly speaking, these types of science are distinct intrinsically and by themselves, and not by anything extrinsic such as a final end. Cf. *Sent.*, Prol. 11; C, S-X.

the others. Ockham does not appear to have adequately faced this problem, which is indeed a difficult, if not an insuperable one for any empiricist. A science such as metaphysics, he tells us, has the unity of an aggregate: *scientia metaphysicalis est una unitate aggregationis.*[51] Like natural science it is made up of many partial sciences (*scientiae partiales*), some of which have still to be discovered. Its subjects are also manifold, as we can verify by reading Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. "Being" is only a partial subject of this science, since it is only one of the many subjects of metaphysical propositions.[52] This science is clearly not one in number: it contains many habits, distinct not only in species but also in genus. Yet they are all related among themselves, and it is because of this special relation among them that they can be called, and in common parlance are called, one science: *propter quem ordinem specialem, qualem non habent aliqua alia scibilia vel cognoscibilia, possunt dici et dicuntur secundum usum loquentium una scientia.*[53]

Perhaps it is not far-fetched to see in this last remark a hint as to Ockham's mind on the present problem. The *usus loquentium*, or prevailing convention—which in Ockham's day was the Aristotelian—in the last analysis determines the exact limits and unity of the sciences. It would be hazardous, however, to venture further than this in the absence of more explicit information from Ockham himself.[54]

Peter Auriol

Ockham was not the first to criticize the notion of science as a habit one in number and to propose that it is a unified collection of habits. Among others, Peter Auriol, who commented on the *Sentences* shortly before Ockham (c. 1316-1318), takes up the problem of the unity of theology in his prologue and concludes that it, like any science, has only the unity of an ordered totality. We know from Ockham himself that he was acquainted with Auriol's opinions, although he tells us that all together he was occupied with them for no more than twenty-four hours.[55] The striking similarities between their doctrines of the unity of theology suggest that some of this time was spent in reading Auriol's prologue.

Peter Auriol's treatment of the nature and unity of theology is worthy of study for its own sake. Of special interest to the historian of mediaeval theology are his numerous references to the views of his immediate predecessors and his criticism of them. Here we shall be concerned only with his possible influence upon Ockham.

Peter Auriol seems to be the source of Ockham's criticism of the Thomistic notion of the unity of theology. Like Ockham, he refers to St. Thomas' doctrine that theology is one habit because it considers all its objects under one aspect; namely, in so far as they are divinely revealable. It deals with men and angels, God and creatures; but no matter how diverse these may be, they do not detract from the unity of theology for they are all alike in that they can come under divine revelation. Divine revelation is, as it were, the light by which theology views all its objects, and since this light is one theology itself is one.[56]

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[51] *Sent.*, Prol. 8; I.

[52] *Sent.*, Prol. 1; M, p. 14.

[53] Cf. *supra*, note 12.

[54] It is difficult to see how, on Ockham's terms, there can be any intrinsic principle or cause of the "special order" proper to one science, for he limits the essential causes of science to two, namely a final and an efficient cause, both of which are extrinsic to science. Properly speaking, science has no formal or material cause. *Physics*, pp. 7, 8.

[55] . . . quia tamen pauca vidi de dictis illius doctoris, si enim omnes vices quibus respexi dicta sua simul congregarentur, non complerent spatium unius diei naturalis. *Sent.*, I, 27, 3; H. Cf. P. Vignaux, "Occam", *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* XI, 886.

[56] Peter Aureoli, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, Prooemium, 4, a. 3 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1952), p. 270, n. 58. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, 1, 3. St. Thomas speaks of revelation as the light by

Peter Auriol does not think this reasoning sound. Divine revelation is a light enabling us to know many things, as in its own way and within its own order the agent intellect illuminates objects so that they can be known. Now the objects known by the light of the agent intellect are divided among the various philosophical and human sciences. The fact that they are all known by this one light does not prevent them from belonging to different sciences. So too, the objects known through divine revelation can belong to several different sciences; the unity of the light of revelation does not assure the unity of theology.[57]

Auriol, unlike Ockham, is willing to accept the Thomist distinction between the material and formal objects of a science: one science has one formal object, for it considers its various materials under one formal aspect. But Auriol thinks the Thomists contradict themselves when they say that the formal object of theology is "the divinely revealable" and that God, under the aspect of deity, is the subject of theology. The deity as such and "the revealable" are not identical: the former is something absolute while the latter is a relation. "The revealable" cannot be the formal object of theology if God as such is its subject.[58]

Moreover, let us suppose that God gives to someone the infused knowledge of geometry, philosophy, or ethics, as he perhaps did to Solomon. The objects of these sciences would be known in so far as they are divinely revealed, yet that person would possess several scientific habits. By the same token, theology can contain several habits, even though all its objects are known in the light of revelation.[59]

Auriol concludes that theology is not one simple, individual habit. Like every science, it is composed of many habits, joined together not as potential parts of a continuous whole, nor as an aggregate like stones in one heap, but rather as parts of an ordered totality. We find the same kind of unity in a house, which is one by reason of the unity of its form. Similarly, a figure composed of several lines is one by reason of the total form resulting from these lines. A scientific habit in the soul has the same unity of an ordered whole.[60]

Although Auriol solves this problem in the light of his own philosophical ideas, which are not always in agreement with Ockham's, he anticipates some of the essential features of Ockham's notion of science and of his criticism of the Thomistic doctrine of the unity of theology. Unless the two theologians drew upon a common source, Auriol played an important part in shaping Ockham's views on the unity of science.

Auriol's prologue makes it clear that he was not the first to propose the notion of science as an ordered whole. He cites Godfrey of Fontaines (c. 1300), who taught that theology is composed of two habits, one practical and the other speculative, united by their common ordination to man's final beatitude.[61] This division of theology, which foreshadows the modern division into moral and dogmatic theology, was in opposition to the Thomist conception of the strict unity of the habit of theology.

Auriol also refers to Bernard of Auvergne (c. 1300), who maintained in opposition to Henry of Ghent that science is neither one simple, indivisible form, nor an aggregate (*acervus*) of many specific habits, but an arrangement (*ordi-*

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which the theologian considers his objects in his *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, Prol. q. 1, a. 2 (Paris, 1929), p. 10.

[57] Peter Aureoli, *ibid.*, p. 270, n. 59. So too Scotus writes: Si igitur haec scientia (*scil.* theologia), quae est de Deo, non sit maxime una, non erit prima scientiarum; nec unitas luminis fidei, in quo cognoscuntur ejus principia secundum eos, sufficit ad unitatem ejus, quia sic omnes scientiae philosophiae, essent una scientia propter unitatem luminis naturalis, in quo principia apprehenduntur. *Rep. Paris.*, Prol. 3, 2, n. 13; XXII, pp. 51, 52.

[58] Peter Aureolus, *ibid.*, n. 60.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 271, n. 61.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 267, n. 54.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 274, n. 76. Cf. Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet XIII*, 1 (*Les philosophes belges* V [Louvain, 1932]), pp. 169-177.

natio) of intelligible species in the intellect enabling one to understand promptly and at will.[62]

These are indications that by the early fourteenth century it was becoming quite customary to describe science as a collected totality, rather than in the Thomist manner as a simple and indivisible habit of the intellect. We are here at the origin of the notion, so common today, that science is a body of knowledge, an "ensemble of knowledges ordered according to principles",[63] or even, as the logical empiricists put it, an "ordered mass of sentences"[64] or a "collection of statements."[65] Ockham not only proposed that science is an ordered collection of knowledges or mental habits; he was the first, to my knowledge, to speak of science as an arranged ensemble of written propositions.[66] In this respect, as in so many others, he was truly the initiator of the *via moderna*.

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[62] Peter Aureolus, *ibid.*, p. 260, n. 34. The works of Bernard of Auvergne (de Claromonte) are for the most part unedited. Cf. F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi* (Würzburg, 1947), I, pp. 51, 52.

[63] Kant, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft,* Vorrede (Leipzig, 1921), IV, p. 547.

[64] J. Joergensen, *The Development of Logical Empiricism* (*International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* II, n. 9 [Chicago, 1951]), p. 76.

[65] O. Neurath, *Foundations of the Social Sciences* (*International Encyclopedia . . .* II, n. 1 [Chicago, 1944]), p. 9.

[66] *Supra,* note 12. Peter Auriol also speaks of the mental habits which constitute a science being "bound in one volume." Peter Aureolus, *ibid.*, p. 275, n. 78.

The Calendar of the Early Thirteenth Century Curial Missal

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THE discovery of the text of the *Ordinarium of* Haymo of Faversham (d.1244) has thrown a great deal of light on the history of the development of the Roman Breviary and Missal in the thirteenth century.[1] His *Ordo Missalis* and *Order Breviarii* are the basis for the Missals and Breviaries that have come down to us in such numbers in late thirteenth and fourteenth century manuscripts bearing the title: *Ordo Missalis* (*Breviarii*) *secundum consuetudinem Curiae Romanae.* Haymo's work was completed before 1244 but, given the conditions of the age and the slowness in producing and copying the service books containing his arrangement and his revised rubrics, it is only about 1260 to 1270 that new books begin to take over the field.[2] In the meantime the Friars continued to use and to copy the missal and the breviary which they had from the Roman Curia. A limited number of these service books have survived, to them has been given the name "pre-Haymonian Missals or breviaries".[3] So far as the missal is concerned, this "pre-Haymonian" mass book has survived in three known manuscripts, all of Franciscan origin: (1) Naples B.N. VI, G.38;[4] (2) Rome Bibl. Corsiniana 376;[5] and (3) Assisi Bibl. Comm. 607.[6]

If one asks wherein this pre-Haymonian missal differs specifically from the well-known late thirteenth century Franciscan missals "according to the custom of the Roman Curia", a partial answer may be given under the following points:

1. The Sanctorial begins in the pre-Haymonian missal with the feast of St. Silvester (Dec.31) and ends with that of St. Thomas the Apostle (Dec.21);[7] it contains masses for only two Franciscan saints: Francis Oct.4 (*Dilectus*), and Anthony of Padua June 14 (*Os justi*). The post-Haymonian missal begins the Sanctoral cycle with the Vigil of St. Andrew (Nov. 29) and ends it with the feast of St. Catherine (Nov.25); it has new and different masses for St. Francis (*Gaudeamus*) and St. Anthony (*In medio*) and adds masses for the feasts of St. Dominic (Aug.4), St. Elizabeth (Nov.19) and St. Catherine (Nov.25).[8] These are already in Haymo's *Ordo Missalis*; other additions soon followed.

The pre-Haymonian missal follows exactly the *Ordo* of the Lateran for the celebration of its great patronal feast, St. John the Baptist (June 24) with Vigil,

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[1] A. van Dijk, "Il Carattere della Correzione Liturgica di Fra Aimone da Faversham, O.F.M. (1243-1244)", *Ephemerides Liturgicae* LIX, 1945, 177-223; LX, 309-367. The text of the *Ordinarium* has been expected in the publications of the Henry Bradshaw Society now for some years; we are still expecting it.

[2] The earliest one that can be dated with some accuracy (1254-1261) is Paris, Bibl. Mazarine 426 (223); cf. Leroquais, *Les sacramentaires et les missels manuscrits* II, pp. 125-127.

[3] By A. van Dijk in the articles cited and in a series of articles plubished in *Franciscan Studies, Sacris Erudiri* etc. Cf. for example "Some Manuscripts of Early Franciscan Liturgy", *Franciscan Studies* XVI, 1956, pp. 60ff.

[4] Cf. Ebner, *Iter Italicum* p. 120-121; 313-317; *Paléographie Musicale,* XV, 79.

[5] Ebner, *Iter Italicum* pp. 167-168.

[6] Described in detail by A. van Dijk, "The Lateran Missal', *Sacris Erudiri* VI, 158-164; 166-175.

[7] This arrangement is a bit surprising in view of the fact that the *Ordo* of the Lateran about 1150 (ed. Fischer) starts the description of the Sanctoral with the Vigil of St. Andrew and the *Ordinarium* of Innocent III also begins the description of the Sanctoral with the same day — the feast of St. Saturninus and the Vigil of St. Andrew.

[8] This is the arrangement in the first printed Roman Missal, Milan 1474, reprinted in Vol. 17 of the Henry Bradshaw Society (London, 1899). That it goes back to Haymo's revision is evident from Ms. Paris Bibl. Mazarine 426; Leroquais II, 126. Cf. also: van Dijk, *Il Carattere etc.* Eph. Lit. LX, p. 360.

Missa Primo Mane, Ad Missam Majorem, and Octave.[9] Haymo's has only one mass for the feast. He also, it appears, suppressed the feasts of the Dedication of the Lateran Basilica (Nov.9) and the Dedication of the Basilica of St. Peter and Paul (Nov.18),[10] both of which are found in the Lateran *Ordo* and in the pre-Haymonian calendar of the Naples Manuscript.

2. In the *De tempore* of the pre-Haymonian missal, the first twenty-two Sundays after Pentecost have the same *formulae* as are found in all later Franciscan and Roman missals up to our day.[11] The divergence begins with the twenty-third Sunday; the pre-Haymonian missal repeats the collect: *Deus refugium* from the mass of the previous Sunday and uses the same secret and post-communion prayers for both the twenty-third and twenty-fourth Sundays. In Haymo's revision there is a new set of prayers for the twenty-third Sunday. The *Ordinarium* of Innocent III which gives only the Introit and the Collect for the mass of these Sundays agrees here with the pre-Haymonian missal.

Ordinarium Innocent III Paris B.N. lat. 4162A fol. 59^v	Pre-Haymonian Missal Ms. *Corsiniana* 376. f.129^v-130^v	Franciscan Missal Vat. Reg. Lat. 2048 f. 180^v-182^r
Dom. XXIII:		
Or: Deus refugium	Deus refugium	Absolve Domine qs.
Sec.	Propitius esto	Pro nostre servitutis
P.C.	Concede Nobis	Quesumus O.D. ut quos.
Dom. XXIV:		
Or. Excita D.qs tuorum	Excita qs. D. tuorum	Excita qs. D. tuorum
Sec.	Propitius esto	Propitius esto
P.C.	Concede nobis	Concede nobis

3. The pre-Haymonian missal retains the Good Friday rubric, from the *Ordinarium* of Innocent III, admitting of consecration by contact. Haymo revised this in accordance with contemporary theological ideas.

Rome, *Corsiniana* fol. 83^r	Haymo's *Ordo Missalis*
Oratione dominica completa dicat hanc orationem in eadem voce *Libera nos quesumus.* Responso autem *Amen* frangat hostiam secundum consuetudinem ponens de ea in calicem nichil dicens. Sanctificatur autem vinum non consecratum per corpus Domini inmissum. *Pax domini* non dicitur. *Agnus Dei* non cantatur neque pacis osculum datur nec post-communio cantatur. Communicat autem sacerdos ante altare ob humili-	. . . . in eadem voce qua dicit *Pater Noster* absolute sine *Oremus* in tono orationis misse dicit *Libera nos quesumus* . . . et responso a choro *Amen.* frangit hostiam more solito in tres partes. *Pax Domini* non dicitur. Agnus Dei non cantatur neque pacis osculum datur sed immediate post fractionem unam partem de hostia mittit in calicem nichil dicens. Postmodum vero ante-

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[9] Bernhardi, *Ordo Officiorum Ecclesiae Lateranensis,* ed. L. Fischer (München, 1916), pp. 140-142.

[10] Cf. van Dijk, *Il Carattere etc.* Eph. Lit. LIX, 215-217.

[11] On this question see the very comprehensive study of Dom L. Brou O.S.B. "Etude historique sur les Oraisons des Dimanches après la Pentecôte dans la tradition romaine", *Sacris Erudiri* II, 123-224. This excellent work now needs some revision in view of the present knowledge on the date of the Lateran Missal; it can no longer be cited as an eleventh-century document. The author also takes it for granted that the 'Missel de la chapelle papale' is the same thing as the missal of the Roman Curia; we trust that this present article will clear up that confusion.

tatem reverentie diei et passioni Christi.	quam duas reliquas partis recipiat dicit omnia que dicere diebus aliis consuevit pretermissa oratione *Domine Jesu Christe fili dei vivi qui ex voluntate patris* quia facit de sanguine mentionem. Quibus receptis . . .[12]

4. The rubrics in the pre-Haymonian missal are written in the same style as those of Innocent's *Ordinarium*; in fact they follow the wording of the latter closely and generally just adapt them to the use of the ordinary priest. Haymo's rubrics are in the Latin of the school rather than that of the sacristy. Let us compare the rubric for the chanting of the Alleluia on Holy Saturday:

Ordinarium of *Innocent III*	Rome *Corsiniana* 376, fol. 67^{r}	Haymo's *Ordo Missalis*
. . . Finita vero oratione et epistola, primicerius annuntiat pontifici lenta voce dicens: *Annuncio vobis canticum novum. Alleluia,* et deosculatur ipsius pedem, quod *Alleluia* ipse pontifex proper sui novitatem totum decantat. Primicerio in ammone similiter eam repetente atque decantante, iterum pontifex altius repetit Alleluia, iuvantibus his qui assistunt ei, et similiter primicerius recantet eam. Et iterum pontifex plus alte repetit *Alleluia* et primicerius iterum cantat eam et ipsemet incipit versum *Confitemini.* Deinde primicerius descendens de ambone cum scola in choro cantat versum *Confitemini domino* et tractum *Laudate dominum omnes gentes.*	. . . Finita vero oratione et epistola, primicerius annuntiat sacerdoti lenta voce dicens: *Annuntio tibi canticum novum Alleluia.* Ipse sacerdos propter sui novitatem totum decantat *Alleluia,* primicerius in ammone similiter eam repetente atque decantante. Iterum sacerdos altius repetit *Alleluia* et similiter primicerius decantat eandem. Iterum sacerdos plus altius repetit *Alleluia,* primicerius iterum decantat et ipsemet incipit V. *confitemini* descendens de ammone cantat cum cantoribus totum *V. confitemini domino quoniam bonus quoniam in seculum misericordia eius.* Tractus *Laudate dominum omnes gentes.*	. . . Finita epistola sacerdos qui cantat missam incipit *Alleluia* et totum decantat ter exaltando vocem suam gradatim et chorus post quamlibet vicem in eadem voce repetit illud idem. Postea *V. Confitemini* cantatur communiter vel sicut cantator disposuerit. Deinde tractus.
Ante evangelium non portantur facule set incensum tantum.[13]	Ante evangelium non portantur facule sed incensum tantum.	Ad evangelium non portantur luminaria sed incensum tantum.[14]

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[12] A. van Dijk, *Il Carattere etc.* Eph. Lit. LX, p. 336.

[13] We cite the text from the edition of: Michel Andrieu, *Le Pontifical Romain au Moyen-Age*, Tome II, *Le Pontifical de la Curie Romaine au xiii^{e} Siècle; Studi e Testi* 87 (Città del Vaticano, 1940), pp. 576-577. We use the text of the 'Missel of the Papal Chapel' rather than that of the *Ordinarium* of Innocent III since the latter in the form that it has come down to us is frequently interpolated.

[14] A. van Dijk, *op. cit.* p. 338.

There seems to be some question whether Haymo of Faversham based his revision on the *Ordinarium* of Innocent III or on the Curial missal in use in his day. There is no reason to rule out the possibility, and the probability, that he had both documents at his disposal. There are, however, certain ceremonies which the *Ordinarium* of Innocent III does not describe. Let us take for example the procession from the sacristy on Good Friday when the pre-consecrated Host is brought to, and placed on, the altar:

Ordinarium of Innocent III	Rome *Corsiniana* fol 76^{v}	Haymo's *Ordo Missalis*
15. His finitis pontifex ad altare ingrediatur . . . <cum ministris . . . suis nigris casulis ut mos est.>	His finitis veniat sacerdos cum ministris ante altare, diaconus et subdiaconus sint involuti casulis nigris sicut mos est. Factaque confessione ante altare deferat diaconus corporale ad altare et extendat.	16. Postea omissa confessione consueta sacerdos cum ministris ad altare accedit. 14 . . . palla super toaliam extenditur et corporale a diacono super pallam. Sacerdos vero corpus domini quod pridie fuerat reservatum in loco convenienti reverenter ponit super patenam et corporali parvo plicato cooperit.
	Et in sacrario in loco convenienti preparet diaconus calicem cum vino non consecrato et imposito diligenter super patenam ac reverenter corpore domini et desuper corporale parvum plicatum imponat. Tunc ad altare hoc ordine procedant: duo portantes luminaria in albis et tertius cum turibilo fumigante et subdiaconus portans ampullam aque post hos veniat diaconus deferens calicem cum corpore domini.	17. Deinde diaconus cum ministris abiens in locum dominici corporis ibidem preparat calicem cum vino puro, cui totaliter preparato patenam cum corpore domini cooperto diligenter superponit. Tunc ad altare hoc ordine procedunt: primo procedit unus cum turribulo fumigante quem sequuntur duo portantes luminaria, deinde subdiaconus portans ampullam aque, post hos venit diaconus deferens calicem cum corpore domini.
16. Et diaconus offerat ei in patena corpus domini quod pridie fuerat reservatum quod accipiens collocet super corporali ab eodem diacono prius	Cum autem ad altare ventum fuerit et diaconus tradens calicem subdiacono accipiensque patenam de manu subdiaconi cum corpore domini quod pridie fuerat reservatum offerat sacerdoti quod accipiens collocet super corporale ab eodem dia-	18. Cum autem ad altare ventum fuerit diaconus tradit calicem subdiacono accipiensque patenam cum corpore domini offert sacerdoti qui ipsum nichil dicendo collocat super corporali.

super sindonem expanso.	cono prius super syndonem expanso.	
Offerat ei et calicem similiter cum puro vino et subdiaconus offerat ampullam cum aqua quam pontifex vino commisceat ut representet quod eo die emanaverunt sacramenta ecclesie videlicet sanguis et aqua de corpore Christi. In quibusdam vero ecclesis . . . purum . . . vinum offertur . . . passionis Christi.	Offerat ei similiter et calicem cum puro vino et subdiaconus offerat ampullam cum aqua quam sacerdos vino commisceat ut representent quod hodie emanaverant sacramenta ecclesie videlicet sanguis et aqua de corpore Christi.	Cumque diaconus resumpserit calicem sacerdos, accepta ampulla de manu subdiaconi aquam vino puro commiscet in calice nichil dicens.
17. Collocato autem calice de consuetudine ad latus dominici corporis a diacono offerat ei et incensum et pontifex ut mos est utrumque adoleat.[15]	Collocato autem calice de consuetudine ad latus dominici corporis a diacono offerat ei incensum et sacerdos ut mos est utrumque adoleat.	Deinde diaconus calicem collocat in altari et corporali cooperit neutro eorum aliquid dicente. Quo completo more consueto fit incensatio a sacerdote dicente. *Incensum istud.*[16]

The evidence is decisive. Haymo of Faversham's work on the missal is a correction of a revision of the missal in use among the Friars Minor before 1243-4. That missal, John of Parma (d.1257) tells us in his letter *Quia sicut indubitanter,* was the missal of the Roman Curia:

> In missarum celebratione uniformitatem doceatis a cunctis fratribus quantum fieri poterit observari . . . sicut *in rubricis missalis quod habemus a curia* continentur.[17]

The evidence also indicates clearly that the text contained in the three manuscripts mentioned above is, save for some additions by the Friars Minor, the text of the missal of the Roman Curia.

Only one of our three manuscripts has anything in the way of a title for this missal: in the Naples Ms we find the simple introductory words: *Incipit Missale.* But the origin of this pre-Haymonian missal is clearly indicated in the rubric at the beginning of the Ordinary of the Mass:

> Quando sacerdos preparat se ad celebrandum missam *secundum consuetudinem romanae curie* dicat hos psalmos.[18]

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[15] Andrieu, *Pontifical* II, pp. 560-562. The words in brackets (< >) are from the late fourteenth century manuscript of the *Ordinarium*; the same source has a brief reference to the procession: Et ille idem presbiter qui portavit per viam sic processionaliter sicut portatum fuit portet corpus Christi usque ad altare. *Ibid.* p. 561.

[16] A. van Dijk, *Il Carattere etc. Ibid.* pp. 335-336. Haymo has revised the rubric so much that we are forced to reverse the order of sections 14 and 16 of his *Ordo missalis* to show the parallelism.

[17] The letter has been preserved in Luke Wadding's *Annales Minorum ad annum* 1249; 3rd ed. pp. 208-209. In the same letter he describes Haymo's work as follows: . . . quod ordinarium missalis et breviarium (breviarii?) a fratre Aymone sanctae recordationis praedecessore meo pio correctum studio et per apostolicam Sedem confirmatum et approbatum . . .

[18] Rome, *Corsiniana* fol. 84ʳ. The rubric for the use of the *Credo* on the same folio begins: *Secundum ordinem Curie Romane.*

The date of the composition of this Curial Missal is probably between 1220 and 1240; it is posterior to the *Ordinarium* of Innocent III and anterior to the *Ordinarium* of Haymo of Faversham. This question and other relevant matters will be treated in detail in the introduction to the edition of the text which is in preparation.[19] For the present we confine our attention to the calendar of this curial missal as found in the Naples codex; it is the only manuscript of the three which has retained a calendar.

THE CALENDAR OF THE NAPLES MANUSCRIPT

The manuscript, Naples B.N.VI G 38 has (fol.1-6) a complete calendar for the feasts of the church year—with all the usual details: dominical letters, length of days and nights, position of the sun, etc. We omit all of these for the present and give only the dates in Arabic Numerals and the corresponding feasts. To show its relation to the calendar of feasts celebrated at the Curia in the first quarter of the thirteenth century, we give in another column an indication of the presence or absence of these feasts in the *Ordinarium* of Innocent III.[20] In a third column we indicate the same thing in regard to two other early calendars which derive from the same source, *viz.*: that of the Breviary of St. Francis[21] and that of the so-called Breviary of St. Clare.[22] Since the latter is incomplete and runs only from June 24th to December 31st, we shall merely indicate in the notes where it diverges from the Breviary of St. Francis. Feasts in the Naples calendar for which a mass is found in the sanctoral of that manuscript or in the Corsiniana Codex are marked with an asterisk.

It should be remarked that neither the so-called Lateran Missal nor that "of the Papal Chapel" is considered here; the former has been shown to be a rather late thirteenth century composite which contains a sanctoral which betrays a north-central Italian origin;[23] the latter is too late in date and has so many additional feasts that its use here would only complicate the question of the calendar of the early thirteenth century Curial Missal.[24] The reader who is interested in seeing how faithfully the Naples calendar follows the order of the feasts celebrated at the Lateran Basilica some seventy-five years earlier can compare it with the *Ordo Officiorum* composed by Prior Bernard about 1150.[25]

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[19] The late Mons. Michel Andrieu had planned an edition of this missal under the title: *'Le Missel de la Curie romaine au temps d'Innocent III'. Cf. Mélanges en honneur de Monseigneur Andrieu* p. 6. We intend to dedicate the edition of the text to his memory.

[20] The *Ordinarium* of Innocent III is preserved in the codex Paris BN. Lat. 4162A copied in 1365 at Castro Durante (Urbania) in North Central Italy. The discovery of the manuscript and the work of the late Mons. Andrieu on its importance for the history of the Roman Rite is well known. The complete text is still unedited but a complete description of the codex and several extracts from it will be found in M. Andrieu, *Le Pontifical Romain au Moyen-Age*, T. II, pp. 87-89; 451-578. For the purposes of this study we have used a film of the Ms. supplied through the courtesy of the Director of the Bibliothèque Nationale. To obtain a complete list of the feasts of the saints mentioned therein, it is necessary to read through the whole manuscript; some of the feasts are only mentioned *en passant* in the rubrics for the *De tempore*.

[21] The text of the Calendar is published by A. van Dijk, "The Breviary of St. Francis", *Franciscan Studies* IX, 1949, 29-40. Note in particular the remarks on p. 28 about the common source of these early Franciscan Calendars: "This common source is the calendar corresponding to the Ordinary of Innocent III, composed in the years 1216-23."

[22] For a thorough description of this interesting book, see A. van Dijk, "The Breviary of St. Claire", *Franciscan Studies* VIII, 1948, 25-46; 351-387; the text of the Calendar is found *ibid.* 367-374.

[23] For the rediscovery of this manuscript, see: V. L. Kennedy, "The Lateran Missal and Some Allied Documents", *Mediaeval Studies*, XIV, 1952, 61-78 and the subsequent remarks thereon by A. van Dijk, "The Lateran Missal" *Sacris Erudiri* VI, 1954, 124-179. In my study on this Missal I dated it about 1230; in view of the fact that it does show a dependence on Haymo of Faversham's *Ordo missalis*, the date must be set later than 1243-44. The important thing is that the Lateran Missal must no longer be taken as evidence of the state of the mass liturgy at Rome, and specifically at the Lateran, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The implication that I hold that the Lateran Missal was written for Arezzo is quite unjustified. In speaking of the first half of the manuscript — the sacramentary part — I wrote (page 66): "Judging from the sanctoral alone, one would be inclined to say that the missal was intended for a church or a monastery in or near Arezzo. We prefer to say that the scribe who wrote the first part of the Lateran Missal used as his model a sacramentary that originated at Arezzo or its environs." That this somewhat archaic model came from Arezzo or Città di Castello, as Father van Dijk prefers, is a matter of minor importance and I am quite content to settle for any north-central Italian center. On the purpose, and the origin, of the whole composition

Naples B.N. VI G 38 Calendar	*Brev. St. Fran.* Calendar	*Ordinarium* Innocent III
Januarius 1. Circumcisio Domini*	Id.	Id.
Sci Basilii, Sce Martine	Omit.	Omit.
2. Oct. Sci Stephani*	Id.	Id.
3. Oct. Sci Iohannis*	Id.	Id.
4. Oct. Innocentium*	Id.	Id.
5. Vigilia*	Id.	Id.
6. Epyphania*	Id.	Id.
7 to 9 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
10. Sci Pauli Eremite	Id.	Omit.
11. Sci Igini P.M.	Id.	Id.
12.		
13. Oct. Epyphanie*	Id.	Id.
14. Sci Felicis in Pincis*	Id.	Id.
15. Sci Mauri Abbatis	Id.	Id.
16. Sci Marcelli P.M.*	Id.	Id.
17. Sci Antonii Abbatis	Id.	Id.
18. Sce Prisce V.M.	Id.	Id.
19. SS. MM. Marii Marthe Audifax et Abbacuc*	Id.	Id.
20. Sci Fabiani P.M. et Sci Sebastiani M.*	Id.	Id.
21. Sce Agnetis Virg. et M.*	Id.	Id.
22. Sci Vincentii M. et Sci Anastasii M*	Id.	Id.
23. Sce Emerentiane Virg. et M.*	Id.	Id.
24.		
25. Conversio Sci Pauli*	Id.	Id.
26.		
27.		
28. Sce Agnetis secunde*	Id.	Id.
29.		
30.		
31. SS. Cirii et Iohannis	Id.	Omit.

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that we know as the Lateran Missal, I repeat the final sentence of my article, p. 75: "It (the Lateran Missal) was apparently not intended for use at the Basilica of St. John Lateran, but rather for some church or chapel where the 'custom' of the Roman Curia was in use."

[24] By the missal of the Papal Chapel we mean the one found in the manuscripts Vat. *Ottob.* 356 and Avignon 100. This is the name given to it by Mons. Michel Andreu, "Le missel de la chapelle papale à la fin du xiii^e sièle", *Miscellanea* Fr. Ehrle II, 347-376. Andrieu's conclusions have been questioned by A. van Dijk, "Three Manuscripts of a Liturgical Reform by John Cajetan Orsini Nicholas III)", *Scriptorium* VI, 1952, 213-242. For Mons. Andrieu's reply to this, see "L'authenticité du 'Missel de la Chapelle papale' ", *Scriptorium* IX, 1955, 17-34. To this we have the reply of A. van Dijk, "The Legend of the 'Missal of the Papal Chapel' ", *Sacris Erudiri* VIII, 1956, 76-142.

[25] A complete list of the feasts mentioned in the Lateran *Ordo* will be found in: A. Le Carou O.F.M., *L'Office divin chez les Frères Mineurs au xiii^e siècle* (Paris, 1928), pp. 153-163, where the list is compared with the Calendar of the pre-Haymonian Breviary in the Codex of St. Anne (Munich).

January: 10. Paul Hermit has a commemoration only in the *Ordo Lateran.* 31. Lateran *Ordo*: *De Sanctis Cyro et Iohane de martyribus cantimus et legimus.*

Naples B.N. VI G 38	*Brev. St. Fran.*	*Ordinarium*
Februarius 1.	S. Ignatii M.	
2. Purificatio Sce Marie Virg.*	Id.	Id.
3. Sci Blasii Epi et M.	Id.	Id.
4. Sci Gilberti Epi et M.	Id.	Omit.
5. Sce Agathe Virg. et M.*	Id.	Id.
6 to 9. (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
10. Sce Scholastice Virginis	Id.	Id.
11 to 13 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
14. Sci Valentini pres. et M.*	Id.	Id.
15 to 21 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
22. Cathedra Sci Petri*	Id.	Id.
23. Vigilia	Id.	Omit.
24. Sci Mathie Apostoli*	Id.	Id.
25 to 28 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
Martius 1 to 6 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
7. SS. Perpetue et Felicitatis V. (*et Thomasii*)	Id.	Omit.
8.		
9. SS. Quadraginta MM.	Id.	Id.
10.		
11.		
12. Gregorii Pape*	Id.	Id.
13 to 20 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
21. Sci Benedicti Abbatis*	Id.	Id.
22 to 24 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
25. Annunciatio B.M.V.*	Id.	Id.
26 to 31 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
Aprilis 1 to 13 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
14. SS.MM. Tiburtii, Valeriani et Maximi	Id.	Omit.
15.		
16. Sci Aniceti PP. et M.	Id.	Id.
17.		
18.		
19.		
20.		
21.		
22. Sci Sotheris P.M. Gaii P.M.	Id.	Id.
23. Sci Georgii Martiris	Id.	Id.
24.		
25. Sci Marci Evang. et Letanie maiores	Id.	Id.
26. Sci Cleti P.M. Marcellini P.M.	Id.	Id.
27.		
28. Sci Vitalis M.	Id.	Id.
29. (*Sci Petri ordinis predicatorum*)		

February: 1. Lateran *Ordo*: *De Sancto Ignatio episcopo de uno martyre etc.* 4. St. Gilbert of Sampingham d. 1189 and canonized by Innocent III 1198-1216).

March: 7. *et Thomasii*—in a much later and cruder hand; no doubt Thomas Aquinas is meant, canonized in 1323.

April: 14. The absence of these martyrs in the *Ordinarium* is unusual; they are listed in the *Ordo Lateran.* 29. In a later and uneven script; obviously an addition. The feast appears frequently in later Franciscan Missals.

Naples B.N. VI G 38	*Brev. St. Fran.*	*Ordinarium*
Madius 1. Apostolorum Philippi et Iacobi*	Id.	Id.
2.		
3. Inventio Sce Crucis*	Id.	Id.
et Alexandri, Eventii et Theodoli et Iuvenalis*	Id.	Id.
4.		
5.		
6. Sci Iohannis Ante Portam Latinam*	Id.	Id.
7.		
8. Apparitio Sci Michelis	Id.	Id.
9.		
10. SS.MM. Gordiani et Epimachi*	Id.	Id.
11.		
12. SS.MM. Nerei Achilei et Pancratii*	Id.	Id.
13.	Dedic. S. Marie ad Mart.	
14. Sci Bonifatii M.*	Id.	Omit.
15 to 18 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
19. Sce Potentiane Virginis*	Id.	Id.
20 to 24 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
25. Sci Urbani P.M.*	Id.	Id.
26. Sci Eleutherii P.M.	Id.	Id.
27. Sci Iohannis P.M.	Id.	Id.
28.		
29.		
30. Sci Felicis P.M.	Id.	Id.
31. Sce Petronille Virginis	Id.	Id.
Junius 1.	S. Nichomedis M.	Nichomedis
2. SS.MM. Marcellini et Petri*	Id.	Id.
et Herasmi*	Id.	Omit.
3 to 8 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
9. SS.MM. Primi et Feliciani*	Id.	Id.
10.		
11. Sci Barnabe apostoli*	Id.	Id.
12. SS.MM. Basilidis, Cirini Naboris et Nazarii*	Id.	Id.
13. (Nativitas Patris nostri Antonii confessoris de ordine minorum)*	(Id.)	Omit.
14.		
15. SS.MM. Viti et Modesti atque	Id.	Id.
Crescentie*	Id.	Omit.
16.		
17.		
18. SS.MM. Marci et Marcellini*	Id.	Id.

May: 13. The Dedication of *S. Mariae ad martyres* is not found in any other Curial source so far as I know. 14. The feast of St. Boniface is in the Lateran *Ordo*.

June: 2. Herasmus (Erasmus) is not found in the Lateran *Ordo*. 13. This is a Franciscan addition; it was written in by a later hand in the Caledar of St. Francis. 15. Crescentia has been added to the day since the Lateran *Ordo*.

Naples B.N. VI G 38	*Brev. St. Fran.*	*Ordinarium*
19. SS.MM. Gervasii et Protasii*	Id.	Id.
20. Sci Silverii P.M.	Id.	Id.
21.		
22. Sci Paulini Epi et Conf.	Id.	Id.
23. Vigilia*	Id.	Id.
24. Nativitas Sci Iohannis bapt.*	Id.	Id.
25.		
26. SS.MM. Iohannis et Pauli*	Id.	Id.
27.		
28. Sci Leonis P. Cf.*	Id.	Id.
Vigilia apostolorum Petri et Pauli*	Id.	Id.
29. SS. Apostolorum Petri et Pauli*	Id.	Id.
30. Commemorantionis Sci Pauli*	Id.	Id.
Iulius 1. Oct. Sci Iohannis Baptiste*	Id.	Id.
2. SS.MM. Processi et Martiniani*	Id.	Id.
3 to 5 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
6. Oct. Apost. Petri et Pauli*	Id.	Id.
7 to 9 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
10. SS.MM. VII Fratrum*	Id.	Id.
et Scarum Rufine et Secunde V.*	Id.	Omit.
11. Sci Pii P.M.*	Id.	Id.
12. SS.MM. Naboris et Felicis*	Id.	Id.
13. Sci Anacleti P.M.	Id.	Id.
14.		
15. SS. Quirici et Iulitte M.	Id.	Omit.
16.		
17. Sci Alexii Conf.	Id.	Id.
18. Sce Simphorose cum vii filiis suis M.	Id.	Id.
19.		
20. (*Sce Margarite V.M.*)		
21. Sce Praxedis virginis*	Id.	Id.
22. Sce Marie Magdalene*	Id.	Id.
23. Sci Apolinaris Epi et M.*	Id.	Id.
24. Sce Christine Virg. et M.	Id.	Id.
25. Sci Iacobi apostoli*	Id.	Omit.
et Christofori M.	Id.	Id.
26. Sci Pastoris pres. et conf.	Id.	Id.
27. Sci Pantaleonis M.	Id.	Id.
28. SS.MM. Nazarii et Celsi, Victoris P.M. et Innocenti P.M.*	Id.	Id.
29. SS.MM. Simplicii, Faustini et Beatricis et Felicis P.M.*	Id.	Id.
30. SS.MM. Abdon et Senen*	Id.	Id.
31.		

July: 10. The Lateran *Ordo* gives the primacy to SS. Rufina and Secunda on this day because of church *juxta fontes*. 15. Quiricus or Cyricus and Julitta are vouched for by the Lateran *Ordo*. 20. In a later hand; found in the calendar of the Brev. of St. Clare. 25. St. Christopher rates a commemoration in the Lateran *Ordo*.

Naples B.N. VI G 38	*Brev. St. Fran.*	*Ordinarium*
Augustus 1 Sci Petri ad Vincula et SS. Machabeorum M.*	Id.	Id.
2. Sci Stephani P.M.*	Id.	Id.
3. Inventio corporis Sci Stephani protomartiris*	Id.	Id.
4. Sci Iustini pres. et M.	Id.	Omit.
5. (*Sci Dominici conf. de ordine Predicatorum*)		(*Festum Nivis B.M.*)
6. Sci Xisti P.M. et SS. agapiti et Felicissimi M.*	Id.	Id.
7. Sci Donati Epi et M.*	Id.	Id.
8. SS.MM. Cyriaci Lergi et Smaragdi*	Id.	Id.
9. Sci Romani M.*		
Vigilia Sci Laur.*	Id.	Id.
10. Sci Laurenti M.*	Id.	Id.
11. SS. Tiburtii et Susanne Virg. M.*	Id.	Id.
12.		(*Sce. Clare*)
13. Sci Ypoliti et sociorum eius MM.	Id.	Id.
14. Sci Eusebii pres. et Conf.*	Id.	Id.
et Vigilia domine nostre*	Id.	Id.
15. Assumptio beate Marie Virginis*	Id.	Id.
16.		
17. Oct. Sci Laurentii*	Id.	Id.
18. Sci Agapiti M.	Id.	Id.
19 to 21 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
22. SS.MM. Timothei Ypoliti et Simphoriani M. et Oct. B.M.V.*	Id.	Id.
23.		
24. Vigilia	Id. et Auperte	Omit.
25. Sci Bartholomei apostoli*	Id.	Id.
26. Sci Zephirini P.M.	Id.	Id.
27.		
28. Sci Augustini Epi et Hermetis M.*	Id.	Id.
29. Decollatio Sci Iohannis Bapt.*	Id.	Id.
et Sce Sabine Virg. et M.	Id.	Id.
30. SS.MM. Felicis et Audacti*	Id.	Id.
Septembris 1 SS. Duodecim MM. et Sci Egidii Abbatis*	Id.	Id.
2. Sci Antonii M.	S. Antonini	Omit.
3 to 6 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
7.	Vigilia	Vigilia Nat. B.M.
8. Nativitas Sce Marie Virg.*	Id.	Id.
et Sci Adriani M.*	Id.	Id.

August: 4. St. Justin rates a mention in the Lateran *Ordo*. 5. Insertion of Dominic is in a later hand. The presence of the *Festum Nivis* (*S. Maria ad Nives*) in the *Ordinarium* of Innocent III is a late addition. 12. St. Clare obviously does not belong in the original text of the *Ordinarium* of Innocent III.

September: 2. In the Lateran *Ordo* as Antonius; in the Brev. of St. Clare as Antolinus. 16. St. Eufemia rates a commemoration only in the Lateran *Ordo*.

Naples B.N. VI G 38	*Brev. St. Fran.*	*Ordinarium*
9. Sci Gorgonii M.*	Id.	Id.
10.		
11. SS. Proti et Iacinthi MM.*	Id.	Id.
12.		
13.		
14. Exaltatio Sce Crucis*	Id.	Id.
SS. Cornelii et Cypriani MM.*	Id.	Id.
15. Sci Nicomedis*	Id.	Id.
16. Sce Eufemie	Id.	Omit.
Lucie et Geminiani M.*	Id.	Id.
17 to 19 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
20. Sci Eustachii et sociorum	Id.	Id.
Vigilia*	Id.	Omit.
21. Sci Mathei Apostoli et Evang.*	Id.	Id.
22. Mauricii cum sociis eius*	Id.	Id.
23. Sci Lini P.M.	Id.	Id.
24.		
25.		
26. Sci Cypriani Epi et M. et S. Iustine Virg. et M.	Id.	Id.
27. SS. Cosme et Damiani*	Id.	Id.
28.		
29. Delicatio Basilice Sci Michelis archangeli*	Id.	Id.
30. Sci Ieronimi pres. et conf.	Id.	Id.
Octobris 1 Sci Remigii epi et conf. (*et Dedicatio Sci Nicolai confessionibus*)	Id.	Id.
2.		
3.		
4. (Nativitas patris nostri Francisci confessoris)*	(Id.)	(Id.)
5.		
6.		
7. Sci Marci P. et Conf.*	Id.	Id.
Sergi et Bachii Marcelli et Apulei MM.*	Id.	Id.
8.		
9. SS. Dionisii Rustici et Eleutherii*	Id.	Id.
10. Sci Cerbonii epi et conf.	Id.	Omit.
11 to 13 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
14. Sci Calixti P.M.*	Id.	Id.
15 to 17 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.

October: 1. The addition, *Dedicatio etc.* is in a later hand; it may help to determine the *provenance* of the manuscript. 4. In the first hand in Naples and in the Breviary of St. Clare; written in a later hand in the Brev. of St. Francis. Its presence in the *Ordinarium* is obviously an addition. 11. Octave of St. Francis in the Brev. of St. Clare. 26. Pope Evaristus is vouched for by the Lateran *Ordo*; it is also in the Brev. of St. Clare which adds: *et domitille martyris*.

Naples B.N. VI G 38	*Brev. St. Fran.*	*Ordinarium*
18. Sci Luce Evang.*	Id.	Id.
19.		
20.		
21. Sci Ylarionis abbatis	Id.	Id.
22 to 24 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
25. SS.MM. Grisantii et Darie*	Id.	Id.
26. Sci Evaristi P.M.	Id.	Omit.
27. Vigilia*	Id.	Id.
28. SS. Apostolorum Symonis et Iude*	Id.	Id.
29.		
30. Vigilia Omnium Sanctorum*	Id.	Id.
Novembris 1. Festivitas omnium sanctorum*	Id.	Id.
et Cesarii M.*	Id.	Id.
2.		
3.		
4. SS.MM. Vitalis et Agricole	Id.	Omit.
5.		
6. Sci Leonardi conf.	Id.	Omit.
7.		
8. SS. Quatuor Coronatorum MM.*	Id.	Id.
9. Dedicatio Basilice Salvatoris	Id.	Id.
et Sci Theodori M.*	Id.	Id.
10. SS. Triphonis et Respitii M. et Nimphe Virg.	Id.	Id.
11. Sci Martini epi et conf.*	Id.	Id.
et Menne M.*	Id.	Id.
12. Sci Martini P.M.	Id.	Id.
13. Sci Bricii epi et conf.	Id.	Omit.
14 to 17 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
18. Dedicatio Basilicarum apostolorum Petri et Pauli	Id.	Omit.
19. Sci Pontiani P.M.	Id.	Id. (*add S. Elizabeth*)
20.		
21.		
22. Sce Cecilie Virg. et M.*	Id.	Id.
23. Sci Clementis P.M. et Sce Felicitatis*	Id.	Id.
24. Sci Grisochoni M.*	Id.	Id.
25.		
26. Sci Petri Alexandrini Epi. et M.	Id.	Omit.
27.		
28.		
29. Sci Saturnini M. et Vigilia*	Id.	Id.
30. Sci Andree Apostoli*	Id.	Id.

November: 4. Vitalis and Agricola are missing from the Lateran *Ordo*. 6. St. Leonard is in the Lateran *Ordo*. 13. St. Britius is vouched for by the Lateran *Ordo*. 19. The addition of St. Elizabeth is of course a late addition to the *Ordinarium*. 26. St. Peter of Alexandria is found in the Lateran *Ordo*.

Naples B.N. VI G 38	*Brev. St. Fran.*	*Ordinarium*
Decembris 1.		
2. Sce Bibiane Virginis	Id.	Omit.
3.		
4. Sce Barbare Virginis et M.	Id.	Omit.
5: Sci Sabe Abbatis et Conf.	Id.	Omit.
6. Sci Nicolai Epi. et Conf.*	Id.	Id.
7. Sci Ambrosii Epi. et Conf.	Id.	Id.
8.		
9.		
10. Sci Melchiadis P.M.	Id.	Omit.
11. Sci Damasi P.M. et Conf.*	Id.	Id.
12.		
13. Sce Lucie Virg. et M.*	Id.	Id.
14 to 19 (*Blank*)	Id.	Id.
20. Vigilia*	Id.	Id.
21. Sci Thome Apostoli*	Id.	Id.
22.		
23.		
24. Vig. Dom. N. Jesu Christi*	Id.	Id.
25. Nativitas D. N. Jesu Christi*	Id.	Id.
26. Sci Stephani protomartiris*	Id.	Id.
27. Sci Iohannis Apos. et Evang.*	Id.	Id.
28. SS. Innocentium MM.*	Id.	Id.
29. Sci Thome Archiepiscopi et M.*	Id.	Id.
30.		
31. Sci Silvestri P. et Conf.*	Id.	Id.

December. 2, 3 and 4. Sts. Bibiana, Barbara and Saba are all mentioned in the Lateran *Ordo*. 10. St. Melchiades is listed in the Lateran *Ordo*.

Utrum Theologia Sit Scientia
A Quodlibet Question

of

Robert Holcot O.P.

edited by

J. T. MUCKLE C.S.B.

PREFACE

For the following text of Robert Holcot's *Quodlibet*, I have used the only three manuscripts of which I know: P. Pembroke College, Cambridge, *Ms.* 236; vellum, ff. 221 + 3; early XV century. This text is found on ff. 194-200. This Ms. is faulty: two passages which form units are omitted as I have indicated in the variants; one short passage is put after the real end of the text; this *Quodlibet* is number 84 but the last fourth is tacked on to the end of the following *Quodlibet* number 85. But in spite of its faults, I feel it furnishes the best text—fewer corruptions and in the use of terms written more in the style of Holcot. I have used it as the basic *Ms.* and have supplied the missing passages from the others. R. British Museum, Royal *Ms.* 10 C. VI; vellum; ff. 175; late fourteenth century. This work is found on ff. 141v-146. This *Ms.* does not furnish as good a text as the former. There are more corruptions and some of the variants appear to be of a little later period than Holcot. It too has some passages misplaced.
B. Balliol College, Oxford, *Ms.* 246; vellum; late fourteenth century; 268 folios. This text is found on ff. 182-192. It is the poorest of the three; there are more corruptions and misreadings. It is closer to *Ms.* P than is *Ms.* R but in very many instances the variants of B and R are the same.

The text of all the *Mss.* presents difficulties; even numerical order is not always followed in the objections (*dubia*) and the answers to the objections frequently do not follow the same order as the arguments in the objection. Further, as I have noted in the variants, passages are sometimes misplaced. *Mss.* B and R often add an explanatory phrase or clause. I consider these as additions and have put them among the variants. I consider that *Ms.* P represents an unrevised record by Holcot but I hesitate to say that the *Mss.* are *reportationes* for the reason that the variants, except for the additional phrases in *Mss.* B and R, run much the same as other *Mss.* of the time. In view of the title I have written the word theologia and its derivatives with a capital.

With the increasing interest in Holcot, let us hope that some scholar will undertake a study of his *Quodlibets* and even a critical edition of them.

In the preparation of this text I am deeply indebted to my colleagues, especially to Rev. J. C. Wey, to Rev. Armand Mauer, Rev. Joseph Owens and Professor L. E. Lynch for assistance and suggestions. But I must take responsibility for the edition as it is.

Utrum[1] Theologia sit scientia

ET arguitur quod non, quia si sic, esset scientia[2] una. Consequens falsum et[3] consequentia patet ex primo Posteriorum;[4] falsitas consequentis ostenditur quia si sic, esset de aliquo uno subjecto. Consequens falsum et[5] consequentia patet similiter ex[6] primo Posteriorum 31.[7] Falsitas consequentis ostenditur quia illud vel[8] esset deus vel non deus. Non secundum, quia tunc non diceretur Theologia. Nec primum quia deus nullo[9] modo a nobis cognoscitur. Hoc probatur[10] quia neque per cognitionem sensitivam neque[11] intellectivam. Primum patet ex se et ex primo sequitur secundum quia omnis nostra cognitio ortum habet a sensu et nihil est in intelllectu nisi quod praefuit[12] sub sensu et[13] deficiente sensu[14] alicuius[15] sensibilis deficit[16] scientia de eodem, primo Posteriorum.[17] ergo etc.

Ad oppositum: desiderium naturale non est[18] frustra. Sed omnes desideramus naturaliter[19] scire Theologiam. Ergo est scientia nobis possibilis. Circa istam quaestionem tria intendo facere: primo ponam quasdam distinctiones; secundo subinferam quasdam conclusiones; et[20] tertio solvam quasdam dubitationes.

Prima distinctio est ista: quod[21] Theologia potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet,[22] vel pro notitia de deo quam credimus habere illos qui sunt beati, vel pro notitia quam[23] in nobis viatoribus communiter experimur.[24]

Secunda[25] distinctio est ista: quod Theologia possibilis[26] viatori est duplex,[27] hoc est[28] dupliciter accipitur vel pro notitia quam viatores communiter[29] studentes acquirunt per studium et doctrinam de lege communi, vel pro notitia quam deus potest eis conferre ex[30] privilegio speciali.[31]

Tertia distinctio est ista: quod[32] Theologia potest accipi pro quadam collectione notitiarum multarum de omnibus quae continentur in canone scripturae et de[33] omnibus decretis ecclesiae, et sic accipitur Theologia large. Alio modo accipitur strictius pro notitia illorum[34] quae continentur[35] in scriptura sacra[36] et determinationibus quae sunt veritates tantum[37] supernaturaliter nobis notae,[38] ut sic[39] notitia Theologica non sit[40] de aliqua veritate de qua habitus potest esse naturaliter adquiribilis. Nam primo modo[41] accipiendo Theologiam,[42] continet multas veritates ad humanas scientias pertinentes quia in sacra scriptura multae propositiones dicuntur[43] quarum quaedam sunt ad sensum notae, sicut[44] *Genesis* primo,[45] *factum est vespere et mane, dies unus.* Hoc patet quia nox constituit diem naturalem cuicumque homini evidenter.[46] Similiter, Ecclesiastes[47] primo; *oritur sol et occidit*, etc. et[48] sic est de multis aliis propositionibus quarum veritates intuitive et ad sensum cognoscimus et de multis aliis quae in scientiis naturaliter possibilibus deducuntur, quae tamen veritates proprie loquendo non sunt veritates Theologicae.

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[1] Utrum—scientia: In disputatione de quolibet proposite fuerunt 27 (37B) questiones quarum prima est haec: utrum Theologia sit scientia BR.

[2] *om.* scientia una R.

[3] *om.* BR.

[4] *add.* 41 R; capitulo 191 B. Cf. Aristotle, *Post. Analytics* I, 28.

[5] *om.* BR.

[6] *om.* BP.

[7] capitulo 41 B; *om.* P. Cf. *Post. Analytics* I, 31.

[8] aut R.

[9] a nobis nullo modo R. Such transpositions without change in meaning will henceforth be omitted.

[10] prob. quia: ostenditur R; ostenditur nam B.

[11] *add.* per cognitionem B.

[12] praefuerit B.

[13] *om.* R.

[14] sensus B.

[15] actus R.

[16] *om.* def. scientia B.

[17] *add.* etc. R.

[18] est frustra: frustatur R.

[19] scire nat. R.

[20] *om.* R.

[21] *om.* R.

[22] *om.* R.

[23] quae R.

[24] exprimitur R.

[25] alia P.

[26] posita B.

[27] est ex B.

[28] et B.

[29] sicut R.

[30] de B; *om.* R.

[31] spirituali R.

[32] *om.* BR.

[33] de om. dec: ceteris determinationibus R.

[34] rerum B.

[35] continetur B.

[36] *om.* R.

[37] *om.* R.

[38] *add.* et R.

[39] sit B.

[40] sic B; est R.

[41] *om.* B.

[42] theologia R.

[43] *om.* R.

[44] *om.* BR.

[45] I. 5.

[46] videntem B.

[47] ecclesiasticus R; essentialiter B; I. 11.

[48] et . . . quae: quando etiam (quod et B.) intuitive videmus dicuntur etiam (et B) aliae propositiones quaedam BR.

Quarta distinctio est[49] ista: cum Theologia sit de veritatibus Theologicis proprie loquendo quae non sunt naturaliter[50] nobis notae, ut dictum est, adhuc[51] tales veritates[52] duplices sunt quia quaedam veritas vocatur Theologica quia est aliqua propositio cuius extrema vel extremum est terminus supponens vel connotans aliquid quod tamen[53] est revelatum esse, sicut est haec propositio: "*fides*[54] *est substantia rerum sperandarum*, etc.", vel ista: beatitudo est finis hominis, loquendo de beatitudine ad[55] modum quo loquuntur Theologi, vel ista: caritas est perfectissima virtus,[56] et sic de multis aliis. Alia est veritas Theologica[57] strictissime accipiendo Theologiam, quae tamen est propositio cuius extremum est deus vel aliquis terminus supponens tantum pro deo sicut est[58] ista: deus est trinus et unus; deus creat, et huiusmodi.

Quinta distinctio est ista:[59] veritas Theologica, quaedam est[60] contingens, quaedam necessaria; contingens, sicut ista: deus creabit:[61] deus justificabit impium, et[62] hujusmodi; necessaria, sicut ista:[63] deus est trinus[64] deus est bonus, et[65] hujusmodi.

Sexta distinctio est ista:[66] propositionum formabilium de deo quaedam sunt affirmativae, quaedam negativae. Item de numero affirmativarum, quaedam sunt[67] quarum alterum extremum potest verificari de ente et de non ente, sicut est[68] ista:[69] deus est in opinione; deus est intellectus; deus est nobilis; quaedam sunt quarum neutrum extremum potest verificari de non ente sed tantum de ente, sicut est[70] ista:[71] deus est prima causa; deus est[72] infinitae virtutis intensive, et huiusmodi.

Secundo igitur pono distinctiones de hoc nomine scientia. Et dico quod ad praesens potest accipi tripliciter: uno modo pro firma adhaesione alicui vero et sic accipitur valde[73] improprie quia[74] sic fides posset[75] dici scentia, et sic forte[76] loquitur Augustinus, 14[77] de Trinitate,[78] c. 8:[79] scimus ea quae a fide dignis fideliter[80] dicuntur et quae in historiis legimus.[81]

Secundo modo dicitur scientia notitia evidens alicuius veritatis sive contingentis sive necessarii,[82] sicut scimus istam: sol lucet; ignis calet;[83] et istas:[84] de quolibet dicitur[85] alterum contradictoriorum[86] et[87] de[88] nullo eorum ambo; impossibile est idem esse et non esse. Et sic scientia includit notitiam intuitivam complexam[89] de contingentibus et intellectum[90] principiorum et scientiam[91] improprie[92] dictam.[93]

Tertio[94] accipitur scientia pro notitia evidenti alicuius necessarii nati fieri evidens per[95] propositiones necessarias ad ipsum demonstrative applicatas.[96] Et sic accipit philosophus scientiam primo Posteriorum capitulo[97] 9.[98] Et sic non est[99] nisi conclusionis in demonstratione, et sic forte secundum quosdam[100] est una qualitas causata vel nata causari ex duabus qualitatibus. viz. de[1] duabus noticiis[2] duarum premissarum.

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[49] est ista *om.* R.

[50] nobis notae naturalitur R.

[51] adhuc tales *om.* BR.

[52] veritates: illae sunt BR.

[53] tantum BR.

[54] *Hebrews* XI. 1.

[55] ad modum quo: sicut BR.

[56] virtutum BR.

[57] *om.* B.

[58] est: de P; est de B.

[59] ista ver: de veritate P; ista *om.* R.

[60] *om.* P.

[61] creavit R.

[62] et huj. *om.* BR.

[63] *om.* P.

[64] *add.* et unus BR.

[65] et huj: *om.* B; et cetera R.

[66] est ista: quod P.

[67] *om.* R.

[68] *om.* R; *add* de P.

[69] iste R.

[70] *om.* est BR.

[71] ista: de istis P; *om.* R.

[72] *om.* R.

[73] *om.* R.

[74] *add.* etiam R.

[75] potest BR.

[76] formaliter B.

[77] 5 R; 3 B; 15 P.

[78] *om.* R.

[79] 32 all MSS. Cf. *De Trinitate* 14. 8. PL. 42, 1075.

[80] nobis R.

[81] *add.* etc. BR.

[82] necessariae R.

[83] calefacit B.

[84] istam BR.

[85] *om.* PR.

[86] contradictorum R; *add.* et cetera et istam R.

[87] A difficult passage.

[88] de . . . ambo *om.* BR.

[89] connexam B.

[90] intellectu PR.

[91] scientia est R.

[92] proprie B.

[93] dicta R.

[94] *add.* modo B.

[95] *add* multas B.

[96] applicatum B.

[97] capitulo *om.* P.

[98] 4 R; *om.* P.

[99] *add.* enim R.

[100] *add* ipsa BR.

[1] ex R.

[2] *om.* BP.

His visis infero aliquas[3] conclusiones, nihil tamen asserendo sed humiliter quicquid dixero cuiuslibet catholici correctioni subdendo. Quarum[4] prima[5] est ista:[6] Theologia quam habet beatus est[7] scientia secundo modo accipiendo scientiam, quia[8] est notitia evidens[9] veritatis necessarii vel contingentis. Unde articuli fidei nostrae sunt sicut credimus evidenter noti beato.

Secunda conclusio:[10] non potest constare utrum debeat dici scientia proprie dicta vel non, nam scientia proprie dicta includit imperfectionem, hoc est, non dicit perfectissimam cognitionem, quia[11] certior[12] vel evidentior est cognitio principiorum quam conclusionis[13] ex[14] primo Posteriorum capitulo 2.[15] Similiter sicut[16] istius[17] propositionis:[18] sol lucet[19] cuius notitia[20] habetur evidenter intuitive, sic[21] potest[22] sine periculo dici quod notitia alicuius articuli erit[23] immediate ex notitia intuitiva essentiae divinae ita quod, sicut viso sorte et albedine[24] existente in sorte scio evidenter quod sortes est albus,[25] ita beatus visa essentia divina clare scit[26] hoc complexum[27] esse[28] verum: deus est trinus et unus ita quod istius notitiam[29] non deducit ex aliquibus propositionibus prius notis vel magis ei[30] immediatis. Et per consequens haec notitia non est scientia tertio modo dicta.

Contra[31] hoc quod ponit Guilielmus[32] quod[33] per notitiam intuitivam rei[34] non existentis possum[35] evidenter scire rem illam non esse, ita quod notitia intuitiva est[36] causa totalis illius iudicii, et notitia intuitiva cum[37] re est causa iudicii oppositi quando res est.[38]

Contra:[39] impossibile videtur quod haec[40] sit mihi evidens: sortes non est, quia non sequitur:[41] non est in[42] loco, ergo[43] non est. Similiter, non video eum nec tango,[44] ergo[45] non est,[46] quia isti termini non[47] sunt termini Sanctorum nec philosophorum sed videntur adinventi a Scoto.[48] Ideo licet cuilibet uti eis sicut voluerit vel non uti. Unde videtur quod notitia intuitiva non possit[49] esse[50] non existentis quia iste terminus est unus[51] terminus connotativus qui supponit pro quadam qualitate quae est notitia et connotat objectum cognitum esse existens et praesens in se, propter quam connotationem illa notitia vocatur intuitiva. Et ideo eadem,[52] si conservetur[53] miraculose, re destructa, iam non erit notitia intuitiva. Et sic eadem notitia potest esse modo intuitiva modo abstractiva quia illud quod connotatur aliter et aliter se habet. Simile forte[54] est de istis:[55] deus est homo; Christus fuit conceptus de spiritu sancto; Corpus Christi est in sacramento[56] altaris, et sic de multis aliis veritatibus fidei quas beati sciunt non scientia conclusionis sed evidentiori[57] notitia quae potest dici[58] notitia intuitionis.[59] Quaedam tamen alia pertinentia[60] ad fidem scire possunt scientia proprie dicta. Quae autem sint[61] talia et quae alia tunc sciemus cum illuc[62] venerimus.[63]

[3] *om.* R.

[4] *om.* BR.

[5] *add* conclusio BR.

[6] *add* quod R.

[7] et R.

[8] *om.* R.

[9] et ver: ejus R.

[10] *add* est haec B; est quod R.

[11] *om.* R.

[12] certia P.

[13] conclusio B.

[14] *om.* BR.

[15] all Mss read 6.

[16] *om.* BR.

[17] illius BR.

[18] *om.* B.

[19] *om.* sol lucet BR.

[20] notitiae B.

[21] sicut BR; *add* istius sol lucet (lucecet B) BR.

[22] *add* autem BR.

[23] est R.

[24] Corrupt in B.

[25] azinus B. which always uses this for albus.

[26] sit R.

[27] consequens R.

[28] *om.* B.

[29] notitia B.

[30] ei immediatis: immediate BR.

[31] et hoc est contra B.

[32] W. PR: Wills with stroke B. Cf. William of Ockham, *Prologue* to his *Commentary on Sentences*, Phil. Boehner (1939) 50.

[33] *om.* B.

[34] rerum B.

[35] possit B.

[36] sit R.

[37] cum re corrupt in B.

[38] *add* causa R.

[39] *om.* B.

[40] hoc BR.

[41] *add* sortes R.

[42] *add* hoc R.

[43] *add* Sortes R.

[44] *add* etc. R.

[45] *add* Sortes R.

[46] *add* ratio R.

[47] non-ter. *om.* P.

[48] voluntaria institutione *add* R.

[49] potest B.

[50] *add* de (ss.) R.

[51] *om.* B.

[52] *add* notitia R.

[53] conservaretur B.

[54] certe R.

[55] ista R.

[56] sacro altare B.

[57] evidenti R.

[58] *om.* P.

[59] institutionis B.

[60] *add* et B.

[61] sunt R.

[62] illud B.

[63] veniemus BR.

Tertia conclusio est[64] ista: aliqua Theologia communicabilis[65] viatori est vera[66] scientia tertio modo dicta[67] et aliqua est maior et evidentior. Cuius probatio est quia non includit contradictionem deum communicare viatori certam notitiam cujuscumque propositionis verae. Sed omnes propositiones de quibus est fides sunt verae. Ergo potest deus[68] earum notitiam certam causare[69] et communicare[70] viatori. Sunt[71] autem inter eas aliquae immediatae[72] et quaedam[73] quae natae sunt esse conclusiones.[74] Unde non[75] video[76] contradictionem aliquam, si ponatur quod viator de talibus habeat[77] evidentem notitiam sicut de illis potest habere. Ad huius[78] evidentiam dico[79] duo: primum est quod deus potest communicare[80] viatori notitiam intuitivam sui; secundum est quod potest communicare viatori beatitudinem sic quod demonstrato eodem utraque istarum[81] erit[82] vera: iste[83] est viator; iste est beatus. Unde isti termini non sunt repugnantes nec aliquam[84] repugnantiam important. Utrumque istorum[85] patet fuisse verum[86] de facto de Christo, nam Christus habuit notitiam intuitivam essentiae divinae et fuit comprehensor et viator. De Paulo autem pro[87] tempore sui raptus, licet doctores[88] sentiant quod non[89] fuit viator nec beatus, tamen[90] certum est, ut videtur,[91] posset fuisse viator. Unde si placeret deo statuere, nulla contradictio videretur[92] quod beatus mereretur.[93] Posset enim[94] deus acceptare dilectionem[95] beati ad maius[96] praemium sicut dilectionem[97] viatoris,[98] sic quod beatus[99] mereretur[100] tunc[1] intensionem suae[2] beatitudinis vel extensionem, hoc est, perpetuitatem. Posset[3] enim deus statuere vel forte statuit quod non[4] erunt angeli[5] et homines continue[6] beati nisi[7] quia continue deum amabunt et laudabunt, et sic erunt semper viatores et semper beati; vel[8] posset[9] ordinare[10] quod[11] mererentur[12] beatitudinem in infinitum. Nec hoc includit contradictionem.

Ex his dico quod diffinitio exprimens quid nominis huius termini viator male assignatur sic dicendo: viator est qui caret notitia intuitiva deitatis possibili sibi communicari de potentia dei ordinata, et maxime dicendo quod notitia intuitiva est illa per quam scitur[13] de re quod est quando est, et ipsam non esse quando non est, qua[14] etiam sciuntur propositiones contingentes de eadem.

Positio Guilielmi[15] quantum ad propositum pertinet,[16] ponit[17] tres propositiones:[18] prima est quod haec est discriptio intellectus[19] viatoris: intellectus[20] viatoris[21] est ille qui non habet notitiam intuitivam[22] deitatis sibi possibilem de potentia dei ordinata. Secunda est ista: notitia intuitiva rei est una notitia incomplexa virtute cuius potest scire de re[23] quod est si est, et quod non est si non est, et hoc[24] si sit[25] intuitiva[26] perfecta; et universaliter[27] omnis notitia rei vel rerum

[64] est ista *om.* P.
[65] communicabiliter B.
[66] una B.
[67] *add* scilicet qua R.
[68] *om.* B.
[69] *om.* causare et B.
[70] communicari B.
[71] sunt . . . eas: sic igitur inter ea sunt B.
[72] Corrupt in R.
[73] aliquae *om.* BR.
[74] *add* propositiones R.
[75] *om.* BR.
[76] videtur R; *add* sequi R.
[77] *add* ita R.
[78] cujus R.
[79] contradico R.
[80] communicari B.
[81] illarum BR.
[82] est BR.
[83] hic BR.
[84] aliqua repugnanti importabitur R.
[85] illorum R.
[86] utrum B.
[87] *om.* R.
[88] quidam R; doctori B.
[89] nec BR.
[90] nec B; et nec R.
[91] *add* quod BR.
[92] esset R.
[93] meretur R; *add* quare B, quare non R.
[94] *om.* R.
[95] *om.* BR.
[96] magis R.
[97] *om.* BR.
[98] viator B: *add* sed quid merebitur dico quod R.
[99] *om.* BR.
[100] merebitur BR.
[1] *om.* BR.
[2] sui B.
[3] possit R.
[4] ideo BR.
[5] angelis B.
[6] *om.* B.
[7] *om.* BR.
[8] ut BR.
[9] possent R.
[10] judicare R.
[11] *om.* R.
[12] merentur R; mereretur B; *add* intentiorem R.
[13] scire B.
[14] quare B *om.* etiam B.
[15] W. PR; Willi B.
[16] *om.* BR.
[17] posuit B; *add* tria sive P.
[18] *add* quarum B, quarum ista R.
[19] *om.* BR.
[20] *om.* R.
[21] viator R.
[22] *om.* BP.
[23] *om.* R.
[24] *add* est BR.
[25] est R; *om.* B.
[26] intuita B.
[27] unita R.

virtute cuius potest evidenter cognosci aliqua veritas contingens, maxime de praesenti, est notitia intuitiva. Notitia autem abstractiva se habet omnino per oppositum, quia nec per[28] eam scitur evidenter de re quod est quando est, nec quod non est quando non est, nec per eam potest aliqua veritas contingens evidenter cognosci. Haec dicuntur quaestione[29] prima, articulo secundo, et[30] ex istis[31] duabus[32] descriptionibus patet intentio sua in tertia conclusione[33] superius.[34]

Contra ista[35] et[36] primo[37] quod descriptio notitiae intuitivae repugnat descriptioni viatoris, probatur.[38] Nam aliqua veritas contingens de deo potest evidenter sciri a viatore. Propterea[39] contra descriptionem, quia animae in purgatorio convenit descriptio et tamen non descriptum. Certum est enim[40] quod primus parens in statu innocentiae et angeli ante lapsum vel[41] confirmationem habuerunt de deo talem notitiam quia sciebant evidenter deum creare res et eas[42] conservare et alia multa contingentia. Ergo notitia intuitiva dei non repugnat viatori, sic accipiendo notitiam intuitivam. Propterea damnati habent talem notitiam intuitivam de deo, nam sciunt hanc: deus vult nos damnari, quae est contingens et non potest sciri nisi ex notitia eorum et[43] dei. Propterea[44] si beatitudo repugnet[45] viatori, vel hoc est quia[46] ipsa est tanta[47] perfectio quod habens[48] eam non potest habere maiorem de potentia dei absoluta, vel non. Non[49] potest dici quod sic quia unus beatus habet maiorem beatitudinem alio et tantae beatitudinis est unus capax sicut alius ex quo sunt eiusdem speciei; ergo ex parte beatitudinis non est impedimentum quin[50] ipsa intendi possit[51] in multis beatis. Unde quod aliter[52] est de facto,[53] sicut tenetur communiter, hoc est quia deus[54] sic statuit libere et per consequens oppositum eius non includit contradictionem. Propter quod dico quod diffinitio exprimens quid nominis huius[55] termini viator est ista: existens in statu in quo[56] habens usum[57] liberi arbitrii[58] deus[59] vult ipsum mereri. Ad talem autem[60] statum non requiruntur nisi gratia et liberum arbitrium et quod deus velit actus liberi arbitrii esse acceptos et apud se praemio dignos. Sic ergo tenetur quod omnis notitia de articulis[61] fidei quam habet beatus, sive sit[62] scientia secundo modo,[63] sive[64] tertio,[65] est communicabilis viatori, manenti[66] viatori post illam communicationem. Unde dico quod omnis Theologia viatoris sic[67] privilegiati est scientia secundo modo vel tertio[68] dicta. Qui tamen articuli tantum modo[69] sunt[70] scibiles[71] vel an[72] omnes, qui[73] tertio modo et qui secundo modo, difficile est videre.[74] Quod tamen omnes sint scibiles[75] secundo modo per notitiam, videlicet[76] intuitivam, aliquarum rerum credo esse verum. Unde non erit[77] beatis necessarium facere deductiones sillogisticas sed eadem erit[77a] notitia quae[77b] erit scientia primo modo dicta et secundo, sicut eadem scientia qua video lunam eclipsabilem[78] quia video[79] eclipsari, posset fuisse[80] causata[81] per demonstationem sicut unus et idem effectus[82] potest a diversis causis produci.[83] Certum est autem[84] quod notitia conclusionis in beatis non causatur a notitia principiorum.

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[28] ne B.

[29] quaestio P. Cf. *op. cit.* p. 50.

[30] *om.* BR.

[31] his R.

[32] *add* intentionibus vel B.

[33] quaestione B.

[34] *add* posita B.

[35] istud BR.

[36] *om.* BR.

[37] *add* probo BR.

[38] *om.* BR.

[39] probatur R.

[40] *om.* R.

[41] *add* ante R.

[42] eos B.

[43] *om.* et dei R.

[44] prima R.

[45] repugnat BR.

[46] *om.* B.

[47] tantum R.

[48] et B.

[49] *om. B.*

[50] *add* saltem BR.

[51] potest R.

[52] Corrupt in B.

[53] defectio R.

[54] *om.* BR.

[55] *om.* R.

[56] istius B.

[57] *add* deus BR.

[58] in statu R.

[59] *om.* BR: *add* an abbreviation which may be for arbitrii R.

[60] *om.* R.

[61] articuli B.

[62] scit P.

[63] *add* dicta BR.

[64] *add* modo BR.

[65] existenti R.

[66] sit R.

[67] *add* modo B; dicta before vel B.

[68] *add* modo B.

[69] tantum modo sive R.

[70] sint R.

[71] *add* tertio modo R; scibiles tantum primo modo B.

[72] ante B.

[73] qui . . . et *om.* BR.

[74] iudicare B.

[75] dificiles B.

[76] *om.* R.

[77] erit beatis: est R.

[77a] *om.* BR.

[77b] quae erit: est BR.

[78] eclipasalem B.

[79] et postea: quia video eam (ipsam B.) BR.

[80] *add* per R.

[81] creata B.

[82] *add* produci R.

Quarta[85] conclusio. Nulla notitia[86] quam viator potest naturaliter adquirere de articulis fidei est scientia secundo modo[87] vel tertio[88] dicta[89] Haec[90] probatur dupliciter: primo sic; omne scitum secundo modo vel tertio[91] vel est per se notum, vel deductum demonstrative ex[92] per se notis,[93] vel notum evidenter in[94] notitia intuitiva extremorum. Sed articuli fidei nullo istorum[95] modorum sunt cogniti. Ergo etc. Suppono[96] quod non possumus[97] deum naturaliter cognoscere modo in via de lege consueta[98] in se, sic quod nihil concurrat in ratione objecti cogniti aliud a deo, sed cognoscimus deum in aliquo conceptu composito sibi proprio, vel in aliquo conceptu simplici instituto ad placitum qui erit aequivalens illi conceptui composito, et talis conceptus supponit pro deo. Et[99] ideo dicimus quod quando illum conceptum intelligimus quod intelligimus deum non quidem in se sed in alio, et illi conceptui attribuimus quicquid potest deo attribui non pro se sed pro deo supponenti.[100] Major ergo[1] apparet. Minorem probo,[4] quia si sic, aequaliter forent vel per se noti vel ex talibus deducti infidelibus sicut[5] catholicis,[6] quia ad[7] assensum[8] illius propositionis quae evidenter deducitur[9] vel est per se nota[10] non requiritur fides, sed intellectus necessario cogitur[11] ad assensum.[12] Sed[13] articulos fidei[14] nemo credit[15] nisi volens; igitur.[16] Similiter, hoc est principium Aristotelis primo Posteriorum capitulo 22,[17] ubi probat quod[18] status in praedicatis[19] mediis inter subjectum et praedicatum conclusionis qualis est ista: homo est substantia, ubi supponit hanc propositionem pro principio quod, si est aliqua propositio[20] nota per aliam, si[21] illam aliam neque scimus demonstrative neque melius nos habemus in cognoscendo ipsam quam sciendo, impossibile est quod sciamus illam propositionem quae per eam[22] cognoscitur. Vocat autem melius cognoscere vel melius nos habere quam scire habere talem notitiam ita evidentem qualem[23] habemus de principiis indemonstrabilibus.

Quinta conclusio est[24] ista: Nulla propositio deducta ex duabus praemissis creditis,[25] vel ex[26] altera praemissa credita et altera scita, est conclusio scita proprie. Istam probo dupliciter. Primo sic; notitia principiorum est evidentior notitia conclusionis, primo Posteriorum captulo 1,[27] *unumquodque propter quod, etc.* Sed nullus articulus potest esse evidenter[28] notus, ut patuit in[29] conclusione praecedente. Secundo patet per signum tam haec conclusio quam praecedens, quia signum scientis[30] est posse docere. Nullus autem invenitur qui sciat plura docere quam sciret unus infidelis; igitur.[31]

Sexta[32] conclusio est ista:[33] nulla notitia de veritatibus mere theologicis et quae in nulla humana probatur[34] scientia potest dici notitia scientifica; patet ista conclusio; nam tales veritates vel sunt articuli vel ex eis sequentes.

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[83] *om.* R.
[84] quod P; *om.* B.
[85] *om.* quarta concl. R.
[86] after naturaliter R.
[87] *add* dicta B.
[88] *add* modo BR.
[89] *om.* B.
[90] hoc BR; probo BR.
[91] *add* modo B.
[92] et R.
[93] notis vel notum; notum R; notum vel nota B.
[94] mihi R.
[95] illorum R.
[96] suppono . . . supponenti *om.* R.
[97] possimus B.
[98] communi B.
[99] *om.* B.
[100] supponente B; close lacuna in R.
[1] *om.* BR.
[4] minor probatur B.
[5] scilicet; *add* patet B.
[6] catholici R.
[7] *om.* B.
[8] sensum BR.
[9] adducitur R.
[10] notum BR.
[11] convincitur R; communiter B.
[12] sensum B.
[13] sicut R.
[14] *om.* P.
[15] credens R.
[16] etc. B; *add* etc. R.
[17] 34 all *Mss.*
[18] *add* est B; tres R.
[19] praedicamentis? B.
[20] prop. nota: vera notitia R.
[21] et R.
[22] ea B; illam R.
[23] quam B.
[24] *om.* est ista P.
[25] credit R; traditis B.
[26] *om.* B.
[27] 6 all *Mss.* Cf. I. 2. 71b 21; 71b 29-30.
[28] essentialiter R.
[29] *om.* P; ex R.
[30] scitum B.
[31] *om.* BR.
[32] sexta . . . sequentes *om.* P.
[33] quod R.
[34] praesciantur B.

Septima conclusio est[35] ista quam tamen[36] non assero sicut nec quascumque alias est ista:[37] nulla propositio Theologica et affirmativa cuius praedicatum non verificatur nisi de existente est scibilis de deo evidenter a[38] viatore, ita quod nulla talis:[39] deus est[40] infinitae virtutis;[40a] deus est prima causa; deus est bonus; deus est intelligens;[41] et[42] sic de aliis, est evidenter scibilis.[43] Quod[44] probo sic:[45] quaelibet talis[46] propositio includit istam: deus est, nec potest aliqua talis esse evidens nisi haec sit evidens.[47] Sed haec non potest esse evidens;[48] igitur.[49] Maior patet.[50] Minorem probo:[51] illa[52] propositio cuius subjectum est compositum ex multis terminis qui sibi invicem non conveniunt evidenter, vel est terminus simplex aequivalens[53] tali composito[54] ex multis quorum unum non praedicatur[55] evidenter de alio, illa, inquam, propositio non potest esse evidenter nota;[56] v.g., accipio hanc:[57] album est coloratum. Modo[58] subjectum huius[59] est unus terminus simplex aequivalens[60] uni complexo. Nam quid nominis ipsius est aliquid habens albedinem. Impossibile est autem quod haec sit mihi evidens:[61] album est coloratum, nisi haec sit mihi evidens: aliquod est habens albedinem. Hoc probo[62] quia[63] sicut subjectum implicativum falsi[64] semper falsificat propositionem affirmativam quando supponit personaliter, quod semper suppono in isto processu, ita subjectum includens inevidentiam, totam affirmativam reddit inevidentem.[65] Patet ergo haec maior, scilicet, quod[66] illa propositio cuius subjectum est compositum ex multis[67] terminis qui sibi invicem non conveniunt evidenter, et hoc vel[68] formaliter vel aequivalenter, non est[69] evidenter nota. Sed haec propositio: deus est,[70] est huiusmodi,[71] etc. Ad hujus autem[72] minoris declarationem suppono primo quod deum in praesenti non possumus cognoscere in aliquo conceptu sibi proprio et[73] simplici nisi forte[74] ille conceptus sit ad placitum institutus, ita quod ille conceptus est[75] a nobis intellectus et isto conceptu utimur loco rei quae deus est, ita quod impossibile est deum[76] intelligi a nobis nisi per hoc quod talis conceptus intelligitur. Hoc modo autem conceptus compositus[77] soli deo est conveniens licet quilibet ejus[78] sit abstractus a creaturis, v.g.[79] supponamus quod ens infinitae bonitatis, vel[80] illud quo[81] maius cogitari non potest, vel necesse esse, sit conceptus proprius et exprimens quid nominis hujus termini deus. Impossibile est ergo quod haec sit evidens: deus[82] est, nisi haec sit evidens:[83] deus[84] est infinitae[85] virtutis.[86] Haec autem evidens esse non potest; ergo, etc.[87] Propterea haec propositio: deus est non potest sciri nisi per intuitivam notitiam; igitur.[88] Probo assertum:[89] quia non majorem notitiam habemus[90] de deo quam de creatura. Sed esse non scitur de quacumque creatura nisi per notitiam intuitivam. Ergo[91] nec de deo. Ex isto videtur sequi quod nulla

[35] est ista *om.* P; est quod R.

[36] *om.* R.

[37] haec R.

[38] *om.* B.

[39] *add* propositio BR.

[40] *add* ens BR.

[40a] virtute B.

[41] intellectus BR.

[42] *om.* B.

[43] scita R.

[44] hanc R.

[45] *om.* R.

[46] *add* deus est R.

[47] *add* deus est R.

[48] *add* viatori R.

[49] *add* etc. R.

[50] *add* per B; et R.

[51] *add* sic B.

[52] ista est R.

[53] *add* tantum R; cum B.

[54] proximo B; complexo R; *add* ex multis quia si pro ipso nomine ponatur (ponitur B.) diffinitio exprimens quid ipsius ponetur (poneretur B.) unum tale complexum (connexum B.) BR.

[55] ponatur BR.

[56] *add* nisi illa diffinitio est eidem evidenter nota R.

[57] *add* propositionem R.

[58] *om.* BR.

[59] istius BR.

[60] valens R.

[61] *add* possibile vel B.

[62] probat R. *add* corrupt B.

[63] *om.* R.

[64] *om.* B.

[65] inevidenter B.

[66] quod *om.* B.

[67] pluribus R.

[68] est R.

[69] esse R.

[70] *om.* BR.

[71] *add* ergo BR.

[72] *om.* B.

[73] *om.* B.

[74] *om.* R.

[75] *add* est R.

[76] eum B.

[77] compositum B.

[78] *add* pars R.

[79] *add* si B.

[80] est B.

[81] quod B.

[82] deus . . . evidens *om.* B.

[83] aliquod ens R.

[84] *om.* R.

[85] *add* bonitatis vel veritatis R.

[86] *om.* R.

[87] *om.* B.

[88] *add.* ergo BR.

[89] assumptum B.

[90] habetur R.

[91] nec de deo: etc. R.

propositio affirmitiva est sufficienter evidens per solam notitiam abstractivam, vocando[92] abstractivam notitiam illam per quam non potest sciri esse de re quando est et non esse quando non[93] est. Confirmatur ratio per illud ad[94] Hebraeos, *accedentem*[95] *ad deum oportet credere quia est*. Propterea nulla propositio est homini naturaliter evidens cuius terminos non potest naturaliter apprehendere. Sed conceptum[96] dei nullus adquirit naturaliter, sed tantum per doctrinam, igitur.[97] Propterea nulla propositio implicativa[98] est naturaliter evidens nisi[99] quaelibet[100] sua[1] exponens sit[2] naturaliter evidens. Sed omnis propositio mentalis cuius subjectum est conceptus in quo catholicus intelligit deum est propositio implicativa. Ergo ad hoc[3] quod ipsa sit evidens oportet quamlibet[4] ejus exponentem[5] esse evidentem. Major patet.[6] Minor probatur: quia in conceptu quidditativo et proprio in quo catholicus intelligit deum intelligit[7] deum[8] trinum et unum.[9] Sed talis[10] conceptus est conceptus formalis[11] vel aequivalenter si est conceptus simplex institutus ad supponendum pro eodem pro[12] quo conceptus compositus. Ergo aliqua exponens huius propositionis: deus[13] est, debet esse ista: aliquid est trinum et unum. Haec[14] autem nullo[15] modo potest esse evidens. Ergo nec illa:[16] deus[17] est.

Octava conclusio potest[18] esse ista:[19] nulla propositio negativa formata de deo est scibilis evidenter ab homine, hoc supposito quod implicatio[20] aliquid ponit[21] respectu actus negati hoc est[22] si propositio implicativa negativa,[23] ubi implicatio praecedit negationem quae est posita ad principalem compositionem, requirit ad suam[24] veritatem, unam[25] cathegoricam esse veram per quam exprimitur illud quod implicatur, v.g. ad veritatem illius:[26] homo qui est albus non currit, videtur[26a] requiri veritas huius: homo est albus, quae[27] implicatur in subjecto. Et hoc videtur verisimile, quia si exprimi debeat quicquid significatur[28] per hanc implicativam,[29] oportet habere istam[30] copulam[31] veram: homo est albus et ille non currit. Similiter ex quo implicatio praecedit negationem, non potest[32] suum officium[33] exercere circa ipsam. Alias enim[34] forent tales concedendae: homo qui est asinus non est leo; deus qui est diabolus non est equus,[35] et[36] sic de aliis. Supposito ergo isto et simul cum hoc quod conceptus[37] dei sit quidam conceptus compositus vel[38] formaliter vel aequivalenter ex multis conceptibus quorum connexio[39] ad invicem non[40] sit evidens, ipsis supponentibus personaliter,[41] sequitur quod nec aliqua affirmativa nec aliqua[42] negativa cujus[43] subjectum est deus potest esse evidens naturaliter propter quasdam implicativas[44] inclusas in subjecto, sicut haec propositio: homo est animal, nullo modo foret mihi evidens si conceptus hominis sit[45] aliquid[46] compositum ex corpore et anima intellectiva, et cum hoc quod haec propositio sit[47] mihi inevidens:[48] aliquid[49] est compositum, etc.

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[92] voc . . . not. *om.* BR.
[93] *om.* P.
[94] *om.* P.
[95] accedentes R.
[96] concept. dei: comuniter dicitur B.
[97] *add* etc. BR.
[98] indicativa B.
[99] *add* cujus R.
[100] quilibet R.
[1] *om.* R.
[2] est R.
[3] haec BR.
[4] quemlibet P.
[5] evi. esse exponentis B.
[6] *add* et R.
[7] includit B; includitur R.
[8] *om.* BR.
[9] *add* vel formaliter R.
[10] talis conc. *om.* R.
[11] formalis BP.
[12] *om.* B.
[13] deus est *om.* R.
[14] haec autem: sed hoc B.
[15] nul. mo: non R.
[16] ista R; *add* naturaliter loquendo R.
[17] *om.* deus est BR.
[18] potest esse: est B.
[19] *add* quod BR.
[20] multiplicatio R.
[21] ponat R.
[22] *om.* P.
[23] *om.* B.
[24] sui R.
[25] suam B.
[26] hujus BR.
[26a] *om.* P.
[27] quia hoc BR.
[28] *om.* BR.
[29] implicatur R.
[30] hanc R.
[31] copulativam BR.
[32] *add* negatio R.
[33] effectum R.
[34] *om.* BR.
[35] deus R.
[36] et . . . aliis *om.* BR.
[37] *om.* R; *add* vel B.
[38] *om.* B.
[39] complexio R; unio? B.
[40] non sit ev. after personaliter R.
[41] *add* non sit ejus B.
[42] *om.* B.
[43] *add* vel R.
[44] implicationes R.
[45] *add* hoc complexum R.
[46] aliquod R.
[47] est R.
[48] evidens B.
[49] aliquod R.

Et[50] universaliter, sicut implicatio falsa arguit propositionem implicativam[51] falsam, ita[52] implication inevidens facit[53] propositionem inevidentem.

Nona conclusio. Nulla propositio mere cathegorica formatur de deo. Probatur[54] secundum dicta, quia nulla propositio quae ad sui veritatem requirit plures cathegoricas eam exponentes in quarum qualibet 'est' praedicatur tertium[55] adiacens est mere cathegorica[56] sed exponendo hanc: deus est, premissis suppositis[57] sic[58] est; igitur.[59] Decima conclusio. Et[60] sequitur ex praemissis:[61] nulla Theologia quam viator potest naturaliter adquirere est scientia.

Tertio[62] principaliter[63] circa praedicta, restat solvere quaedam dubia et primum dubium potest esse de ultima conclusione, nam si theologus nullam scientiam adquireret[64] ultra simplicem fidelem, frustra videntur[65] theologi[66] in Theologia studere. Secundo, vanius videtur quod ipsi[67] praesumunt docere et nomen doctorum[68] usurpare.[69] Tertio, videntur[70] frustra disputare de Theologia.[71] Ponit[72] quidam quod omnis habitus intellectualis,[73] speculativus saltem,[74] idem est secundum substantiam cum habitu principiorum, ita[75] quod non differt[76] ab habitu principiorum nisi sicut habitus explicitus ab[77] habitu[78] implicito.[79] Idem habitus est continens[80] et implicans aliquas veritates et potest quis[81] per studium explicare[82] easdem.[83] In primis autem principiis implicantur[84] universaliter[85] omnes[86] veritates; nam imaginatio sua est quod habitus principiorum et conclusionum non differunt nisi sicut forma remissa et intensa. Habitus enim principiorum est remissus, sed habitus[87] conclusionis est[88] intensus et magis[89] intensus[90] in quanto ad plures conclusiones se extendit. Unde quod habitus principiorum est magis intensus in doctore quam in rustico, ideo doctor plures conclusiones videt in uno principio quam rusticus. Unde idem habitus sub esse remisso se extendit ad principia, et[91] sub esse intenso se extendit ad conclusiones.

Contra[92] secundam conclusionem arguitur[93] et probatur quod habens notitiam intuitivam de deo potest probare multas propositiones veras de deo; nam omnia predicabilia[94] de deo in se quae sunt demonstrabilia[95] de conceptu composito proprio deo, qualem non[96] habemus de facto, sunt[97] in[98] illo conceptu demonstrabilia per divinam essentiam in se tamquam per[99] medium, quia talis formare potest propositionem[100] in qua essentia divina est subjectum, et paternitas filiatio vel[1] spiratio praedicantur de deo, qualem propositionem[2] non possumus[3] formare[4] in vita ista. Et haec propositio est per se nota ex terminis, quia omni[4a] intellectui apprehendenti[5] terminos istius propositionis ipsa est per se nota.[6]

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[50] *add* ita B.

[51] multiplicativam R.

[51a] *add* sic B.

[52] sic B.

[53] *add* istam R.

[54] patet R; hoc patet B.

[55] tertio B.

[56] *add* quod adduco quia alias nulla propositio ubi 'est' praedicatum (ponitur B) tertium (secundo B) adjacens foret mere cathegorica BR.

[57] supponentes? B; *om.* R.

[58] sic est *om.* B.

[59] *add* etc. R.

[60] quae BR.

[61] his omnibus quod (*om.* B.) BR.

[62] *add* restat BR.

[63] prim . . . et: contra (circa B.) haec dicta solvere quaedam dubia nam plura videntur in eis dubia quam vera BR.

[64] adquiret R.

[65] videtur BR.

[66] theologus BR.

[67] *om.* R.

[68] doctoris sibi R.

[69] usurpant R.

[70] videtur BR.

[71] theologicis B.

[72] ponit . . . quod *om.* B; R omits point . . . to ad conclusiones, line 25 and places it after sapientiam on p. 138, l. 26.

[73] intelligi B.

[74] after est R.

[75] *om.* BR.

[76] quod non dif: nec differet R.

[77] *om.* R.

[78] *om.* BR.

[79] implicitum R.

[80] contingens R.

[81] *om.* BR.

[82] explicans BR.

[83] ex eisdem B.

[84] implicatur B.

[85] *om.* R.

[86] *om.* omnes ver. R.

[87] *om.* R.

[88] *add* magis BR.

[89] et magis: in tanto BR.

[90] *om.* BR.

[91] *om.* R.

[92] In *Ms.* R. the section Contra to de via, p. 138, l. 9, is put after the Responsio ad dubium septimum, 153, l. 10.

[93] *add* sic B.

[94] Blank space R.

[95] dubitabilia BR.

[96] nos? R.

[97] sicut R.

[98] de BR.

[99] per med. *om.* R.

[100] proponi (*bis*) B.

[1] *om.* R.

[2] *add* nos R.

[3] *add* nos B.

[4] informare B.

[4a] communi intelligenti B.

[5] apprehenti P.

[6] *add* nostra autem dubitabilis B; autem dub. R.

Ratio[7] videtur quod cum beatus potest[8] utramque propositionem formare et prima est per se nota, secunda vero est saltem demonstrabilis[9] alicui[10] quod ista potest esse conclusio demonstrata[11] per primam;[11a] nam in prima propositione praedicatur et subicitur vera[12] res, in secunda[13] autem non nisi conceptus[14] supponentes pro re ista.

Ad horum evidentiam dicit quaedam opinio[15] conclusiones:

Prima est quod nil quod est realiter dictum[16] essentia potest de essentia divina demonstrari ita[17] quod res subiciatur et praedicetur;[18] patet tamen[19] quia non est demonstrabilis[20] cum nulli potest esse[21] per prius convenire quam essentiae in se.

Secunda conclusio erit[22] nihil quod est realiter divina essentia potest demonstrari de persona quia persona est realiter divina essentia.[23]

Tertia conclusio est conceptus communes praedicabiles[24] quid de deo et creaturis[25] non possunt de divina essentia in se demonstrari a priori; quilibet[26] enim talis est immediata.[27]

Quarta conclusio est quod conceptus connotativi et negativi communes deo et creaturis possunt de divina essentia demonstrari si tales sunt[28] de ipsa visa in se dubitabiles[29] sicut omne ens est bonum.

Quinta conclusio est[30] quod conceptus connotativi et negativi proprii[31] deo non sunt de divina essentia demonstrabiles a priori sicut esse creativum[32] et omnipotens et[33] aeternum et infinitum.

Sexta conclusio est omnia predicabilia de deo in se quae sunt dubitabilia[34] de conceptu composito[35] proprio[36] deo qualem nos[37] habemus de facto sunt de conceptu demonstrabilia per divinam essentiam in se tamquam per medium vel per aliquod commune tamquam per[38] medium quia sunt[39] relationes notionales[40] vel persone prius conveniunt ipsi divinae essentiae, sed[41] sint[42] conceptus negativi vel connotativi proprie deo sicut prius[43] essentiae, si sint conceptus[44] creaturis[45] communes prius conveniunt[46] alicui[47] communi sicut verum, bonum et huiusmodi v.g. aliquis homo[48] viator dubitat[49] 'deus est' ita[50] quod deus est[51] faciendo eum[52] beatum sed[53] sibi notitiam intuitivam, talis potest facere hanc demonstrationem essentiam dei[54] nam ubi praedicatum quod est conceptus quem nos habemus praedicatur de divina essentia in se cognita, et est major: deus est essentia divina, ubi essentia divina praedicatur in se[55] de conceptu quem nos habemus de deo; ecce[56] minor et sequitur quam[57] nos habemus de deo demonstratam[58] a priori ex hac conclusione pari ratione[59] . . . videtur sequi quod talis potest[60] a priori praedicari[61] de conceptu quem[62] nos habemus omnia predicata de deo in articulis fidei quod omnia ista praedicata sunt dubitabilia de conceptu quem nos habemus de deo.

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[7] This section from ratio to de deo on page 138 is not in *Ms.* P. It is in this place in *Ms.* B. It follows the above paragraph in *Ms.* R. on f. 146ʳᵃ.

[8] possit B.

[9] dubitabilis B.

[10] *add* alteri B.

[11] demonstratativa R.

[11a] praecognitum B.

[12] una B.

[13] vero B.

[14] compositus R.

[15] *add* contra B. The following six conclusions are taken from William of Ockham; *Prologi in Sent.* Quaestio I. They are found in the Lyons Edition, 1495, as follows: The first conclusion is from Quaestio I Z; The second, Q.I. AA: The third, Q.I. BB; The fourth, Q.I. CC; The fifth, Q.I. DD; The sixth, Q.I. EE. The text of the sixth conclusion here is faulty.

[16] dici B.

[17] secunda R.

[18] praedicatur R.

[19] tantum R.

[20] dubitabilis R.

[21] *om.* B.

[22] est B.

[23] esse R; *om.* potest . . . essentia R.

[24] praedicabilis R.

[25] creatura B.

[26] quaelibet B.

[27] immediata R.

[28] sed . . . sint: si tales sunt B.

[29] dubitabilis R.

[30] *add* est B.

[31] proprii deo *om.* R.

[32] creatum B.

[33] *om.* B.

[34] dubitabilia R.

[35] *om.* R.

[36] *add* concepto R.

[37] non B.

[38] *om.* B.

[39] sunt B.

[40] notiores B. no . . . l . . . R.

[41] sed B.

[42] sit R.

[43] *add* deus quintus R.

[44] deo et B.

[45] creaturae B.

[46] convenit B.

[47] ac R.

[48] *om.* B.

[49] *add* hanc B.

[50] *om.* R.

[51] *om.* B.

[52] ipsum B.

[53] quisque B.

[54] dei nam: divinam B.

[55] *om.* in se R.

[56] illeg. R; *om.* ecce. . . . deo B.

[57] *sic* BR.

[58] demonstrata B.

[59] Blank space for several letters in R.

[60] possit B.

Tertio[7] videtur dubium de tertia conclusione ubi[8] dicitur quod beatitudo est communicabilis viatori manenti postea viatori. Contra: esse[9] in termino et non esse in termino sunt opposita. Secundo sic: beatus est viator. Ergo[10] potest damnari. Tertio sic: sortes[11] est beatus. Ergo caret fide quia habet notitiam intuitivam.[12] Ergo non est viator, quia *ad*[13] *Hebr: sine fide impossibile est,*[14] etc.[15] Et loquitur[16] de[17] via.[18]

Quartum dubium est de quarta conclusione.[19] Dicit enim[20] quod articuli fidei[21] nullo modo possunt naturaliter fieri viatori evidentes. Nam est una opinio quae ponit articulos fidei[22] non solum creditos[23] sed intellectos[24] et ideo conclusiones ex eis[25] deductae sunt vere scitae in quodam lumine medio[26] inter[27] lumen gloriae et lumen fidei. Quod lumen non habent isti simplices sed magni[28] doctores. Et[29] est opinio[30] Gandavensis et pro ea videntur esse quaedam[31] auctoritates sanctorum. Unde Augustinus[32] ad Volusianum: ecclesiae catholicae fidem profiteor et ad certam scientiam me perventurum praesumo. Item Ricardus de trinitate[33] primo, in prooemio:[34] parum nobis[35] debet esse quae recta sunt et vera de deo credere,[36] sed[37] satagamus . . . quod credimus[38] intelligere. Item ibidem: parum nobis[39] debet[40] esse quae vera[41] sunt de[42] aeternis[43] credere nisi detur[44] hoc ipsum rationis[45] accersione[46] convincere. Et infra[47] dicit Ricardus:[48] non enim debent[49] de talium[50] intelligentia comparanda[51] desperare, dum tamen se sentiant firmos[52] in fide.

Propter has autem[53] auctoritates et consimiles[54] est imaginatio Henrici de Gandavensi[55] quod theologicis[56] datur unum lumen medium inter lumen gloriae et lumen fidei et[57] in illo lumine adquirunt sapientiam.[58] Item[59] Wynk[60] tenet quod in solo lumine naturali et fidei[61] et sequentibus[62] ad[63] articulos adquiritur vera scientia proprie dicta. Est tamen scientia non propter quid sed quia tantum. Contra has opiniones est[64] experientia communis[65] et rationes in quinta conclusione.

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[61] probari B.

[62] quem . . . conceptu *om.* B.

[7] dubium tertium B: (numbers 63-6 omitted.)

[8] ubi dicitur: quod dic. BR.

[9] *add* viatori B.

[10] *add* beatus R.

[11] *om.* BR.

[12] *om.* R.

[13] *om.* P.

[14] *add* placare deo B; deo placere R.

[15] *om.* BR.

[16] legitur R.

[17] in BR.

[18] i.e. of this life.

[19] *add* quae BR.

[20] *om.* BR.

[21] *om.* R.

[22] *add* esse B.

[23] creatos B; *om.* R.

[24] Corrupt in B.

[25] his BR.

[26] *bis* P.

[27] *add* medium B.

[28] isti B.

[29] et . . .ea: nota doctor de Guandino II, V contra eam B; nota opinionem quaedam 5, 9, 1 (or perhaps Guandinus) R.

[30] Cf. Henry of Ghent, I. Summae Quaestionum (Paris 1920) art. 3, q. 5. Responsio T. folio 30 r; art. 13, q. 2. Responsio T. folio 96r; gamma "*ibid*" art. 13 q. 6. ad tertium; folio 95v. M; art. 18, q. 3. Responsio R. folio 115r.

[31] *om.* R.

[32] *add* ep. secunda BR. This text is not in any of the extant Epistles to Volusianus. Likely he is quoting from memory.

[33] *add* capitulo B. Cf. Richard of St. Victor, *De Trinitate*, Prologue; PL 196, 889.

[34] fine BP. Cf. *De Trinitate, Prologus* PL 196, 889C, 890C.

[35] vobis B.

[36] *om.* B.

[37] sed credere B.

[38] credemus B.

[39] vobis BP.

[40] videtur debet P.

[41] *add* recta et B.

[42] *add* deo vel de B.

[43] *add* nobis R.

[44] *om.* BP.

[45] rationes B.

[46] accessione BR; attestatione *Migne.*

[47] *add.* nisi creditur etc. BR; *op. cit.* I. 1, 891B.

[48] *add* quod naturaliter (conditionaliter B) neganda (negativa B) proponitur BR.

[49] debet BR.

[50] tali R.

[51] *om.* R.

[52] infirmos B.

[53] *om.* BR.

[54] similes R.

[55] Guadio B.

[56] theologicis P.

[57] *add* quod BR.

[58] Illigible in B.

[59] item . . . tenet *om.* R; in *Ms.* R, there comes here the section from p. 136, line 13 to p. 136, 1.25.

[60] I have not identified this text. The abbreviation in *Ms.* P is Wynk with a hook after the letter K. *Ms.* B reads vulgariter tenetur.

[61] de articulis fidei B.

[62] *om.* R.

[63] de articulis R.

[64] *om.* R.

[65] conclusionis R.

Quintum dubium est de septima[66] conclusione quae dicit quod nulla propositio affirmativa est evidens cuius subjectum est[67] deus.[68] Contra: ergo deum esse non est per se notum. Item nec deum esse videtur[69] esse[70] demonstrabile. Utrumque istorum[71] est[72] falsum. Ergo.[73] Primum[74] arguitur[75] multipliciter,[76] quia Damascenus dicit[77] quod[78] cognitio existendi deum[79] omnibus hominibus[80] est naturaliter inserta. Item[81] quia praedicatum est de intellectu subjecti. Tertio quia veritatem esse[82] est per se notum; sed deus[83] est veritas. Ergo ipsum[84] esse est per se notum.[85] Maior probatur:[86] ad nullam veritatem esse sequitur veritatem esse,[87] et ad[88] veritatem esse sequitur veritatem esse. Ergo, etc. Quarto quia secundum Anselmum, Proslogion[89] 2° et 3°, deus non potest cogitari non esse.[90]

Probatur sic: illud quo majus[91] cogitari non[92] potest non potest cogitari non[93] esse. Deus est huiusmodi;[94] igitur. Maior probatur: quod potest cogitari et esse in intellectu et tamen non esse in re extra non est maius quod potest cogitari, quia maius est illud quod est in intellectu et in re[95] extra. Ergo illud quo majus[96] cogitari non potest non[97] potest cogitari non esse. Item[98] ubi[99] in propositione idem de se predicatur, nulla propositio videtur verior illa, secundum Boethium;[100] igitur,[1] etc. Secundo,[2] quod deum esse sit demonstrabile probatur, quia multae propositiones tam[3] affirmativae quam[4] negativae demonstrantur de deo[5] tam a sanctis quam a philosophis,[6] quia deum esse demonstratur a[7] commentatore,[8] primo Physicorum, commento ultimo. Item entia separata a materia sunt subjectum primae philosophiae et non demonstrantur[9] esse nisi in philosophia[10] naturali. Item, 8 Physicorum,[11] probatur quod primus motor non est virtus in corpore et quod est infinitae virtutis intensive. Item, 12[12] Metaphysicae in fine, dicit[13] philosophus quod est unus[14] princeps et[15] quod movet ut amatum et desideratum et quod est sua actio. Item Avicenna,[16] quod est necesse esse[17] et tale est tantum unum. Item Plato in Timaeo,[18] probat[19] deum[20] opificem[21] et fabricatorem mundi[22] prout[23] patet libro primo.[24] Item Hermes Trismegistus, de Natura Deorum ad Asclepium, quem librum vocat Augustinus contra 5 hereses logosteleios, id est, de verbo perfecto, per totum disserit.[25] Item Ovidus, de Vetula libro tertio,[26] probat quod deus est unus per hoc quod est omnipotens et quod est remotus a nostra cognitione et multa talia.[27] Item, primo de[28] Caelo et[29] multis locis[30] aliis, Aristoteles propositiones format de deo, et alii philosophi repleverunt libros de deo. Ergo,[31] etc. Item haec: deus non est, includit contradictionem. Ergo scitur evidenter esse falsa[32] et per consequens sua opposita scitur evidenter esse vera. Item Plato in Timaeo:[33] omnibus (*mos*)[34] est[35] qui de maximis rebus aut minimis (*precari*)[36] in auxilium dominum[37] deum. Item Theologia est habitus intelligibilis[38] et veridicus. Respondet Sanctus Thomas tertio[39] Scripti dist. 23. art. 3.[40] q. 3 in penultimo[41] quia Aristoteles[42] ibi non determinat nisi de habitibus[43] de quibus intellectus habet certitudinem[44] et evidentiam naturalem.

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[66] *add.* ratione R.

[67] *add* subjectum implicativum R.

[68] deus: etc. R.

[69] *om.* BR.

[70] esset R; est B.

[71] illorum B.

[72] videtur BR.

[73] *om.* BR.

[74] *add* tum R.

[75] *om.* BR.

[76] *om.* R.

[77] *om.* R. Cf. *De Fide Orthodoxa* I. PG. 94, 789B, 793C.

[78] *om.* BR.

[79] *add* est R.

[80] *om.* hom . . . nat. B; *om.* est R.

[81] tum BR.

[82] *om.* B.

[83] deum esse R.

[84] deum BR.

[85] necessarium B.

[86] patet quia BR.

[87] esse . . . etc.: aliquam B.

[88] aliquam R. I feel this phrase is corrupt.

[89] PL 158, 227C-228B.

[90] *add* hoc R.

[91] magis B.

[92] *om.* non pot. R.

[93] *add* est R.

[94] hujus . . . quod: illud quo majus cogitari non potest (arguitur B); ergo etc. (*om.* B.): major (*om.* B.) patet quia quod BR.

[95] *om.* BR.

[96] *add* est R.

[97] *om.* non potest R.

[98] tum R.

[99] ubi . . . secundum: quia praedicatum idem praedicatur de se ipso, propositio illa igitur est per se nota; igitur nulla verior est illa secundum B; quia praedicatum idem de se, propositio igitur est per se nota quod nulla est verior illa etc. secundum R.

[100] I have not located this text in Boethius. Cf. Ockham. I in Sent. Dist. 3, 2. 4(A).

[1] *om.* igitur etc. R.

[2] *add* dico; quod . . . quia: quod de deo BR.

[3] *om.* BR.

[4] et BR; *add* etiam R.

[5] de deo *om.* BR.

[6] *add* probatur BR.

[7] unde B; *om.* R.

[8] commentator BR. Cf. Averroes *I* I Phys. ch. 5.

[9] declarantur BR.

[10] scientia BR.

[11] Cf. Chap. 10, 266a10 sqq.

[12] Cf. Chap. 7, 1072b.

[13] dic. phil: Probatur BR.

[14] *add* igitur B; ergo est R.

[15] item BR.

[16] Cf. Algazel, Metaphysics (Ed. J. T. Muckle, Toronto, 1933), p. 117, l. 33-5.

[17] *om.* B; et quod B.

[18] 28B.

[19] puta B.

[20] *add* esse B.

[21] omnipotentem et fabricantem R.

[22] mundum R.

[23] *om.* BR.

[24] 27C.

[25] dicit B.

[26] *om.* R. I have not access to this pseudo-Ovidian work attributed to Richard of Fournival.

[27] alia BR.

[28] *om.* R. Cf. Chapter 4, 271a35.

Sextum dubium est de probatione septimae[45] conclusionis. Ideo enim dicitur[46] quia non potest esse naturaliter evidens: deus est, quia quid[47] nominis subjecti est unus conceptus compositus[48] ex multis partibus quarum unio ad invicem non est evidens. Dicitur etiam quod[49] notitia cuiuscumque[50] propositionis affirmativae ubi 'est' praedicatur[51] tertium[52] adiacens requirit notitiam unius propositionis affirmativae ubi 'est' ponatur[53] secundum[54] adiacens. Contra primum: haec est vera: chimera est chimera, et tamen subjectum habet[55] quid nominis compositum ex multis partibus quarum unio ad invicem est incompossibilis.[56] Et[57] quod illa[58] sit vera probatur,[59] tum quia praedicatur idem de se, tum quia sua opposita est falsa, scilicet,[60] chimera non est chimera, cuius probatio est quia est[61] conclusio[62] in syllogismo ex[63] oppositis. Sequitur[64] ergo quod haec[65] sit falsa; haec enim[66] est differentia[67] inter syllogismum ex oppositis et syllogismum ex falsis, secundum[68] Aristotelem, 2° Priorum,[69] quia in syllogismo ex falsis contingit aliqando conclusionem esse veram, sed[70] in syllogismo ex oppositis conclusio[71] est semper falsa. Propterea[72] si[73] sic,[74] omnis propositio[75] per cuius subjectum importaretur unio aliquarum[76] rerum foret contingens, quia omnis unio quarumcumque rerum est contingens, et sic foret omnis propositio contingens[77] ubi genus de genere substantiae praedicaretur[78] de specie, vel passio de specie[79] in genere substantiae, vel difinitio de diffinito. Et sic omnes tales forent contingentes: homo est animal rationale; homo est substantia; homo est risibilis; quae omnia videntur[80] contra philosophum. Item[81] si sic, tunc[82] de termino supponente personaliter et[83] non pro aliquo ente,[84] nihil posset vere praedicari. Consequens falsum. Nam haec[85] est modo vera: antichristus est non ens, et tamen est propositio affirmativa.[86] Similiter ista: antichristus est non homo, et[87] antichristus est[88] creabilis. Propterea haec est vera: chimera[89] non est vacuum; Caesar non est antichristus. Sed omnis negativa praesupponit aliquam affirmativam veram, sicut dicitur in fine[90] libri Perihermenias. Ergo prima praesupponit[91] hanc:[92]

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[29] *add* a R.

[30] *om.* R.

[31] *om.* ergo etc. BR.

[32] falsa . . . esse *om.* B.

[33] 27C; *add* libro primo B.

[34] modis PR; corrupt in B.

[35] *add* que B; qui PR.

[36] probari BR; praedicari P.

[37] dom. deum: dividentem BR.

[38] intelligibile B; intellectualis R.

[39] ad teritum scriptum B; res . . . tertio *om.* R.

[40] art 3, q. 3: q. 6 B; q. 16 PR.

[41] *add* dicens B.

[42] *add* quod R.

[43] hominibus R.

[44] certificationem R.

[45] illius R.

[46] dicere R.

[47] quidquid B.

[48] *om.* R.

[49] *om.* B.

[50] cujuslibet B.

[51] praedicatum BR.

[52] tertio B.

[53] *om.* R.

[54] secundo B.

[55] est B.

[56] impossibilis BR.

[57] *om.* BR.

[58] illa sit: aliter vel esset B.

[59] probo R.

[60] *om.* BR.

[61] *om.* R.

[62] conversio P.

[63] est R.

[64] *om.* R.

[65] haec sit: est B.

[66] *om.* R.

[67] indifferentia R.

[68] secundum . . . falsis *om.* R.

[69] *add* cum agit B; quia . . . verum *om.* B. Cf. Chapters 2 sqq; 8 sqq.

[70] sed in: de B.

[71] *om.* BR.

[72] *om.* R.

[73] secundo R.

[74] sit R; *om.* B.

[75] proponit B.

[76] aliarum R.

[77] *om.* R.

[78] praedicatur R.

[79] *om.* specie in R.

[80] *om.* R.

[81] igitur B.

[82] *om.* BR.

[83] *add* tamen BR.

[84] ente *om.* BR.

[85] est hoc R.

[86] Corrupt in B.

[87] *add* haec R.

[88] *om.* R.

[89] antichristus R.

[90] *om.* R. Cf. *De Interpretatione* 14, 24b3-4.

[91] supponit P.

[92] *om.* B.

chimera est chimera, et secunda hanc: vacuum est vacuum. Propterea alterum[93] extremorum contradictoriorum[94] dicitur de quolibet. Ergo vacuum vel est ens vel[95] non ens,[96] homo vel non homo; igitur.[97] Propterea haec est vera: Caesar est in opinione;[98] Caesar est intellectus,[99] est[100] dilectus, est mortuus,[1] est resuscitandus. Quae omnes sunt affirmativae. Propterea nullo asino existente asinus[2] est vera[3] res; ergo de non existente praedicatur vera[3] res. Probo antecedens:[4] quaelibet[5] singularis est vera. Ergo.[6] Propterea aliquod creabile est[7] aliquid. Probo per conversionem particularis[8] affirmativae;[9] patet, quia haec est falsa: nihil est creabile, quia sequitur:[10] nihil est creabile. Ergo deus[11] non potest creare aliquid. Consequens falsum; ergo.

Septimum dubium est de octava conclusione, quia si implicatio aliquid poneret[12] respectu alicujus[13] negati, haec foret falsa: chimera non est.[14] Similiter[15] contradictoria forent[16] simul falsa:[17] homo albus est homo albus,[18] et haec similiter: nullus[19] homo albus[20] est homo albus. Et huiusmodi[21] forent falsae: Caesar non est; antichristus non est. Similiter[22] haec est[23] falsa, ut[24] videtur, secundum opinionem: homo albus non est, posito quod nullus homo sit albus.

Octavum dubium est[24a] quia hic videntur multa dici contra doctrinam[25] sancti Thomae. Primo, quia deum esse[26] potest demonstrari secundum eum. Secundo[27] quia Theologia est scientia secundum eum, prima parte[28] Summae,[29] et in Scripto. Respondeo quod praedictae conclusiones sunt sequentes ex doctrina sua, nam ipse tenet quod nullum credibile est[30] demonstrabile, unde[31] contra eum[32] qui nihil concepit[33] eorum quae divinitus[34] sunt[35] tradita, nullam viam habet theologus[36] ad probandum aliquod[37] creditum sicut patet per[38] eundem,[39] q. prima, articulo 8 in penultimo, et per Dionysium, de[40] divinis nominibus, c° 2°:[41] si aliquis[42] est qui totaliter eloquiis resistat,[43] longe erit a[44] nostra philosophia, si[45] ad veritatem eloquiorum sanctorum respicit[46] et hoc et[47] nos canone utimur. Unde dicit idem doctor S. Thomas, prima[48] pars,[49] q. 32, articulo primo, in penultimo,[50] quod[51]

> Ille qui probare nititur trinitatem personarum dupliciter derogat fidei; primo[52] quantum ad dignitatem ipsius[53] fidei, quae dignitas[54] est[55] ut[56] sit de rebus[57] quae rationem humanam excedunt. Ad[58] Hebraeos primo, *fides est*, etc., secundo,[59] quantum ad utilitatem trahendi alios[60] ad fidem. Cum enim aliquis ad probandum[61] fidem inducit rationes quae non sunt cogentes, cedit in

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[93] altero R.
[94] contradictorum R.
[95] *add* est B.
[96] *add* vel B.
[97] *om.* BR.
[98] *add* Caesar dilectus R.
[99] *add* Caesar BR.
[100] *om.* est dilectus R.
[1] *add* Caesar BR.
[2] albus R.
[3] una B.
[4] antecedentis P.
[5] quilibet R; *add* ejus R.
[6] *om.* BR.
[7] *add* aliqua propositio R.
[8] particularem B.
[9] *add* alicujus conversionis R.
[10] scitur R.
[11] *add* deus non P; deus nihil potest creare B.
[12] ponit B.
[13] actus BP.
[14] *add* chimera B.
[15] *add* duo R.
[16] essent B.
[17] *add* nam . . . postea BR.
[18] asinus B.
[19] *om.* BR.
[20] asinus B; *add* non BR.
[21] *add* negativae: R.
[22] sicut BR.
[23] *om.* est falsa R; illigible in B.
[24] *om.* ut . . . opinionem BR.
[24a] *om.* R.
..[25] doc. sancti Thomae: contra sanctum Thomam sive
[24a] *om.* R.
[26] *add* est demonstrabile vel B.
[27] sed R.
[28] ista R.
[29] *om.* R.
[30] *add* mere BR.
[31] deum B.
[32] illum R.
[33] *add.* concedit B.
[34] dicimus R.
[35] *om.* sunt R; tradita BR.
[36] theologicus B; habent theologi R.
[37] *add* debitum B.
[38] *om.* B.
[39] Cf. Prima Pars q.1. a.8 ad finem.
[40] *om.* de div. nom. R.
[41] Cf. 2, 2. PG 3, 639A.
[42] quis R.
[43] Blank space B; before totaliter R.
[44] *om.* a nostra B; corrupt in R.
[45] sicut R.
[46] Blank space B.
[47] *om.* B.
[48] *om.* P.
[49] parte summae B.
[50] pede BR. (about midway of the corpus).
[51] et R.
[52] primum B.
[53] ipsi R.
[54] dignitatis R.
[55] *om.* B.
[56] sicut B.
[57] *add* invisibilibus BR.
[58] *om.* P.
[59] secundum R.
[60] aliquos B.
[61] monstrandum B.

> irrisionem infidelium. Credunt enim quod[62] huiusmodi rationibus innitamur; quod[63] etiam[64] propter has credamus ea.[65] Ergo ea[66] quae sunt fidei non sunt temptanda probari[67] nisi per auctoritatem his qui auctoritatem suscipiunt, ad[68] alios vero sufficit[69] defendere non esse impossibile quod fides praedicat.

Et[70] sic patet quid sit mea intentio, etc. Ad ista dubia respondendum est per ordinem.

Ad primum:[71] nego consequentiam istam:[72] Theologus non adquirit sibi scientiam[73] de Theologicis,[74] ergo frustra studet.[75] Studet enim[76] ad concipiendum[77] in particulari quae simplex nec[78] credit nec concipit nisi in universali, v.g., aliquis[79] simplex credit[80] hanc universalem:[81] omne quod credit ecclesia est verum et credendum. Perfectus autem novit haec[82] inducere unde novit istas[83] singulares: mundum esse creatum a deo est credendum, quia, Gen.[84] primo,[85] *in principio creavit deus caelum*[86] *et terram.* Feminam primam fuisse formatam[87] de costa Adae[88] est credendum, et sic de aliis contentis in[89] scriptura. Unde fides magni theologi[90] potest esse magis meritoria, si velit, quam fides unius simplicis, cuius ratio est quia[91] cum credere non sit meritorium nisi quatenus imperatur a voluntate, quanto voluntas imperat credere difficilia[92] et quanto plures persuasiones philosophorum et hereticorum respuit et contemnit, tanto videtur maius[93] mereri apud deum,[94] Thomas, 2, q. 2,[95] articulo 10, ad tertium.[96] Sed certum est quod unus magnus theologus plures persuasiones[97] et rationes[98] hereticorum percipit, quibus non obstantibus, adhaeret. Igitur.[99] Non tamen[100] dico quod aliquam scientiam adquirit theologus quam[1] non adquirit[2] fidelis,[3] sed tantum fidem explicitam.[4] Et per modum istum[5] potest dici quod augmentat fidem suam non inhaerendo firmius sed inhaerendo pluribus, vel forte,[6] et[7] pluribus et firmius.

In hoc etiam discordo a Guilielmo[8] qui[9] dicit quod theologus potest de[10] quibusdam consequentiis[11] certiorari, etc. Contra: vel ille[12] tenet[13] per medium intrinsecum vel extrinsecum. Si intrinsecum, vel sumitur[14] ex parte huius[15] termini deus, et sic erit propositio[16] mere credita,[17] vel ex parte alicujus termini importantis[18] causam, et[19] talem consequentiam potest infidelis[20] scire. Si vero teneat per medium extrinsecum, puta,[21] per[22] aliquam regulam[23] logicalem,[24] illam potest scire quicumque logicus, sicut patet de hac consequentia:[25] deus creat: ergo omne creans est deus.

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[62] *add* in R.
[63] *om.* BR.
[64] et BR.
[65] *om.* R.
[66] *om.* B.
[67] probare all *MSS.*
[68] apud R.
[69] sufficiunt BR.
[70] et . . . etc. om. BR.
[71] *add* dubium B.
[72] illam B; *add* istam P.
[73] *add* aliquam B.
[74] *add* etc. B.
[75] *om.* BR.
[76] *add* theologus B.
[77] considerandum BR.
[78] non BR.
[79] *om.* BR.
[80] *add* quod R.
[81] *add* esse R.
[82] hanc BR.
[83] has R.
[84] *Gen.* I. 1.
[85] *add* dicitur B.
[86] caelum et terram: etc. R.
[87] *add* et istam B.
[88] *om.* PR.
[89] *add* sacra R.
[90] theologici B.
[91] *om.* R.
[92] difficilibus BR.
[93] magis B.
[94] *add* unde sanctus B; *om.* apud deum R.
[95] *om.* P; I R.
[96] *add* argumentum hoc esset B. Cf. 2.2. q. 2 art. 10 ad tertium; *Com in Sent. III* dist. 24, Q. I. art. 3, solutio 3; ad tertium . . . quod: alium certum est quia R.
[97] *add* philosophorum R.
[98] *om.* R.
[99] etc. R.
[100] tantum R.
[1] *om.* quam non R.
[2] adquisitis R.
[3] *add* vel de conditionibus vel de consequentiis propriis BR.
[4] *add* quam acquirit theologus infidelis non potest aquirere BR.
[5] citatum R.
[6] *om.* R.
[7] *om.* BR.
[8] Willo BR; Witto P. I have not identified this quotation.
[9] *om.* qui dicit P.
[10] a R.
[11] consequentiis cert. etc.: blank space in B; a corrupt word plus necessariis R.
[12] iste R.
[13] tenent P.
[14] similiter R.
[15] istius R.
[16] proprie B.
[17] creata B.
[18] important R.
[19] *om.* R.
[20] *add* per and blank for four letters R.
[21] *om.* BR.
[22] propter BR.
[23] regalem R; reve B.
[24] *add* sic R.
[25] *add* tantum BR.

Ad aliud concedo quod vocando docere[26] causare scientiam, theologi non docent credibilia, et sic[27] accipitur proprie docere.[28] Aliter accipitur docere large pro causare adhaesionem[29] ad aliquam.[30]

Ad tertium dico[31] quod aliquando expedit et[32] aliquando non. Non enim expedit disputare de eis quia aliquis velit ea demonstrative probare,[33] sed[34] humiliter investigando, et magis orando quam ratiocinando, debet notitia revelabilium inquiri, secundum[35] quod dicit[36] Aug., 15 de Trinitate, in fine.

Ad secundum dubium dico quod illa[41] non est demonstratio,[42] tum quia ibi non est[43] nisi una propositio, vel oportet concedere quod essentia divina est[44] pars alicuius[45] propositionis formatae per[46] intellectum, immo pars propositionis erit tota propositio. Similiter illa[47] propositio in[48] qua subicietur essentia divina et[49] praedicatur[50] 'est'[51] erit[52] composita ex deo et uno verbo mentali, puta, 'est', quod non videtur conveniens. Similiter[53] intellectus causat propositionem. Ergo omnes eius[54] partes. Tamen[55] esto[56] quod esset talis propositio possibilis,[57] illa[58] foret significatum[59] alterius et non demonstrativum[60] illius[61] tamen[62] aeque composita[63] videtur illa ex signis quia signa[64] stant[65] pro[66] significatis.

Ad tertium dubium dico quod esse in hoc termino et non esse in hoc termino sunt bene[67] opposita, sed esse in uno termino et non in alio bene[68] stant simul. Unde quamvis beatus sit in[69] termino qui est videre deum intuitive in hoc gradu, possibile est tamen, si deus voluerit, quod proficiat meritorie ad videndum deum intensius, vel licet sit in hoc termino qui est videre deum modo,[70] potest tamen adquirere ut videat[71] deum[72] postea.[73] Si dicatur quod de ratione beatitudinis est[74] quod sit perpetua, et per consequens omnis beatus eo ipso quod est beatus habet perpetuitatem, dico quod perpetuitas non est[75] aliqua res intrinseca beatitudini[76] creaturae,[77] tum[78] quia creatura tunc careret[79] aliqua parte suae beatitudinis, tum quia perpetuitas foret[80] accidens in beato,[81] et[82] pari ratione duratio quae erit[83] ad centum[84] annos posset[85] modo[86] poni accidens in[87] beato. Et ideo ista[88] propositio de virtute[89] vocis et proprie accepta: perpetuitas[90] est pars beatitudinis, est falsa, quia denotatur quod sit una res demonstrata, sicut omnis pars est res. Improprie[91] autem et[92] accepta pro una alia propositione est vera. Unde improprie [93] valet ista: nullus est beatus[94] nisi semper sit futurus beatus; modo ista bene stant simul quod aliquis sit[95] beatus et semper sit futurus beatus et[96] quod continue mereatur quod sit semper[97] futurus beatus.

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[26] *add* facere B.

[27] *om.* B.

[28] *add* et B.

[29] adhesitationem R; *add* sed nec sic docet theologus (illeg. word) quamcumque sed supposita adhesionem ad unum articulum causat aliquo modo adhesionem R.

[30] aliam B; alium R.

[31] *om.* BR.

[32] *om.* R.

[33] *om.* B; *add* vel demonstrative reprobare R.

[34] sicut R.

[35] *om.* BR.

[36] *De Trin.* XV. 27 (in fine) PL 42, 1097.

[41] ista R. (note numbers 37-40 omitted).

[42] *add* cum R.

[43] erit R.

[44] unius R.

[45] primum R.

[46] *om.* R.

[47] ista R.

[48] *om.* in qua R.

[49] est R.

[50] praedicatum B; probatur R.

[51] et R; *add* sic R.

[52] similiter B.

[53] sicut R.

[54] *om.* BR.

[55] quia BR.

[56] *om.* B.

[57] *om.* P.

[58] iam B.

[59] singulariter P.

[60] demonstratum B.

[61] *om.* R.

[62] *add* quia B; quia est R.

[63] Corrupt in BR.

[64] signant R.

[65] statum R.

[66] per R.

[67] *om.* BR.

[68] *om.* B.

[69] *add* uno B.

[70] non B; nunc R.

[71] viderit R.

[72] *om.* R.

[73] *add* clarius R.

[74] *om.* R.

[75] est . . . int: habet aliquod accidens tributa B.

[76] beatitudine B.

[77] creatae R.

[78] dei B; *om.* R.

[79] caret B.

[80] foret: formaret B; *add* aliquod BR.

[81] creatura BR.

[82] et: etiam consequens R.

[83] est R.

[84] illos R.

[85] possit R.

[86] modo poni: vere primi R.

[87] *add* subjecto R.

[88] haec R.

[89] veritate R.

[90] perpetuitatis R.

[91] proprie B.

[92] *om.* B; after accepta R.

[93] proprie R; *om.* valet ista R; istam BP.

[94] *om.* R.

[95] *om.* R.

[96] *add* tamen R.

[97] *om.* BR.

Similiter quando dico quod haec est possibilis: viator est beatus, accipio beatitudinem pro omni re in beato existente sicut pro[98] visione dei per essentiam et[99] fruitione, gaudio et huiusmodi. Manifestum est autem quod deus[100] de potentia sua absoluta posset[1] creare angelum et illum beatificare[2] et postea adnihilare. Ad secundum nego consequentiam: beatus est viator, ergo potest[3] damnari. Quicquid sit de veritate vel falsitate consequentis, patet instantia in Christo. Non enim ideo[4] diceretur talis viator quia posset deficere et proficere, sed quia[5] proficere. Aliter[6] potest[7] dici quod conclusio sit[8] vera.[9] Nam ille qui est[10] beatus potest postea[11] esse damnatus. Ad tertium[12] potest dici quod sine fide posset homo mereri si deo placeret per dilectionem. Unde dicit[13] S. Thomas quod si aliquis sciret aliquod[14] credibile demonstrative[15] probare,[16] et haberet promptam voluntatem ad assentiendum[17] illi[18] sine demonstratione ex sola auctoritate dei[19] dicentis,[20] in nullo minueretur[21] suum[22] meritum. Sic[23] posset esse in beatis: licet non habeant fidem de articulis quos nos habemus, saltem[24] de aliquibus[25] aliis possent,[26] sicut angelus inferior potest habere fidem de his quae clare scit[27] superior.

Ad quintum[28] dubium potest dici generaliter quod non habemus ab aliquo philosopho demonstrative probatum[29] quod aliquis[30] angelus est, neque[31] de deo, neque[32] de aliquo incorporeo.[33] Sed quicquid ipsi de talibus in libris[34] scripserunt, vel acceperunt[35] per legislatores vel[36] ab aliis qui eos praecesserunt in quibus relinquebatur quoddam vestigium umbrosum cognitionis dei a primis parentibus, licet forte hoc non cognoverint.[37] Unde[38] Lycurgus, Socrates et[39] Cicero, et omnes[40] legislatores[41] et[42] auctores[43] sectarum,[44] sicut[45] Saracenorum, et[46] aliorum, conceperunt[47] unam[48] aliam vitam futuram post istam, deum etiam[49] praemiatorem esse virtutum, eo quod boni viri male patiantur et iniusti et[50] mali prosperentur in praesenti. Unde restat quatinus[51] iustitia servetur, quam reputaverunt[52] clarissimam[53] virtutum, quod aliqua facta hominum tam bona quam mala in futuro condigne praemientur. Similiter[54] certum est Abraham et[55] alios[56] patriarchas fuisse in Caldea et[57] in[58] Aegypto in quibus terris[59] antiquissimi philosophi claruerunt quando ad grecos derivata[60] est philosophia. Philosophi autem, tum quia curiosi,[61] quia etiam[62] ambitiosi,[63] volentes reddere causam in omnibus etiam[64] in his quae vulgus opinabatur, miscuerunt Philosophiam suam cum dictis legislatorum[65] et prophetia[66] fidei celebrata[67] per patres et[68] predecessores suos, non quod ipsi per naturalem rationem aliquod incorporeum, ut deum, vel angelum, vel animam, esse convincerent,[69] sed ne insufficientes in assignandis[70] causis et rationibus eorum quae sapientes, ut legumlatores vel[71] prophetae, vel forte vulgus opinabatur viderentur, persuasiones adduxerunt quales potuerunt, multas[72] falsas,[73] paucas veras. Unde habita fide vel opinione quod[74] angeli erant sive per philosophiam[75] sive per[76] inspirationem, nescivit Aristoteles videre viam vel officium[77] de quo servirent[78] nisi forte moverent corpora celestia. Et ideo secundum numerum orbium ponit errans numerum angelorum. Et ideo[79] ribaldus ille pessimus Commentator Averois, omnium[80] legum contemptor, qui legem Christianorum, Iudeorum, et Saracenorum plane[81] contemnit,[82] 11° Metaphysicae commento 18, quia posuerunt creationem esse, et specialiter legem Christianorum quae[83] ponit trinitatem,[84] deridet,[85] commento 38,[86] prope finem. Iste[87] enim[88] omnem legem contemnit in prologo[89] quem scribit super[90] 3m librum[91] physicorum, dicens:[92]

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[98] per visionem R.

[99] *om.* BR.

[100] *add* est R.

[1] *add* etc. R.

[2] *om.* R.

[3] possit R.

[4] *om.* R.

[5] *add* posset R.

[6] *add* et verius BR.

[7] *om.* potest dici quod B; dico quod R.

[8] est R.

[9] *add* patet B.

[10] *add* modo BR.

[11] *om.* R.

[12] secundum R.

[13] *Com. in Sent. III.* Dist. 24. q.1. art. 3, solutio ad 3.

[14] *add* demonstrabile vel B.

[15] demonstratione R.

[16] *om.* R; *om.* probare et B.

[17] sentiendum B.

[18] ille sic B.

[10] *om.* P.

[20] dicunt R.

[21] minuere B; minueret R; *add* fidem R.

[22] suum mer: suam fidem B.

[23] sic . . . esse *om* BR.

[24] *add* omnibus respectu R; videlicet B.

[25] *om.* P.

[26] *om.* possent BR.

[27] sit B; videt R.

[28] The response to the fourth dubium is not in *Mss.*

[29] ad probandum B; *add* neque BR; *add* de deo R.

[30] *om.* BR.

[31] neque . . . deo *om.* BR.

[32] vel similiter BR.

[33] in corpore B; corporeo R.

[34] suis B.

[35] *add* per prophetas vel R.

[36] *om.* vel . . . cognoverint R.

[37] *add* sicut Liggus (sic) BR.

[38] *om.* unde . . . Cicero et B; unde: sunt R.

[39] et *om.* R.

[40] omnes enim legis: before unde R.

[41] *add* sicut Licurgus, Socrates B.

[42] atque B.

[43] *add.* etiam BR.

[44] *add* Manicheorum BR.

[45] et BR.

[46] et al. *om.* BR.

[47] acceperunt B; conceperant R.

[48] *om.* BR.

[49] et BR, and after vitam R.

[50] et mali: frequenter BR.

[51] *om.* B.

[52] reprehendunt B; reputabant R.

[53] praeclar. B.

[54] insuper B.

[55] *add* per R.

[56] certos B.

[57] *om.* B.

[58] *om.* R.

[59] *om.* BR.

[60] divulgata B.

[61] *add* tum BR.

[62] *om.* R.

[63] *add* honorum BR.

[64] et R.

Videmus modernos loquentes dicere quod qui primo addiscunt philosophiam[93] non possunt postea addiscere leges, sed qui primo addiscunt legem non[94] absconduntur[95] eis[96] postea aliae scientiae.

Et[97] reddit causam secundum[98] malitiam suam,[99] capitulo sequenti:[100] eo[1] quod aliqui sunt ita assueti[2] recipere falsum[3] quod[4] propter assuefactionem impediuntur[5] a veritate[6] . . . et hoc[7] modo, scilicet, per assuefactionem,[8] aestimatur quod[9] apologi positi civitati[10] corrumpunt multa principia necessaria,[11] et . . . ideo fides vulgi est fortior quam fides philosophorum,[12] et[13] hoc est quia vulgus non assuevit audire aliud;[14] philosophi[15] autem[16] audiunt multa et ideo quando disputatio et consideratio communis est omnibus corrumpitur fides vulgi, et ideo quaedam leges prohibent disputare.

Nota hic[17] circa[18] stolida dicta sua quod habentes[19] per prophetarum revelationem leges[20] sicut habent Christiani et Judaei tantummodo[21] vocat loquentes[22] quasi garrulantes sine sensu vel ratione. Similiter alios de lege sua, quia[23] fuit aliquando Saracenus, vocat volentes quasi sine[24] scientia non quod ratio cogit sed quod voluntas eligit. Vult ergo dicere in praedicto prologo quod loquentes[25] tales dicunt quod homo imbutus in aliqua lege potest postea addiscere philosophiam,[26] quia naturales rationes necessitabunt[27] eum ad dissentiendum[28] legi,[29] sed qui[30] primo addiscit[31] philosophiam[32] numquam potest[33] postea[34] legibus assentire. Appologos vocat leges[35] et statuta et cerimonias quibus multitudo[36] hominum in communi civitate[37] regulabatur,[38] et ideo dicit quod[39] quando licet omnibus[40] publice disputare tunc fides vulgi corrumpitur et cetera sunt[41] plana. Ita[42] dico quantum ad[43] philosophos.

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[65] latorum R.
[66] prophetis R; *add* et BR.
[67] celebratae BR.
[68] *add* per R.
[69] convincerunt R.
[70] assignandum R.
[71] et R.
[72] *om.* multas falsas B; *add* incompactas et regulas suas multas et B; mythicas? et R.
[73] *add* multas et R.
[74] quod . . . erant after inspir. BR.
[75] prophetiam R.
[76] *om.* R.
[77] effectum B.
[78] serviret B; servierunt R.
[79] *om.* R.
[80] omnem R; legum . . . qui *om.* R.
[81] plene contempsit R.
[82] *add* commentis BR. Cf. Averroes (Venice 1574), VIII. p. 304, *Metaphs.* liber XII, 18E.
[83] qui corrected from que B.
[84] *add* in deo R.
[85] *om.* R.
[86] Cf. *loc. cit.* 39. i. p. 322B.
[87] ille BR.
[88] in quantum R.
[89] Averroes, Vol. IV, Book I. 60F, p. 36r.
[90] *om.* R.
[91] primum librum; primo R.
[92] *ibid.* GH, p. 36v.
[93] prophetia R.
[94] *om.* in text of Averroes.
[95] abscondi R.
[96] ei B; enim R.
[97] *om.* R.
[98] *add* quod aliam capit subjectum sive inquit dixerint R.
[99] *om.* B.
[100] saltem B.
[1] *add* ille inquit in quanto (quod B) congregatur in consuetudo (conservando B) veritatis (veritatem B) et comprehensio (comprehenso B) veritatis non habet impedimentum a veritate BR; *add* consuetudine recipiendi falsam aptus est ut impediatur a veritate et nec falsa et hoc modo per consuetudinem B; *om.* eo . . . assuefactionem B; *om.* malitiam . . . ita R.
[2] consuetudinem recipiendi R.
[3] apertius est R.
[4] *om.* quod . . . assuef. R; *add* ut R.
[5] impediatur R.
[6] *add* et infra R.
[7] *add* enim R.
[8] consuetudinem R.
[9] Corrupt in R.
[10] tractati R; *add* sibimet BR.
[11] naturae Text of Aver; *add* et hoc est per assuefactionem BR.
[12] propriorum all Mss.
[13] *om.* et hoc est BR.
[14] aliquid PR.
[15] proprii all *Mss.*
[16] autem and blank space B.
[17] *om.* BR.
[18] contra R.
[19] *add* leges R.
[20] *om.* R.
[21] tamen R.
[22] *om.* B.
[23] qui R.
[24] sine scientio non: non dicentes P; scientes non B.
[25] loquaces R.

Unde ad primum argumentum de dicto[44] commentatoris dico quod ipse per motum[45] numquam probare potuit angelos esse. Posset[46] enim dici quod motus circularis est corporibus caelestibus naturalis sicut motus[47] rectus gravibus et levibus, nec potest demonstrari oppositum, opinabile tamen[48] vulgo quod angeli illa corpora movent[49] sicut auriga currum ne deus in familia sua[50] teneat otiosos sed nulla necessitas[51] cogit catholicum hoc sentire.[52]

Ad secundum concedendum est[53] quod omnes propositiones quas Aristoteles ponit[54] 8 physicorum vel sunt contingentes vel probantur per contingentes, et per consequens non demonstrat.[55] Haec est enim contingens: deus est prima causa; deus movit per tempus[56] infinitum. Immo haec est falsa similiter: omnis[57] motus potest reduci in corpus et[58] omnis causalitas hic[59] reperta ab eis, licet non ita sit in rei[60] veritate. Sunt enim effectus multi, sicut fide tenemus, quos solum[61] deus potest causare, sed constat quod ibi[62] non est motus.[63] Unde cum super aeternitate[64] motus[65] et mundi fundetur sua persuasio, 8[66] physicorum, planum est quod fundatur super falso[67] et per consequens non est demonstratio. Et[68] per hoc patet[69] responsio ad Platonem,[70] Trismegistum, Apuleium,[71] Avicennam, et Ovidium, et[72] omnes alios.[73] Plura alia de[74] blasphemiis commentatoris[75] in leges quaere[76] 2° Metaphisicae commentis[77] 14 et 15. Modo dicit[78] S.[79] Thomas, secunda[80] secundae,[81] q.1., articulo 7,[82] quod sicut omnia principia continentur in primo principio, ita omnes articuli implicite continentur in aliquibus primis credibilibus, scilicet, ut[83] credatur deum esse et[84] providentiam habere circa hominem,[85] secundum illud[86] *Hebr.* XI.[87] 6, *Accedentem ad deum oportet credere quia est et quia*[88] *inquirentibus se*[89] *remunerator sit.* Sic in esse[90] divino includentur[91] omnia quae credimus[92] in deo aeternaliter existere. In fide autem providentiae includuntur omnia quae temporaliter[93] a[94] deo ad salutem hominum dispensantur.

Ex his patet quod unum de primis credibilibus secundum[95] eum est[96] deum

[26] prophetiam R; *add* (marginal note) et non prius P.

[27] retardabunt B.

[28] discendiendum BR.

[29] *om.* BR.

[30] quando R.

[31] *add* primo R.

[32] *add* quasi fundatus (finitus R) secundum eum in principiis verissimis BR.

[33] poterit B.

[34] *om.* BR.

[35] stat. legis R.

[36] vitam R; multa B.

[37] civilitate BR.

[38] regulabantur P.

[39] *om.* R.

[40] hominibus R.

[41] *om.* sunt R.

[42] ista R; et ideo B.

[43] *add* aliquos B.

[44] dictorum B.

[45] medium R.

[46] potest R.

[47] modus R.

[48] *add* e B; est R.

[49] agitent R.

[50] *om.* BR.

[51] necessitatis BR.

[52] sensum re ? R.

[53] *om.* conc. est R.

[54] probat BR.

[55] demonstrantur B; demonstrant R.

[56] *add* in R.

[57] *om.* R.

[58] sed B.

[59] haec BR.

[60] *om.* R.

[61] solus R.

[62] *om.* quod ibi P; quod ille R.

[63] modus R.

[64] eternitatem B.

[65] modus R.

[66] 8, 15A sqq., pp. 349v-350r.

[67] falsum B.

[68] *om.* BR.

[69] eadem B.

[70] *add* et R.

[71] *om.* ap . . . or. R.

[72] *add* cetera R.

[73] *om.* R.

[74] *add* Platone R.

[75] Corrupt in R.

[76] quaeretur B.

[77] commento B; *om.* R. Cf. 13, 14. Metaphysics II, 13G-14M.

[78] idem BR.

[79] beatus B.

[80] prima P; secunda B; super secundum R.

[81] partis B.

[82] I R; *add* dicit BR.

[83] *om.* B.

[84] ut R.

[85] *add* subjectum BR.

[86] *add* ad BR.

[87] XI, 6: VI B.

[88] *om.* quia est R.

[89] *om.* se . . . sit R.

[90] Blank space of six letters R.

[91] includit B; inclusionem R.

[92] creduntur R.

[93] sperantur R.

[94] a . . . disp: disponuntur (dispensantur B) ad hominum salutem (subjectum R) BR.

[95] sec. eum *om.* R.

[96] *om.* B.

esse, et omnes propositiones quas credimus de deo, quae sunt de praedicatis[97] absolutis[98] et aeternaliter deo convenientibus, includuntur in isto, et per consequens non est demonstrabile a nobis. Quod[99] autem dicit[100] quod[1] deum esse est demonstrabile, verum est in se, quia est propositio necessaria,[2] et taliter[3] demonstrabilis, et nata[4] fieri evidens per discursum sillogisticum,[5] tamen a nobis viatoribus demonstrari non potest. Quando autem[6] dicit quod Theologia est scientia, vult dicere quod veritates Theologicae sunt in se scibiles, hoc est, ita verae quod de eis potest esse scientia,[7] et tamen quod istae[8] sint verae nos credimus[9] tantum.

Redeamus[10] ergo ad respondendum dictis[11] sanctorum adductis pro 5 dubio in prima[12] quaestione, quae[13] videntur sonare[14] quod deum esse est per se notum, sicut[15] sunt Damascenus et venerabilis Anselmus. Dicendum[16] quod in hoc ab aliis doctoribus non tenentur. Unde Anselmus in ratione sua vel supponit aliquid tale esse quo[17] maius cogitari non potest, et tunc sua ratio petit; vel hoc non supponit, et tunc, cum nihil tale probet[18] esse, nihil probat[19] de proposito. Unde singillatim ad propositiones suas potest responderi.

Primo quando[20] accipit illud quo maius cogitari non potest non est solum in intellectu, dico quod haec est implicativa falsi,[21] quia[22] nihil est quia eo maius cogitari possit,[23] si[24] dicam quod omne ens est finitae[25] virtutis[26] et[27] finitum quam intensive quam[28] extensive, sicut aliquis infidelis vellet dicere. Et ad probationem quando dicitur[29] illud quo maius cogitari non potest non est[30] solum[31] in[32] intellectu, dicendum[33] quod, subjecto[34] supponente personaliter, illud[35] nusquam[36] est, quia[37] dico quod[38] est implicativum[39] falsi,[40] quia nihil tale est. Similiter[41] quando accipit[42] deus est[43] quo maius,[44] etc.,[45] haec[46] est dubia et ab infideli negaretur.[47] Ad Damascenum patet,[48] quia nulla cognitio est homini naturaliter inserta[49] neque dei[50] neque principii neque conclusionum.[51] Sed[52] potest utcumque[53] glossari: 'cognitio dei est omnibus hominibus naturaliter[54] inserta', hoc est, in omni[55] homine est anima[56] capax[57] dei et cognitionis ejus. Ad[58] responsionem, quando dicitur quod praedicatum[59] est in[60] intellectu subjecti et similiter quod[61] idem praedicatur de se, ergo propositio est vera, nego utramque[62] consequentiam. Cum enim dico: homo irrationalis[63] est homo, certum est quod conceptus qui est praedicatum est pars subjecti, id est, aequivalenter, et per consequens[64] de intellectu subjecti, hoc[65] est, hoc[66] subjectum non concipitur sine eo, et tamen propositio est impossibilis.

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[97] praedictis B.
[98] absolute BR.
[99] quod autem: quando quia B.
[100] *add* Sanctus Thomas R.
[1] *om.* R.
[2] nota R.
[3] taliter dem: tamen and blank B.
[4] *add* est R.
[5] *add* sed R.
[6] *om.* B.
[7] vera BR.
[8] ita P; a B.
[9] *add* et non demonstramus; *om.* tantum R.
[10] This section to the end is placed in the *Pembroke Ms.* in the following question (No. 85), fol. 199a, four lines from bottom. Red . . . resp. *om.* BR.
[11] dictis . . . questione: ad dicta sanctorum Damascini et venerabilis Anselmi BR.
[12] apparently question 84, *utrum Theologia* etc. was formerly Question 1.
[13] qui BR.
[14] dicere BR.
[15] sicut . . . Anselmus *om.* BR.
[16] dicitur B; dico R.
[17] quod B.
[18] probat BR.
[19] *add* esse B.
[20] *add* ipse BR.
[21] falsa R.
[22] quando B.
[23] non potest BR.
[24] quia BR.
[25] infinitum B; finitum R; *add* tam BR.
[26] veritate R.
[27] *om.* et fin. BR; *add* quam veritate R; quam quantitatis B.
[28] quam int . . . et *om.* BR.
[29] *add* ergo BR.
[30] *om.* R.
[31] secundum R.
[32] *om.* in int. R.
[33] dico R.
[34] supposito R.
[35] *om.* BR.
[36] nullus quam R; corrupt in B.
[37] *om.* B.
[28] *add* talis R.
[39] implicativa R.
[40] *add* et B.
[41] sicut R.
[42] accipitur B.
[43] *add* illud R.
[44] *add* cogitari non potest BR.
[45] *add* et B.
[46] hoc est dubium R.
[47] et cetera R.
[48] *add* secundum dictum philosophi R; exemplo philosophorum B.
[49] incerta B.
[50] *add* nec etc. R.
[51] conclusionis BR.
[52] sic R.
[53] Corrupt in B; utrumque R.
[54] *om.* R.
[55] *om.* R.
[56] *add* quae est BR.
[57] capax . . .ejus; capax ejus et cognitionis Dei BR.
[58] ad arguendum cum B; ad respondendum dicitur R.
[59] principium B.
[60] de BR.
[61] *om.* R.
[62] *om.* B.
[63] Illeg. R.) rationalis B.

Et quando[67] Boetius dicit quod nulla propositio est verior illa[68] in qua, etc., potest dici tripliciter:[69] uno modo ad[70] formam, quod non sequitur, ergo est vera, sicut non sequitur, nulla propositio[71] est verior ista: homo est asinus,[72] ergo[73] illa est vera. Certum est autem quod antecedens est verum, quia suum oppositum est falsum, aliqua est verior ista. Nam tunc haec esset vera. Aliter potest[74] dici, magis ad intellectum sancti,[75] quod quando ponitur constantia subjecti inter propositiones affirmativas respectu verbi de praesenti, nulla est evidentius vera apud habentem notitiam terminorum. Si[76] tamen terminus denotet[77] se supponere pro aliquo et non supponat[78] respectu verbi de praesenti, propositio potest esse falsa. Per idem[79] patet ad illud 7[80] Metaphisicae quod[81] ista propositio[82] homo est homo est[83] propositio[84] immediata[85] et tamen non est necessaria, nam ista[86] est vera[87] et nulla est[88] propositio per quam ista possit[89] demonstrari et tamen cum hoc[90] stat quod sit contingens.

Notandum[91] est quod[92] cum dicitur aliquid demonstratur de deo aliquid praedicatur[93] de deo proprie loquendo ly deo non supponit personaliter sed per tales actus signatos[94] denotatur quod iste[95] terminus deus est subjectum conclusionis in demonstratione ut dicit[96] prima propositio[97] vel[98] saltem in aliqua propositione sicut dicit secunda et ideo dato quod demonstretur[99] aliqua conclusio de aliquo termino communi hoc est demonstretur[100] aliqua conclusio cuius subjectum est terminus communis[1] et praedicatum passio eiusdem puta de triangulo quod habet tres etc.,[3] non ideo potest proprie[2] dici quod ista passio demonstratur de aequilatero. Nam possibile est concedere hanc conclusionem:[4] triangulus[5] habet tres etc., et tamen dubitare hanc conclusionem: triangulus aequilateris habet[6] tres quia[7] nescio[8] utrum sit aliquis talis triangulus aut[9] non, et secundum intentionem[10] Aristotelis possum scire istam:[11] omnis[12] triangulus habet[13] etc., et tamen dubitare[14] de ista: triangulus[15] aequilateris[16] habet[17] etc.[18] Similiter istud argumentum non videtur valere: demonstro hanc conclusionem de angulo: aliquis angulus[19] est acutissimus;[20] sed angulus contingentiae est acutissimus. Ergo demonstro hanc conclusionem de angulo contingentiae. Nam possibile est quod sciam hanc:[21] aliquis angulus est acutissimus;[20] et non[22] concipiam quod[23] angulus contingentiae sit[24] in rerum natura. Similiter[25] istud argumentum non valet; Aristoteles demonstravit primum corpus esse sphericum, sed[26] primum corpus est nona sphera; ergo[27] probavit[28] nonam spheram esse corpus sphericum. Nam utraque praemissa est vera et conclusio est[29] falsa quia ipse[30] numquam concipit[31] nonam spheram esse. Et[32] eodem modo dico quod[33] hic discursus non valet: Aristoteles demonstravit primam causam esse, hoc est, hanc propositionem: Prima causa est, sed deus est prima causa. Ergo demonstravit hanc propositionem:[34] deus est[35] et ideo dico breviter quod nec Aristoteles nec aliquis homo umquam[36] probavit hanc: deus est accipiendo propositionem mentalem quam[37] catholicus accipit[38] per[39] illam quia de[40] tali[41] propositione numquam concipit[42] infidelis adhaerendo[43] alicui complexo[44] affirmativo[45] maxime cuius extremum[46] est iste terminus.[47] Nam dico quod in isto termino vel[48] in diffinitione exprimente quid nominis istius termini includuntur omnes articuli quorum termini[49] non connotant[50] aliquid in creatura et multi alii veri[51] scilicet[52] quod sit ens infinitum, trinum et unum, creativum, gubernativum, beatificativum[53] et huiusmodi. Nam talem conceptum format sibi catholicus et tali utitur pro re quae est deus. Contra:[54] ergo[55] non omnes catholici habent conceptus[56] aequivalentes de deo et per consequens non est idem articulus aequivalenter quem habent duo homines.

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[64] *add* est B.
[65] *om.* hoc est R.
[66] quia R.
[67] cum BR.
[68] *om.* illa in qua R; in qua B.
[69] *om.* R.
[70] *om.* ad formam R.
[71] *om.* BR.
[72] albus R.
[73] ergo . . . vera *om.* R.
[74] dici potest and after sancti BR.
[75] beati Thomae B.
[76] *om.* si R.
[77] denotatur, *om.* se R. Cf. PG 94, 790B.
[78] supponit R.
[79] illud R.
[80] *om.* R. Cf. Z 17, 1041a17-22.
[81] *om.* quod . . . propositio R.
[82] *add* nullus R.
[83] *om.* est . . . necessaria R.
[84] *add* in metaphysica B.
[85] *om.* B.
[86] *om.* R.
[87] vera et: id est R.
[88] *om.* R.
[89] potest R.
[90] *om.* hoc R.
[91] *add* tamen B.
[92] *om.* BR.
[93] probatur R.
[94] singulatis ? R.
[95] talis R.
[96] ut dicit: sicut BR.
[97] *om.* B;.a R.
[98] *om.* R.
[99] de modo and a blank space R; demonstraretur B.
[100] demonstraretur B; demonstratur R.
[1] *om.* R.
[2] *om.* B.
[3] *om.* B.
[4] *om.* R.
[5] *add* est R.
[6] *om.* habet tres R.
[7] ut R.
[8] nesciam R.
[9] *om.* aut non R.
[10] mentem R.
[11] tam R.
[12] *om.* B.
[13] etc.: tres P.
[14] denotatur B.
[15] *add* est R.
[16] aequilaterus R.
[17] *om.* R.
[18] tria B; *add* est R.
[19] *om.* angulus est R.
[20] acutius B.
[21] *om.* B.
[22] non conc: tamen dubitem R.
[23] utrum R.
[24] possit esse BR.
[25] sicut R.
[26] *om.* sed . . . corpus R.
[27] *add* Aristoteles B.
[28] demonstravit R.

Ad sextum[57] dubium primae[58] questionis, dico quod haec est falsa: chimera est chimera et[59] ad primam probationem cum dicitur idem praedicatur[60] de se,[61] patet per praedicta[62] quomodo[63] illa[64] debet intelligi.

Ad secundum probationem cum[65] dicitur quod sua opposita[66] est falsa, dicendum[67] quod est[68] propositio implicativa et[69] non est simplex categorica.[70] Et posset dici[71] quod ad habendum contradictorium[72] propositionis implicativae, oportet ponere negationem ante implicationem et sic[73] haec concedenda: non chimera est.[74] Et[75] sic est[76] de omnibus[77] implicativis. Levius[78] posset dici propter usum[79] loquentium, sive verius sive non, quod implicatio ante negationem non possit[80] aliquid[81] et[82] concedere[83] tales: melius deo non est melius deo: deus qui est diabolus non currit in bello monte,[83a] et ita de aliis. Probari[84] ergo potest octava conclusio quia fide tenetur quod deus potest esse quaelibet res de mundo simul et per consequens non potest probari quod leo non est deus quia deus posset facere suum oppositum esse[85] falsum vel verum ad libitum et hominem omnem hoc latere. Unde dico quod istae[86] propositiones: chimera est, chimera non est, non contradicunt, quia sunt propositiones plures. Quandocumque enim[87] ad veritatem alicuius propositionis negativae[88] requiruntur[89] plures[90] propositiones,[91] si aliqua illarum sit falsa, ipsa non est vera. Sed ad veritatem huiusmodi: chimera non est chimera, vel, melius deo non est melius deo, requiruntur multae propositiones quarum saltem haec affirmativa est falsa: aliquid est melius deo. Hoc enim implicatur in subjecto, supposito quod implicatio ponat[92] aliquid[93] respectu actus negati.

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[29] *om.* BR.

[30] *om.* R.

[31] concepit B.

[32] *om.* BR.

[33] cum R.

[34] *om.* BR.

[35] *add* accipiendo propositionem mentalem quam habet vere considerans R.

[36] numquam R.

[37] *add* habet R.

[38] *om.* R.

[39] *om.* per illam BR.

[40] *om.* R.

[41] tali prop: tales R.

[42] concepit B.

[43] inhaerendo R.

[44] quod R.

[45] affirmative R.

[46] *om.* BR.

[47] *add* deus est extremum B; est extremum R.

[48] Aristotelis B.

[49] *om.* R; *add* aliqui ? R.

[50] communicant R.

[51] verbi ? R; *add* gratia R; veri . . . sit: verbi gratia B.

[52] scil . . . sit *om.* R.

[53] *om.* R.

[54] *om.* R.

[55] istos and blank for five letters R.

[56] *om.* R.

[57] tertium B.

[58] primae quaestionis *om.* BR.

[59] *om.* BR.

[60] praedictum B.

[61] ipso B.

[62] dicta R.

[63] quo B.

[64] ista R.

[65] quando B.

[66] contradictoria R.

[67] dicitur R.

[68] *om.* BR.

[69] *om.* BR.

[70] *add* sed sunt plures cathegorice et ideo multe contradictorie R.

[71] *add* et B.

[72] contradictionem B.

[73] *add* est BR.

[74] *add* chimera B.

[75] *om.* B.

[76] *om.* BR.

[77] *add* aliis BR.

[78] *add* tamen B.

[79] assuefactionem BR.

[80] potest BR.

[81] aliquis R.

[82] *om.* BR.

[83] *add* et B.

[83a] Possibly Beaumont, a hill outside the north wall of medieval Oxford.

[84] This sentence to hoc latere is not in *Ms* R. It seems out of place here but I have left it here because the author refers to the argument as already given just a few lines below.

[85] *om.* B esse falsum . . . ad libitum.

[86] illae R.

[87] vero B.

[88] *om.* B.

[89] requiretur P.

[90] multae R.

[91] *add* velut R.

Ad secundam probationem cum dicitur quod in syllogismo ex oppositis semper conclusio est falsa, concedo quando sunt premissae oppositae[94] et ponitur constancia subjecti nec[95] est aliqua vera oppositio in[96] implicativis.

Ad tertium concedo quod omnis[97] propositio est contingens ubi genus praedicatur de specie sicut haec: omnis homo est snimal; omne totum sua parte est majus; omnis triangulus habet tres, etc.[98] Philosophus tamen qui ponit[99] aeternitatem mundi[100] vult quod[1] omnes[2] tales sint[3] necessariae. Posuit enim quod haec est impossibilis: homo non est; rosa non[4] est, et sic de singulis.[5] Aliter dicunt Christiani qui[6] ponunt inceptionem mundi et desinitionem et cuiuscumque speciei saltem possibile. Ideo potest dici quod quando dicit quod tales sunt necessariae homo est homo; homo est animal, vult per istas[7] cathegoricas intelligere has[8] conditionales: si[9] homo est, homo est; si homo est, homo est animal,[10] et sic[11] de[12] aliis. Unde concedo quod nulla categorica est necessaria[13] si alterum terminorum supponit[14] pro corruptibili.

Ad secundam partem sexti[15] dubii dico quod omnis propositio affirmativa mere de[16] praesenti est falsa ubi subjectum[17] non supponit pro ente.[18] Unde concedo quod haec est falsa, sicut[19] frequenter dictum est, chimera est non ens, propter falsam[20] implicationem. Et dico, sicut dictum est, quod haec non est sua contradictoria, scilicet,[21] chimera est, sicut[22] dico ad istam: antichristus est non ens, supposito quod quid[23] nominis huius[24] termini[25] sit hoc vel includens hoc, scilicet,[26] compositum ex corpore et anima intellectiva. Nam omne compositum ex corpore et anima intellectiva est. Sed ad istas propositiones, antichristus est futurus, antichristus est creabilis, antichristus est possibilis, dicitur communiter quod praedicata sunt termini ampliativi et ideo propositiones sunt acceptabiles et distinguendae eo[27] quod subjectum potest supponere pro eo quod est vel pro eo quod erit. Primo modo[28] sunt falsae;[29] secundo[30] modo[31] verae. Sed[32] non obstante isto modo dicendi, mihi videtur quod omnis propositio affirmativa in qua subjectum non supponit pro ente, si copula sit verbum sustentivum[33] praesentis temporis, propositio est falsa de virtute[34] sermonis qualitercumque[35] sit de praedicato. Nec videtur mihi quod istae[36] acceptationes[37] respectu[38] verbi de praeterito vel respectu verbi de futuro possunt convenienter assignari, quia semper in acceptatione[39] pro eo quod erit,[40] vel pro eo quod fuit, est implicatio falsi,[41] sicut[42] patet manifeste in ista: aliquid est creabile, quia habet duas acceptationes.[43] Si enim subjectum accipiatur[44] pro eo quod erit quia implicantur[45] omnes istae propositiones et denotatur[46] quod sint[47] verae, aliquid non est, et illud erit, et idem[48] potest creari[49] quod erit, erit[50] creabile ubi[51] manifeste implicatur quod aliquid[52] erit distinguendo futurum contra praesens et ipsum est creabile vel erit creabile. Similiter[53] in[54] ista: homo fuit in archa Noe, implicatur quando[55] subjectum supponit[56] pro eo quod fuit[57] homo qui fuit[58] in archa Noe et haec[59] est falsa,[60] supposito quod nullus sit[61] homo vel quod homines sint[62] primo in hoc instanti, quia denotatur quod istae[63] propositiones sunt verae: homo non est et ille fuit et idem[64] fuit in archa Noe. Et ideo[65] dicitur quod tales propositiones sunt aliter distinguendae [66] secundum modum amphibologiae, eo quod possunt[67] accipi proprie pro[68] seipsis sicut[69] sonant,[70] et sic sunt falsae, vel improprie et[71] pro aliis propositionibus[72] et sic[73] possunt esse verae.[74] Unde haec propositio: antichristus est possibilis[75] est falsa[76] de virtute[77] sermonis. Si tamen pro ista, haec est possibilis: antichristus est, propositio est vera. Eodem modo haec propositio: antichristus erit secundum quod conceditur a doctoribus accipitur pro ista: haec[78] aliquando erit[79] vera, si[80] formetur, antichristus est. Et[81] consimiliter dico de propositionibus de praeterito. Nam ista: Caesar fuit, equivalet isti:[82] haec fuit vera, Caesar est, et sic est concedenda.

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[92] ponit BR.
[93] *om.* B.
[94] opposita P.
[95] non BR.
[96] in imp: implicationis B.
[97] *add* talis B.
[98] *om.* P.
[99] posuit BR.
[100] *add* et omnium specierum BR.
[1] vellet B.
[2] *om.* R.
[3] essent B.
[4] *om.* non est B.
[5] aliis BR.
[6] *om.* qui . . . ideo BR; vel aliter BR.
[7] ista R.
[8] istas R.
[9] *om.* si homo est homo est R; *om.* est . . . homo B.
[10] si animal est animal B.
[11] cetera R.
[12] *om.* de aliis R.
[13] vera B.
[14] supponat B; *add* affirmative R.
[15] tertii R.
[16] de . . . falsa after ente R.
[17] *om.* subj. non R.
[18] *add* et R.
[19] ut BR.
[20] *om.* R.
[21] *om.* BR.
[22] ens similiter B; similiter R.
[23] *om.* R.
[24] istius B.
[25] *add* antichristus BR.
[26] *om.* BR.
[27] eo . . . eo *om.* B.
[28] modo: istae propositiones B.
[29] *add* hujus R.
[30] *add* vero R.
[31] *add* sunt R.
[32] *om.* BR.
[33] substantivum R; subjectum ? B.
[34] veritate R.
[35] qualiter R.
[36] illae R.
[37] acceptiones BR.
[38] respectu . . . praet. before possunt BR.
[39] acceptione BR.
[40] est R.
[41] *om.* P.
[42] sicut . . . si *om.* R.
[43] acceptiones B.
[44] supponit R.
[45] multiplicantur R.

Ad secundum pro[83] secunda parte sexti dubii dico quod tales negativae sunt falsae propter falsam[84] implicationem in subjecto: chimera non est vacuum. licet principalis compositio negetur. Unde dico quod haec[85] negativa: chimera non[86]est vacuum denotat multas propositiones esse veras quarum aliquae sunt falsae.[87] Similiter[89] est de ista: chimera est vacuum. Et ideo istae propositiones non sunt oppositae, sicut dictum est prius, sed[90] implicant[91] multas propositiones[92] quarum quaelibet[93] habet suam contradictoriam, et ideo[94] quando philosophus dicit quod omnis negativa de aliquo subjecto praesupponit affirmativam aliquam esse[95] veram de eodem subjecto, videtur mihi quod philosophus loquitur ibidem quando subjectum[96] supponit negative pro aliquo, alias non oportet. Sed contra[97] quaero si est[98] dare aliquam cathegoricam simplicem et non implicativam. Dico[99] quod sic, quando terminus absolutus est simplex, non[100] equivalens multis, supponens pro[1] re simplici, et 'est'[2] praedicatur[3] secundum adiacens.

Ad quartum dico omnes istae sunt falsae de virtute[12] sermonis si accipiantur dicitur de quolibet, sicut patet, quia,[4] significet animal idem quod tantum[5] homo, vel idem quod homo in quantum homo; tunc[6] haec est falsa: animal est album, et haec similiter: animal est non album. Et cum accipitur[7]vacuum est non ens,[8] dico quod haec est falsa sicut haec: locus in[9] quo non est corpus est non ens,[10] et[11] hoc propter falsam implicationem.

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[46] denotantur BR.
[47] sit R.
[48] illud R.
[49] *add* vel aliquid R; secundum B.
[50] est R.
[51] nisi B.
[52] eadem B.
[53] sicut R.
[54] *om.* R.
[55] quod R.
[56] accipitur B; sumitur R.
[57] *om.* B.
[58] *add* fuit P.
[59] hoc R.
[60] falsum (before est) R.
[61] fuit (after homo) R.
[62] sunt B.
[63] ille R.
[64] *add* non R.
[65] enim B.
[66] concedendae B; *add* penes vel R.
[67] possunt . . . proprie *om.* R.
[68] *om.* pro seipsis R.
[69] *om.* sicut . . . improprie et R.
[70] sonat B.
[71] *om.* B.
[72] *add* vel R.
[73] et sic) pro seipsis R.
[74] *add* et secundo modo sunt falsae R.
[75] poss. est) est impossibilis R.
[76] *add* et R.
[77] veritate R.
[78] *add* erit BR.
[79] *om.* BR.
[80] *om.* si formetur BR.
[81] et cons. dico) similiter est BR.
[82] huic R; add et B.
[83] *add* ista R.
[84] *om.* B.
[85] *om.* R.
[86] *om.* non est R.
[87] oppositae BR; *add* et ideo nec est B; et non haec non est vera R.
[89] *add* etiam R.
[90] sicut R.
[91] *add* vel aequivalent BR.
[92] *add* esse B.
[93] quilibet R.
[94] *om.* R.
[95] *om.* R.
[96] after aliquo; negative before alias R.
[97] *add* istam BR.
[98] *add* possibile BR.
[99] *om.* BR.
[100] vel B.
[1] *om.* R.
[2] *om.* BR.
[3] *add* ibi BR.
[4] *om.* BR.
[5] after vel R.
[6] *om.* R.
[7] dicitur B.
[8] *om.* B.
[9] et R.
[10] *om.* B.
[11] *om.* et hoc BR.

Ad quartum dico omnes istae sunt falsae de virtute[12] sermonis si accipiantur proprie. Si[13] tamen[14] accipiantur[15] improprie et pro aliis,[16] sunt verae, v.g., haec propositio: Caesar est mortuus accipitur pro istis propositionibus: haec fuit vera, Caesar vivit,[17] et modo non est vera. Similiter, ista: Caesar est resuscitandus, accipitur pro[18] istis: haec potest[19] esse vera: Caesar est resuscitatus, et[20] aliquando erit vera actualiter, si formetur. Similiter ista:[21] Caesar est in opinione, proprie accepta est falsa, sed improprie[22] accipitur pro[23] istis: opinio est et si Caesar esset, illa opinio foret de Caesare. Similiter ista: antichristus est intellectus a deo, debet sic exponi: deus est quaedam intellectio[24] quae sufficit ad cognoscendum antichristum, ita quod si antichristus esset, haec foret vera: antichristus est intellectus hac intellectione. Eodem modo[25] haec:[26] antichristus est oditus, debet[27] sic[28] exponi: odium[29] est quod posito antichristo est[30] sufficiens[31] ad verificandum hanc: antichristus est oditus. Ex his patet quod quando recordor alicuius non existentis,[32] haec est falsa: aliquid est intellectum a me, et haec recordor alicuius, cognosco[33] aliquid, et hoc[34] supposito[35] quod ly[36] aliquid supponat[37] pro aliquo existente extra animam non[38] forte in omni intellectione et universaliter in omni cognitione primum cognitum est conceptus vel similitudo rei cognitae secundum Avicennam, Algazalem et S. Thomam.

Ad quintum dico haec est falsa: nullo asino existente asinus est vera res, quia quaelibet exponens est falsa, sive sit temporalis sive causalis, sive conditionalis.[39] Si sint[40] temporales exponentes,[41] sunt contingentes et[42] non inferunt illam universalem. Non enim sequitur, dum iste asinus non existit, asinus est,[43] et sic de singulis, posito[44] quod multi; ergo dum nullus asinus existit[45] asinus est.[46] Similiter, secundum praedicta, quaelibet singularis est falsa,[47] quando est temporalis vel causalis, propter falsam implicationem, sicut patet cum dicitur, quia iste asinus non existit asinus est,[48] quia denotatur quod iste[49] sit asinus et tamen non existens. Unde dico[50] quod talis propositio si nullus asinus existit asinus est non inducitur[51] sufficienter per tales conditionales, si iste asinus non existit asinus est et[52] si iste asinus non existit asinus est etc. et sic de singulis; ergo nullo[53] asino existente etc., vel ergo si nullus asinus existit[54] asinus est sed[55] debet[56] induci per unam propositionem categoricam de conditionato subjecto sic[57] dicendo si nec iste asinus existit[58] nec iste et sic de singulis existit asinus est; ergo si nullus asinus[59] existit asinus est sed tunc consequentia est bona et[60] antecedens[61] falsum, posito[62] quod multi[63] asini sint[64] sicut sophisma supponit.

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[12] veritate R.
[13] *om.* R.
[14] *add* quando R.
[15] accipiuntur R.
[16] *add* propositionibus BR.
[17] vincit B.
[18] pro istis haec: quod ista opinio B; pro ista propositione haec R.
[19] potest esse: fuit B.
[20] *om.* et . . . formetur BR.
[21] *om.* R.
[22] *om.* sed impr. R; *add* tamen B; cum R.
[23] pro istis: quod ista B; pro ista R.
[24] intelligentia.
[25] *add* ad R.
[26] ista B; istam R.
[27] est R.
[28] *om.* B; haec R.
[29] eadem R.
[30] est: in esse BR.
[31] sufficit R.
[32] Corrupt in BR.
[33] intelligo R.
[34] *om.* R.
[35] supponendo R.
[36] si R.
[37] supponitur R.
[38] ideo R.
[39] *add* et quando arguitur de singularibus suis (eis B) quia isto asino (albo R) non (nec B) existente asinus (albus R) est vera res etc. de singulis (*om.* R) dico quod iste singulares sunt distinguende et si sint conditionales sunt false BR.
[40] *om.* sint . . .et B.
[41] *om.* R.
[42] sed R.
[43] *add* etc. R; *add* quia pono quod multi sunt et dum iste non existit asinus est B.
[44] *om.* posito . . . multi BR.
[45] *add* iste B.
[46] *add* et B; etc. R.
[47] *add* quando est falsa R.
[48] *add* etc. R.
[49] *om.* R.
[50] *om.* dico quod BR. This passage as far as sophisma supponit comes at the end of the text in Ms. P. and after consequentia, just below, in *Ms.* B.
[51] indicitur P.
[52] et . . . est *om.* B.
[53] nullo . . . ergo *om.* BR.
[54] *add* etc.; *om.* existit . . . est R.
[55] *add* sic R.
[56] *add* sic B.
[57] *om.* sic dicendo BR.
[58] *om.* R.
[59] *add* vel sic si iste asinus non existit nec iste nec sic de singulis asinus est; ergo si nullus asinus (*om.* R.) etc. et utrobique; *om.* existit . . . tunc BR.
[60] sed BR.
[61] *add* est B.
[62] posito quod: suppositis R.
[63] multi asini: multis aliis R.
[64] sint . . . supponit *om.* R.

Similiter si sint[65] conditionales sunt falsae, sic dicendo,[66] si iste asinus non existit asinus est, quia inter antecedens et consequens non est[67] necessaria consequentia. Cum[68] ergo arguitur isto asino non existente asinus est vera res, et sic de singulis, dico quod haec sit distinguenda sicut illa: nullo asino existente, etc. Et sive sit conditionalis sive causalis, vel temporalis, est falsa.

Ad sextum patet per dicta[69] ad 7 dubium et[70] concedo tales negativas esse falsas: vacuum non est infinitum; Caesar non est antichristus. Et dico, sicut dictum est[71] quod de talibus terminis implicativis[72] nihil[73] vere[74] affirmatur vel negatur, sed quaelibet[75] talis oratio est plures implicans[76] contradictoria, scil.,[77] affirmativam[78] et[79] negativam.[80]

Ad argumentum principale, quod est contra viam istam[81] quando accipitur quod naturaliter desideramus scire Theologiam, dico quod ista propositio potest multipliciter intelligi; primo[82] ut non accipiatur pro ista: naturaliter habemus desiderium ad sciendum Theologiam, ut distinguatur[83] naturaliter contra libere, et sic est falsa, tum quia semper nobis inesset, tum quia non possemus[84] non desiderare[85] scire Theologiam. Aliter accipitur pro ista propositione: nostra est natura[86] desiderare scire Theologiam, et hoc est verum. Et tamen cum hoc stat quod illam scientiam non possumus attingere in[87] praesenti ex nobis, sicut naturaliter disideramus[88] semper vivere et tamen semper vivere a solo deo est,[89] quod[90] nobis concedat.

[65] sit B.
[66] *om.* BR.
[67] videtur BR.
[68] cum . . . falsa *om.* BR.
[69] predicta R.
[70] *om.* BR.
[71] *om.* BR.
[72] implicationis R.
[73] vel R; *add* negetur R.
[74] *om.* R.
[75] quilibet R.
[76] et implicativis B; *om.* R.
[77] *om.* BR.
[78] affirmativa R.
[79] vel B; sive R.
[80] negativa R.
[81] *add* quod B.
[82] primo . . . accipiatur: aut enim accipitur R.
[83] distinguitur R.
[84] possimus B.
[85] desiderere B.
[86] *add* nata R.
[87] de B.
[88] *add* naturaliter R.
[89] est: donatur nobis BR.
[90] *om.* quod . . . concedat B.

John Wyclif's Political Activity

T. J. HANRAHAN C.S.B.

THE early life of John Wyclif is remarkably obscure. Very few dates can be given with any certainty and almost the only one of any real importance is the date that he became Master of Theology. This was certainly between January 28, 1371 and December 26, 1373 and probably closer to the earlier date.[1] Up to this time he had been receiving his theological training at Oxford, after it he fulfilled the functions of a master at the University. His position in life was now a clearly defined one: he was a scholastic theologian charged first of all with the duty of guiding students in theology at the University. He might be called on to perform other tasks but this was his basic one. This was a position of not inconsiderable responsibility, one in which a man could spend a lifetime doing work that was nonetheless important for being quite unspectacular. It was also one from which a man who would seize his opportunities could reach out to a wider influence and a wider measure of fame. Theology is at once a speculative and a practical science and there was often a need and an opportunity for the theologian to take part in practical affairs. Such an opportunity soon presented itself to John Wyclif.

Envoys of the King of England, to go to Bruges, there to "treat and discuss in kindly and charitable fashion with the nuncios and ambassadors of the Supreme Pontiff about certain affairs", were appointed on July 26, 1374. At the head of the English deputation was Bishop John Gilbert of Bangor and second on the list of seven came "Master John Wiclif, Professor of Sacred Theology". The matters to be treated were not specified in the appointment but they were said to be the same as those for which a four man commission had been sent to Avignon the year before. The experienced Bishop of Bangor had also headed that mission and with him then had gone Uttred of Boldon the most prominent Benedictine theologian of the day.[2]

There were in fact several troubled points that had to be settled between England and the Pope. Papal provisions to English benefices were a long standing issue, and there was also the question of a subsidy, since both King and Pope were demanding a tenth from the troubled clergy.[3] There may also have been a renewal by Pope Gregory XI of the demand for the annual tribute of one thousand marks promised to the papacy by King John but our only evidence for this renewal is a passage in the *Continuatio Eulogii* which seems to be more imaginative than historical and which is now generally rejected.[4]

Whatever the exact subjects of discussion may have been, the negotiations of 1374 were inconclusive. Wyclif was away from July 27 to September 14 and received sixty pounds for expenses.[5] During the winter, however, less formal bargaining seems to have been continued and in the following August another embassy was sent to Bruges. When the list for this commission appeared Wyclif's name was not on it and his diplomatic career came to an end.[6]

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[1] This is evident from a comparison of two letters of Pope Gregory XI issued on those dates. The first is printed in M. E. H. Lloyd, "John Wyclif and the Prebend of Lincoln", *English Historical Review*, LXI (1946), p. 392; the second in J. A. Twemlow, "Wycliffe's Preferments and University Degrees". *English Historical Review*, XV (1900), p. 530.

[2] T. Rymer, *Foedera* (Record Commission, London, 1830), III pt. II, 1007.

[3] There is a good discussion of these issues in H. B. Workman, *John Wyclif*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1926), I, 226 f.

[4] *Eulogium Historiarum*, ed. F. S. Haydon, 3 vols. (Rolls Series, London, 1858-63), III, 337 f. See the article, "Whittlesey" in *Dictionary of National Biography*, by J. Tait. W. A. Pantin, *The English Church in the XIVth Century* (Cambridge, 1955), p. 129 n., says, "We should probably regard this account as a political pamphlet rather than as sober history". H. B. Workman, *op. cit.*, 1, 228-30, accepts the account as historical.

[5] *Issues of the Exchequer*, ed. F. Devon (Record Commission, London, 1837), p. 197.

Scholars have given various explanations for the omission of Wyclif from the deputation sent to Bruges in 1375. It has been suggested that he was not sent because it was realized that "he was not sufficiently accommodating to be a party to the pre-arranged deal between King and Pope".[7] A less charitable suggestion is that "he was found to have neither pliancy nor finesse".[8] There is, however, one fact that seems to weaken these explanations and to suggest another. Wyclif's position in Bruges had presumably been that of a theological advisor and he had been the only theologian in the group. He was omitted in the following year but he was not replaced by any other Doctor of Theology. The obvious inference would seem to be that while a theologian was a useful man to have along in the preliminary discussions, he would be just an extra hand in the final drafting of an agreement. Wyclif would thus be omitted neither because he was stubborn nor because he was inept but simply because he was not needed.

The diplomatic mission of 1374 marks the first occasion when we definitely see John Wyclif engaged in other than scholarly activity. There is no serious reason for thinking that he had "entered the service of the Crown"[9] much before that. Perhaps his appointment by the King to the Rectory of Lutterworth on April 7, 1374,[10] marks the time the arrangement was made. It can hardly be argued that his appointment to go to Bruges implied any previous experience. It was a little unusual for a theologian to go directly from his scholastic tasks to such a position—most of those who received such calls were Doctors of Canon or Civil Law rather than theologians—but it was certainly not unheard of. There is for example no sign that Uttred of Boldon had ever served the Crown before his appointment on the mission to Avignon in 1373.[11]

Earlier authors assigned the beginning of Wyclif's political career to a much earlier date. For this they had three principal pieces of evidence. Nothing could illustrate better the development of Wyclif studies than a brief examination of these.

One of Wyclif's friends in his earlier days at Oxford was William Binham, a Benedictine of Saint Alban's Abbey. Their friendship was strained, however, by a controversy over the authority of the Pope. Binham produced a work *Contra positiones Wiclevi*—not extant today—and Wyclif replied with *Contra Willelmum Vynham monachum S. Albani Determinatio.*[12]

In this *Determinatio* one of the points at issue was the papal claim that England owed an annual tribute because of the agreement made by King John with Pope Innocent III. Wyclif put his arguments against the tribute in the form of statements said to have been made by the lords "in a certain council".[13] This is now generally regarded as a simple literary device, but to Lechler, author of the first works on Wyclif of a scientific nature, as to earlier writers, it was "the earliest instance of a report of a parliamentary debate".[14] Once this was accepted it was easy to imagine Wyclif as a member of the Parliament of 1366, which had rejected a demand for the payment of the tribute made in the previous year by Pope Urban V.[15] A phrase that Wyclif, in the *Determinatio,* applied to himself, "in a special sense the King's clerk",[16] was taken to indicate that he had been summoned to Parliament.[17] Naturally as a member of that body he would be in an ideal position to report the speeches.

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[6] *Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, ed W. H. Bliss and J. A. Twemlow, 4 vols., (London, 1893-1902), IV, 144. *Cf.* Workman, *op. cit.*, 1, 246.

[7] Workman, *op. cit.*, 1, 246.

[8] K. B. McFarlane, *John Wycliffe and the Beginnings of English Nonconformity* (London, 1952), p. 88.

[9] Workman, *op. cit.*, 1, 209, puts this "shortly before obtaining his doctors degree", but his evidence seems insufficient. See below n. 25.

[10] Workman, *op. cit.*, 1, 209.

[11] Uthred was a monk of Durham. He was at Oxford from 1347 to 1367 and became Master of Theology in 1357. He left Oxford under a cloud as Archbishop Langham condemned some of his theological opinions. For the rest of his life, frfom 1367 to his death in 1396, except for the years 1383-86 when he was back at Oxford, he was in office at Durham or its daughter Priory of Finchale, and engaged in affairs for his monastery. The chronology of his life is given in summary form in a *Vita Compendiosa*, printed in the *Bulletin of the Institute for Historical Research*, III (1925-1926), p. 46. Useful sections on Uthred are contained in D. Knowles, *The Religious Orders in England*, (Cambridge, 1955), II, 48-54, and W. A. Pantin, *op. cit.*, 166-175.

[12] *Opera Minora*, ed. J. Loserth (Wyclif Society, London, 1913), pp. 415-430.

[13] *Opera Minora*, p. 425.

This fine picture was attacked by J. Loserth in 1896 when he pointed out that, according to the *Continuatio Eulogii,* the request for tribute was renewed in 1374. He argued that while the vehement arguments in the *Determinatio* could hardly be reconciled with the earlier date, they fitted well with the later. Thus he dated the *Determinatio* about 1377.[18] Although not accepted immediately,[19] this argument was the first step in revolutionizing the picture of Wyclif as a politician by the simple fact that it threw serious doubt on what had been the strongest evidence for more than half of the period which had been assigned to Wyclif's political activity. The fact that we now reject the passage on which Loserth based his argument[20] need not affect the conclusion since it is clear in the *Determinatio* itself that the question of the tribute is regarded by Wyclif as a dead issue brought up by his opponent merely to embarrass him.[21] Once this is recognized, there remains no satisfactory evidence that Wyclif ever took an active part in any controversy, other than purely scholastic, over the papal demands for the tribute.

A second piece of evidence for dating the beginning of Wyclif's political activity before 1374, was found in a phrase used by John Kynyngham, an opponent of Wyclif in a purely theological dispute just before he received his Master's degree, probably in 1372. Wyclif, arguing for the literal truth of everything in Scripture, said that this could be shown on three levels, which he likened to three nests for "Christ's chickens".[22] Kynyngham in his attack on this replied in similar vein, "My Master builds his nests on high and while I would like to follow him I cannot, for I do not have *herodii domus* as a leader".[23] Faced with this reading in the manuscripts and unable to make any sense out of it, the editor of the *Fasciculi Zizaniorum,* amended it to read "*Herodis domus*", "the House of Herod".[24] Accepted as the correct reading, this was taken as a clear indication that Wyclif was already connected with the royal service.[25] The error was finally recognized by B. L. Manning in 1926.[26] He pointed out that Kynyngham was referring to Psalm 103 in the Vulgate which speaks of "the house of the heron", *herodii* being a simple transliteration of the Greek word for heron, *ἐρωδιός*. This would seem clear enough but even in 1952, K. B. McFarlane could still write that "This has generally been interpreted as a scarcely veiled reference to the King's favour, and it can be nothing else".[27]

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[14] *Fasciculi Zizaniorum,* ed. W. W. Shirley (Rolls Series, London, 1858), p. XIX; quoted with approval by G. V. Lechler, *John Wycliffe and His English Precursors,* trans. P. Lorimer (2nd edn., London, 1884), p. 130 n 2.

[15] For the papal demand: *Caesaris Baronii Annales Ecclesiastici,* ed. A. Theiner, vol. 26 (1356-1396), Angers 1872, p. 110, no. 13. For the rejection of it: *Chronica Johannis de Reading,* ed. James Tait (Publications of the University of Manchester, Historical Series, No. XX), Manchester, 1914, p. 171, and notes p. 335.

[16] *Opera Minora,* p. 422.

[17] Lechler, *op. cit.,* p. 130 f.

[18] J. Loserth, "The Beginnings of Wyclif's Activity in English Politics," *English Historical Review,* II (1896), pp. 319-328.

[19] It was not accepted by S. Armitage-Smith, *John of Gaunt* (Westminster, 1904), and H. Rashdall, in the article "Wycliffe" in the *Dictionary of National Biography,* was still doubtful about it in 1909. Workman, *op. cit.,* I, 228, accepts it fully.

[20] See above n. 4.

[21] *Opera Minora,* p. 425. The *Determinatio* is now generally dated 1374-75. See below n. 36.

[22] *Fasciculi Zizaniorum,* Appendix, p. 453.

[23] *Ibid,* p. 14 n.

[24] *Ibid,* p. 14.

[25] Workman, *op. cit.,* I, 209. This is the principal basis for his idea that Wyclif entered the service of the crown at this time.

[26] B. L. Manning, "Wyclif and the House of Herod", *Cambridge Historical Journal,* II (1926), pp. 66-67; Psalm 103, 16-18: Saturabuntur ligna campi, et cedri libani, quas plantavit: Illic passeres nidificabunt. Herodii domus dux est eorum: Montes excelsi cervis: petra refugium herinaciis. Kynyngham simply uses these verses as a figure nicely matching Wyclif's three nests: Magister meus

A somewhat stronger piece of evidence is generally accepted as pointing to a connection of Wyclif with the Parliament of 1371. In his work *De Civili Dominio* Wyclif argues against an opponent who seems to have held the position that the religious orders in England did not owe the King "tenths or fifteenths or any other payment however rich they might be and however difficult the position of the King". In reply Wyclif presents a story:

> I have heard that the possessioners in a certain parliament of London argued that way and one lord, more skillful than the others, replied with a fable. "Once upon a time," he said, "the birds were gathered together and there was an owl there who had no feathers. Putting on that he was weak and cold the shivering owl asked the other birds to give feathers to him. So out of sympathy they each gave a feather, until the owl was quite disguised with the others' plumes. Then was sighted a hawk, out looking for prey. The birds, eager to avoid the plunging attack of the hawk, either by defense or by flight, asked the owl to return their feathers. He refused. Then they all roughly snatched back their feathers and escaped the danger, leaving the owl behind, worse off now than he had been at first." And he continued, "In the same way, if the war goes against us, we shall have to take back the goods of the possessioners as rightly belonging to us and the country, and thus defend the country in a sensible way with those things that we can best spare."[28]

In 1858 Shirley noted this passage and argued that it must refer to the Parliament of 1371, since the work was written after 1369 but still in the reign of Edward III and "Within these limits is there any date except 1371 which will suit the passage quoted above?"[29] Loserth in his edition of the *De Civili Dominio* accepted this and referred to Shirley's notice.[30] It has been generally accepted and used not only by writers on Wyclif but also by general historians in their accounts of 1371.

It cannot be denied that the fable could very well have been used in 1371. Hard pressed in the renewed war with France, the King asked Parliament for fifty thousand marks from the laity and a like sum from the clergy. The clergy refused to grant the subsidy until it was approved by Convocation. Feelings were bitter as there was a demand for the removal of the clerical ministers of the crown and their replacement by laymen. Moreover, there were articles laid before Parliament by two Augustinian Friars which presented much the same position as that taken by Wyclif. They argued against those clergy who "refuse to contribute to the necessity that presses the kingdom, for their own safety and that of the whole community".[31] There can be no doubt that these

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nidificat in excelsis; quem sequi cupio sed apprehendere nequeo, quia nec herodii domus dux mihi est in curiosis et subtilibus adinventionibus, neque cum cervis montes excelsi mihi pervii sunt, in arduis sententiis et deductionibus, sed cum herinaciis refugium mihi est humilis petra solidae veritatis. *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*, pp. 14-15.

[27] McFarlane, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[28] *De Civili Dominio*, 4 vols., vol. I, ed R. L. Poole (Wyclif Society, London, 1885), vols. II-IV, ed. J. Loserth (Wyclif Society, London, 1900-1904), II, 7.

[29] *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*, p. XXI n. 2.

[30] *De Civili Dominio*, II, 7, note on line 15.

[31] V. H. Galbraith, "Articles laid before the Parliament of 1371", *English Historical Review*, XXXIV (1919), p .580.

articles "corroborate the conjectural ascription to this parliament of a lord's speech (the fable of the owl) on similar lines".[32] Again, the chroniclers reported that when, in the following year, the Earl of Pembroke, who had led the attack on the clerical ministers, was captured by the French, among the reasons by which some explained his misfortune were that "he had attacked the rights and liberties of the church in a certain Parliament . . . and persuaded the King and his council that in time of war they should mulct the clergy".[33]

But even if we accept this attribution of the fable of the owl to 1371,[34] it still does not give us any direct connection of Wyclif with that Parliament. He does not say "I heard them say this", but "I have heard that they said this".[35] Thus this text, like the others, still leaves us with no evidence of political activity by Wyclif before 1374.

Thus the evidence seems to indicate that when Wyclif was chosen in 1374 to support the English position at Bruges, it was as a prominent Doctor of Theology, known no doubt to be interested in political questions but without practical experience and not as yet committed to any particular theory. It was probably only on his return to the regular life at Oxford that his mind turned definitely to political theory. It was at this time that he wrote the *Determinatio*[36] against Binham and, on a larger scale, his *De Dominio Divino*,[37] and the first book of *De Civili Dominio*.[38]

The next definite sign of political activity by Wyclif does not come until late in 1376, after the so-called Good Parliament. There have been a great many conjectures as to his relationship to this Parliament. Lechler imagined him to have been a member of it and then, in view of Wyclif's later connection with John of Gaunt, was faced with the rather awkward task of trying to decide how he would have voted, since "he must have taken his place either on one side or the other".[39] This picture is intrinsically improbable and without evidence, and it has been rejected. But it is still maintained that his writings at least were "the academic side of the political movement reflected in the Good Parliament".[40] Upon examination this idea does not seem to mean very much. The main business of the Parliament was the attempt to reform the government of the country by the use of impeachment. This was an innovation that "openly and directly challenged the medieval view that the function of the monarch was to rule and that his servants and ministers were answerable ultimately only to the King, however much their conduct might be scrutinised and questioned by the nation".[41] Far from joining in this challenge, Wyclif was moving in the opposite direction. For him civil lordship was bound up with the idea of coercion, of civil justice imposed by the will and power of the ruler. The King made the law and, therefore, was above it. He was bound to obey, not his own law, but the higher law, and served his own voluntarily while others were compelled to obey. Even evil Kings must be obeyed and the right to rebel against a tyrant could be used only in extraordinary circumstances.[42] In this matter then, which was a central concern on both sides, Wyclif can hardly be said to have inspired the practical men of the Good Parliament. He would indeed have been more in sympathy with them when they spoke in their petitions with much bitterness of the "benefice brokers living in the sinful city of Avignon".[43] But this was not the main issue for him or for them, and the significance of their argument is lessened when we remember that there was hardly a man in England who would not join in such a complaint.[44] Of Wyclif's preoccupation with the right and duty of the King and the Lords to remove the clergy's excess wealth there is no mention in the records of the Good Parliament, and if there had been it would hardly have received that name from the monastic chroniclers.[45]

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[32] *Ibid*, 579.

[33] Thomas Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, ed. H. T. Riley, 2 vols. (Rolls Series, London, 1863-1864), I, 314; *cf.* also Ranulf Hidgen, *Polychronicon*, ed. J. R. Lumby, 9 vols. (Rolls Series, London, 1865-1886), VIII, Appendix I, 378.

[34] The question to be answered still seems to be that posed by Shirley and cited above. Now Book Two of *De Civili Dominio* was almost certainly written after the Parliament of January 1377. At that Parliament special grants were demanded because of the pressure of the war and even threats of invasion; there was a quarrel over this with the Clergy and a grant was finally made by them only after threats by the Duke of Lancaster. *cf. Rotuli Parliamentorum*, 8 vols. (1767-1832), II, 362; Thomas Walsingham, *Chronicon Angliae*, ed. E. M. Thompson (Rolls Series, London, 1874), pp. 112-114, 131; *The Anonimalle Chronicle*, 1333-1381, ed. V. H. Galbraith (Manchester, 1927), pp. 100-101. This being so it is hard to see why the Parliament of January 1377 is not as likely a place for the lord's speech as that of 1371, and, in view of the chronology of Wyclif's career, 1377 seems the preferable date. In either case the ascription remains conjectural.

[35] *De Civili Dominio*, II, 7. Audivi religiosos . . . expetere et unum dominum . . . respondisse. This is hardly the same as stating that "he himself 'heard'" the speech, as Workman has it, *op. cit.* I, 210.

[36] For this date *cf.* Workman, *op. cit.* I, 239; Loserth placed it in 1377, see above n. 18. McFarlane, *op. cit.*, p. 62, without giving his authority says that the disputes to which the *Determinatio* referred were held in 1373 and that the first one, which was with Uthred of Boldon, was interrupted when the latter was sent to Avignon. These were written up later by both sides.

[37] *De Dominio Divino*, ed. R. L. Poole (Wyclif Society London, 1890).

[38] *De Civili Dominio*, IV, p. IX.

[39] Lechler, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

[40] Workman, *op. cit.*, I, 258.

When we turn to his connection with John of Gaunt, we are on surer ground. Wyclif may have applauded some of the measures of the Good Parliament, but it is in any case certain that within a short time after that assembly he was allied with the man who set out to undo its work. Before looking at the workings of this alliance we must try to understand its basis. Workman felt that "the one link between the two was hostility to the power and wealth of the Hierarchy".[46] And this has been broadened by Steele to the position that "the foundations of the alliance . . . undoubtedly lay in Wyclif's theories of civil and divine dominion, for which he was already famous at Oxford".[47] There is, however, no real evidence that Gaunt was hostile to the power and wealth of the clergy as a whole, nor that he ever showed the slightest interest in theories as such. A more probable suggestion is that which sees the basis of the alliance in Wyclif's strong support for the ideals of kingship.[48] This was what we saw as separating him basically from the Good Parliament, and this is what must have drawn him to assent to the invitation of Lancaster that he take a share in the task of restoring the wounded royal authority.

In any case on September 22nd, 1376, a messenger was sent to Oxford "with a letter of privy seal . . . directed to Master John Wyclif, to repair to London to the King's Council".[49] This presumably was concerned with Gaunt's desire to have things go as smoothly as possible during the next few months while he moved to restore the situation disturbed by the Good Parliament. To have the support of this strong royalist and vigorous denouncer of clerical abuses might well be of considerable help in a battle where the main opposition was likely to come from the clergy. With the Lords, whose functions had been all important in the Good Parliament, Gaunt was able to work out a reconciliation. The Commons he felt able to control. But the Bishops who had strongly supported the reforming movement were less tractable and were highly indignant over the treatment given to one of their number in the person of William Wykeham. The Duke must have felt that his best line of attack lay in combining his restoration of royal authority with a continuation of his opponents' complaints about ecclesiastical abuses in Avignon and in the English benefices filled by papal provision. This was just the spot for the vigorous preacher from Oxford. In this way then, Wyclif, his previous experience limited to one brief paddle in the sea of diplomacy, made his plunge into the mire of politics.

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[41] B. Wilkinson, *Studies in the Constitutional History of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (2nd edn. Manchester, 1952) p. 107.

[42] *De Officio Regis*, ed. A. W. Pollard and C. Sayle (Wyclif Society, London, 1887), p. 94; *De Civili Dominio*, I, 199 ff. This doctrine on kingship has been described as his most original contribution to political theory: R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, 6 vols. (London, 1903-1936). VI, 56-62.

[43] *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, II, 337.

[44] See for example the sermon preached July 7, 1375 by Thomas Brunton, monk of Norwich, canonist, and Bishop of Rochester since 1373, in *Sermons of Thomas Brinton*, ed. Sister M. A. Devlin, 2 vols. (Camden 3rd Series, Royal Historical Society, vols. 85, 86, London, 1954), II, Sermon 91, p. 417.

[45] *cf. Chronicon Angliae*, p. 68; *Historia Anglicana*, I, 324.

[46] Workman, *op. cit.*, I, 275.

[47] A. Steele, *Richard II* (Cambridge, 1941), p. 22.

[48] This is made in two unpublished theses of the University of Toronto, 1949: L. Daly, An Essay on the Political Theory of John Wyclif, and E. Healey, John of Gaunt and English Politics, 1370-1381.

[49] *Issues of the Exchequer*, p. 200.

His career was brief enough. We may presume that he started his preaching in Gaunt's favour shortly after his summons to the council in September 1376. Secure in the support of the Lords he "ran about from church to church,"[50] and "like a wild man preached in London and elsewhere his various charges against the clergy".[51] But the reaction of the Bishops was not slow in coming. Sudbury, the Archbishop, was somewhat dilatory, but he was forced into action by the more vigorous members of the hierarchy.[52] Wyclif was summoned to appear in St. Paul's, February 19th, 1377. He was not deserted by his patrons. Lancaster engaged four doctors of theology, one from each of the Mendicant orders,[53] to support the defence, and on the day of the trial he and Henry Percy, the new King's marshall, appeared in person with their retinues. The result was that the proposed trial never did get under way but quickly degenerated into altercations between Percy and Gaunt on the one side, and William Courtenay, then Bishop of London, on the other. It ended in a riot as the Londoners heard the Duke, who only that morning had sought to limit the city's liberties in Parliament, threaten their Bishop and they rose to guard him.[54]

In this highly irregular manner Wyclif escaped from his first trial. But even while this first attempt to deal with him was failing, new and more serious charges were being prepared against him in a different quarter. On November 18th, 1376, the Benedictine monk and scholar, Adam Easton, wrote from Avignon to the Abbot of Westminster for copies of the writings of Wyclif against their order and against the Church and of his work on the royal power. He had heard of these in Avignon but had not been able to obtain copies and so he asked the Abbot to send them through the Benedictine students at Oxford.[55] It was most probably through Easton that the teachings of Wyclif drew the official notice and disapproval of Pope Gregory XI. Wyclif himself complained that he had been reported to Rome "*per pueros*" and that the text that had been sent there was just a report of what he had said in school.[56] This corresponds well with the role of the Benedictine students at Oxford in Easton's request, and seems the best explanation of Wyclif's reference in a sermon to a certain "*Tolstanus*" or his pups as responsible for reporting him to Rome.[57] In any case, on May 22nd, 1377, Pope Gregory XI issued a series of letters condemning nineteen of Wyclif's conclusions, all drawn from the first book of the *De Civili Dominio*.[58] The bulls urged the authorities in England to take action in the matter, but various events, including the accession of a new King, conspired to prevent the publication of the bulls until the following December.[59]

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[50] *Chronicon Angliae*, 117.

[51] *The Anonimalle Chronicle*, p. 103.

[52] *Chronicon Angliae*, p. 117.

[53] *Ibid*, p. 118. The Mendicants had long preached against the abuses of clerical wealth and Wyclif at this time regarded them as allies, *cf. De Civili Dominio*, III, 350; *Eulogium Historiarum*, III, 345.

[54] *Chronicon Angliae*, p. 120.

[55] *Chapters of the Black Monks*, ed. W. A. Pantin, 3 vols. (Camden 3rd Series, Royal Historical Society, vols. 45, 48, 54, London, 1931-1937), III, 76-77.

[56] *Chronicon Angliae*, p. 184; *Historia Anglicana*, I, 357.

[57] Sermons, ed. J. Loserth, 4 vols. (Wyclif Society, London, 1887-1888), III, 189; W. A. Pantin, "The Defensorium of Adam Easton", *English Historical Review*, LI (1936), p. 680, n. 4. This seems better than other identifications of *Tolstanus* (or *Colstanus*) *cf.* Workman, *op. cit.*, I, 296.

In the meantime Wyclif had not been idle politically. The second and third books of the *De Civili Dominio* seem to date from this period.[60] He wrote against the Papal collector, arguing that he had broken the oath he had taken in 1372. By no means was he as yet in disgrace or politically useless. The council saw him as a good man to call on for an opinion on the vexed question as to whether they might prevent the removal from the kingdom of its wealth even in the face of Papal displeasure.[61] His reply was that this course was quite justified by the laws of nature, of the Gospel and of conscience. The country need fear no censures the Pope might impose, nor need it fear any dangers to itself from the excess wealth, but only its own lack of perseverance. Before attempting this, care must be taken "lest personal favour or private gain should in the future impede the kingdom's common utility".[62] At this point silence was imposed on him by the King and council.

This council was probably connected with the Parliament of October, 1377, and Wyclif tells us that in that Parliament Bishop Brunton of Rochester let it slip that Wyclif's conclusion had been condemned by the Curia.[63] Clearly the Papal bulls had not yet been made public, but their content was known to some at least.[64] They were finally published on December 18th, 1377 and Wyclif was cited to appear in St. Paul's within the next month.[65] The Chancellor of Oxford was also ordered to hold an investigation into the matter to determine whether or not the accused did in fact hold the condemned conclusions. The University, in a rather unhappy position, compromised by declaring that Wyclif's teachings were true, though they sounded badly, and by persuading him to submit to some form of house arrest.[66] The court at St. Paul's was not held, perhaps because of Wyclif's professed fear that Sudbury was plotting his destruction.[67] But before the end of March a court was held at Lambeth to which Wyclif came and to which he presented a defense of his positions.[68] This trial was remarkably similar in its outcome to the first attempt to bring him to account more than a year before, and the two have often been confused. This time protection came to him from the widow of the Black Prince, now the Queen-mother, who sent a knight with orders that no final judgement on the case was to be given. Once again too, the London crowd intervened, this time on Wyclif's side, and by their uproar prevented the proceedings from being carried on in any sort of order. The commissioners had to be content with commanding him not to spread these theses in his lectures or sermons.

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[58] *Chronicon Angliae*, pp. 173-183; *Historia Anglicana*, I, 345-355; J. Dahmus, *The Prosecution of John Wyclif* (New Haven, 1952), pp. 39-50, gives translations of the Bulls and Propositions and on p. 51 n. 7, gives references in *De Civili Dominio*, I, for the Propositions. His list needs a few corrections: no. 4 is found verbatim on p. 1, no. 8 practically verbatim on p. 255, no. 14 on p. 283, no. 17 on pp. 289-290.

[59] *cf. Dahmus*, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

[60] *De Civili Dominio*, IV, p. IX.

[61] Dahmus, *op. cit.*, p. 59, denies the accuracy of the rubric in *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*, p. 258, that states that the Great Council put the question to Wyclif. Despite his arguments for this, it is hard to see how he can discard this rubric and then make so much of the one at the end of the response, *Fasciculi Zizanicorum*, p. 271; Dahmus, *op. cit.*, p. 61. See the review of Dahmus by S. H. Thomson, *Speculum*, XXVIII (1953), pp. 563-566.

[62] *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*, p. 271.

[63] *De Ecclesia*, ed. J. Loserth (Wyclif Society, London, 1886), p. 354.

[64] Dahmus, *op. cit.*, p. 57, suggests that, after Bishop Brunton's slip, Wyclif may have hastily drawn up the *Libellus* contained in *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*, pp. 245-257, and circulated it among the members of Parliament. But how did Wyclif at this time obtain the text of the condemned conclusions?

[65] *Concilia Magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae*, ed. D. Wilkins, 4 vols (London, 1737), III, 123-124.

[66] *Eulogium Historiarum*, III, 348.

[67] *De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae*, ed R. Buddenseig, 3 vols. (Wyclif Society, London, 1905), I, 374.

[68] *Chronicon Angliae*, pp. 184-189; *Historia Anglicana*, I, 357-363.

This ended for the time being the efforts to bring Wyclif into line in his political theories. When the trials were renewed a couple of years later, it was on the more definite ground of his Eucharistic teachings that he was finally condemned. In the meantime he had taken his last fling at politics in the Gloucester Parliament of October 1378. His task there was to defend royal officers who had been excommunicated for violating the right of sanctuary in Westminster Abbey. We see him as one of the

> Doctors in Theology and in Canon and Civil Law (who) were examined . . . and said that neither God, saving his perfection, nor the Pope, saving his holiness, nor any King or Prince should grant such a privilege. And even if some Prince saw fit to grant it, the Church, which must be the source and sustenance of all virtues, should not accept a privilege which can give place to sin or the occasion of sin.[69]

He also expanded his arguments and included them in his work *De Ecclesia* which he was then writing.[70] The matter was not at this time settled, but was simply allowed to lapse.

This was the last of Wyclif's direct activity in politics, though it did not mark the end of his interest, for his work *De Officio Regis* was probably written in the next year. But in 1379, too, he first began to apply the consequences of his realist philosophy to the doctrine of the Eucharist, and the emphasis for himself as well as for his opponents shifted from the political side of things to the more purely theological.

This then is in summary what we know of Wyclif's political career. It started in 1374 in the field of diplomacy, was renewed in late 1376 with a great commotion in the pulpits of London, exploded into the fireworks of trials, charges and counter-charges and considerable public disturbance. The older authors were accustomed to see too much importance in this activity, and it has now become the fashion, as scholarship has trimmed down the scale as well as the time of his action, to belittle his place as a politician. He was not an instigator of policy, nor was he ever, as Lechler pictured him, the confidant on equal terms of John of Gaunt.[71] He was not a member of Parliament, nor was he the moving spirit behind the ideas of the Good Parliament, nor for that matter, of any other Parliament. He never held any administrative post in the government and he never succeeded in bringing any of his cherished dreams to legislative reality. There were many, many men in England who were more important than he when it came to matters of planning, formulating, and executing policy. If this is what is meant by a politician then it must be admitted that Wyclif not only was not a very important one, he never even thought of trying to be one.

If we wish to understand his activity we must always remember the position he occupied. He was one of the foremost theologians of the day, and that very fact was sufficient to bring him into politics. The theologians' position in medieval political life was indeed a recognized one. Parliament required them to give their opinions on many questions. Ideally they were to give instruction, although too often they simply provided some justification for already determined courses of action. Sermons, too, were not unfamiliar political weapons. It is, therefore, unfair to Wyclif to judge him as a unique case, or to compare him with men on a different level of political life. He should on the contrary be looked at as a rather extraordinary member of a rather ordinary class.

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[69] *Rotuli Parliamentorum,* III, 37.

[70] *De Ecclesia,* p. 150.

[71] Lechler, *op. cit.,* p. 145.

In his own mind he must have thought of his own role in much the same terms as those he used to describe the function of the theological faculty:

> Through it the fame of the King is extended, the subject is instructed as to due obedience to his rulers and to God, through it the devilish cleverness of Antichrists' efforts to deceive the laity is shown.[72]

This must have been what he had in mind when he turned from scholastic disputes to those of the larger stage. In Bruges his task was precisely that of giving counsel and of exposing the arguments of the other side. When he answered the call of John of Gaunt to more directly political activity, he was still out to spread the fame of the King, for that was at the very heart of Lancaster's reaction to the Good Parliament, and to teach the subject due obedience. His activity then, in his own view at least, was always that of the theologian.

This is shown clearly by the beginning of Book Two of the *De Civili Dominio*, which was written after his own preaching in London, and after his first trial. His doctrine that the temporal lords could deprive delinquent ecclesiastics of their goods had been challenged. He expresses amazement at this.

> Indeed, I have often turned over in my mind, what could have been the reason why my opponent attacked this matter in so singular and preposterous a fashion. I say "preposterous" for it would seem that this should have been treated of in scholastic fashion by many wise heads, *before it should be preached* from the house tops.[73]

This could hardly have been written unless Wyclif was quite convinced that his own activity was a natural one for the theologian and that he had been carrying it out in proper theological fashion.

How could Wyclif maintain this attitude? Some understanding of this can perhaps be had by noting a prominent characteristic of his theological disputations. He was in fact a very competent controversialist, and must have been a redoubtable figure in the scholastic exercises. He had the useful quality of being able to see and to exploit the weaknesses in his opponents' arguments, and in particular he had mastered the technique of taking the initiative in the disputation, forcing his opponent to produce long arguments which he knew beforehand he could shatter in a few lines. A very effective means to this end was his custom of using language "according to Scriptural usage".[74] Undoubtedly this was more to him than a mere method of winning a point; he felt that the manner of speaking used by God in Revelation should be most congenial to the theologian who professed to expound the truths of faith. But he was not above using this for whatever advantage could be gained from it.

A good example of this sort of argument is found in the dispute he had with John Kynyngham, probably in 1372. One of the items of controversy was Wyclif's statement that the supreme authority of Scripture was assured by its antiquity. It was easy for Kynyngham, with the use of examples and quotation from Saint Augustine, to show that this was insufficient.[75] Wyclif, however, calmly replied that these arguments were very good but not *ad rem*, since he had been using the word "antiquity" as it was sometimes used in Scripture and by Dionysius,[76] in the sense of "the eternity of God", and, therefore, whatever other meanings the word might have, in this sense it certainly denoted the basis for the authority of Scripture.[77] Kynyngham was reduced to indignant protests that this was not the way the word was used either by Augustine or in the common way of speaking,[78] but his indignation only led him into more difficulties.[79] Surely such an argument, however effective it may have been, cannot be characterized as anything but irresponsible, a mere trick to place his opponent at a disadvantage. Wyclif, however, apparently felt it to be justifiable and a useful weapon in theological disputations.

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[72] *De Officio Regis*, p. 177.

[73] *De Civili Dominio*, II, 1.

[74] *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*, Appendix I, p. 454.

[75] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-8.

Now the remarkable fact is that it was in precisely this way that Wyclif tried to defend the propositions condemned by Pope Gregory XI. In the defense which he presented at the Lambeth trial he protested that he understood "the conclusions according to the sense and manner of speaking of Scripture and of the Holy Doctors", and that he was ready to expound this sense.[80] Take for example the sixth proposition:

> If God exists temporal lords can legitimately and meritoriously take away the goods of fortune from a delinquent church.[81]

Wyclif defends this in this way:

> This is correlative to the first Article of Faith, "I believe in God the Father Almighty." I understand "can" in the way it is used in Scripture when it is granted that God "can" from these rocks raise up children to Abraham; for otherwise all Christian Princes would be heretics. The reasoning behind this conclusion is this: If God is, He is Omnipotent; and if this is so, He can command temporal lords to take away such goods; and if this is so, they can legitimately take them away. And it is in virtue of this principle that Christian Princes have put this opinion into practise. But let no one believe from that that it was any part of my intention that secular lords should be able to do this whenever or however they wanted or just on their own authority, but rather only on the authority of the Church in the cases and form set by law.[82]

It is no wonder that Walsingham was disturbed that Wyclif escaped unscathed after such a defense. These propositions, he said,

> if they are simply taken in the way he brought them forward in the schools and in public sermons, unquestionably savour of heresy. For he did not mix any circumlocution with them when he poured them into laymen's ears, but taught them openly and simply.[83]

But, however much we may understand the feelings of the Benedictine chronicler at such use of dialectical trickery in the public forum, the fact that Wyclif used it shows how he considered his preaching and other activity with political consequences as a part of his role as a theologian, to be conducted in much the same fashion as his classroom disputes. If anyone disagreed with his statements, why they should come and meet him in open scholastic debate and resolve the matter. That he had not much to fear there is shown clearly by the decision given by the masters of Oxford when they were finally forced to consider the condemned propositions.[84] But the results of Wyclif's entry into practical political affairs were too broad to be dealt with only in the schools. The techniques of theological argumentation that he brought with him proved to be very effective as instruments of political activity.

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[76] Wyclif seems to be referring to Daniel, VII, 9: Antiquus dierum; and to the development of this in Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, Ch. 10, pt. 2, *Dionysiaca*, Recueil donnant l'ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l'Aréopage, 2 vols., Paris, 1937, vol. I, pp. 482, 485.

[77] *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*, Appendix I, p. 454.

[78] *Ibid*, pp. 15-18.

[79] *Ibid*, p. 18 and Appendix II, p. 479.

[80] *Chronicon Angliae*, p. 184; *Historia Anglicana*, I, 357.

[81] *Chronicon Angliae*, p. 186; *Historia Anglicana*, I, 359; *De Civili Dominio*, I, 267.

[82] *Chronicon Angliae*, p. 186; *Historia Anglicana*, I, 359.

[83] *Chronicon Angliae*, p. 190; *Historia Anglicana*, I, 363.

A first evidence of this effectiveness is the unusually violent opposition which he aroused. He was perhaps marked out to the more observant ecclesiastical authorities as a dangerous man by his theories at Oxford before he ever started to mix in politics. But it was his political activity that first got him into trouble, and that came very rapidly. A scant four months after he was first called to London by the Council, he was called to St. Paul's by Convocation. It is hard to see the point of that first trial if Wyclif's activity had not been very effective indeed. He was by no means the only cleric supporting Lancaster, as witness the four mendicants whom the Duke brought to his support, but he was the only one whom the church authorities saw fit to attack.

Another thing which must be remembered is that the most determined attacks of the Church were, during the period we are considering, all defeated, and that Wyclif received strong and continual support from his lay patrons. Only on one occasion can this support be called into question, and that is on the evidence of the rubric at the end of his argument before the council on the matter of preventing money from leaving the country, which says that "at this point silence on these matters was imposed on him by the Lord King and the council of the kingdom".[85] Dahmus takes this to mean much more than had earlier authorities, who passed over it in a line or without mention at all. He argues that the government had just received the Papal bulls at that time, and so,

> when it ordered Wyclyf to be silent on the matters noted above, since these represented in substance what Gregory had taken exception to, the government was actually co-operating with the Pope's request . . . This silencing marks the crucial moment in Wyclyf's career. If there was some question up to this point as to where the government stood with regard to him, that issue was now made crystal clear. The government bluntly ordered Wyclyf to cease attacking the church.[86]

This interpretation seems to be making too much of a rubric which occurs in only one of the two manuscripts of the response in question,[87] and the meaning of which is far from clear. It might be what Dahmus makes it, but it might equally be a command not to publish the fact that he had been consulted on this matter by the council, or it might even simply represent the desire of a busy council to get on with the business at hand, though it involved cutting off this rather long-winded theologian. In view of the facts of the aid he received from the government in his trial at Lambeth in the following spring, and the use made of him in the Parliament of Gloucester, it is hard to see this silencing as "the crucial moment in Wyclyf's career". John of Gaunt might not at all times be completely synonymous with the "government," but he was at least a very important voice in it, and there was never any question as to where he stood with regard to Wyclif. Lancaster was always a strong defender of those who served him, but surely his extraordinary involvement on Wyclif's behalf should be accepted as arguing that he as well as the Bishops felt that this man had served him well and would be equally useful in the future. This was at least the motive attributed to him by contemporaries, who pictured him as fearing that if Wyclif was to fail before the charges of the Bishops, "his strongest supporter would be lost".[88]

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[84] *Eulogium Historiarum,* III, 348.

[85] *Fasciculi Zizaniorum,* p. 271.

[86] Dahmus, *op. cit.,* p. 61.

[87] *Fasciculi Zizaniorum,* p. 271, n. 11.

Finally, we must note that up to the time when he broke into obvious heresy about the Eucharist, Wyclif's position, influence and support may be seen to be growing steadily stronger. One would expect that after the scene in St. Paul's at his first trial, Wyclif would be inextricably bound up with Gaunt's unpopularity in the mind of the Londoners. But at Lambeth just over a year later they seem to be his supporters. Moreover, the support he received from Gaunt and Percy at his first trial was an exercise of their personal influence, while that he received from the Queen-mother at Lambeth seems to have been much more official.

Finally, though his last effort in the Parliament of Gloucester has been derided as a "characteristic failure to mould events decisively",[89] it should be kept in mind that he was regarded there as the "principal"[90] clerical upholder of the arguments of the princes and lords against the churchmen.

The evidence, then, seems to lead us to the conclusion that, while Wyclif's importance as a politician has often been exaggerated, it has also been too much minimized. It may be argued that "the most favourable interpretation possible for this episode (his alliance with John of Gaunt) is that he was in politics little better than a child",[91] but surely such an interpretation is hardly better than possible. We have argued that he entered into the service of the Duke of Lancaster with open eyes moved by a basic agreement with him on the central question at issue between Lancaster and the Good Parliament, that his services were regarded, by those on both sides of the quarrel, as very effective aids to the Duke's cause, and that this effectiveness is a necessary part of any adequate explanation of the fact that this theologian's political activity, although lasting only two years, drew the attention, to attack or to defend, of the highest levels of Ecclesiastical and Civil Government, and won a strong following even among those most opposed to his chief patron.

Had it not been for his involvement in political activity, John Wyclif might have avoided much of the trouble in his life, for he was one who tended to go to extremes in the face of opposition, and the opposition started most strongly as a result of his political actions. The obviously heretical positions that he took up from 1379 ended his political usefulness. But given his heresies and the natural reaction to them of the medieval Church and State, perhaps the most remarkable fact of Wyclif's life is that he ended it in what amounted to peaceful retirement in his benefice. Surely the only satisfactory explanation of this is the strong position he had won for himself by his political activity.

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[88] *Chronicon Angliae*, p. 118.

[89] McFarlane, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

[90] *Polychronicon*, VIII, Appendix I, p. 398.

[91] McFarlane, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

The Extravagantes in the Summa of Simon of Bisignano

T. P. McLAUGHLIN C.S.B.

INTRODUCTION

THE extensive use made by Simon of Bisignano of texts outside the Decretum of Gratian, the Extravagantes, almost exclusively papal decretals published after the composition of the Decretum, is a fact well known to historians of Canon Law. Composing his *Summa* in the second half of the seventies of the twelfth century, Simon attaches great importance to the new law as modifying, completing or consolidating the older decrees contained in the work upon which he was commenting. One is struck by the difference in this respect when his work is compared with other *Summae* written around fifteen years earlier. Whereas Rufinus, the Parisiensis and Stephen of Tournai refer each to only one post Gratian decretal, Simon's work contains a great number. On some 175 occasions he cites the Extravagantes, amounting in all to about 80 decretal letters, embodying a still much larger number of excerpts or chapters such as we meet in the systematic collections, for example the Compilations and the Decretals of Gregory IX.

It is true that Simon had the advantage of writing many years after the accession of Alexander III, a pope well known for his legislative activity. Perhaps also the fact that his numerous decretals were already being gathered together into primitive collections made more readily available other decretals of his immediate predecessors.

The exact number and identification of the Extravagantes cited by Simon has not yet been determined because estimates have been based on the study of one or two manuscripts, and those not the most reliable. The task of preparing an edition of the *Summa* of Simon has necessitated reading all the manuscripts listed below. This work of reading and collation has been completed and it has clearly brought to light important differences between the earlier and later manuscripts on many points, as will appear in the edited text. On the problem which concerns us here, already some striking divergencies are revealed. Some of the Extravagantes are referred to only in one or two or three late manuscripts. For example, Numbers 13, 16, 22, 23, 31, 61, 65, 83b, 83d, 83f, 84, are sufficient to put us on our guard about Simon's use of the Extravagantes. Again, Number 54, considered by Schulte[1] to be the most recent decretal—Alexander III, Dec. 1173—cited by Simon, and Number 11—a canon of the Lateran Council of 1179—both much discussed[2] in fixing the date of the work of Simon, offer an interesting manuscript tradition.

My main purpose in drawing up this list is to draw attention to what may be considered acquired and to indicate points where more complete information is desirable before publishing the edition. So far I have not been successful in identifying all the Extravagantes mentioned. I wished to refer to collections of decretals or decretal law already published where the texts may be found. Where there was no difficulty in the identification of the citations of Simon my indications are quite brief. Where there was some doubt or considerable ignorance on my part I have indicated the point of law by quoting the relevant passage from the *Summa*, hoping that others may be more successful in the work of identification since we still lack a *Corpus decretalium*. In all cases I have noted the significant differences in the manuscript tradition.[8]

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[1] J. F. von Schulte, *Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des canonischen Rechts,* Vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1875), p.142.

[2] S. Kuttner, *Repertorium,* p.149; J. Juncker, *Die Summa des Simon,* p.328; F. Gillmann, *Die Notwendigkeit der Intention . . .* (Mainz, 1916), p.58, note 3; Idem, "Von der Hinterlegung des Allerheiligsten im Altarsepulchrum", *Archiv für kath. Kirchenrecht,* 102 (1922), pp.33-344.

MANUSCRIPTS

A......Augsburg, Kreis- und Stadtbibl. I (fol. 1-72)
B......Bamberg, Staatsbibl. Can. 38 (p. 3-107, recent pagination, replacing the old folio numbers 2-54).
C......Casanatense 1105 (A. II. 11; fol. 199r-222v). This manuscript ends just after the beginning of Causa 10.
L......London, Lambeth Palace 411.
M......London, British Museum, Royal 10. A. III.
N......London, British Museum, Addit. 24659 (fol. 3-26v; 28r-41). The part of the *Summa* from the beginning of C. 15, q. 7 to the end of C. 24 is missing.
P......Paris, Bibl. Nat. Ms. lat. 3934A (fol. 56-101v).
R......Rouen, Bibl. Municipale, 710 (E. 29; fol. 64-117). Mss. L and M are the oldest and will be used for the basis of the edition. A Vienna Ms. Staatsbib. 2121, fol. 84r contains only the prologue to the *Summa*.

TABLE OF EXTRAVAGANTES

1. ACCESSIT: *Summa,* D.77,c.2; C.30,q.2,c.1; C.34,q.1 and 2,c.1; Accessit ad praesentiam: C.25,q.2,c.16; C.27,q.2,c.11; Accessit ad praesentiam nostram: C.30,q.2,pr; C.12,q.1,c.1.
   X,IV,2,c.5; Alexander III,1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13887.
2. ADRIANUS. See NOBIS IN EMINENTI.
3. AD AURES NOSTRAS: *Summa,* C.32,q.7,c.21.
   Comp.I, IV,13,c.2; Alexander III,1163-1179; Jaffé-L.13163.
4. AD HAEC: *Summa,* C.33,q.2,c.6: Vel hic de meris rebus ecclesiasticis, ibi vero de mixtis agitur, ut in Extra.c.Ad haec.
   X,II,28,c.6,Ad haec. The subject matter is not treated in this cap, but rather in the cap. 7, Si duobus, following, which is never referred to by Simon. Both passages form part of the same decretal, Cum sacrosancta, of which the opening part is found in cap.5 of the same title. See N.20, below.
5. AD NOSTRAM: *Summa,* C. 16,q.1,c.46.
   X,III,30,c.12; Alexander III,1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13859.
6. AD NOSTRAM NOVERIS: *Summa,* C.20,q.1,pr.; C.20,q.2,c.I; C.20,q.3,c.4 and 5.
   X,III,31,c.8; Alexander III,1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13854.

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[8] The following are some of the works most frequently consulted or referred to: Jaffé, P., *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum,* 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1885-1888); Friedberg, E., *Corpus Juris Canonici* (Leipzig, 1879-1881); Idem, *Quinque Compilationes Antiquae* (Leipzig, 1882); Idem, *Die Canonessammlungen zwischen Gratian und Bernhard von Pavia* (*Leipzig,* 1897); P. Kehr, Italia Pontificia (Berlin, 1906 ff.); S. Kuttner, *Repertorium der Kanonistik* (Vatican City, 1937); Idem, "Notes on a Projected Corpus of Twelfth-Century Decretal Letters", *Traditio,* 6 (1948), p.345 ff.; S. Kuttner and E. Rathbone, "Anglo-Norman Canonists of the Twelfth Century", *Traditio,* 7 (1949-1951), p.279 ff.; W. Holtzmann, "Die Regester Papst Alexanders III in die Händen der Kanonisten", *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken,* 30 (1940), p.13 ff.; Idem, "Ueber eine Ausgabe der päpstlichen Dekretalen des 12. Jahrhunderts", *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen,* Phil.-hist. Klasse, 1945, p.15 ff.; J. Juncker, "Die Summa des Simon von Bisignano und seine Glossen", *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung,* kanon. Abt., 15 (1926), p.326 ff.; Idem, "Die Collectio Berolinensis", *ibid.* 13 (1924), p.284 ff.; H. E. Lohmann, "Die Collectio Wigorniensis", *ibid.* 22 (1933), p.36 ff.; J. F. von Schulte, "Zur Geschichte der Literatur über das Dekret Gratians," Erster Beitrag, *Wiener Sitz. Ber.* 63 (1869), p.299 ff.

7. AD NOSTRAS: *Summa,* C.27,q.1,c.14: Hinc collige quod si quis jaceret in notorio crimine et admonitus resipiscere contemnit, si data sententia contra eum, in vocem appellationis prorumpit, non erit ejus appellationi aliquatenus deferendum, ut in Extra. Ad nostras. This seems to refer to the decretal treated in the next number.

8. AD NOSTRAS AURES: *Summa,* C.18,q.2,c.1; Ad praesentiam nostram: C.15, q.1,c.9.
X,II,28,c.3,Ad nostram noveris; Alexander III,1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13,865.

9. AD PETITIONEM: *Summa,* C.18,q.1,c.1; C.18,q.2,c.12; C.20,q.4,c.1; Ad petitionem vestram: C.27,q.2,c.22 and 25.
The first three references are to Comp.I, III,27,c.1 and the last two to X,III,32,c.8, Uxoratus. All appear to belong to the same decretal of Alexander III,1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13972. See notes of Friedberg on both texts.

10. CAUSAM QUAE: *Summa,* D.61,c.16; C.1,q.6,c.3; C.16,q.1,c.48.
X,I,6,c.8; Alexander III,1159-1181; Jaffé-L.14070.

11. CLERICI IN SUBDIACONATU: *Summa,* C.11,q.1,c.29.
X,I,37,c.1; Lateran Council, 1179,c.12. This reference, the only one to the Third Lateran Council in Simon, and so important for the dating of his work, is found in Mss A,N and P. It is omitted in M and R. It is found in another hand in the margin of L together with some more of the text of Simon which preceded it. It is found in another hand in the margin of B together with part of the text of Simon both preceding and following it. As a consequence we cannot rule out on the basis of L and B the possibility of its having been found in the original. M is one of the two oldest Mss. and there it is not found. I feel sure that it was not mentioned in the original work but was added at a very early date and so is found in the Mss copied a bit later. See Kuttner, *Repertorium,* p.149, note 6 and the literature indicated there.

12. CONQUESTI SUNT NOBIS: *Summa,* C.17,q.4,c.29: Sed Romana ecclesia tenet quod etiam qui bona ecclesiae diripuit est ad sedem apostolicam transmittendus ut ibi absolutionis beneficium possit promereri qui non excommunicandus sed excommunicatus esse est judicandus et denuntiandus ut in Extra.c.Conquesti sunt nobis.
This passage appears to refer to X,V,39,c.22. In the edition of Friedberg the cap. carries the attribution *Idem,* following a series of eight other *Idem,* which follow the name of Clement III, though the editor says some of them belong to Celestine III. The text has not been found in the canonical collections until the Comp II (where Friedberg attributes it to Celestine III). The Marburg Ms. of the Comp. II indicates Alexander III as the author. Jaffé-L.17642, list it among the letters of Celestine III. The difficulty with identifying the reference with Clement III (1187-1191) or Celestine III (1191-1198) is that it places the date of Simon's work too late. It is found in all Mss. Is there an earlier decretal with the same incipit, dealing with the same subject? Perhaps the cap. of the Decretals belongs to Alexander III.

13. CONSTANTINUS IMPERATOR: *Summa,* D.93,c.22: in quodam extravaganti quod sic incipit: Constantinus Imperator.
Following the word 'incipit' there is a blank space left in all Mss. except P. The reference is to D.96,c.14, a Palea in the edition of Friedberg.

14. CONSTITUTUS: *Summa,* C.1,q.7,c.15: Unde hinc potest colligi lapsos post poenitentiam de jure suo restitutionem petere non posse. Dispensatio enim fieri potest, peti vero non potest, ut in Extra. Constitutus.
This seems certainly to refer to a decretal of Alexander III in the *Collectio Brugensis,* 13, 5 (Friedberg, *Canonessammlungen,* p.146).

15. CONSULTATIONIBUS: *Summa,* C.16,q.1,c.68.
X,III,24,c.4; Alexander III,1159-1181; Jaffé-L.12636.

16 CONSULUIT: *Summa,* C.27,q.1,c.18.
X,II,28,c.14; Alexander III, 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.14112. The only place this reference is found is in the margin of B: Et. in extrav. Consuluit Toletano scribit.

17. CONSULUIT NOS: *Summa,* C.13,q.2,c.5.
Comp. I, V,34,c.8; Alexander III, 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.14025.

18. CUM INTER: *Summa,* C.34,q.1 and 2,c.1; C.35,q.7,c.1.
X,IV,17,c.2; Alexander III, 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.14194.

19. CUM NUNTIIS: *Summa,* C.14,q.2,c.1.
X,II,20,c.12; Alexander III, 1174-79; Jaffé-L.13249.

20. CUM SACROSANCTA: *Summa,* C.2,q.1,c.3; C.2,q.6,c.19; C.2,q.6,c.31; C.17, q.4, c.6; C.2,q.6,c.16; C.2,q.6,c.3.
The first four of these have reference to X,II,28,c.5, the fifth and sixth to c.6, Ad haec and c.7, Si duobus, respectively of the same title. All are parts of the same decretal of Alexander III. Friedberg gives the date 1159-1181. Jaffé-L.12020 date it 1171-1172.

21. CUM SIT ECCLESIASTICIS: *Summa,* C.1,q.2,c.1: et in Extrava. cum sit ecclesiasticis.
This is found in Ms. A only. The Mss. L. M. N and P give a list of references to the Decretum ending with C.10,q.ult.,c. penult. ecclesiasticis. B gives penult. Ecclesiasticis, but from the position of the word in the line—the others are arranged in a column—as well as the capitalization and the fact that it is underlined, it is clear that the scribe considered it a word from the text. Later a line has been drawn through the word to erase it. R provides the clue to the puzzle. It reads: penult. et C.12,q.2, Ecclesiasticis. So it is not an Extra. but C.12,q.2,c.67.

22. CUM SIT ROMANA: *Summa,* C.31,q.1,c.8: in second marriage non debet benedictio iterari.
This reference is found only in the late Mss. A and B.
X,IV,21,c.3,Vir autem. This excerpt belongs to a decretal which has been broken up into several parts, the first of which is X,V,3,c.10, Cum sit Romana. The cap. Vir autem is attributed to Urban III but actually belongs to Alexander III. See notes of Friedberg. In Jaffé-L.14126 it is found among the letters of Alexander III.

22A. CURA: *Summa,* D.63,c.24. This is found only in A and in the margin of B.
X,III,38,c.11; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13893.

23. DE CETERO SI ALIQUIS CLERICUS: *Summa,* C.16,q.7,c.32.
X,III,38,c.19. This is part of the same decretal as N.15, Consultationibus, above. The incipit is missing in A. L. M and P. It is found in the text of R only and as a superscript addition in B. This part of the work is not contained in C and N.

24. DIGNUM EST: *Summa,* C.29,q.2,c.8.
X,IV,9,c.1; Adrian IV, 1154-1159; Jaffé-10445.

25. DILECTI: *Summa,* C.16,q.1,c.43.
X,III,30,c.8; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.14023.

26. DILECTI FILII: *Summa,* a) C.1,q.1,c.5; C.2,q.6,c.38 (Dilecti); C.14,q.2,c,2; C.22,q.1,c.17 (Dilecti): Unde hinc potest colligi testes esse cogendos ad testimonium perhibendum.
b) C.33,q.2,c.4: Hinc habes quod tenetur judex etiam de loco judicii providere partibus ut in eo loco velit de causa cognoscere ubi partes libere et secure valeant convenire.
Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13934. The complete text of this decretal,

containing the points made by Simon, is found in the *Collectio Wigorniensis,* published for the first time by Lohmann (VI,c.37). Only certain excerpts found their way into other collections such as the Appendix Conc. Lat., Coll. Brugensis, Comp. I and the Decretals of Gregory IX. The last contains two chapters, II,1,c.6 and II,28,c.1, neither of them in support of Simon's argument. See also Kuttner, *Repertorium,* p. 288.

27. EGO PETRUS: *Summa,* C.10,q.3,c.3.
X,II,24,c.4. This seems certainly to be the text referred to, though its incipit reads: Ego N. episcopus, with variants for the N. in certain Mss. Its attribution is: Idem Petro subdiacono. The first cap. of this title is attributed to Gregory III. It is actually of Gregory VII. The second cap. reads: Ex registro Gregorii and it is a text of Gregory VII also. The third has Idem regi Francorum, an unidentified cap. So the cap 4 could be from Gregory VII. The note of Friedberg reads: ejusdem fere tenoris juramentum exstat in conc. Rom. hab. sub Greg. VII, Romae an. 1079. An almost identical text is found in the Register of Gregory VII, vi,17a,n.4: Sacramentum archiepiscopi Aquileiensis, in Roman synod of 1079. Edit. E. Caspar, p. 428.

28. EX CONQUESTIONE: *Summa,* C.35,q.2 and 3,c.4.
Comp. I, IV,21,c.2; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13766.

29. EX LITTERIS: *Summa,* C.2,q.1,c.7.
X,II,14,c.2; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.14069.

30. EX LITTERIS: *Summa,* C.33,q.2,pr.: Certo certius est quod nemini licet auctoritate sua uxorem dimittere, etiam causa consanguinitatis, ut in Extra. c. Ex litteris.
X,IV,14,c.1; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13838.

31. EX LITTERIS: *Summa,* C.33,q.4, c.10: *separentur,* ad tempus dicunt quidam hanc separationem esse faciendam. Ms. A only has the addition: quod hodie Romana tenet ecclesia, nam idem est etiam ubi nuptiae sunt contra speciale ecclesiae interdictum celebratae, ut in Extra. Ex litteris.
This seems to be to be a reference to X,IV,16,c.2; Alexander III; 1174-1181; Jaffé-L.14311.

32. EX PARTE: *Summa,* C.2,q.5,c.19.
X, I,31,c.5; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13919.

33. EX PARTE: *Summa,* C.27,q.2,c.3: Hinc collige quod in quolibet voto, promisso vel juramento debet quaelibet licita et honesta conditio subintelligi, ut . . . et in Extra. c. Ex parte.
Mss. L and M read ex parte viri, but it is scribal error for the word *cum* from the text of Gratian immediately following which has been omitted. R also has viri, but it omits two words *cum initiatur.* A, B, N and P are correct. I am unable to locate this reference.

34. EX PUBLICO INSTRUMENTO: *Summa,* C.27,,q.2,pr.; C.27,q.2,c.27.
X,III,32,c.7; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13787. P. Kehr dates this decretal 1179-1181 (*Italia Pontificia,* VI,1,p.312,n.13).

35. EX QUERIMONIA: *Summa,* C.2,q.6,c.31.
Comp. I, II,20,c.33, Ex querimoniis; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13814.

36. FRATERNITATEM: *Summa,* C.13,q.1,d.p.c.1,§4; C.16,q.1,c.6; C.16,q.1,c.46. This last completes the incipit with tuam scire volumus.
Comp. I, III,26,c.8; Alexander III, 1159-1181; Jaff§-L.13873.

37. INDECORUM: *Summa,* D.60,c.1.
X,I,14,c.3; Alexander III; Jaffé-L.13820.

38. IN EXCEPTIONIBUS: *Summa,* C.2,q.7,c.52: Si vero quis voluerit crimen in adversarium in modum exceptionis objicere et retorquere, non cogitur onus inscriptionis subire, ut in Extra. c. In exceptionibus.
Coll. Cantabrigiensis, 44, edit. Friedberg, *Canonessammlungen,* p. 15. See

also Coll. Paris. I, 140(*Id*.p.60) and Coll. Paris. II, XL,112(*Id*.p.39). Alexander III; 1070-1076; Jaffé-L.12632.

39. INHAERENTES: *Summa,* C.3,q.6,c.14; C.22,q.5,c.22.
X,II,7,c.1; Honorius II; 1125-1130; Jaffé-L.7401. In the first of these places Simon says this decretal is of Eugene. In the second place he does not identify its author but states that the decretal Litteras (c.2 of the same title) is of Eugene. The edition of Friedburg attributes c.1 to Honorius; c.2 carries the inscription Idem, but it is from Eugene III. Cap. 3, also referred to by Simon, is rightly inscribed as Eugenius Papa, but some Mss. have Idem. Some error or confusion had already crept into the authorship of these texts in the source which Simon was using for the Extravagantes.

40. IN LITTERIS; a) *Summa,* C.3,q.1,c.1; C.5,q.2,c.4. In the first of these references L has incipit Litteras, corrected to Litteris; M has Litteras.
X,II,13,c.6, Item cum; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.14219.
b) *Summa,* C.2,q.3,d.p.c.7; C.7,q.1,c.39.
X,IV,21,c.4, Super illa. Though this passage is here indicated as belonging to Urban III, it is really of Alexander III as is gathered from the notes of Friedberg and its attribution in earlier collections: App. Lat., IX,2; Lips., LXV,2; Comp. I, IV,22,c.2. Jaffé-L.14219. In fact it belongs to the preceding letter.
c) *Summa,* C.10,q.1,c.10: ut in extra. v.c. Lexoviensi in litteris. (Some Mss. have Lexoniensi).
X,III,48,c.4, De his sane; Alexander III; 1177; Jaffé-L.14219. This is part of the same decretal In litteris, above. It is addressed Lexoviensi episcopo (variants: Exoniensi, Brixiensi, etc.), which explains the unusual citation by Simon. The incipit of the entire decretal is at X,I,29,c.9. See the notes of Friedberg on the various passages indicated in a, b and c. Concerning the date, see Kuttner, *Repertorium,* p.280 and Juncker, *Coll. Berolinensis,* p.327,n.1.

41. IN PARTIBUS TOLOSAE: *Summa,* C.1,q.4,c.7; C.11,q.3,c.25; C.14,q.4,c.12. In the first of these references the incipit is In partibus; in the second a passage of the Summa containing it is missing in M. It is added in the margin in L.
Comp. I, V,6,c.10; Alexander III in Council of Tours, 1163,c.4.

42. IN PERTRACTANDIS: *Summa,* C.17,q.4,c.32.
X,II,7,c.3; Eugene III; 1145-1153; Jaffé-L.9506.

43. INTER CETERA: *Summa,* C.15,q.8,c.5.
Comp. I, III,3,c.4; Alexander III; 1163-1174; Jaffé-L.12254.

44. INTER CETERAS CONSULTATIONES: *Summa,* C.25,q.1,pr.
X,1,3,c.4; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13878.

45. JUVENIS ILLE: *Summa,* C.23,q.1,c.4.
X,IV,1,c.3; Eugene III; 1145-1153; Jaffé-L.9655.

46. LEXOVIENSI. See IN LITTERIS.

47. LICET PRAETER SOLITUM: a) *Summa,* C.27,q.2,pr.; C.27,q.2,d.p.c.47.
X,IV,4,c.3, Licet praeter solitum.
b) Summa, D.55,c.6; C.23,q.8,c.4.—X,V, 14, c.1, Porro.
c) *Summa,* C.2,q.7,c.6.—X,II,20,c.14, De cetero.
d) *Summa,* C.2,q.1,c.18; C.11,q.1,c.31; C.11,q.1,c.45.—
X,II,1,c.4, At si clerici.
e) *Summa,* C.16,q.3,c.5; C.16,q.4,c.3.—X,II,26,c.4, De quarta.
f) *Summa,* D.82,c.5; C.9,q.2,c.10.—X,I,20,c.1, De presbytero.
g) *Summa,* C.23,q.5,c.8.—X,V,12,c.7, Presbyterum
h) *Summa,* C.30,q.3,c.4.—X,IV,11,c.1, Utrum.
i) *Summa,* C.30,q.1,pr.—X,IV,11,c.2, Si vir vel mulier.

All of these excerpts belong to the same decretal of Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.14091. The references of Simon are always to the incipit of the entire letter, never to the individual passages. This decretal has been dated 1174-1176 by Jean Dauvillier, *Le mariage dans le droit classique de l'Eglise* (Paris, 1933), pp. 23, 52.

48. LICET UNIVERSIS: *Summa,* D.87,c.3; C.2,q.4,c.2; C.12,q.2,c.75; C.28,q.1,c.11. In the first of these references we meet the longer incipit: Licet universis Dei fidelibus.
X,II,20,c.23; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13974.
49. LITTERAE QUAS NOBIS: *Summa,* C.33,q.4,c.10.
X,IV,16,c.1; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.14055.
50. LITTERAS: *Summa,* C.22,q.5,c.22.
X,II,7,c.2; Eugene III; 1145-1153; Jaffé-L.9654. Simon says that this is a letter of Eugene and it is rightly so held by Friedberg, though the inscription reads Idem following a letter of Honorius II. See N.39, above.
51. MEMINIMUS: *Summa,* C.17,q.2,c.1.
X,IV,6,c.3; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13162. For other parts of this same letter see below, N.83.
52. NE RELIGIOSORUM: *Summa,* C.16,q.4,c.3.
Comp. I, II,18,c.5; Gregory I; Reg. VII, 36,an.597 (Edit. Ewald and Hartmann, I,484); Jaffé-E.1482.
53. NOBIS IN EMINENTI: *Summa,* C.16,q.1,c.6; C.16,q.1,c.46
Comp. I, III,26,c.15; Adrian IV; 1154-1159; Jaffé-L.10444. The first reference reads: ut in Extra. v.c. Adrianus; the second: in illo Extra. v.c. nobis in eminenti specula disponente Deo constitutis.
54. NON EST VOBIS: *Summa,* C.25,q.2,c.25.
X,IV,1,c.11; Alexander III; 1173-1174; Jaffé-L.12248, where it is dated 1173. It should be noted that all Mss. except B read: ut supra,C.prox.q.3,c.1 et in extra.v.c. followed by a blank space. B supplies the incipit but introduces an error. It has: ut supra,C.prox.q.3,c.1 et in extra.v.c.si habes. non est nobis. The Si habes is in fact the incipit of the c.1 just referred to. The clear reading nobis is due to the scribe or the text which he was copying.
55. NON SATIS UTILITER: *Summa,* C.13,q.2,c.12; C.27,q.1,c.28.
X,V,3,c.8; Alexander III in the Council of Tours, 1163,c.6.

55A. NOSTI: *Summa,* D.79,c.9. The incipit is given only by R: et in extra. usque nosti. C,N and P have only: et in extra. Even that is missing in A,B,L and M.
X,I,6,c.9; Alexander III; ca.1176; Jaffé-L.12753.

56. PERLATUM. See RELATUM.
57. PERVENIT AD NOS: *Summa,* C.32,q.5,c.18; C.34,q.1 and 2, c.1.
X,IV,8,c.1; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13794.
58. PRAELATUM. See RELATUM.
59. PLURES QUOQUE: *Summa,* D.47,c.2; C.10,q.2,c.2; C.14,q.3,c.3.
X,V,19,c.1; Alexander III in Council of Tours, 1163, c.2.
60. QUAESITUM. See QUONIAM QUAESITUM.
61. QUAMVIS GRAVE: *Summa,* C.16,q.1,c.68. This is found in A and P only.
X,III,30,c.17; Alexander III in Council of Tours, 1163,c.3.
62. QUAMVIS SIMUS: a) *Summa,* D.25,c.1; C.2,q.6,d.p.c.39; C.9,q.2,c.7.—X,I,29, c.6, Quamvis simus.
b) *Summa,* C.2,q.1,c.7.—X,I,3,c.3, Ceterum.
c) *Summa,* C.1,q.1,c.5; C.2,q.6,c.38; C.14,q.2,c.2; C.22,q.1,c.17.—Comp. I, II,13,c.13, Quamvis simus, et infra, Porro.
All are from the same decretal of Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.14156.
d) *Summa,* C.10,q.1,c.6; C.16,q.7,c.26; C.21,q.2,c.5—X,III,38,c.8, Illud. Though

listed separately by Jaffé-L.14154, this passage seems to belong with the others in one letter. See note of Friedberg to c. Illud and also Lohmann, *Collectio Wigorniensis,* p. 76.

62A. QUOD SUPER HIS DE QUIBUS: *Summa,* D.56,c.13.
Comp. I,I,9,c.5; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13869.

63. QUONIAM NON SOLUM: *Summa,* C.14,q.3,c.3; D.47,c.2 (Quoniam).
X,V,19,c.2; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13819.

64. QUONIAM ENORMIS: *Summa,* C.21,q.2,c.5.
X,V,4,c.3; Alexander III in Council of Tours, 1163, c.5.

65. QUONIAM QUAESITUM: *Summa,* C.11,q.3,c.4.
Comp. I, I,23,c.2, Quaesitum; Alexander III; 1171-1180; Jaffé-13583. See note of Friedberg on this text. This Extra. is found in Mss. A, P and R, in the margin of B and L, and as a superscript addition in M.

66. QUONIAM SICUT EX MULTIS: a) *Summa,* C.13,q.2,c.3; C.32,q.5,c.18 — X,IV,8,c.2, Quoniam ex multis.
b) *Summa,* C.31,q.1,c.1 (Quoniam sicut). — X,IV,7,c.3, Super hoc vero quod. Both texts belong to the same decretal of Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13773.

67. QUOTIES FRATER NOSTER: *Summa,* C.33, q.1,c.2; C.35,q.6,c.8.
X,V,34,c.5; Innocent II; 1130-1143; Jaffé-L.8289. The same text is found as a Palea at C.2,q.5,c.17.

68. REFERENTE: *Summa,* C.21,q.1,pr.
X,III,5,c.7; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.14168.

69. RELATUM: *Summa,* C.16,q.1,c.1: Unde hinc habes quod quoslibet fideles possunt monachi in monasterio sepelire qui apud eos sibi sepulturas elegerunt . . . dummodo medietatem eorum quae testantur dent ecclesiae in qua sacramenta susceperunt, ut in . . .
X,III,28,c.2, Relatum; Leo IX; 1048-1054; Jaffé-L.4269, where the date 1052 is assigned. There can be no doubt that this is the text Simon has in mind. Three Mss. L, M and R read Prelatum; and three, A, B and P read Perlatum. This part of the work is lacking in C and N.

70. SANCTA AC VENERABILI: *Summa,* C.1,q.5,c.1: Ex hoc cap. colligitur quia quod recte actum est, delicto vel nova causa superveniente, non immutatur; simile — several references to the Decretum — et in Extra. c. Sancta ac venerabili. I am unable to locate this Extra.

71. SANE SUPER HOC: *Summa,* D.75,c.7.
X,I,11,c.2 and 3; the first of these cap. contains the incipit, the second the part of the text here referred to. Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13948. This may be part of the same decretal as Jaffé-L.13946. See Lohmann, *Coll. Wigorniensis,* p.73, and below, N.82.

72. SICUT DIGNUM EST: *Summa,* D.1,c.6; C.11,q.3,c.17; C.15,q.1, c.13; C.15,q.1,c.2; C.17,q.4,c.19; C.17,q.4,c.29; C.18,q.2,c.1.
X,V,12,c.6; Alexander III; 1171-1173; Jaffé-L.12180.

73. SICUT ROMANA: a) *Summa,* C.2,q.6,c.19. — X,I,3,c.1.
b) *Summa,* D.93,c.26; C.16,q.2,c.1. — X,I,29,c.5, Praeterea.
c) *Summa,* C.15,q.6,c.2; C.22,q.4,c.22. — X,II,24,c.8, Si vero. The fuller explicit Sicut Romana ecclesia occurs in a). All belong to the same decretal of Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.12293, where the date assigned is 1173-1174.

74. SIGNIFICASTI: *Summa,* C.7,q.1,c.43; C.32,q.1,c.5; C.33,q.1,c.2.
X,IV,19,c.4; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.14107.

75. SIGNIFICAVIT: *Summa,* C.22,q.4,c.22.
X,IV,7,c.2; Alexander III;1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13937.

76. SI HABES. See NON EST VOBIS.

77. SI QUANDO: *Summa,* C.14,q.1,c.3.
X,I,3,c.5; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.14074.
78. SI QUANDO: *Summa,* C.24,q.3,c.1: Hinc collige testes non esse recipiendos qui rem se scire asserunt, sed unde et qualiter noverint non declarant, ut . . . in Extra. c. Si quando. I am unable to locate this text.
79. SI SACERDOS: *Summa,* C.15,q.5,c.2.
X,I,31,c.2, where it carries the inscription Eugenius Papa. Jaffé-L.14030, consider it a letter of Alexander III to the bishop of Norwich, 1159-1181. Others hold for Eugene III.
80. SOLLICITUDINI: *Summa,* C.33,q.4,c.10.
Comp. **I**, IV,4,c.4(6); Alexander III; 1169-1181; Jaffé-L.14235.
81. SUPER EO: *Summa,* C.14,q.4,c,11.
X,V,19,c.4; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.14042.
82. SUPER EO QUOD: *Summa,* C.17,q.2,c.1; C.20, q.3,c.3; C.27,q.1,pr.
X,III,31,c.9; Alexander III; 1159-1181; Jaffé-L.13946. This probably belongs belongs to the same decretal as N. 71, above.
83. SUPER EO QUOD A NOBIS:
a) Super eo: *Summa,* C.25,q.2,d.p.c.6. — X,II,22,c.2,Scripta.
b) Super eo quod a nobis: *Summa,* C.32,q.1,c.5, (Found in A and B only); C.32, q.7,c.21. — Comp. **I**, IV,20,c.6, Meninimus. Si quis parochianorum.
c) Super eo quod a nobis: *Summa,* C.2,q.6,c.11; C.2,q.6,c.19. — X,II,28,c.11, De appellationibus.
d) SUPER EO: *Summa,* C.2,q.6,c.11 and 16 (Last found in B only.— X,II,28,c.11, De appellationibus.
e) Super eo: *Summa,* C.10,q.1,c.2. — X,III,24,c.3, Ceterum; X,IV,5,c.4, Verum cum.
f) Super eo quod: *Summa,* D.1,c.10, de cons. (In A, B and P only). — X, III,24,c.3, Ceterum; X,IV,5,c.4, Verum cum.
All of these excerpts and others have been collected under one number in Jaffé-L.13162, and they are so found in certain twelfth century decretal collections. Two letters of Alexander III, Super eo quod a nobis and Meminimus, appear to have been dissected and then reassembled. The excerpts referred to by Simon in c and d seem to belong to one letter with the incipit Super eo quod a nobis, and a, b, e, and f, as well as N. 51, above, belong to another with the incipit Meminimus. The date assigned by Jaffé-L., 1163-1179, cannot be considered certain. On this text see Juncker, *Coll. Berolinensis,* pp. 386-390; Kuttner, *Repertorium,* pp. 283, 284, 287; Lohmann, *Coll. Wigorniensis,* pp. 91-92.
84. TANTA EST VIS: *Summa,* C.32,q.7,c.21: Qui autem ducit in conjugem cujus consanguineam ante cognovit, et cum occultum sit probare non potest, debet laborare ut eam ad continentiam inducat. Si vero non potest, poenitentiam accipiat de commisso et uxori debitum reddat, sed non exigat, ut in Extra. (In A and B only).
The only published decretal with such an incipit (X,IV,17,c.6), does not deal with the point at issue. This is covered exactly by a decretal of Alexander III in the text Meminimus. si quis parochianorum (See N.83, preceding), already referred to by Simon under the incipit Super eo. Another text from a decretal of Alexander III to the bishop of Exeter in Comp. **II**, IV,7,c.1, Super eo quod a nobis, Jaffé-L.13907, deals with the same point of law. Further, another passage from a decretal of Alexander III to the bishop of Exeter, in Appendix Con.Lat. 33,1, Jaffé-L.13917, Meminimus, has a second paragraph beginning Tanta est (enim) vis. Have these two texts with similar incipits led to further confusion with the texts discussed under N.83? Note finally that in his commentary on

the same point on C.32,q.7,c.20, Huguccio refers to the Extra. Si quis parochianorum (Ms. Paris, B.N. Lat.3892,fol.318va).

85. VIDETUR: *Summa,* C.2,q.1,c.7; C.33,q.4,c.10; C.35,q.6,c.1 (This last reference is found only in A and B).
X,IV,18,c.3; Jaffé-K, 384. This cap. carries the inscription: Clemens III papa Florentino episcopo. Some Mss have Coelestinus III, others Coelestinus as in the Comp. I, IV,17,c.1, where it precedes two texts of Alexander III. The same text appears as a Palea in Gratian, C.35,q.6,c.2, where it is Coelestini papae decretum ecclesiae Florentinae missum, text found in the margin of one of the Mss used by Friedberg. It is placed among the letters of Celestine I by Jaffé-K. but characterized as spurious. It is already referred to by Rufinus, once attributed to Innocent, and once to Eugene (edit. Singer, p. 266, 434).

86. VIGILANTI: *Summa,* C.14,q.6,c.1.
X,II,26,c.5; Jaffé-L.14186. The attribution of this decretal to Alexander III is not at all certain.

87. QUAEDAM EXTRAVAGANTIA contine(n)t quod in causa simoniae unus testis admittitur: *Summa,* C.2,q.1,pr.
Because of the lack of an incipit it is impossible to be sure what text Simon had in mind. One might suggest X,V,3,c.3.: Deodatus Papa. This old text is invoked by Stephen of Tournai: Invenitur decretum Deusdedit papae (edit. Schulte, p.173).

88. Explaining why it is not considered usurious to rent a house or a horse because these are consumed in use and remain at the owner's risk, Simon adds: et haec ratio habetur in quodam Extra. quod est supra in fine distinctionum (*Summa,* C.14,q.3,c.3).
Again vagueness makes certain identification impossible. Evidently some decretal had been copied on a blank folio at the end of the First Part of the Decretum, in the copy which he was using.

St. Thomas Aquinas on the Two Powers

I. T. ESCHMANN O.P.

IN the works of St. Thomas Aquinas there are two main texts concerning the relations of the two powers, the "spiritual" and the "temporal", with special reference to the pope and his position in Christendom. The one is found at the end of Book Two of the *Scriptum super sententiis*, where indeed it is integrated into the doxology with which the mediaeval author was obliged to terminate a work. We shall henceforth designate this text as text *S*. The other, in this essay to be referred to as text *R*, is taken from the *Opusculum De regno ad regem Cypri*, also called, though less correctly, *De regimine principum* (Bk. I, ch. 14[1]).

These texts do not present an identity of views nor such a similarity as could easily be synthesized. Rather they are contradictory. In writing this, I am aware of taking a *positio extranea*, as it would have been called in mediaeval times. However the attempts at constructing out of these texts a synthesis of Thomistic doctrine, all based upon the assumption of their inner continuity, have proven unsatisfactory. St. Bellarmine, a great synthesizer himself, candidly stated: *De s. Thoma quid senserit non est tam certum.*[2] The Jesuit Doctor acutely grasped the true nature of the difficulty but tried to overcome it by the mediaeval method of "turning the nose of one authority (in this case that of text *S*) around until it pointed in the good direction" (of text *R*).

Father Yves Congar O.P., in an article written for the representative encyclopedia *Catholicisme, Hier - Aujourd'hui - Demain*, does not mention Thomas Aquinas at all in the list of post-Gregorian theologians who significantly dealt with the matter of Church and State. In his opinion text *S* is "enigmatic", a qualification which will consequently apply to the whole of Aquinas' doctrine on the two powers.[3]

Thus it seems justifiable to approach the problem from a new angle. But let it be understood that this paper is not meant to be anything more than an essay. I intend to present and, if possible, verify a working hypothesis, and to examine its implications as well as its possibilities, with a view to a correct understanding of St. Thomas' doctrine. This doctrine might perhaps make better sense than the explanations of the past seem to allow for. A survey of the history of these explanations was originally part of this essay but had to be stored away for another occasion. This history begins not later than A.D. 1301, with Giacopo Capocci of Viterbo, the metaphysician of Christendom. He it was who for the first time subjected text *S* to the exacting demands of text *R*[4] and thereby opened up the way to a long series of misunderstandings, at the end of which there is that inscrutable enigma.

[1] In the edition of *Opuscula omnia* I (ed. J. Perrier, Paris 1949) the chapter number is 15.

[2] *De Romano Pontifice* V, 1; ed. *Opera omnia* (Naples 1856) 525.

[3] *Eglise et Etat, op. cit.* III, 1430 ff; *Bulletin thomiste* VIII, p. 1231; *Revue des sciences philos. et théol.* 29 (1940) 49, n. 2: La pensée de s. Thomas sur cette question n'est pas d'une entière netteté.

[4] *De regimine Christiano* 2, 7; ed. Arquillière, Paris 1926, 237 f. In the following transcription the elements due to texts *S* and *R* are italicized. Propter quod principes omnes temporales *obedire debent ei, apud quam spiritualis potestas in summo residet, tanquam Domino nostro Ihesu Christo* et ipsum sicut superiorem et sicut caput recognoscere et honorare ac ei *subici* . . . Et si reges ei obedire debent, quare alii omnes qui qualicumque (? qualitercumque) subsunt regibus, immo multo magis quam regibus: quia quantum ad omnia et semper est superior et quia *totius potestatis spiritualis et temporalis apicem tenet.* Unde si summus pontifex mandaret unum et quicumque princeps temporalis contrarium, obediendum est magis summo pontifici quam principi. De aliis autem pontificibus secus est, quia non habent plenitudinem potestatis. Unde *in hiis quae ad salutem animae pertinent,* magis eis obediendum est quam principi. In hiis autem *quae ad bonum civile pertinent,* magis obediendum est principi. See below n. 56.

The doctrinal substance of text *S*[5] may be presented thus, in a paraphrase closely following the original text:

The two powers are not found in one closed system of powers where one would be, as it were, the first, and the other the second cause, *per se* ordained to, and totally dependent on, the first cause. Spiritual and secular powers are not derivative but original *imperia*. They are like first causes, each autonomous in its own order, the spiritual power in the things belonging to the salvation of souls, the political power in the things concerning the civil good. None of these powers is absolute power; rather each one is limited by, and according to, its proper *ratio superioritatis*.[6] We owe no obedience to the spiritual power in the things that belong to Caesar, just as we owe no obedience to the secular power should it put its sickle in the other power's harvest. The distinction however between the spiritual and the secular is not one between things and things but between form and form. Not a separation of the two spheres is taught, but the formal distinction of competences and a relative and mutual[7] subordination, which allows the penetration of the spiritual into the secular to be accomplished in orderly and just fashion.

The second point of the doctrine of our text concerns the case when the two powers are joined in one person. Remaining formally distinct they are, in this case, materially united. To such a comprehensive power will correspond a comprehensive obedience, the spiritual obedience being founded upon this person's spiritual power, the secular or political obedience on his secular or political power. This rule, which indeed is none other than the former rule put to use in particular circumstances, finds its application whenever a spiritual lord, a bishop for instance, is at the same time secular lord. It is especially to be applied to the pope—to Innocent IV or Alexander IV—who holds the summit of both powers. In both spiritual and secular matters we must obey the pope; in the former because he is the spiritual head of the Church, in the latter because he is also the secular, political head in Christendom.

This doctrine of text *S* is thus perfectly coherent and logically consistent. No break in the continuity of the discourse can be discovered. It will be noted especially that the second point does not disavow what the first had given; rather it reiterates the former statement. Text *S* does not contain a law and a privilege a rule and an exception,[8] but one law and one rule which is applied to ordinary and to special circumstances. Let us emphasize also that not one but two specifically different competences and jurisdictions are attributed to the pope. These two are not reduced one to the other. Nowhere in text *S* is there a hint at, let alone the explicit teaching of, such a *reductio ad unum* which would introduce a fatal contradiction, a duplexity, not to say duplicity, into the continuous movement of the discourse. The pope's secular power is not presented to us as included in, or in any way derived from, his spiritual supremacy. Should the pope's command be of a secular nature,[9] we must obey. But the reason for this obedience is not the pope's specifically ecclesiastical or spiritual supremacy; rather it is his secular overlordship.[10] This, strange as it may sound to many ears, seems to be the clear evidence of text *S*.

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[5] Videtur esse falsum [quod est magis obediendum maiori potestati quam minori] quia . . . [4°] potestas spiritualis est altior quam saecularis. Si ergo maiori potestati magis est obediendum, praelatus spiritualis semper absolvere poterit a praecepto potestatis saecularis, quod est falsum . . . Ad quartum dicendum quod potestas spiritualis et saecularis utraque deducitur a potestate divina. Et ideo intantum saecularis potestas est sub spirituali, inquantum est ei a Deo supposita, scilicet in his quae ad salutem animae pertinent. Et ideo in his magis est obediendum potestati spirituali quam saeculari. In his autem quae ad bonum civile pertinent, est magis obediendum potestati saeculari quam spirituali, secundum illud Matth. xxii, 21. *Reddite quae sunt Caesaris Caesari*, nisi forte potestati spirituali etiam saecularis potestas coniungatur, sicut in papa, qui utriusque potestatis apicem tenet, scilicet spiritualis et saecularis, hoc illo disponente qui est sacerdos et rex, sacerdos in aeternum secundum ordinem Melchisedech, Rex regum et Dominus dominantium, cuius potestas non auferetur et regnum non corrumpetur in saecula saeculorum. Amen.

[6] This notion is here borrowed from *Summa* II-II, 104, 5.

[7] To the words in text *S*: est magis obediendum potestati saeculari quam spirituali, Johannes Nicolai, the main editor of the *Opera omnia*, Paris 1660, adds in note: Nota hanc doctrinam. See also *Opera*, ed. Vivès VIII. Paris 1873, and Mandonnet's edition of the *II Script.*, Paris 1929. This doctrine of the juridical equality of the two powers is indeed worthy of note to the contemporary of Louis XIV. But the reader of Suarez will find it no less interesting. Suarez maintains that a subordination of the spiritual to the secular power is unthinkable: . . . nec dici nec cogitari potest secundum rectam rationem, quia temporalia omnia ordinari debent ad spiritualem finem (*Defensio fidei cath. adversus anglicanae sectae errores* III, 22, 7; ed. *Opera omnia* XXII, Paris 1859, 310). Note the tacit reference to text *R*. See below, n. 24.

[8] Ever since the end of the sixteenth century the part of the text beginning with the words *Nisi forte* has been read as an exception to the rule earlier established. Suarez: haec posteriora verba exceptionem continent

Text *R*[11] contradicts this evidence at exactly this point: the pope here has one power only, viz., the spiritual power. Yet, by its nature, spiritual power includes secular power. Man's ultimate end is a spiritual end, viz., by the grace of God life everlasting, to which the priest and, most of all, the chief priest are set to lead us by their government. To the king's government belongs on the contrary, a "preceding", an intermediate end, viz., the good life according to virtue. Now, the ultimate and the preceding ends constitute an *ordo per se causarum*, a closed system of causes, in which the second cause, *per se*, depends on the first cause. The corresponding powers consequently also constitute such an *ordo*, and the second power is derived from the first for the order of agents always corresponds to that of the ends. The princes of Christendom therefore are subject to the pope on account of his being the spiritual head of the Church. They are indeed "temporally", not only spiritually subject to him, the Vicar of Christ, as to Christ Himself. Their *regna* which, taken together, are Christendom, are part of the Church.

We might summarize the results of the foregoing analysis thus: Text *S* joins the two powers only materially together in certain persons, especially in the person of the pope; text *R*, on the contrary, brings about a formal *reductio ad unum* by formally subsuming secular power under spiritual power, especially the papal power. While in the former text the pope as pope, i.e., as spiritual sovereign and head of the Church, has no political power whatsoever; in the

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a prioribus (*op. cit.*, 1. c.) Michele Maccarrone: Enuncia . . .la nuova dottrina come una eccezione al principio della distinzione (*Vicarius Christi. Storia del titolo papale*, Rome 1952, 140). A thousand examples in St. Thomas' works show that with the words *Nisi forte* a consideration of a thing *secundum aliud* (*secundum accidens*) is added to its consideration *secundum se*. That which is true *secundum aliud*, does not destroy or contradict, rather it confirms, the truth enounced *secundum ea quae per se insunt*. The view expressed by Suarez originates in a type of abstract, legalistic thinking (*"nisi aliud caveatur"*) which is alien to the vital intellectuality of St. Thomas, the intellectuality of the *intellectus practicus*.

[9] By this I do not mean anything like the notion of potestas (spiritualis) in temporalibus, a direct spiritual power which is dealt with in the first part of text *S*.

[10] H. Rommen very aptly states that the last sentence of text *S* "cannot mean that in virtue of his spiritual power and on account of the fact that the spiritual power is superior, the pope holds ipso iure by divine dispensation all secular power directly and necessarily" (*The State in Catholic Thought*, St. Louis and London 1945, 538). This interpretation is also that of St. Bellarmine when he explains the apex potestatis saecularis to be the pope's secular power in the *Patrimonium Petri* (*De Rom. Pont.* V, 5, *l. c.* 530). This restriction is, it seems to me, opposed to the evidence of the text, but the fundamental idea is quite correct; St. Thomas does not here integrate the pope's secular power into his canonical primacy. The notion of *apex potestatis saecularis* in text *S* evidently has the same latitude and universality as that of *apex potestatis spiritualis*. Moreover, in ecclesiastical terminology the word *apex* has a technical, well fixed signification; c. 22, C. 22, q. 8: Pontificalis apex qui in ore capitis ecclesiae praeeminet; c. 6, D. 17: to the *pontificalis apex* belong *maiora negotia*.

[11] Huiusmodi ergo [divini] regni ministerium [quod ordinatur ad finem fruitionis divinae,] ut a terrenis spiritualia essent discreta, non terrenis regibus sed sacerdotibus est commissum, et praecipue summo sacerdoti, successori Petri, Christi Vicario, Romano Pontifici, cui omnes reges Populi Christiani oportet esse subditos, sicut ipsi Domino Iesu Christo. Sic enim, ut dictum est, ei ad quem ultimi finis pertinet cura subdi debent illi ad quos pertinet cura antecedentium finium et eius imperio dirigi.

latter, supreme political power is given him precisely by reason of his spiritual primacy. Church and Christendom are distinct social groups according to text *S*, although they are bound together in the person of the pope who holds the apex of both powers. Christendom in text *R* is, on the contrary, part of the Church, and the two powers are reduced to the oneness of one supreme hierarchical summit. If hierarchical monism is perhaps a convenient formula characterizing the doctrine of the *Opusculum*, the Commentary's teaching presents itself as spiritual-secular dualism. It is a dualistic intention which prompts the author to explain the total papal power as a composite thing.

To this substantial divergence between our texts an opposition as to method and attitude must be added.

In text *S* a juristic problem is being tackled, belonging to the *Titulus De maioritate et obedientia* in Gregory IX's Decretals, and more particularly to chapter 6 of this *Titulus*, beginning with the words *Solitae benignitatis*, a *caput multum allegabile*, as the rubric says, taken from Innocent III's letter to the Byzantine Emperor Alexius III (A.D. 1200).[12] Is the spiritual power "greater", "higher" than the secular power? Is it a prepotent jurisdiction, a true *praelatio* which, according to St. Thomas' definition, consists *in ordine unius tamquam regentis, et alterius tamquam subiacentis*?[13]

Jurisdictional problems are not solved by abstract speculation but by law and the lawgiver for, if a quotation of Goethe be allowed,

> Leicht beieinander wohnen die Gedanken,
> Doch hart im Raume stossen sich die Sachen.

And it is the theologian's business to treat this sort of problem by resorting to either positive divine law, or, if the case so warrants, to natural law. In text *S* a theologico-juristic method appropriate to the nature of the problem is chosen; its potentialities are thoroughly explored, but its limitations also carefully observed.

The relations between the two powers are established by divine law. This law is found in Matt. xxii, 21:[14] *Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's.* Hence, the argument runs, there is a domain proper to Caesar, viz., the civil good, just as there is a domain proper to the Church, viz., the salvation of souls. Now this, expressed in juridical terms, means that each sphere constitutes an original, not a derivative *imperium*. This distinction is taken over from Albert the Great,[15] and with it Aquinas—making a contribution of no slight significance to the history of the two-power-discussions—recognizes Church and State as two closed, self-sufficient, sovereign systems of power, each autonomous in its domain, each juridically equal to the other. The sovereignty of these *imperia*, however, is to be understood in a relative, not an absolute sense. However independent Church and State are, one with regard to the other, they do not escape being parts of one *respublica hominum sub Deo, principe universitatis,*[16] Who makes one subordinate to the other *secundum quod vult*. The terms of this subjection are laid down, again, in the above quoted law. The position of spiritual and temporal lords is thus comparable to the structure of the metropolitan constitution as it had developed after Gregory VII. While formerly the metropolitan had instituted, confirmed, and consecrated his suffragans, conducted visitations in their dioceses, summoned them to provincial synods, and heard cases on appeal from their courts, the archbishop contemporary to our text was in principle *primus inter pares*. The full-grown, centralized power of the papacy had succeeded in crushing these dangerous intermediaries, eliminated their general jurisdiction, and left them with nothing but a certain jurisdiction *in casibus determinatis a jure*, as St. Thomas says, or, according to Innocent III in the Decretals,[17] *in quibusdam articulis*. In like manner the spiritual power has and retains a certain primacy over the secular powers but this is a primacy among peers, established by positive divine law and limited to "the things which belong to the salvation of souls." Thus the proposition of the chapter *Solitae benignitatis* which had given rise to the developments of text *S*—in St. Thomas' words: *Potestas spiritualis est altior quam saecularis*—is to be accepted if it means to emphasize the order of dignity, of theological and metaphysical perfection and primacy. If, on the contrary, a prepotent jurisdiction is signified, a distinction is to be made which in the terms of the school we might present thus: the secular power is subjected to the spiritual power not *secundum se* but *secundum quid* only. In other words, it is "spiritually" subjected, not "temporally", i.e., politically. Neither is it subjected temporally because spiritually, or in view of spiritual necessities, or however we may wish to express this type of doctrine to which text *S* is diametrically opposed.

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[12] c. 6, *X* 1, 33; Potthast 1278.

[13] 2 *Sent.*, 44, I, 2.

[14] Where Innocent III also had found it. See c. 13 (*Per venerabilem*) X 4, 17, ed. Friedberg 716. But the part of the Innocentian letter to which we are here referring was omitted in the original legal text set up by Raymund of Penyafort; it was therefore inaccessible to St. Thomas.

[15] Albert in his commentary to 2 *Sent.*, dist. 44, art. 6. See *Summa Alexandri*, vol IV (Quaracchi 1948) n. 777. The explanations following above in our text are based on the article from which text *S* is taken.

[16] This notion is borrowed from *Summa* I-II, 100, 5 and *ibid.*, 91, 1.

The other conclusion regarding the pope need not be proved. The political primacy of the pope is a fact of history, tangibly evident to a man living in that Augustan age of the papacy which was inaugurated by Innocent III. Innocent IV was perhaps still alive when this text was written, and the curtain had scarcely fallen on the scene at Lyons where Pope and Prelates extinguished their torches and turned them upside down, liturgically enacting that *horribilis et stupenda damnatio* (Matthew of Paris), the deposition of the Hohenstaufen Emperor. The reader will carefully ponder the words used here by St. Thomas. The pope holds the apex of both powers: *hoc illo disponente qui est sacerdos et rex*. The word *disponere* belongs to the vocabulary of the theology of Providence; it underlines the historical character of the pope's eminent position at the summit of secular power. By comparing this text with other contemporary documents—we shall do so later—its meaning will emerge in a clearer light. The papacy is not the highest secular power by its nature and immanent perfection established by Christ, the Founder of the Church. Rather it has acquired this extra-canonical prerogative in the course of time which is disposed by Christ, the Lord of history. There is a certain prudent caution to be noticed at this point, which might easily be missed by those who read a text of such burning actuality in isolation from its sources.

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[17] c. 11, *X* 1, 31.

[18] This word has been so understood by all ancient commentators, St. Bellarmine not excluded. It was only in recent times that a new interpretation was put on text *R*. See Martin Grabmann, *Studien über den Einfluss der aristatelischen Philosophie auf die ma. Theorien über das Verhältnis von Kirche u. Staat*, Munich 1934, 14 f. The juridical independence of the princes is said to be preserved in text *R* since St. Thomas always carefully emphasizes the *Eigenständigkeit* of the political order, just as he also insists on the *Eigenständigkeit* of philosophy in respect of theology. — — It should be observed, first, that no ancient commentator ever thought of such an interpretation; and, second, that, however much we emphasize this "self-stand" and the original value of the political order, this metaphysical premise does not, of itself, produce any conclusion in the juridical order. John of Paris, therefore, who vigorously affirmed this original value, never thought of getting rid of the embarrassing authority of text *R* by the modern distinction; he simply suppressed it. See *De potestate regia et papali*, ed Leclercq, Paris 1942, p. 229, 26 (sine rectore Christo est vera et perfecta (!) iustitia quae ad regnum requiritur), and p. 178, 30, where a long quotation of *De regno* I, 14, is suddenly cut short.

Opposed to the aposterioristic method of text *S*, we find in text *R* an aprioristic method based on the teleological analysis and coordination of the functions of the two powers. Their ends are subordinated *per se*. Hence, in virtue of the Aristotelian doctrine of *techne architektonike* (*Eth.* I, 1: 1094a 14), the respective agents are subordinated, *per se*, in their turn: *Semper invenitur ille, ad quem pertinet ultimus finis, imperare operantibus ea quae ad finem ultimum ordinantur.* This principle, three times repeated in chapters 14 and 15, is the cornerstone of the construction. The word *imperare* must be understood in its jurisdictional sense[18] as is evident from the text and context where the univocally jurisdictional words: *subdi, esse subditum, esse subjectum, subjacere, obedire, servire, famulari* are frequently and emphatically used: The Druids of ancient Gaul are even recommended because they "laid down the law" in the whole land (. . . *totius Galliae jus definirent*).

This essentially philosophical argument is confirmed by a theological consideration centering around the notion of *vicarius Christi*. The pope being Christ's vicar, the subjection of the kings in Christendom is due him as it is, and because it is, due to Christ Himself. Being King and Priest, Christ left to his priests, and especially to the highest priest, a *regale sacerdotium*, i.e., a priesthood which as such is *imperium* over the kings of the Christian people. While in text *S* the idea of *vicarius Christi* as the foundation of such an *imperium* is presented as a vague allusion, here it enters the argument at a definite place and with a definite function. But, we repeat, this *imperium* itself is differently conceived in the two texts.

From the standpoint of text *S* the reasoning of *R* must be judged inconclusive since a speculative truth is not of itself a juridically valid law—at least not until the philosophers, merely by being philosophers and nothing else, are either popes of kings. Text *R* shares this predilection for abstract speculation with many mediaeval hierocrats; they were acute philosophers but less discerning—as philosophers not infrequently are—with respect to the specific exigencies of a juridical situation or argument. The objectionable part of text *R*—objectionable in the light of text *S*—is not, of course, taken in itself, its philosophy of the order of ends and of the corresponding agents. The principle *Ordo agentium correspondet ordini finium* surely is good and sound. It might even be used in a larger explanation of text *S* where it would fit into the idea of the priest's greater dignity which is only implicitly contained in this text. But St. Thomas abstained from such developments; they are irrelevant to the point in question.[19] To translate this idea forthwith into juridical terms, this is a thing which text *S* certainly does not undertake and even seems to exclude by reason of its obvious method.

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Texts *S* and *R* are contradictory in doctrine as well as method. They also originate in different and conflicting schools of thought.

Their sources, curiously enough, have never been identified or investigated. For a long time it seems to have been a tacitly accepted rule, as it were, among the commentators to consider the conformity of St. Thomas' teaching in this matter with sixteenth century theology of greater importance than its position wihin the author's own world.

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[19] A characteristically Thomistic way of speaking about the *dignitas pontificalis* is found in the Commentary to Hebr. v, 1; Sicut ergo illa quae pertinent ad Dei cultum excedunt temporalia, ita dignitas pontificalis excedit omnes alias dignitates. Non ergo pontifices debent se implicare negotiis saecularibus praetermissis his quae sunt ad Deum.

Text *S* recalls to mind the dualistic thesis of some twelfth and thirteenth century canonists. That Aquinas here depends on this canonist teaching is, it seems, undeniable. Whether or not text *S* is due to the author's immediate contact with these sources is hard to say. In view of his general attitude towards the jurists it would seem safer to suppose a knowledge acquired indirectly rather than directly.[20]

We present this canonistic teaching in the words of its greatest representative, Huguccio of Pisa, the Bolognese professor and teacher of one illustrious disciple, Lothar of Segni, who was to become Pope Innocent III. Huguccio's *Summa super Decretum*, still unedited, has been called an encyclopedia of the science of canon law which had developed between Gratian and the year 1190, and is the most

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[20] St. Thomas' attitude toward the canonists (*iuristae*) is most concisely expressed in a statement of the *Opusculum Contra retrahentes pueros a religionis ingressu* 13 (*Opuscula*, ed. Mandonnet IV, 308, 300): Inconsonum et derisibile [videtur] quod sacrae doctrinae professores iuristarum glossulas in auctoritatem inducant vel de eis disceptent. A similar statement is found in *De forma absolutionis* (*Opuscula, ed. cit.* II, 166) where Aquinas agrees for once to say a word about a juristic controversy but excuses himself for so doing: ut postillatori non fiat iuiuria. This *postillator* was his Dominican confrère William of Rennes. Among the authors explicitly mentioned in the *Contra retrahentes* there is especially Raymund of Penyafort, the third Master General of the Dominican Order, compiler of the Decretals of Gregory IX, and author of the *Summa poenitentiae*, a *Summa casuum*, which was authoritatively recommended to the Dominican students (A. Walz, *Compendium historiae O.P.*, Rome 1948, 227).

Modern readers are not infrequently surprised at this attitude of Aquinas and embarrassed to find an explanation for it. B. Kuhlmann attributes it to the heat of the controversy against the Geraldines in which some decretalists had sided with the secular masters against the friars (*Der Gesetzesbegriff beim hl. Th. v. A.*, Bonn 1912, 103). Georges Renard excuses it as a slip and mistake of an otherwise admirable genius: son génie s'égara à mésestimer (la science juridique): il méprisait de tout son coeur les juristes (*La philosophie de l'Institution*, Paris, 1939, 228; see also G. Graneris, *Contributi tomistici alla filosofia del diritto*, Torino 1949, 12). It seems however that St. Thomas' statements are well considered and founded not on sentiment but on principle.

The thirteenth century theologians are unanimous in assigning to the jurists the task of legal casuistry; the jurists deal with particular cases in reference to particular positive laws that apply to them. The *Summa fr. Alexandri* (vol. IV, p. 362) speaks of *inquisitio circa sententiam definitionis*, which *sententia* in its turn is *causae determinatio quae controversiis finem imponit pronuntiatione iudicis*. St. Bonaventure says (4 *Sent.*, 18, II, 3): In hac quaestione [a quo possit excommunicatio fieri] canonum est dicere Quia . . . theologiae est dicere Propter quid, tamquam scientiae superioris (cf. *ibid.* 25, II, 4; scientia inferior, scientia superior). St. Albert reserves to the theologian the *ratio iuris* (4 *Sent.* 27, 16), the *intellectus qui regit viam iuris* (*ibid.*, 19, 17) or also, in other words, the *reductio iuris ad universale et ad artem* (l. c.); to the jurists belong the *casus et particularia* (*infra* n. 27). St. Thomas says (*Quodlibet* IX, 16): Haec quaestio [utrum habere plures praebendas sine cura animarum, absque dispensatione, sit peccatum mortale] ad theologos pertinet, inquantum dependet ex iure divino vel ex iure naturali, et ad iuristas, inquantum ex iure positivo. As a matter of fact, the jurists do not agree upon what the law is in the case in question, but Aquinas decides: haec controversia iuristis est relinquenda.

This definition of legal casuistry and the proper task of the canonist is the basis of St. Thomas' statement in *Contra retrahentes*. Whether we agree or not, is another question. But once this foundation is recognized as such, the statement makes sense. The theologian appealing to the authority of canonistic *glossulae* does indeed look ridiculous; he is trying to put the cart before the horse. Theology is the very science of the legislator on whom the canonist entirely depends.

St. Thomas conformed to the rule to which he gave such an emphatic expression. Usually he did not even consult the *glossulae* directly. Abundant proof of this is furnished by his fourth *Scriptum super sententiis*, especially in the discussions about the sacraments. In only a few passages, if in any at all, can he be proved to have made direct use of canonistic sources. His frequent resumés of canonistic considerations, for instance in the questions about Order and Matrimony, are all derived from his predecessors in the theological chairs who had sifted the canonistic literature and gathered the theological grains. Aquinas relied especially on the *Summa fr. Alexandri*, whose presumed author was sometimes credited with the title *Doctor utriusque iuris* (*Glossa in quatuor libr. Sent.*, ed. Quaracchi 1951, 27*), on St. Bonaventure, and most of all on St. Albert. It should be noted however that this attitude of his seems to have changed, to a certain extent, in the later *Secunda Secundae*, which on the whole shows the author's marked preoccupation with the completeness of his positive knowledge. Article 6 of II-II, q. 100 (on simony) is in its entirety a *reductio ad artem* of Raymund's *Summa de poenitentia* I, 1, §§ 9 ff. But even in this text, and in others of the same kind, Aquinas is careful important foundation of subsequent canonistic work.[21] Its influence on the theologians of the thirteenth century is considerable, although most of the time anonymously transmitted. The *Summa fr. Alexandri* is an especially noteworthy intermediary of Huguccio's jurisprudence; in all moral questions it has constant recourse to canonistic sources, and there it could not help but encounter the doctrine, if not the name, of Huguccio, on almost every page.[22]

In a gloss to the words *Cum ad verum* in c. 6, D. 96, of Gratian's *Decretum*, Huguccio takes occasion to abandon the jurist's ordinary ways of handling individual cases and concrete problems, and to present a general doctrine:[23]

> Hinc aperte colligitur quod utraque potestas, scilicet apostolica et imperialis, instituta sit a Deo, et quod neutra dependeat ab altera, et quod imperator gladium non habeat ab apostolico.

Huguccio sets forth this doctrine while glossing a canon of Pope Gelasius I, and it is also with documents of Gelasian origin or inspiration that he supports his thesis, for instance c. *Duo sunt quippe* (c. 10, D. 96[24]) and c. *Si imperator* (c. 11, *ibid.*).

Text *S*, as we saw, also states that both powers are derived from God and are independent one of the other. The connection with Gelasian doctrine as formulated by Huguccio is evident. Text *S* will therefore correctly be classed with the great number of mediaeval, Gelasian, dualistic pronouncements which, ever since the second half of the twelfth century, are known faithfully to follow the authority of Gratian, the father of canon law.[25]

With c. 6, D. 96 (*Cum ad verum*), Huguccio and the canonists generally hold that the division of powers was established by Christ. The usual reference is to Luke xxii, 38: *Behold, here are two swords.* In these words the canonists find Christ's law expressed *in figura,* in accordance with the mystical, allegorical form of Scriptural interpretation predominant in their time.

In the Gelasian canon *Cum ad verum* the division of powers however appears to have a purely moral significance. Christ, it is said, established this law in order to recommend humility and to hold back that arrogance which is the temptation of those who possess total power. The canonists emphasized this moral aspect. A juridical meaning of this law of division was, for the first time as far as I can see, brought to light by Aquinas, in text *S*. For this purpose the

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to preserve at least one element of the principle found in the *Contra retrahentes.* He does away with allegations which are an essential feature of a canonistic gloss. Of nearly fifty allegations in Raymund's casuistic *Summa* only two survived in the theological *Summa.* Theology, which is *fides quaerens intellectum,* should avoid even the appearances of a method alien to its proper intentions. The Franciscan theologians were usually less discreet in this respect. Some passages of St. Bonaventure would do honor to any *Glossa in Decretales;* see for instance 4 *Sent.*, 37, *dub.* 3, which should be compared with the parallel passage in St. Thomas, 4 *Sent.*, 35, *exp. text.*

J. Brys points to the fact that St. Thomas was unaware of certain juristic discussions regarding the problem of dispensation from solemn vows (*De dispensatione in Iure Canonica*, Bruges 1925, 263, 269).

[21] S. Kuttner, *Reportorium der Kanonistik* (*Studi e testi* 71) Città del Vaticano 1937, 157.

[22] *Summa fr. Alexandri*, vol. IV, *Prolegomena* pp. 291, 305.

[23] Text in A. Stickler S.D.B., Der *Schwerterbegriff bei Huguccio*. Offprint (p. 13) from *Ephemerides Iuris Canonici* 3 (1947) 201 ff. I take this occasion to thank Fr. Stickler for kindly sending me his many important and enlightening studies. They unfortunately are still buried in the cemetery of the Reviews.

[24] This canon is not a direct and integral quotation of Gelasius I but presents the text with the characteristic and confusing omissions of Gregory VII. See the original in Thiel 351. In the context of our present study it is interesting to point out the sequence of Gelasius' original text, following right after the words: redigi voluntatem. Si enim quantum ad ordinem pertinet publicae disciplinae, cognoscentes imperium tibi superna dispositione collatum, legibus tuis ipsi quoque parent religionis antistites, ne vel in rebus mundanis exclusae videantur obviare sententiae, quo, oro te, etc. Text *S* is more thoroughly and integrally Gelasian than Gregory VII would allow.—See Suarez' remark, supra n. 7.

[25] A. Stickler, *Magistri Gratiani sententia de potestate Ecclesiae in Statum*, Appollinaris 21 (1948) 64-71, 78-80.

Angelic Doctor, as we saw above, used Albert's distinction between original and derivative *imperium* and the analogy of a closed and an open system of causes, illustrated by the example of the metropolitan constitution. It is to be regretted that the well-known antagonism between jurists and theologians in the middle ages—and later—caused St. Thomas' brilliant explanation to be lost to juristic science. History might have taken a different course, had men like Henricus de Segusia or Guilelmus Durantis read and pondered Thomas Aquinas. But text *S* was offered to a generation of students capable already of asking a master of theology the absurd (or perhaps teasing) question: whether it was better for a pope to be a jurist or a theologian.[26]

In Huguccio's statement of the problem the reader will have noticed the fact that not, as in text *S*, spiritual and secular, but papal and imperial, powers are envisaged. While St. Thomas starts the discussion with the opposition between the powers as such and their formal objects, and therefore arrives at universally valid conclusions, Huguccio begins with individualized incarnations of these powers, and soon runs aground. Who is greater (*maior*), pope or emperor? the canonist asks; and remaining consistent with the foundations of his synthesis, he answers:

> In spiritualibus papa maior est imperatore; imperator maior papa in temporalibus.

In the mouth of a mediaeval canonist this is indeed a courageous statement. Afraid, as it were, of his own courage (and rightly so!), the author however adds qualifications:

> Sed aliter et aliter. Papa sic maior in spiritualibus quod habet iurisdictionem super imperatorem, ut in eis possit eum ligare et condemnare . . . Sed imperator non sic est maior papa in temporalibus . . . Nullam enim iurisdictionem vel praelationem habet imperator super papam. Sed dicitur maior in temporalibus quam ille, quia maiorem potestatem habet in eis quam ille, non tamen super eum . . . Si ergo offenderet papa aliquem, puta auferendo ei capram vel possessionem aliquam vel huiusmodi, non posset conveniri ab illo coram imperatóre. Posset enim excipere et dicere: qui me iudicat, Dominus est.

This solution recalls to mind Albert's repeatedly expressed complaint[27] that the decretists know nothing about the *reductio ad artem*, the art, that is, of a consistent doctrinal construction which, in the light of a firmly established principle, knows how to distribute the various and often recalcitrant elements of a complex reality. The canonist's discussion ends up in the appeal to a privilege proper to the pope and founded not on spiritual power as such but on the pope's unique spiritual primacy: *papa a nemine iudicatur.*[28] The monistic, hierocratic potentialities of this privilege are evident.

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[26] Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* 10, 18; ed. Hoffmans, *Les philosophes belges* 4, Louvain 1924, 395.

[27] On the division of natural law presented in the *Glossa* of Ioannes Teutonicus Albert remarks: Haec distinctio nec artem nec rationem habet, sicut est mos decretistarum ponere distinctiones (*Summa de bono* V, 1, 2: ed. Instit. A. M. Colon. 1951, 268). Parum solent curare de definitionibus vel aliis ad subtilem intellectum pertinentibus, Albert says of the decretists in 4 *Sent.*, 27, 2. Raymund of Penyafort's survey of the *modi quibus sponsalia contrahuntur* is criticized in these words: De reductione ad artem non curant iurisperiti, quia intendunt grossis pro vulgaribus, circa quae sunt casus et particularia (4 *Sent.*, 27, 15). In the same discussion concerning a problem of matrimony Albert again throws his hands up in despair: decretistae nesciunt unam obiectionem solvere quam faciunt (4 *Sent.*, 27, 21). These and similar remarks do not, of course, concern the jurists' work as such but their competence in questions of the *ratio iuris* which, according to Albert and the other contemporary theologians, lie outside the jurists' own domain, namely casuistry. St. Thomas does not usually imitate his teacher's somewhat emphatic language. This is all the more remarkable since Albert's commentary on 4 *Sent.*, written in 1249 when young Aquinas was in Cologne, was certainly known to him; his own treatises on Order and Matrimony are hardly more than a rephrasing of Albert's discussions. But Aquinas may also swell the note if he so choses. In II-II, 88, 11, the absolute non-dispensability of the solemn vow of continence is maintained: quamvis quidam iuristae ignoranter contrarium dicant—a famous remark which began to interest canonists as early as the beginning of the fourteenth century (Ioannes Andreae, see J. Brys, *De dispensatione in Iure Canonica*, Bruges 1925, 269). In St. Thomas' 4 *Sent.*, 27, III, 1, 3, a juristic opinion is qualified as *valde absurda*. Aquinas does not usually evaluate the scientific respectability of those with whom he enters into discussion. A. M. Stickler's article in *Sacerdozio e Regno, Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae*

These did not fail to strike Huguccio's colleagues. Indeed not a few of them professed a resolutely hierocratic system of world order culminating in the one summit of the supreme hierarch. Huguccio himself summarizes this system in three points:

> . . . quod imperator potestatem gladii et imperium habeat ab apostolico, et quod eum faciat imperatorem papa, et quod posset eum deponere.

The canonists of this school still acknowledged the weight of the Gelasian *Duo sunt quippe* (c. 10, D. 96) but were unable to interpret this canon, as Huguccio had set out to do, as the expression of a juridical equality of the two powers and their relative and mutual subordination. To them the Gelasian fragment, transmitted as it was, not in the original and integral wording, but in the characteristically diminished version of Gregory VII, even furnished an argument favorable to their way of thinking. The gigantic personality of Gregory VII, his intransigent will totally and forcefully, by fire and sword if need be, to spiritualize the world and all its orders by integrating them into the Church, is indeed the deepest source of this canonistic doctrine which therefore may aptly be characterized as Gregorian in its inspiration. The Gregorian stamp is also clearly set on the theology of the two powers, current in the twelfth century, on which these canonists depend to a certain extent. Hugh of St. Victor propounded a succinct resumé of Gregorianism when he wrote:[29]

> . . . spiritualis potestas terrenam potestatem et instituere habet ut sit et iudicare habet si bona non fuerit . . . Unde in ecclesia adhuc sacerdotalis dignitas potestatem regalem consecrat et sanctificans per benedictionem et formans per institutionem.

That both powers are in one society, i.e., one Church, is indeed an essential feature of ecclesiastico-political Gregorianism as it developed during the twelfth century.

While with the theologians this system may be said to have retained a certain fluid vitality, with the canonists it assumes the rigor and fixity of juridical notions. The pope was to them *iudex ordinarius et quoad spiritualia et quoad temporalia*, as Alanus Anglicus, professor at Bologna, said in the early years of the thirteenth century.[30] The same canonist emphatically stated against Huguccio and his followers:

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18 (Rome 1954) 1-26, reads as an impressive justification of Albert's and Thomas' severe criticism.

[28] c. 13, C. 9, q. 3: Nemo iudicabit primam sedem iusitiam temperare desiderantem. Neque enim ab augusto, neque ab omni clero, neque a regibus, neque a populo iudex iudicabitur. This canon is taken from the pseudo-Isidorian *Constitutio Silvestri*. The subsequent c. 14 (*Aliorum hominum*) also adduced by Huguccio, comes from the *Apologeticum Ennodii*.

[29] *De sacramentis christianae fidei* II, 2, c. 4; PL 176, 417. Michele Maccarrone holds this doctrine to be largely of Gelasian inspiration (*"Potestas directa" e "Potestas indirecta" nei teologi del XII e XIII secolo. Sacerdozio e regno. Miscell. Hist. Pontificiae* 18, Rome 1954, 29 f.). A different judgment is set forth by F. Kempf, *Papsttum und Kaisertum bei Innocenz III. Misc. Hist. Pont.* 19, Rome 1954, 189.

[30] Gloss to c. 7 (*Si duobus*) Comp. I, 2, 2 (= c. 7, *X* 2, 28) s. v. *iuris*. Text quoted from S. Mochi Onory, *Fonti canonistiche dell' idea moderna dello Stato*, Milan 1951, 191, n. 2 (Friedrich v. Schulte, *Literaturgesch. d. Compilationes antiquae*, Wien 1870, 39). Our next text is taken from this same gloss. —See A. Stickler, *Sacerdozio e Regno* 23 (Papa est iudex ordinarius omnium hominum de omni negotio).

> Verius est quod (imperator) gladium habet a papa: est enim corpus unum ecclesiae: ergo unum solum caput habere debet.

Alanus' reason is that Christ, the Founder of the *unum corpus ecclesiae*, had the "two swords". Did He not show His political power when "He cast out of the temple all those that sold and bought, and overthrew the tables of the money changers, and the seats of the doves sellers: c. 9 (*Ex multis*) C. 1, q. 3? And did not Christ leave the two powers that were His to Peter and His successors, Christ's vicars on earth"? "Show me," Alanus exclaims, "the secular prince who might rightfully claim to be Christ's vicar in the temporal sphere of His overlordship." With a not unimportant group of early thirteenth century canonists—Johannes Galensis, Laurentius Hispanus, Tancred, and others of the sort—Gregorianism takes its fateful turn to political spiritualism, i.e., hierocraticism.

Rhetoric aside, the real foundation of this system seems to lie in a certain theology of the kingship of Christ. Christ is king not only spiritually speaking but "temporally" as well. This is true but needs theological elaboration in order not to be misleading. "True," St. Thomas says (*Summa* III, 59, 4 ad 1), "Christ is indeed constituted king by God, but while living on this earth He refused to exercise earthly kingship in the way kings do, i.e., with a view to the civil good (Non tamen in terris vivens terrenum regnum temporaliter administrare voluit). Hence He said, John xviii, 36: *My kingdom is not of this world.* And again, He that had come into this world to lift men up to things divine, also refused to exercise judiciary power over things temporal" (Luke xiii, 13).

Unconcerned with such theological refinements the canonists project eschatology into the present *aeon*[31] and from a christological premise, crudely formulated *pro vulgaribus* (as Albert would say), imperturbably draw the conclusion that Christ's vicar must have Christ's secular power. This "vulgar" theology is the backbone of hierocratic thinking. The notion of secular power, we might say, was indeed foisted upon the idea of *Vicarius Christi* and that of the *plenitudo potestatis*. The distinctive note of hierocraticism and clericalism is not the acknowledgment that a pope, under given circumstances, is the head of an historically given Christián secular society, but the affirmation that the pope is all this "*naturaliter et potentialiter*", i.e., precisely as vicar of Christ and bearer of the full power given him by Christ.

These adverbs "*naturaliter et potentialiter*" are taken from a document which carries us into the immediate chronological vicinity of text *S*. viz., the treatise *Aeger cui lenia*. With this document is associated the illustrious name of Sinibaldo de' Fieschi, who was Pope Innocent IV, but, be it noted, he explicitly wanted his juristic writings to be read as mere scholarly productions, not as papal pronouncements. Although sometimes quoted as a papal bull or letter written in justification of the deposition of Frederic II, the *Aeger cui lenia* can hardly be considered such a declaration since it is not found in the official register. There is no doubt however that the document most exactly reproduces both Sinibaldo's ideas, often expressed in his *Apparatus in quinque libros decretalium*, and an opinion widely held at the time. We quote the following passage[32] which the reader will easily recognize as a text of considerable interest for the commentator of text *S*.

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[31] See a similar and pertinent criticism in M. Maccarrone, *Vicarius Christi*, Rome 1952, 123. In all hierocratic thinking this eschatological anticipation is prominent. It shows up, for instance, in the opinion that the pope, and none other in Christendom, must have the right to declare war in order to make the Christian mission successful here and now (Hostiensis, *In Decretalium libris commentarii*, gl. in c. 8 *X* 3, 34, ad v. *Pro defensione*) for, as a certain clerical *enfant terrible* says in the sixteenth century, the pope must be able "impedientes suam potestatem resistere et contradicentes temporaliter punire" (Antonio de Cordoba, text in V. Carro, *La teología y los teólogos juristas españoles ante la conquista de América* II, Madrid 1944, 61. n. 94). Mediaeval criminal law also sometimes reveals the same trends criticized by St. Thomas, with the theology of the last judgment, in *Summa*, II-II, 108, 4; see Eschmann, *Mediaeval Studies* 9 (1947) 52 ff.

> [Temporalis regiminis potestas] procul dubio extra ecclesiam efferri non potest, cum foris, ubi omnia aedificant ad gehennam, a Deo nulla sit ordinata potestas. Minus igitur acute perspiciunt nescientes rerum investigare primordia, qui apostolicam sedem autumant a Constantino primitus habuisse saecularis imperii principatum, qui prius erat naturaliter et potentialiter apud eam. Dominus enim Iesus Christus, Dei Filius, sicut verus homo verusque Deus, sic secundum ordinem Melchisedech verus rex ac verus sacerdos existens, quemadmodum potenter ostendit nunc utendo pro hominibus honorificentia regiae maiestatis, nunc exequendo pro illis dignitatem pontificii apud Patrem, in apostolica sede non solum pontificalem sed et regalem constituit monarchatum, beato Petro eiusque successoribus terreni simul ac caelestis imperii commissis habenis . . . In gremio enim fidelis ecclesiae ambo gladii habentur administrationis utriusque reconditi.

I am inclined to believe that St. Thomas might have contacted this type of doctrine through St. Bonaventure's *Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica* IV, 3: *Utrum christianae religionis sit quod omnes obediant uni.*[33] In this disputation the following text is found, very similar to that of Sinibaldo.

> Posset tamen dici quod secundum veritatem utraque potestas in summo pontifice concurrit in unam personam. Cum enim ipse sit summus sacerdos secundum ordinem Melchisedech, qui fuit rex Salem et sacerdos Dei altissimi et Christus utrumque habuit, vicarius Christi in terris utramque a Christo potestatem accepit; unde et sibi uterque gladius competit. Unde Bernardus, IV° ad Eugenium: Uterque est Ecclesiae, et spiritualis scilicet gladius et materialis, sed is quidem pro Ecclesia, ille vero ab Ecclesia exserendus; ille sacerdotis, is militis manu, sed sane ad nutum sacerdotis et ad iussum imperatoris.[34]—Ex quo aperte colligitur, quod utraque potestas ad ipsum reducitur sicut ad unum hierarcham primum et summum.

Michele Maccarrone[35] is no doubt right in judging the Sinibaldian doctrine to be an "extremist conception profoundly upsetting the teaching on Church and

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[32] Text from E. Winkelmann, *Acta imperii inedita* II, Innsbruck 1865, n. 1035.

[33] Among the great scholastic theologians St. Bonaventure is no doubt the one who most closely, more so at any rate than St. Thomas, in his early writings, followed canonistic literature. The chronology of his *Quaest. Disp.* can be fixed only by the extreme dates of his being master in Paris, i.e. from 1253 to the beginning of 1257. The dates of the several *Scripta* of St. Thomas are unknown; the greater part however of the whole work belongs to Aquinas' pre-graduate studies in Paris, 1252 to 1256. The text of St. Bonaventure which we are quoting is an alternative answer to objection 8, 1. c. Why should all obey one supreme hierarch, i.e., the pope? "The government of the ecclesiastical hierarchy is divided between royal and sacerdotal powers". Now, the line of royal power may subsist without an emperor. Why therefore the necessity of a spiritual primate? St. Bonaventure first proceeds on the supposition that the powers, although comprised in one ecclesiastical hierarchy, are personally divided. Then, however, follows the second answer introduced by the words: Posset tamen dici . . .

[34] The reader will not miss the difference between St. Bonaventure's: utramque a Christo potestatem accepit, and St. Thomas': utriusque potestatis apicem tenet, hoc illo disponente . . . St. Bernard's text about the two swords (*De consideratione* IV, 3, 7; PL 182, 776) figures also in the *Aeger cui lenia.* Like Sinibaldo, St. Bonaventure seems to understand, with the analogy of the "material sword", secular power according to what it is, in itself. When, on the contrary, St. Thomas uses this text of St. Bernard in 4 *Sent.*, 37, exp. text., he seems to envisage secular power as the bracchium saeculare of ecclesiastical coërcion; see 1. c., q. 2, a. 1. That this latter is also the meaning of St. Bernard was conclusively proved by A. Stickler, Il *"gladius" negli atti dei Concilii e dei RR. Pont. sino a Gregorio e Bernardo di Clairvaux, Salesianum* 13 (1951) 441-444.

[35] *Vicarius Christi* 128 f.

State to which the Middle Ages had adhered up to the beginning of the thirteenth century." But when the author then says[36] that text *S* is, or better, turns out to be (after a promising start which Aquinas is unable to carry out?) an hierocratic theory of the type commonly held around the middle of the century, his opinion is, it seems to me, difficult to maintain. True, a doctrine of the Sinibaldian type is indeed envisaged by St. Thomas, but it is rejected. Aquinas is no Sinibaldian for the following three reasons.

First. In the very *corpus* of the article where text *S* is one of the *responsiones ad objecta*, he stated his theologically correct notion of the Primacy:

> Sic etiam (i.e., in the manner of an *ordo per se causarum*) se habet potestas papae ad omnem spiritualem (!) potestatem in ecclesia (!), quia ab ipso papa gradus dignitatum diversi in ecclesia (!) et disponuntur et ordinantur: unde eius potestas est quoddam ecclesiae (!) fundamentum, ut patet Matth. xvi. Et ideo in omnibus magis tenemur obedire papae quam episcopis vel archiepiscopis vel monachus abbati, absque ulla distinctione.

While Sinibaldo affirms the supreme secular power to be a "natural" i.e., formal and essential, part of the Primacy, Thomas, on the contrary, holds that it is an added privilege not entering the essence of the Primacy.

Second. While according to Sinibaldo the double power in the one person of the pope is due to Christ's "constitution", Thomas makes it depend on a providential "disposition" of Christ. Aquinas does not "follow the common hierocratic trend of the time." He only borrows from the hierocratic store of goods the ancient, magnificent formula: *Christus sacerdos et rex, sacerdos in aeternum secundum ordinem Melchisedech* etc., and with it composes the doxology demanded by convention.

Third. In none of St. Thomas' works, neither the early nor the later ones, excepting text *R*, is there any trace of that curious theology of the Primacy which includes secular power in its essence and appeals to a certain christological materialism for its support. Although the "good Homer" may nod now and then, Aquinas, when dealing with theology, will not be caught off guard.

Compared with its sources and placed in the world in which it was written, text *S* emerges in what I believe to be its true perspective and meaning. With Innocent IV the papacy had climbed to staggering heights. "To-day," the Genoese Pope triumphantly wrote to his fellow-citizens in 1254,[37] three months before his death, "the *status ecclesiae* is more glorious than it has ever been." The emperor had gone, deposed by a Pope who knew how to follow through an ecclesiastical decision by all means, spiritual as well as political. The hold of the papacy on Christendom was, or might easily have appeared to be, complete. The son of the *Signore di Roccasecca* had watched the last stages of this rise to power from a vantage point close to the events. His family living on the borderline between the *Regnum* and the *Patrimonium* had been deeply involved in the struggle. They had been imperial partisans like the rest of the nobility and the cities of the *Terra di Lavoro* which had turned to Innocent IV not earlier than in 1251. Another Tommaso d'Aquino, count of Acerra, related to our Thomas through the latter's great-great-grandfather, had been an imperial chamberlain (*valettus imperatoris*) and married, in 1247, a natural daughter of Frederic, Margarete von Schwaben. Thomas' older brother Raynald had also been *valettus imperatoris* and counted among the Emperor's inner circle (*inter maiores in curia*[38]). The Dominican Order likewise had felt the repercussions of the gigantic struggle. There had been imperial partisans among the friars, especially in the Italian and German Provinces of the Order, a group considerable enough to have caused the Chapter General in Paris, 1246, to ordain[39] that "the brethren should, with the utmost care, abstain from criticizing the *facta domini papae*, among themselves as well as in the presence of laymen; and they also should avoid giving, by word or deed, the impression that they were on Frederic's side." In 1247, when Aquinas very probably was in Cologne on the Rhine, in the territory of the *Provincia Teutoniae*, Pope Innocent IV had written a letter to two members of this Province[40] permitting them to leave the Order. While preaching the Pope's cause against Frederic, they had, so they complained, found nothing but opposition and ill treatment among their confrères.

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[36] *Op. cit.* 139.

[37] Ad Dei gloriam dici potest cum exultatione spiritus, quod eiusdem status ecclesiae magis quam umquam fuerit, est hodie gloriosus (*Reg. imp.* 8819, quoted by J. Haller, *Das Papsttum* IV, 1955, 438). Innocent wrote thus after the Kingdom of Sicily was, or appeared to be, in his and his armies' hands. St. Augustine had warned: Non dicendum est ecclesiam esse gloriosam quia reges ei serviunt: ubi est periculosior maiorque tentatio. And again: Quomodo dicenda est ante resurrectionem (Domini) ecclesia eius gloriosa? (*De perfectione iustitiae* 35, PL 44, 31).

Aquinas accepts the "acts of the Lord Pope". History has taught us that this papal secular power was but a semblance of power, a façade behind which disintegration and decay were slowly beginning. But who was, in 1255 or thereabouts, the man to foresee the still distant future?

Aquinas' problem, as a theologian, was to affirm and preserve the Gelasian tradition in the face of contemporary facts. Many a great mind had tackled the same task but failed. St. Thomas is the only scholar among the thirteenth century canonists as well as theologians to work out a synthesis in this matter according to all the rules of the art, as Albert had required.

His solution centers around the conjunction of the two powers in the one person whom Providence has chosen, i.e., the pope. If Gelasianism means that there ought to be two "*eximiae personae*"[41] to whom the highest government in Church and Christendom is entrusted, then Gelasianism cannot make sense any longer in the middle of the thirteenth century. But what contradiction, theological or otherwise, is there in assuming that he who is the head of the Church, is also, and moreover, the head of Christendom: *utriusque potestatis apicem tenet*? Of course, if this exalted person claims to be the latter in virtue of being the former, then again Gelasianism founders. The more fundamental and more indispensable requirement of the canon *Duo sunt* is at any rate the objective and specific division of powers. Let the man who is supreme in Christendom assume his responsibilities. But let him not fuse and confuse the legacy of St. Peter with that "fatal dowry of Constantine." Politics for spiritual ends is pseudo-politics; and likewise is pastorship for political ends pseudo-pastorship. This, in my opinion, is St. Thomas' lesson in text *S* which was written in one of the most confusing moments in Church history.

It seems thus that for once the din of arms indeed can be heard from far away in one of St. Thomas' works. The pope, at the head of Church as well as Christendom, is the one whose armies, under the command of prelates such as Ubaldini, Montelongo, Fontana, had destroyed the Staufen regime, saved the Papal States, and, for a brief moment at least, established the pope's hegemony in Italy. On December 7, 1254, Innocent IV died in Naples, the capital of the continental *Regnum*, the former residence of Frederic II, at whose university young Aquinas had studied. The Empire was defeated in battle. And the Emperor was the highest prince in Christendom. As Walter von der Vogelweide had said long ago:

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[38] On Count Tommase d'Aquino and on St. Thomas' brother Raynald see E. Kantorowicz, *Kaiser Friedrich* II, Ergänzungsband, Berlin 1931, 282, 279. According to Tocco and Tolomeo of Lucca, Raynald abandoned the Emperor's cause and died "for being faithful (to the Church)" (A. Walz, *San Tommaso d'Aquino*, Rome 1945, 5 n. 9). He is said to have taken part in the murder plot of Orlando di Rossi, brother-in-law of Innocent IV (A. Toso, *San Tommaso d'A. e il suo tempo*,, Rome 1941, 83).

[39] *Acta Capitulorum Generalium* I, ed B. M. Reichert, Rome 1898, 37. On Frederic II and the Dominicans see E. Kantorowicz, *op. cit.* 232.

[40] MGH, *Epist. sel. saeculi XIII*, 2, 317.

[41] Terms of the Council of Paris, A.D. 829, *MGH*, *Concilia* 2, 610 (Totius sanctae Ecclesiae corpus (!) in duas eximias personas . . . [dividitur]). Gratian, dict. p. c. 41, C. 2, q. 7 (Duae sunt personae quibus mundus iste (!) regitur, regalis videlicet et sacerdotalis).

> alle fürsten lebent nû mit êren,
> wan der hoehste ist geswachet.[42]

The Pope, victor over the Emperor, is the *papa qui utriusque potestatis apicem tenet*. He is called to take over the Emperor's responsibilities, viz., to be the protector of the Christian world. His authority, as the highest prince of Christendom, is of a nature which we to-day would define in terms of International Law.[43] But mediaeval men had no other words at their disposition than the vague and confusing *Populus Christianus* (*Christianitas*)[44] and the all too precise and still more dangerous *potestas saecularis*. The pope's supreme secular power would not interfere with the sovereignty of, for instance, the king of France, just as no emperor had ever exercised any sovereign rights in the kingdom of France.

Later interpretations of text *S* not infrequently misunderstood the following two elements of the *apex utriusque potestatis* which I believe can be brought to light by a careful and methodical analysis. First, that the pope's secular supremacy is an extra-canonical prerogative not included in the Primacy, and, second, that it belongs to the category of "international" law.

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The *Opusculum* follows a type of doctrine whose fuller expression and development may best be studied in contemporary documents of the Franciscan school, the *Summa fr. Alexandri*, the works of St. Bonaventure, the letters of Robert Grosseteste and Adam of Marsh. Needless to say, these men are outstanding but by no means the only representatives of theological Gregorianism in the thirteenth century. Their main source is Hugh of St. Victor whose quotations literally fill the pertinent pages especially of the Alexandrine *Summa*.[45] The fundamental principle is that both *potestas sacerdotalis* and *potestas saecularis* are found within one Church, which therefore emerges as the one, supercomprehensive society.

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[42] Ed. Wilmanns, Halle a. S. 1905, 116 (all the princes now live with honor while the highest of them is weakened). The mediaeval idea of the empire does not imply sovereignty over the Christian princes in the modern sense of the word. The empire is *totius orbis patrocinium* in which the kings cooperate. See R. Holtzmann, *Der Weltherrschaftsgedanke des mittelalterlichen Kaisertums und die Souveränität der europäischen Staaten, Hist. Zeitschrift* 159 (1939) 251. Also Richard Scholz, *Weltstaat and Staatenwelt des Mittelalters, Zeitschr. f. Deutsche Geisteswissenschaft* 1941, 81 (literature p. 100). In the middle of the thirteenth century the imperial ideology was rapidly disintegrating even from within. The popes' attempt to give political consolidation and legal shape, on their own terms, to the unity of Christian European civilization, also was doomed to failure. In 1454, after Constantinople had fallen to the Turks, Enea Silvio Piccolomini, the future Pius II, resignedly wrote: Christianitas nullum habet caput cui parere omnes velint. Neque summo sacerdoti, neque imperatori quae sua sunt dantur. Nulla reverentia, nulla obedientia est. Tamquam ficta nomina, picta capita sint, ita papam imperatoremque respicimus. Summa quaeque civitas regem habet. Tot sunt principes quot domus (*Opera omnia*, Epist. CXXVIII, Basel 1551, 656; H. Liermann, *Studien zur Geschichte des corpus christianum in der Neuzeit, Zeitschr. d. Savignystiftung, Rechtsgesch., Kan. Abtlg.* 27, 1938, 496).

[43] See P. Vinogradoff, *Historical Types of International Law. Bibliotheca Visseriana* 1, Leiden 1923, 35 ff. Jacob ter Meulen, *Der Gedanke der internationalen Organisation in seiner Entwicklung* 1, Haag 1917.

[44] *Jean Rupp, L'idée de Chrétienté dans la pensée pontificale des origines à Innocent III*, Paris 1939. Etienne Gilson, *Les métamorphoses de la Cité de Dieu*, Louvain-Paris 1952, esp. chapters 3 and 4, 75 ff. F. Kempf, *Papsttum und Kaisertum bei Innocenz III*, Rome 1954, 303 ff. G. B. Ladner, *The Concepts of "Ecclesia" and "Christianitas" . . . Sacerdozio e Regno*, Rome 1954, 49 ff. The word "Christianitas" was not received into the vocabulary of the great theologians of the thirteenth century. St. Thomas, it seems, wrote it only twice, and in quotations (II-II, 187, 1 and *ibid.* 6 ad 3). His *populus christianus* usually are the faithful people hearing the Church's message and receiving the sacraments, for instance, I-II, 102 2: mores populi christiani (cf. *ibid.* 4 ad 3); III, 83, 4 ad 4: Instructio . . . populi christiani (i.e. fidelis) circa baptismum (cf. 4 *Sent.*, 13, I, 2, 3 ad 2); below n. 75, 76. Sometimes however a more pregnant meaning seems to be suggested. The outstanding text is *Contra Gentiles* 4, 76: in toto populo christiano requiritur unus qui sit totius Ecclesiae caput. In a Parisian manuscript of the *C. G.* the word *Ecclesiae* is omitted (*Opera*, ed. Vivès 12, Paris 1874, 588). This text recalls to mind the Greek Emperor's address to Innocent III: Totius Christianitatis caput ecclesiasticum (*Reg.* IV, 210; PL 225, 237). See also 4 *Sent.*, 19, I, 1, 3 ad 2: (in unctione regum) excellentia potestatis ipsorum a Christo descendere significatur, ut et ipsi sub Christo in populo christiano regnent.

> Universitas Ecclesiae duos ordines complectitur, laicos et clericos, quasi duo latera corporis unius,

Hugh of St. Victor says,[46] and St. Bonaventure echoes:[47]

> Ecclesia constituitur ex duplici pariete, scilicet laicali et clericali.

Even St. Albert will not hesitate to state:[48]

> [Reges] sunt ministri Ecclesiae . . . ibi (!) temporalia administrant.

Ecclesia universalis is a *totum universale* whose parts are the spiritual and the temporal, just as, according to this conception, secular power is an element of the definition of the *plenitudo potestatis*. When St. Bonaventure speaks of the *respublica universalis Ecclesiae seu ecclesiasticae hierarchiae*,[49] he means to stress the spiritual-temporal nature of the Church, comprising and hierarchically ruling the three great works of Christian man and society: the *opus manuale*: handcraft furnishing nourishment, clothes, and shelter to the people; the *opus civile*: civil government, military command, trade and commerce; and the *opus spirituale*: the preaching of God's word, the singing of divine canticles, the dispensation of the sacraments, and charity in the fullest sense of the word.

The Bonaventurian *universalis Ecclesia* is Church and Christendom, welded together in one hierarchical unit. Our *Opusculum* speaks no other language when it propounds the following, ecclesiastical (not to say churchified) definition of kingship:

> Quia igitur vitae qua in praesenti bene vivimus finis est beatitudo caelestis, ad regis officium pertinet ea ratione vitam multitudinis bonam procurare secundum quod congruit ad caelestem beatitudinem consequendam, ut scilicet ea praecipiat, quae ad caelestem beatitudinem ducunt (!), et eorum contraria, secundum quod fuerit possibile, interdicat (1, 15).

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[45] The following texts may be consulted: vol. III (Quaracchi 1930) n. 370 (utrum peccet potestas ecclesiastica si usurpet ea quae sunt potestatis saecularis); IV (Quaracchi 1948) n. 415 (Quaeritur cum duplex sit potestas ordinaria ,scil. potestas saecularis et spiritualis, utrum ordinata potestate una praeemineat alteri. ——Utrum suprema potestas spiritualis quae est Summi Pontificis, possit habere aliquam humanam quae ipsam diiudicat); IV, 468 (Utrum ecclesiasticae personae possint arma movere); IV, n. 478 (Utrum necessarium sit duas potestates, regalem et sacerdotalem); IV, n. 479 (Utrum per aliquod servitium potestas sacerdotalis sit obnoxia regali); IV, 480 (Utrum personae ecclesiasticae pro peccatis obnoxiae sint potestati regali).

[46] De *sacramentis christianae fidei* II, 2, 3; PL 176, 417.

[47] 4 *Sent.*, 24, I, 2, 1; ed. Quaracchi IV, 614.

[48] 4 *Sent.*, 23, 7; ed. Borgnet XXX, 15. The question is here about Peter the Lombard's dictum: Capita regum et pontificum unguntur. Albert maintains a certain significance of the king's function (. . . recognoscant se positos esse ad supportanda onera subditorum et ecclesiae). St. Thomas' position is here especially worthy of note since his whole treatise on the sacraments in 4 *Sent.*, especially the questions on order and matrimony, are elaborated in close, often verbal contact with Albert. Thomas eliminates all traces of his Master's clericalist reminiscences (4 Sent., 23, expos. textus).

[49] *De perfectione evangelica* II, 3; ed. Quaracchi V, 161. Church-Christendom seems to have been a favourite topic of Franciscan preaching and teaching; Hugo de Digna: res publica regni christianorum (*Archiv. Francisc. Hist.* V, 1912, 281). On Roger Bacon see Etienne Gilson, *Les métamorphoses de la Cité de Dieu*, 1952, 75 ff.

This mediaeval, hierocratic, "Gregorian" thinking found its most powerful and grandiose synthesis in St. Bonaventure's *Quaestio disputata: utrum christianae religionis sit ut omnes obediant uni.*[50] The principle of the *reductio ad unum* demanding that all multiplicity and diversity be integrated in a supreme oneness, is the constructive idea of this admirable synthesis. Numerous and diverse are our obligations and loyalties, many and different the authorities which command our obedience according to their different ranks and offices and powers. But

> omnis tamen haec varietas ad unum habet reduci summum et primum, in quo principaliter residet universalis omnium principatus.

This "one" is not only God and Christ, the mediator between God and men, but also Christ's vicar, the *unus hierarcha primus et summus.*

In all this, the Gelasian canon *Duo quippe sunt* is not taken into account. It is conspicuously absent from the *Summa fr. Alexandri*[51] in which there is a rich profusion of texts taken from Gratian's *Decretum.* This too is an authentically Gregorian tradition; in Gregory VII's Register the Gelasian canon had received but cursory attention. The *Opusculum* also enters into this tradition. The context of text *R* discreetly alludes to the canon *Cum ad verum,* in order to say that after the advent of Christ the priest is no longer king nor the king priest: *ut a terrenis essent spiritualia discreta.* The historical account of the various relations between priest and king in the Old Law, in the pagan world, and so on, also goes back to the Gelasian canon *Cum ad verum* and is a favourite topic in Franciscan scholasticism[52] as well as in the whole theological literature issuing from Gregory VII. But no mention, direct or indirect, is made in the *Opusculum* of the *Duo quippe sunt* which we found to be the theme of text *S.*

In Franciscan doctrine this *reductio ad unum* is often philosophically substantiated by pseudo-Dionysian considerations. The most interesting example of this is perhaps Adam of Marsh's address to Pope Innocent IV on the occasion of Henry III's taking the Cross[53] (circa 1250). The ecclesiastical hierarchy, "so St. Dionysius has learned from the Apostle himself", is built in hierarchic degrees, according to a neoplatonic canon. One stream of illumination flows downward, over intermediary banks, on to more distant and lower levels; one light and love gives order and sympathetic coherence to the whole of creation, integrating each degree of being with its neighbor above and below, and bringing about a dynamic unity, the unity of the circular movement going out from, and returning back to, the one origin. In the "Church militant", Adam sees one supreme pontiff, underneath him a "primitive order of apostolic men, prophets, and patriarchs," farther below the realm of "bishops, priests, and deacons," and on the third and last level "kings, people, and penitents." All these are one because one descending illumination permeates them and causes the oneness of their ascending movement, the one purification and sanctification and union. "What therefore," the Oxonian theologian exclaims, "is more evident than that to the one priesthood of the highest pontiff all nations of the orb are subjected by the decree of the Almighty Himself? Indeed you would have to go outside the orb of this world to find a realm not belonging to his care!"

The teleology of the spiritual and the temporal, though sometimes not obscurely suggested by this type of teaching, was not however fully developed. It is in this respect that text *R* shows a physiognomy of its own. In support of its hierocratic thesis it explores some Aristotelian notions from the beginning of the Nikomachean Ethics.[54]

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[50] *De perfectione evangelica* IV, 3; ed. cit. V, 189. See above n. 33.

[51] The canon *Duo sunt quippe* is quoted in vol. II, n. 370, in a passage, however, whose authenticity is doubtful.

[52] *Summa fr. Alexandri* III, 415, sol. 3 ad 4. St. Bonaventure, 4 *Sent.,* 24, I dub. 3; vol. IV, 620.

[53] *Monumenta franciscana* I, ed. Brewer, Rolls Series, London 1858, 416. St. Bonaventure: Ordini hierarchico consonat quod inferior superiori obtemperet (*De perfect. evangelica* IV, 1; vol. V, 180). Robert Grosseteste, Ep. 36, *Epistolae,* ed. Luard, London 1861, 126 f.

In this, our text is neither convincing, as we shall see below, nor is it original. None other than Henry of Segusia, the Hostiensis, *monarcha iuris utriusque*, had already used the Ethics as a support of hierocratic ideas. The text which the reader will find in the notes,[55] although not actually written during the author's teaching career in the faculty of the Decretum in Paris, originated however in this period, i.e., in the early forties of the thirteenth century. I am not suggesting that this passage of Hostiensis is a source of text *R*. But it shows that Aristotelian teleology was being talked about in Paris in those times so much so that, even a professor of law was able to seize the opportunity of elaborating a new and specious argument in favor of clericalism. Hostiensis is the *rara avis* among thirteenth century canonists ever to acknowledge that even the reading of philosophical sources might be fruitful to the science of Canon Law.

It may finally be worth noting that text *R* seems to draw the expression of its hierocraticism from a text of pseudo-Cyril:

> . . . ipsi soli [Romano Pontifici] omnes iure divino caput inclinant et primates mundi tamquam ipsi Domino Iesu Christo obediunt.

This text comes from the *Liber de processione Spiritus Sancti et fide Trinitatis contra errores Graecorum*[56] whose author was identified by A. Dondaine as the Greek Nicolas of Durazzo, Bishop of Cotrone in South Italy.[57] Aquinas quoted it several times in his works up to around the year 1265.[58] But no hierocratic interpretation (*primates mundi=reges populi christiani*) is ever implied in these places.

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[54] I, 1; 1094a 10.

[55] Hostiensis' argument (*Summa*, ed. Lyons 1542, foll 3vb and 2vb) runs as follows: first, Aristotle proves, Eth. Nik. I, 1094a 26—b 7, that civilis scientia, i.e., the science of Civil Law, is the highest of all since it contains the ends of all others; second, nevertheless the science of Canon Law overtops even this civilis scientia. In the following transcription the Latin translation of the Aristotelian passage is italicized: [Civilis scientia omnes alias] sub se continet. Unde Aristoteles in primo ethicorum: *Videbitur autem utique principalissimae et maxime architectonicae*, i.e., principalis operativae *esse*, subaudi, ille finis de quo supra praemisit. *Talis utique civilis apparet. Quae enim esse debitum est disciplinarum in civitatibus*, i.e., quae disciplinae debeant ibi esse, et quales unumquemque addiscere, subaudi, quia talis esset bonus miles qui non esset bonus pistor vel bonus clericus, vel econverso: argumentum infra De magistris, Super specula [c. 5, *X* 5, 5] *et usquequo*, i.e. propter quod et usque ad quod tempus, ut infra dicto capite Super specula, et in prooemio ff § Pro responsis [Constitutio Omnem 5] *haec*, scilicet civilis, *praeordinat. Videmus autem et pretiossisimas virtutum*, scilicet scientias, *sub has existentes ut puta militarem*, quae scilicet tractat de militia, ff De re militari [D. 49, 16] per totum, *oeconomicam*, quae scilicet tractat de dispositione domus: ff De suppellectile legata [D. 33, 10] per totum, *et rhetoricam. Utente vero hac*, scilicet civili, *reliquis practicis*, i.e. operativis, *disciplinarum*, scilicet scientiarum—quasi dicat: primae tres subsunt, sed et aliis utitur quamvis non subsint—*amplius autem legem ponente quid oporteat operari et a quibus abstinere, huius*, scilicet scientae, *finis complectitur utique eos qui aliarum*, scilicet scientiarum —quasi dicat: finis huius scientiae complectitur fines omnium aliarum. *Quapropter utique erit humanum bonum*, verum, dicit Aristoteles, et summum, ut C. 12, q. 2 Cum devotissimum [c. 8]. Sic ista complectitur omnem philosophiam vel quoad suppositum vel quoad usum. Et sic non videtur quaerendum cui parti philosophiae [ista], sed cui scientiae tota philosophia supponatur. Et potest responderi quod canonicae, quae omnia comprehendit, ut notavi supra. The reference is here to a long discussion in the foregoing part of which we reproduce the following: Haec nostra lex sive scientia vere potest scientia scientiarum nuncupari . . . cum sit ars artium, quamvis civilis hoc sibi usurpet, quae etiam alias vilissimas reputat, ut in prima constitutione § Pro responsis, in fine (Const. Omnem 5). Sed canonica videtur praecellere. Nam si haec bene intelligatur et sciatur, per eam tam spiritualia quam temporalia regi possunt. This *canonica*, according to the author, is *theologia humana*, opposed to *theologia caelestis* which is "good for Carthusians, Preachers, and Minorites."

[56] Ed. S. Thom. Aqu. *Opuscula theologica* I, Marietti 1954, 347 ff. 400. Giacopo Capocci also noticed this source of text *R;* see above note 4.

[57] *Nicolas de Cotrone et les sources du Contra errores Graecorum de s. Thomas d'A. Divus Thomas Frib.* 28 (1950) 313-340.

[58] *Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem* 3 (ed. Mandonnet IV, Paris 1927, 29, 41); 4 *Sent.*, 24, III, 2, 3 s. c. 2°; *Contra errores Graecorum*, ed. Mandonnet III, 324.

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The presence, in the works of an author of the stature of St. Thomas, of two texts belonging to different worlds as we have described them on the foregoing pages raises the question of authenticity. As matters stand, this question concerns the *Opusculum De regno* from which text *R* is taken.

This *Opusculum* is authentic. This statement however needs to be qualified. It should be observed that every proof so far adduced concludes, strictly speaking, not at the fact that St. Thomas wrote this treatise, but at the fact that after St. Thomas' death an editor, or editors, by placing the work in a collection of Aquinas' *Opuscula*, affirmed it to be a product of Aquinas' pen. Hence the old rule regarding the *termini* of a syllogism might well find its application here: *Latius hos, quam praemissae, conclusio non vult.*

Nothing is known about this posthumous edition, neither its editors, nor the extent and shape of their primitive collection, nor the principles of their editorial work. If the *De regno* was found among the papers left behind by the Master, we do not know what exactly was found, nor where it was found, nor who found it, nor in what condition the find was. In fact, there exists no document whatsoever, composed during St. Thomas' life, attesting that he wrote and left unfinished, a treatise destined to be sent to the king of Cyprus. No commission or request to write such a work is known to have been issued from any Cypriote court as was the case later in regard to Boccaccio's *De genealogiis deorum.* In Cyprus, the Dominican Stephen of Lusignan, a scion of the very family, to a member of which the *De regno* is supposed to have been addressed, seems to be the only one to know about the work, and he wrote in 1573,[59] after the *Editio Princeps* of St. Thomas' works had come out in Rome (1570-1571). Let us suppose that Aquinas did write whatever it was he may have written with the intention expressed at the beginning of the work, still we know nothing about what happened to this unfinished work between the time of its composition and its rediscovery. The proof of authenticity in this case goes back to some still unspecified date after St. Thomas' death, and from there farther back every trace is lost in impenetrable darkness.

Surely, those editors were no impostors. But it is not impossible that they were mistaken. Surely again, their affirmation of Thomistic authorship will generally be taken at its face-value. But the case of the *De regno* is a special case, where special reasons recommend mistrust; and there are even more reasons for doubt than that suggested in these pages.[60] Although these reasons belong to the realm of internal criticism, they cannot be rejected *a limine* as methodically unsound because they contradict the evidence of the title-page. Concerning the Seven Philosophical Opuscula—a case of course not altogether comparable to that of our work—H.-F. Dondaine[61] justly, it seems to me, vindicated the rights of internal criticism and appropriately urged those who defend the absolute autonomy of the external argumentation to weigh the exact significance of their proof.

The *De regno* thus is an authentic writing of Aquinas in the sense that the work, consisting of an address to the king of Cyprus and eighteen and a half or seventeen and a half chapters—the question of the exact extent is still *sub lite*—has its rightful place in the collection of *Opera omnia* of Thomas Aquinas. It is as a work of this author that it was first presented to the reading public; it will forever keep this label. A corpus of St. Thomas' writings cannot indeed be set up by internal criticism. Let it be understood however that it is impossible to give an historical demonstration of the doctrine of St. Thomas with a text, and any text, of this *Opusculum*. It is no justifiable method to point to such a text and say: This was St. Thomas' doctrine when he wrote this work. It is still less correct to say—as Thomists are wont to say ever since Giacopo Capocci wrote his treatise *De regimine christiano* in 1301—: This is St. Thomas' main doctrine to which every other of his statements must be adjusted.

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[59] *Chorograffia et breve historia universale dell' isola de Cipro*. . .Bologna 1573. See Eschmann, *St. Thomas Aquinas On Kingship*, Introd., Toronto 1949, xxvi.

[60] Eschmann, *op. cit.* xiv ff.

[61] Bulletin thomiste IX, p. 93.

Among St. Thomas' works, the *Opusculum De Regno* is not the only instance of a work whose authenticity is, as it were, both juridically certain and yet really uncertain. In at least one other case, a work's authenticity is really probable but juridically indemonstrable. This latter is the *Opusculum De emptione et venditione ad tempus*; it bears all the earmarks of a genuine work but is absent from any of the bibliographical sources, i.e. manuscripts and catalogues, on which our demonstrations of authenticity are based. If, as is generally done, we allow this work a place in the collection of authentic works, we admit by the same token that the usual criteria of external criticism are not, in any and every event, the last word in Thomistic bibliography.

A case not dissimilar to that of the *De regno* is the twelfth *Quaestio disputata de quolibet* from which a text, often quoted and often treated with a somewhat pedantic seriousness, is taken, concerning St. Thomas' doctrine on the two powers: *In isto tempore reges sunt vassalli Ecclesiae* (art. 19, ad 2). This, as presented in Quodlibet XII, is a conclusion drawn from a text of St. Augustine.[62] It is a conclusion for which the first editor of this work is entirely responsible. The twelfth Quodlibet is a late addition (around 1300) to a pre-existing posthumous collection of five works of the same kind, viz., Quodlibets VII-XI.[63] Nobody to this day knows the exact nature of this novelty, whether it is a *Reportatum* or, as Martin Grabmann suggested,[64] a rough sketch of the disputation composed by Aquinas himself. However this may be, the work is no doubt "authentic" but the fantastic statement quoted above certainly was never made by St. Thomas. It fits into a certain rather vulgar style of pamphleteering which was not unusual in the times of Boniface VIII. It is utterly incompatible with historic reality, and the supposition that Aquinas made it in France (of all places!), in a public disputation at the University of Paris, where an assortment of prelates and masters might have been present, is nothing but ridiculous. A parallel text is found in St. Thomas' lectures on the Psalms. The literary status of these lectures which are a *Reportatio* is by far more respectable than that of *Quodlibet* XII. There is of course no trace of this sweeping and exorbitant claim that the kings are vassals of the Church:

> *Servite.*[65] Et notandum secundum Augustinum quod rex servit Deo inquantum homo, in se iuste vivendo, sed inquantum rex, leges ferendo contra ea quae sunt contra Dei iustitiam. Unde in hoc psalmo praefiguratur status Ecclesiae. Nam a principio reges terrae faciebant leges contra Christum, sed postea condiderunt leges pro Christo.

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[62] This text (*Ep. 50, Ad Bonifatium*) is widely known in the Middle Ages from c. 42, C. 23, q. 4 (see also c. 41, ibid., *Ep. 48, Ad Vincentium*). In *Quodl.* XII, l. c., it is presented as a quotation of some Gloss on the Psalms, a mistake, again, of the first editor for no such Gloss contains any statement of the kind. In the parallel text of St. Thomas' lectures on the Psalms (see below n. 65) St. Augustine's text is correctly quoted without a reference to the Gloss or Glosses.

[63] P. Glorieux, *Les Quodlibets VII à XI de s. Thomas d'A.*, *Recherches de théol. ancienne et médiévale* 13 (1946) 282-303.

[64] *Die Werke des hl. Thomas von A.* 2nd ed., Münster 1949, 310. See J. Destrez in *Mélanges thomistes* 1923, 65.

[65] *In Psalmos Davidis expositio* 2, 9: i. v. Ps. 2, 9: Servite Domino.

When St. Thomas read in Ps. 40, 2 the words: *He* (the Lord) *subdued the people under us and the nations under our feet*, he observed that thus indeed the Church may speak, but no political subjection is intended. Rather we should interpret this verse with Isaiah 52, 7: *How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace.*[66]

Concerning text *R* a detail will be noted which throws further light upon the relation of the *Opusculum* to St. Thomas' otherwise known doctrine and ways of teaching. Consider the Aristotelian principle from Ethics I, 1094a 10 with which the doctrine of text *R* is constructed. We always find, the author of the *De regno* says,[67] that the one to whom pertains the ultimate end, commands those who execute the things which are ordained to the ultimate end: for example, the captain whose business it is to regulate navigation tells the shipbuilder what ship he must construct to be suitable for navigation. From this, the author concludes forthwith that all the kings in Christendom must obey the pope. St. Bellarmine was already surprised by this argumentation.[68] It begs the question, for the captain has no authority over the shipbuilder in the sense of what St. Thomas would call the *ordo praelationis*, in virtue of which obligation and subjection are constituted. Bellarmine therefore discreetly suggested that the general notion of *architektonike*, taken from Eth. I, 1094a 10 be replaced by the more specific *politike* of Eth. I, 1094a 27. The all too general idea of an architectonic art will not carry the argument one step ahead. This, on the contrary, is done by the concrete *episteme ou dynamis politike* which implies the *polis* and one common good and which is indeed the *kyriotate kai malista architektonike* (Eth. I, 1094a 26.) According to Bellarmine this Aristotelian *politike* is in the Christian world the *ars regendi animas* which he prefers to the *ars regendi populos.*

In this way, the Jesuit Doctor did indeed lift up the somewhat limping argumentation of text *R* which, in its purged and polished form, should run as follows, in St. Bellarmine's terms:

> Potestas civilis subjecta est potestati spirituali, quando utraque pars est eiusdem reipublicae Christianae. Ergo potest princeps spiritualis imperare principibus temporalibus et disponere de temporalibus rebus in ordine ad bonum spirituale: omnis enim superior imperare potest inferiori.[69]

The Aristotelian *polis* must first be transformed into the *respublica Christiana*,[70] then Aristotelian principles will be applicable. St. Bellarmine has shown with refreshing clarity and vigor how an hierocratic argument should be constructed so as to be at least formally correct.

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[66] Dicit ergo: Subiecit populos nobis. Haec sunt verba Ecclesiae cui etiam temporaliter sui inimici subiciuntur. Augustinus in Glossa (Lombardi, PL 159, 455): Quanti enim modo currunt ad Ecclesiam nondum Christiani, rogant auxilium Ecclesiae, subvenire sibi temporaliter volunt, etiamsi nobiscum in aeternum regnare adhuc nolunt . . .Sub pedibus nostris: Isa. 52, 7: *Quam pulchri super montes pedes annuntiantis et praedicantis pacem* . . .

[67] *De regno* 1, 14.

[68] *De Romano Pontifice* V, 6. *Opera omnia* I, Naples 1859, 531 and *De potestate summi Pontificis in rebus temporalibus adversus Barclaium* c. 2, *op. cit.* IV (2) 269.

[69] *De Romano Pont.* V, 7, ed. cit. 532.

[70] The anonymus author of Paris, *Bibl. Nat., Lat.* 4046, ff. 116v-121 (14th cent.) is another powerful thinker within the group of hierocrats where confusion and muddling are not unusual. He states that, given the respublica Christiana, a specific distinction between Church and State makes no sense; rather we should distinguish a Christian from a non-Christian, i.e., pagan, Jewish, Saracen, commonwealth: Si principatus dividatur ut genus vel ut totum universale, debet dividi in principatum catholicum et gentilem et Iudaicum vel Saracenum, et sic de aliis qui sunt specie distincti. Principatus autem catholicus sive politia christiana est quoddam unum numerale, non habens sub se partes subiectas sed integrales (Text in R. Scholz, *Unbekannte kirchenpolitische Streitschriften aus der Zeit Ludwigs des Bayern* I, Rom 1911, 252). The same imperturbable logic is shown by Bellarmine when he says that only the Church is formally one society; the State, on the contrary, is formally two and only materially one: . . . ecclesiam vere unam tantum esse et nullo modo duas, civitatem autem unam esse materialiter et duas formaliter. The Christian City is metaphysically split in two by the presence of clerics within its walls since these are exempt from its jurisdiction: Coetus laicorum et coetus clericorum formaliter duae civitates dici possunt, quoniam in ipsis etiam temporalibus rebus

The author of the *Opusculum* has read Aristotle but he did not read far enough. He had made the same mistake in his first chapter where he reproduced Aristotle's preliminary classification of the forms of government from Politics III, 6, 1279a 27, and neglected to advance a little further in his reading, namely to p. 1279b 34, where Aristotle himself stressed the inadequacy and the merely pragmatic character of his former classification.

Two texts of St. Thomas will be of interest at this point. The first shows how Aquinas handles the Aristotelian principles when the question deals with the establishment of an *ordo praelationis.*

> 4 *Sent.,* 24, III, 2, sol. 3: Ubicumque sunt multa ordinata in unum, oportet esse aliquod universale regimen supra particularia regimina: quia in omnibus virtutibus et artibus, ut dicitur in I Ethicorum, est ordo secundum ordinem finium. Bonum autem commune divinius est quam bonum speciale. Et ideo super potestatem regitivam quae coniectat bonum speciale, oportet esse potestatem regitivam universalem respectu boni communis: alias non posset esse colligatio in unum. Et ideo cum tota Ecclesia sit unum corpus, oportet, si ista unitas debet conservari, quod sit aliqua potestas regitiva respectu totius Ecclesiae supra potestatem episcopalem, qua unaquaeque specialis ecclesia regitur: et haec est potestas papae.

Of course, *Ecclesia* is here, as everywhere in St. Thomas, not the hybrid structure of Christendom within the Church, of *respublica Christiana,* but the one body of the faithful assembled for the salvation of their souls.

The second text shows Aquinas handling the authority of Ethics I, 1094a 10 without reference to Ethics I, 1094a 27. The question here is to determine the authority of the priest in respect of what is the *ultima ratio* of politics, viz., war.

> II-II, 40, 2 ad 3: Omnis potentia vel ars vel virtus ad quam pertinet finis habet disponere de his quae sunt ad finem. Bella autem carnalia in populo fideli sunt referenda, sicut ad finem, ad bonum spirituale divinum cui clerici deputantur. Et ideo ad clericos pertinet disponere et inducere alios ad bellandum bella iusta. Non enim interdicitur eis bellare quia peccatum sit, sed quia tale exercitium eorum personae non congruit.

Every reader of St. Thomas knows that the words *disponere* and *inducere* are here used in their precise technical meaning. They signify the action of a merely moral authority which is counsel or persuasion, opposed to jurisdictional power and its commands.[71]

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Text *S* belongs to an early work of Thomas Aquinas. Hence our last problem:

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diversas leges habent, diversum principem, diversa tribunalia, et tamen materialiter unam quoque civitatem faciunt, quia unam urbem inhabitant et sub eiusdem principis protectione vivunt, qui sicut pro labore ac sollicitudine, quam pro communi bone suscipit, a laicis tributa recipit, ita recipit a clericis auxilia longe maiora publicarum precum et sacrificiorum ad Deum (*De exemptione clericorum* 3, *Opera* IV, 2: 32 f.). It is well known how greatly embarrassed the sixteenth century theologians were by St. Thomas' statement: Ab hoc autem debito (solvendi tributa) liberi sunt clerici ex privilegio principum, quod quidem aequalitatem naturalem habet (In Rom. 13, i. v. *Ministri enim Dei sunt*).

[71] See especially *In Eth.* X, 14. When there is no danger of misinterpretation, St. Thomas will not shy away from the word imperium, for instance in 1 *Sent.*, prol. I, 1: (Theologia) imperat omnibus aliis scientiis . . . utitur in obsequium sui omnibus aliis . . . tamquam vassallis . . . medicus imperat pigmentario etc. See also *In Metaph.* I, 2: scientiae imperantes, scientiae famulantes (Aristotle 982a 17).

Are the former doctrine or formulae preserved or cancelled, developed or modified in the later writings?

There is, first of all, in the *Summa* a text "parallel" to the article of the *Second Scriptum* in which text *S* is one of the answers to the objections. This is art. 5, *Secunda Secundae* q. 104. Although 2 *Sent.*, 44, *exp. text.* is not mentioned in the usual list of parallel texts, the affinity of the two pieces is at once evident. The question of St. Augustine's *Sermo* 62, 8,[72] which serves as a starting point of the discussions in the *Scriptum*, also occupies a prominent place in the *Summa*, 1. c. There is no doubt to an attentive reader that in the *Summa* Aquinas reshaped the fundamental considerations which brought about the solution of the *Scriptum*. The earlier teaching is not abandoned but recast; the ties by which it was bound up with Albert are cut away and a more original integration into the author's own theology, a more direct grasp of the real depth of the problem are obtained. Do we owe absolute obedience to our superiors? The answer is: No, because every created superiorship is limited to a definite *ratio superioritatis*. Absolute, unquestioned obedience is due only to God "to Whom man is subjected *simpliciter et quantum ad omnia*." This is also the teaching of the *Scriptum*. But the peculiar direction which in this latter work Aquinas had given to his discussions is not found in the *Summa*. The investigation, characteristic of the *Scriptum*, into certain conflicts arising from the clash of different superiorships of this world and of our corresponding loyalties, is not taken up again in detail. Hence there is no word, in this place of the Summa, about the ecclesiastico-political problem of text *S*.

The answer ad 3 of article 6, *Secunda Secundae* q. 60, seems more directly to belong to a group of texts which may be quoted as parallel texts of text *S*. Discussing the justice of court judgements, St. Thomas, in an objection, refers to the complaint of *ultra vires* often heard in his times against ecclesiastical courts. In his answer, he laconically restates the essential doctrine of text *S* on the relations between spiritual and secular power, adding however a new determination:

> Non est usurpatum iudicium, si spiritualis praelatus se intromittat de temporalibus quantum ad ea in quibus subditur ei saecularis potestas vel quae ei a seculari potestate relinquuntur.

The spiritual judge is thus granted, first, a direct spiritual authority and action even in temporal things, when their cognizance belongs to him in virtue of the formal object of his power which we know to be "the things concerning the salvation of souls." Cases for instance in which heresy, matrimony, usury are involved pertain to the ecclesiastical judge. But he also has the right of cognizance in certain cases which are comprised under the name of "subsidiary", "voluntary" jurisdiction. This is a direct exercise, by the ecclesiastical judge, not of ecclesiastical, but of secular jurisdiction. It came to pass when, and after, the secular judge had "relinquished" his right of cognizance in favor of the ecclesiastical judge. According to the decretal *Venerabilem*,[73] for instance, the King of France did this in a famous case of legitimization. Both these interventions, but especially the second which is characteristic of mediaeval organic societal thinking, are justified by Aquinas with an argument of theological convenience: the spiritual is the vital principle, the soul, of human life and society: *Potestas saecularis subditur spirituali sicut corpus animae.*

It is clear therefore that the doctrinal substance of text *S* is here restated but not to any considerable extent clarified or developed. More especially, no mention is made of the pope holding *utriusque potestatis apicem.* It is well known that Cajetan, by introducing into it the whole content of the Aristotelian philosophy on the relations between body and soul, enlarged this simple teaching to a gigantic hierocratic mystification. The prince, then, is subject to the priest *in ratione formae, moventis, et finis.*[74] How, if this interpretation were true, he might still have something to relinquish to the priest, is not explained by the Commentator. St. Thomas is not the man to mount the high horse of abstract speculation and to pretend dialectically to master the world of human things. The theologian, conscious of both the nature and the limit of his science, knows that a practical order is not set up by deductions but by determinations depending on free will and authority. In other words, St. Thomas knows what *ratio practica* is. This also seems to be the reason why, in his general doctrine on the relations between the two powers, Aquinas never went into details beyond assigning to each its formal object, as he had read in Matt. xxii, 21. The rest is up to either the legislator who determines what, in a given affair, is spiritual and what is not, or the jurist who tells us what the laws are. Aquinas often seems to have irritated, as it were, his later readers by his laconic statements in this matter. Their terseness however is well founded in an accurately defined theological method from which he never deviated.

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[72] PL 38, 430 (c. 97, C. 11, q. 3).

[73] c. 13, *X* 4, 17 . . . cum rex superiorem in temporalibus minime recognoscat, sine iuris alterius laesione in eo (i.e., the legitimization of his natural children) se iurisdictioni nostrae subicere potuit et subiecit etc.

The Gelasian dualism of c. 10, D. 96, is no doubt a doctrine of definitive Thomism. In numerous texts "the prelates of the Church and the princes of Christendom"[75] appear as coordinated agencies juridically independent one from the other, just as their functions too are juxtaposed: peace, unity, common good in things spiritual on the one hand, peace etc. in things temporal on the other.[76] The principle however of this doctrine and the particular development which we found in text *S* are not repeated or replaced in the later writings. The closest Aquinas would ever come to the formula of text *S* is perhaps

> *In Ep. ad Rom.* 13, 1: [Principes saeculares] sunt sub regimine Dei quasi supremi principis, tamquam ministri ordinati.

The immediate divine origin of secular power is of course a constant teaching of St. Thomas. However, Huguccio's ecclesiastico-political interpretation which St. Thomas had adopted and developed in text *S*, seems never again to have attracted his attention.

To the foregoing groups of parallel texts we must add another group not directly concerned with the problem of text *S* but treating a somewhat related question. A number of articles in the *Summa, Secunda Secundae*, qq. 10 and 12, deal with Church and Christendom in their relations with the infidels. When one reads in II-II, 10, 10 ad 2, that the rulership of Caesar existed before the distinction between the faithful and the infidels, one is reminded of the principle: Before the papacy there was the empire, which was one of the main arguments of the canonists to prove the independence of Church and Empire. These articles are the best object lesson on St. Thomas' understanding of Church and Christendom. The juxtaposition *Ecclesia et (vel) membra eius* (l.c.) replacing the simple *Ecclesia* which Aquinas found in his sources,[77] is significant indeed. It indicates the author's awareness of the dualistic structure of Christian society.

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[74] Commentary on II-II, 60, 6. Cajetan misunderstood this passage of St. Thomas. In the clause *vel quae . . . relinquuntur* he saw a reference to the case of the prince-bishop. Yet the word *relinquere* would not fit into the situation of bishops *qui civilem iurisdictionem ab imperatore acceperant* (!), Gratian, C. 23 *initio*.

[75] Quodlibet IV, 13: Praelati Ecclesiae et principes christiani populi. See also I-II, 108, 2.

[76] II-II, 147, 3: Sicut ad saeculares principes pertinent praecepta legalia . . . tradere de his quae pertinent ad utilitatem communem in temporalibus rebus, ita ad praelatos ecclesiasticos pertinent ea statutis praecipere quae ad utilitatem communem fidelium pertinent in rebus spiritualibus. *In Rom.* 13, 1: Sicut reges sollicitudinem habent de bono publico in bonis temporalibus, ita ministri Dei in spiritualibus. In I Tim. prol.: materia harum epistolarum est ad instructionem rectorum populi fidelis, in quo quidam praeferuntur in spiritiualibus, sicut praelati ecclesiarum . . . quidam in temporalibus.

The Church's action is here, with noticeable emphasis and consistency, explained as a spiritual action based upon spiritual authority. We may best see this by taking up one by one the cases which are discussed in three articles of these questions.

In II-II, 10, 9, the first case is that of Jewish usury on which the Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, had ruled as follows:[78] "If the Jews continue extorting heavy and immoderate usury from Christians, all relationship with Christians shall be denied them, until they have made sufficient amends for their exorbitant exactions; and the Christians shall be compelled by ecclesiastical censure, without appeal, to abstain from such commerce." Raymund of Penyafort, the *Summa Alexandri*, and even St. Thomas himself (if the lecture transcript of his Exposition of the *I ad Cor.* may be trusted) had seen in this action depriving the Jews of the Christians' business, an "indirect spiritual jurisdiction" over the Jews.[79] The *Summa* corrects this view which is inadmissible since the Church has no jurisdiction over those who are outside its fold. It should be granted, Aquinas says, that here the Jews are indeed punished by "temporal punishment." But this is the consequence[80] of a spiritual censure directly affecting the Christians.

> [De paganis vel Iudaeis Ecclesia] non habet iudicare spirituali iudicio, sed temporali in casu, cum inter Christianos commorantes aliquam culpam committunt et per fideles (!) temporaliter puniuntur.[81]

The Jews are thus denied commercial relations with the Christians because, and inasmuch as, the Christians are prohibited to deal with them in the way specified by the Council.

The situation is somewhat different in the second case which is hinted at in II-II, 10, 9, and discussed in more detail *ibid.* 12, 2. If a Christian commits the spiritual, ecclesiastical crime of apostasy, he will be punished by the spiritual censure of excommunication. This censure has the effect of cutting him off from any communications with his fellow Christians. If he is a prince, he "loses his dominion" over the faithful. In a large sector of mediaeval literature the word "deposition" was used in connection with this case, and the power to depose Christian princes was one of the strongest arguments for attributing temporal power to the pope. St. Thomas does away with all this, first, by not once mentioning the ominous word "deposition" and, second, by taking the censure of the Church as an essentially spiritual censure. An ecclesiastical censure called deposition of the secular ruler, does not exist in St. Thomas' theology. In the case of apostasy, and in other legally defined cases, the secular prince suffers loss of his rulership by the sentence of the ecclesiastical judge: *sententialiter ius dominii amittit.* This judge, even directly and positively, intends him to suffer this loss as an appropriate punishment for his crime. But let nobody say that "loss of dominion" and "deposition" are the same thing. They are not formally, for the first is a consequence of spiritual action, the second a direct exercise of secular sovereignty. By making the apostate an ecclesiastical outcast, the excommunication dissolves *ipso facto* the oath of allegiance binding his subordinates. In the *sed contra* of this article where from among other, ambiguous texts of the *Decretum* the one appropriate authority is chosen, Aquinas shows that he knows Gratian better than many a decretist of his time.[82] It should be noted however that the *Summa fr. Alexandri*[83] had expressed the same views, not as fully as Aquinas but with sufficient clarity.

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[77] The sources of II-II, 10, 9-10 seem to be the *Summa fr. Alexandri*, vol. III, nn. 745-746, and possibly Raymund of Penyafort, *Summa de poenitentia* I, 4, Rome 1553, 32 ff. The Raymundian Summa was one important source of the Alexandrine work: vol. IV, *Prolegomena*, p. 290. The significant *sed contra* of II-II, 12, 2 is also found in the *Summa fr. Alexandri* (III, n. 780) whose solution is substantially the same as that of St. Thomas.

[78] c. 18, *X* 5, 19. Similar ordinations of provincial Councils in S. Grayzel, *The Church and the Jews in the XIIIth Century*, Philadelphia 1933, 307 ff.

[79] *Summa de penitentia*, I, 4, § 5, ed. cit. 35; *Summa fr. Alexandri* III, n. 745; St. Thom. *In I Cor.* 5, 3, i.v. 12: Quid enim mihi est.

[80] The expression *ex consequenti* is used by St. Thomas in 4 *Sent.*, 18, I 7, 3 ad 2: praeceptum Ecclesiae directe respicit spiritualia et ex consequenti legitimos actus. Cf. *ibid.*, 1 ad 1.

[81] S. Grayzel very correctly states, *op. cit.* 49: Between the Church and the Jews the relationship was an indirect one, the princes being the intermediaries. The test was in the matter of enforcing decisions by means of punishment; that was always up to the particular lord on whose lands the Jews lived, and it was to him that the clergy had to turn whenever they wanted to compel the Jew to obey their decisions.

The third case again concerns especially the Jews.[84] In early centuries already, the Church had objected to the appointment of Jews to military and judicial, as well as political and financial offices. While the former two types of *praelatio* no longer came into question during the thirteenth century, the latter two continued to be important. The problem was most acute in those countries in which the population was not entirely Catholic. In the Iberian Peninsula the kings employed the Jews as treasurers and diplomats. In Hungary there were Jewish major-domos, tax collectors, and officers in charge of mints. In Provence they were frequently appointed as bailiffs and managers of estates. Persistent efforts were made by the Church to prevent Jews from attaining such positions of authority. The main document known to St. Thomas was a decree of the Third Council of Toledo (A.D. 589) which, in the *Decretum,* is c. 14, D. 54, again urged by the Fourth Lateran Council whose text was received into the *Decretals,* c. 16, 5, 6: "We forbid that Jews be given public offices since this not infrequently offers them the pretext to vent their wrath against the Christians; should anyone entrust them with an office of this kind, he shall be restrained from so doing by the Provincial Council which we order to be held every year."

This case offers no special difficulty concerning the nature of the action taken by the Church. But what if Jews are already established in such a *dominium vel praelatio*? The mediaeval men who were imbued by the Roman notion of an absolute inviolability of property and who, on the other hand, inclined toward considering the relationship of authority (*praelatio*) in close analogy with *dominium,* i.e., private property, here run against a grave problem. If the Church interferes with this *dominium,* how can she escape the blame of robbery? The Church did take action indeed. Since early times, Jews were forbidden to hold Christian slaves. These, no matter whether they were born Christians or later converted to Christianity, had to be freed, and no price was paid to the Jew in compensation of his loss, except when he had bought such a slave for trading purposes. In this case however an insufficient indemnification of twelve solidi was fixed by Canon Law.

In the latter part of art. 10, II-II, q. 10, St. Thomas has this case in mind. The *Summa fr. Alexandri* which no doubt is here directly envisaged by Aquinas, had given the following solution of this case of an expropriation without indemnification and therefore of a conflict, apparently intolerable, between divine and human (temporal) justice: "The Catholic Church has no intention of doing injustice to anyone. But the law in question has been enacted in order that no injury be done to God. It would indeed be an injury to God, should anyone's faith be put in danger for no other reason than that temporal justice be preserved."[85]

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[82] See A. Stickler, *Magistri Gratiani sententia de potestate Ecclesiae in Statum, Apollinaris* 21 (1948) 94-97.

[83] Vol. III, n. 780.

[84] See for the following account of the facts S. Grayzel, *op. cit.* 27.

This solution is unacceptable to Aquinas for, to quote a formula used elsewhere by him: "The faith in Christ never destroys, rather it strengthens, the order of human justice."[86] It is a hard and laborious task which Aquinas sets out to accomplish. Nothing less than a doctrine developed already in regard to the arduous problem of the non-dispensability of the ten commandments[87] can produce a solution.

By divine as well as human law founded on natural reason, robbery, considered in itself (*secundum se*) is unjust and unchangeably remains unjust. But it lies in the power of the supreme authority, i.e., God, Who is the Lord of life and death and of all our things, to determine what in certain situations is a man's own and what is not, what therefore must remain his and what may be taken away from him. God does not, by this determination, destroy, rather He confirms, the intrinsic and objective order of justice. That robbery is unjust, is a proposition of absolute and intrinsic validity which admits of no exception. But in Holy Scripture, according to mediaeval interpretation, God declared a certain action of ownership to be unjust *secundum aliud*, i.e., in one of the various subjective and concrete elements which determine the situation of an action (*singularis actus*). Indeed, with the Lord's Own help and blessing, the warriors of Israel spoiled the Egyptians of their *"vessels of silver and gold and very much raiment," Exod.* 12, 35-36. Hence not ownership, but *this* ownership may, by an authoritative sentence and for just cause, be declared to be forfeited. Certain theologians had used such texts as that of *Exodus* in order to justify a radical moral positivism and legalism, destructive of the objectivity of the moral order. Robbery is unjust, these men said in effect, because of God's positive law; therefore the validity of this injustice is limited by the condition: *Nisi aliud caveatur*, characteristic of all positive law. All this is alien to Aquinas' mind and definitely rejected by him. And it is with this same doctrine that he also explains those canonical expropriations which were actually valid Canon Law in his time. On the one hand, the Church possesses God's authority, "not in all things but in those concerning which she is in God's place,"[88] and, on the other, "the infidels, in virtue of their infidelity, deserve to lose their dominion over the faithful who are transferred to the sons of God."[89] The *ordo iustitiae* is hereby not destroyed but confirmed:

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[85] Ecclesia catholica nulli intendit facere iniuriam, sed hoc ordinavit, ne Deo fiat iniuria; iniuria autem fieret Deo, si fides in aliquo periclitaretur occasione iustitiae temporalis servandae.

[86] II-II, 104, 6; see also *In Ep. ad Titum*, 2, 2: Christus per fidem non venit tollere ordinem iustitiae, immo per fidem Christi iustitia servatur.

[87] *Summa* I-II, 100, 8, ad 3. Certain elements of this text are used in the following explanation of II-II, 10, 10.

[88] . . . in his quae sunt commissa hominum iurisdictioni. Quantum enim ad hoc homines gerunt vicem Dei, non autem quantum ad omnia, I-II, l. c. An absurd absolutism is therefore rejected by St. Thomas. A contemporary canonist had affirmed that the pope: *etiam naturam rerum immutat, substantialia unius rei applicando alii;* and that he: *de nullo potest aliquid facere;* or again: *est ei pro ratione voluntas* etc. (Gl. in c. 3, *X* 1, 7, s. v. *veri Dei vicem, Glossa ordin.*, ed. *Decretales,* Lyons 1584, 218). According to St. Thomas, *Papa . . . potest facere prout vult, causa tamen existente legitima* (4 *Sent.*, 20, 4 sol. 3). It should be noted that the decision when to take extraordinary action of the kind described above lies with the pope, and the pope alone; it is not legally predetermined, the Church is no "Rechtsstaat." A recent example of such an action taken by St. Pius X is, it seems to me, c. 1017 CIC.

[89] *qui tranferuntur in filios Dei*. The above translation was suggested by J. E. Ruby, *The Ambivalence of St. Thomas View of the Relationship of Divine Law to Human Law, Harvard Theol. Review* 48 (1955) 123 f. The variant *transferuntur . . .* instead of the usual and Biblical *fiunt filii Dei* probably comes from the vocabulary of *dominium* (*dominium transferre in . . .*) and indeed seems to be used in order to emphasize the fact that the Christian is legally God's own, according to Divine Law, and may therefore be freed from ungodly dominion, by God or His vicar.

> Ius divinum quod est ex gratia non tollit ius humanum quod est ex naturali ratione.[90]

One thing is especially clear in all this: the action of the Church is again explained as a spiritual action flowing from spiritual authority but having temporal consequences.

The significance of these articles with reference to text *S* emerges in full light if we compare their doctrine with certain passages in contemporary canonistic literature. Aquinas can hardly be said to have read them,[91] but he seems to be acquainted with their ideas and tendencies. In the works of Sinibaldo de' Fieschi as well as of Hostiensis the same facts, discussed here by Aquinas, were differently interpreted and taken as the starting point for the most outspoken hierocratic affirmations of the pope's secular sovereignty. Sinibaldo[92] was very definite already but still too hesitant for Hostiensis' clericalist enthusiasm. After having copied one *glossa domini nostri*, not without heavily underscoring its hierocratic statements, the Cardinal of Ostia declared:

> Mihi tamen videtur quod in adventu Christi omnis honor et omnis potestas et omne dominium et iurisdictio de iure et ex causa iusta est per illum qui supremam manum habet nec errare potest, [et quod] omni infideli subtracta fuerit et ad fideles translata . . . Et hoc in persona Christi filii Dei vivi, qui non solum sacerdos fuit, sed et rex[93] . . .

A. M. Stickler rightly warned us not to overlook the statements of Gelasian character also found in the works of Hostiensis.[94] To this canonist however Albert's criticism fully applies: *decretistae nesciunt unam objectionem solvere quam faciunt.* In his heart of hearts, Hostiensis was a clericalist, just as most of them were, Thomas Aquinas alone certainly excepted. The pope holding *utriusque potestatis apicem* was not, of course, this pope of Hostiensis whose "hand lies heavily upon the whole world." But it was decidedly better for St. Thomas not to state again the formula of the earlier work, which in no other writing is ever repeated, either in identical or in equivalent terms. It has never been retracted; it needs no retraction.[95] It has been annulled in the course of history.

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On the foregoing pages St. Thomas' legacy in the matter of the two powers, its native integrality, its substance and meaning, has been put on trial. The defence submits the plea that the testimony of the *De regno* be rejected, this witness not being reliable. Indeed once the *Opusculum* is denied the right of deposition in an investigation of historical scope, the rest of the texts, from the beginning to the end, appear to testify to a doctrine cast in one and the same mold, clear and lucid in its meaning, sound and sober in method, the work of *prudentissimus ille frater Thomas* (Pierre Dubois).

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[90] A thoroughly legalistic interpretation was put on II-II, 10, 10 by J. E. Ruby, *op. cit.* Miss Ruby writes, p. 106: The article . . . is ambivalent. By human law dominion over Christians is legitimate, by divine law it is not. Divine law does not destroy human law; but the Church is empowered by divine law to destroy human law wherever it sees fit.

[91] According to Miss Ruby (*op. cit.*, 123 f) Hostiensis' gloss "Pro defensione" (below n. 93) was one important source of II-II, 10, 10. The proof based on the word *transferre* (see text of Hostiensis below) seems to me all but convincing (n. 89). The only canonistic author who has so far been verified with certainty in the writings of Thomas Aquinas is Raymund of Penyafort who also was the Franciscans' and Albert's ("novitius Raymundus", 4 Sent., 16, 16) main teacher in Canon Law; see *Summa fr. Alexandri*, vol. IV, Prolegomena, 291, 305.

[92] Gl. in c. 8, X 3, 34, s. v. *Pro defensione*, *Apparatus*, ed. Venice 1578, fol. 176^{vb}.

[93] Gl. in c. 8 etc., as in n. 92, *Commentaria*, ed. Venice 1581, fol. 128^{vb}.

[94] *Concerning the Political Theories of the Mediaeval Canonists, Traditio* 7 (1949-1951) 459.

[95] According to Bernhard Jansen (*Der ideengeschichtliche Ort der Gesellschaftslehre Bellarmins, Scholastik* 17, 1942, 16). St. Thomas retracted the last statement of text *S*. The author gives no indication as to where this retraction may be found.

The present essay has the distinction of being published in a volume dedicated to Etienne Gilson. In numerous writings, especially in *Les métamorphoses de la Cité de Dieu,* Etienne Gilson insisted on two conditions for a theology of the two powers. The Church may not be made part of any political organism or organization: *l'Eglise ne fait pas de politique.* But the Church possesses direct, binding, religious authority over the political world of Christians, its institutions and tendencies: *l'Eglise s'occupe de politique.* This is genuine Thomism, taught by the Master in a relatively small number of texts presenting one continuous and intrinsically coherent doctrine.

Cardinal Humbert *De s. Romana ecclesia:* Relics of Roman-Byzantine Relations 1053-1054.*

J. JOSEPH RYAN

CARDINAL Deusdedit's strongly pro-papal *Collectio Canonum*, compiled during the last years of Gregory VII's pontificate and dedicated to his successor Victor III,[1] has preserved for us two texts, *Lib.* I, c. 306 (=Text A, for convenience), and c. 327 (=Text B), under the identical inscriptions: *Ex gestis sancti Bonifatii martyris et archiepiscopi, legati Romanae ecclesiae.*[2] The first successful step in the modern criticism of these texts, after some earlier fruitless efforts, came with the recognition by Percy Schramm that both texts belonged to the author of Leo IX's first letter (Sept. 1053)[3] to Michael Cerularius, Patriarch of Constantinople. This discovery was first reported and confirmed by Anton Michel, who in turn established Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida as the actual author of this letter and of several other Leonine documents, and hence called the two pieces, the *canones Humberti.*[4]

This position was later presented in full by P. Schramm, together with the detailed report of A. Michel's comparative study of these two texts and the other Humbertine writings.[5] The attribution to Humbert has been generally accepted.[6] To the best of my knowledge, the only public dissent was expressed by J. Haller, who admitted that Text A probably belonged to Humbert, but held that Michel's arguments for Humbert's authorship of Text B were to him entirely unconvincing.[7] To this Prof. Michel replied, with some additional evidence especially for Text B, in a subsequent study.[8]

For our present purposes, the main results of the Schramm-Michel studies on the authenticity of these texts may be summed up as follows. The inscriptions in Deusdedit's Collection, where the texts make their first appearance and the only medium through which the entire texts are known to us, are dismissed as erroneous and as having no relation whatever to the texts themselves. Schramm suggests that the error may possibly be explained by the presence in Rome of biographical materials on Wynfrith-Boniface (d. 754), assembled under Leo IX, with which Text A and B somehow later became confused in the papal archives.[9] A. Michel has since suggested that perhaps Humbert himself worked on this same Wynfrith-Boniface material.[10] Thus the problem of the inscriptions, which has not been settled with any certainty and apparently cannot be without fresh evidence, has at least been removed as an obstacle to accepting Humbert's authorship of the texts. The proof of his authorship rests on internal criteria of language, style, argument and sources, furnished by a comparison with the other Humbertine writings. The date of composition is set at about 1053. A much improved edition of both texts was prepared by P. Schramm and presented under the descriptive title: *Die beiden Fragmente* "De sancta Romana ecclesia" *des Kardinals Humbert von Silva Candida.*[11] It is by this name that they are now commonly designated; the earlier designation as the *canones Humberti* has been dropped.

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* The present article is a result of studies during tenure of a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship.

[1] Cf. A. Stickler, *Historia iuris canonici latini* I (Turin, 1950), pp. 172 ff., who gives *ca.* 1083-1086.

[2] V. Wolf von Glanvell, *Die Kanonessammlung des Kardinals Deusdedit* I: *Die Kanonessammlung selbst* (Paderborn, 1905), pp. 177 f. (A); 189-192 (B).

[3] P. Jaffé, *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum* (2nd ed., G. Wattenbach and others, Leipzig, 1885-1888), num. 4302. (Hereafter cited Jaffé.)

[4] A. Michel, *Humbert und Kerullarios: Quellen u. Studien zur Schisma des 11 Jhs.* (2 vols., Paderborn, 1925-1930) I, p. VI, Nachträge.

[5] P. Schramm, *Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio: Studien u. Texte zur Geschichte des römischen Erneuerungsgedankens vom Ende des karolingischen Reiches bis zum Investiturstreit* (Studien der Bibliothek Warburg, XVII), 2 vols., Leipzig-Berlin, 1929. Text A-B are treated I, pp. 238-250; II, pp. 120 ff., with *Anhang: Die Autorschaft des Kard. H.*, by A. Michel, pp. 134-136.

[6] Later references to Text A as of unknown origin are not to be taken as dissent. *E. g.*, J. Lecler, 'Les théories démocratiques au moyen âge II: le pape et l'Eglise universelle', *Etudes* CCV (1935), 170, note 1; V. Martin, 'Comment s'est formée la superiorité du concile sur le pape I: la tradition canon. avant le Grand Schisme d'occident', *Rev. des sciences religieuses* XVII (1937), 121 ff.

[7] J. Haller, *Das Papsttum: Idee u. Wirklichkeit* II (new ed., Stuttgart, 1951), p. 581.

[8] A. Michel, 'Das Papstwahlpactum von 1059, Exkurs II: H. als Autor der Fragmente *de Romana ecclesia*', *Historisches Jahrbuch* LIX (1939), 346 f.

[9] *Op. cit.* II, pp. 123 f.

[10] 'Humbert von Silva Candida bei Gratian, eine Zusammenfassung', *Studia Gratiana* I (Bologna, 1953), p. 90. (Text A-B are treated pp. 86-92.)

With the general acceptance of these results of external criticism and with the advantage of the improved edition, other scholars have been able to take part in the task of interpreting these texts as important items in the ever-growing list of writings now attributed to Humbert,[12] close collaborator of Pope Leo IX (1049-1054), and a leading figure in the Roman Curia under this pope's successors until his own death in 1061. The present study is an effort to contribute to this current work of internal criticism. It is chiefly concerned with some questions common to the problem of evaluating historical documents, which seemed in the present instance to merit further discussion (Part I); and with the interpretation of these two texts as documents belonging to the renewed relations between Rome and Constantinople preceding the excommunication of Michael Cerularius in 1054 (Part II).

I.

Some opinions expressed on the general value of these texts leave no doubt about the high significance that has been attached to them. They have been ranked in importance for the first phase of the Reform with the *Dictatus papae* of Gregory VII in the later stage and deemed to be in some respects of even greater importance.[13] Text A has also been signalized as the first programmatic declaration on the papacy coming from the Reform Papacy itself and perhaps the supreme product of the defence of the papal position in the controversy with the Byzantine patriarch;[14] and as *un hymne à la puissance pontificale.*[15] These views represent a general estimation of the importance of these pieces for historical study and certainly emphasize their claim to the historian's attention. There is room, however, for closer consideration and critical evaluation of the texts themselves.

1. THE CHARACTER OF THE TEXTS

The initial questions pertain to the character of the texts and concern their (a) integrity, (b) style, or type of composition, and (c) original character.

[11] *Op. cit.* II, Text VI, pp. 128-133. (This ed. cited hereafter.)

[12] Cf. A. Michel, 'Die Anfänge des Kard. Humbert bei Bischof Bruno von Toul (Leo IX)', *Studi Gregoriani per la storia di Greg. VII e della Riforma Gregoriana* III (Rome, 1948), p. 305, for writings attributed to H. through the researches of Prof. Michel, but not all universally accepted; H. Tritz, 'Die hagiographischen Quellen zur Geschichte Papst Leo IX.', *Studi Greg.* IV (1952), pp. 229 ff., on H. as author of *Vita Leonis IX* (formerly attributed to Wibert); J. Ryan, 'Letter of an Anonymous French Reformer to a Byzantine Official in So. Italy: *De simoniaca heresi* (Vat. *lat.* 3830)', *Mediaeval Studies* XV (1953), 233 ff. (For Michel's dissent on attributing this to H., cf. *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* XLVII (1954), 247.)

[13] Schramm, *op. cit.* I, p. 238. Cf. also A. Michel, 'Die invectio Humberts an seine Mitmönche (1044)', *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* XXI (1955), 282: Bald sollten in grossartigerer Schau die Fragmente . . . folgen, die das Papsttum in seiner ungeheuren Verantwortung für die ganze Welt schildern. Der Wortführer der Kirche vor Hildebrand hat sich gemildet.

[14] Schramm, *ibid.*, p. 241; II, p. 125.

[15] H. X. Arquillière, *Saint Grégoire VII: essai sur sa conception du pouvoir ponti-*

(a) *Integrity.* The conjecture of P. Schramm that these texts originally were part of a larger work that was perhaps never completed is the basis of his designation of them as *Fragmente*.[16] But are they, in any case, properly called fragments? Even if it were established that they did belong to a larger composition, either intended by the author to be incorporated in it, or later extracted from it, the texts as we know them are not fragments but integral texts. Both exhibit a unity of composition and a complete treatment of their respective themes. They have true beginnings and do not break off abruptly, but have in each case a climactic closing. In this sense they are perhaps better called simply *Texts*. If this has been done here, it is not to cavil, but to avoid a designation that could prove misleading in the attempt to determine their character.

(b) *Style.* Like much of the material assembled in the Reform (and earlier) canonical collections these pieces are not canons, or rules of conduct. They are not in the style of legal texts at all, nor are they doctrinal formulations. They are carefully enough composed, but their purpose is more to move, to persuade and to warn, than simply to inform, direct or sanction. This rhetorical style is especially notable in Text B, but is also clearly discernible in Text A. The medieval commentators often enough riveted their attention on the letter of their excerpted *auctoritates*, despite the sound rules of exegesis they had before them. Modern criticism is more intent on arriving at the mind of an author and recognizes the type of composition as a whole to be an essential factor in evaluating his texts for the history of ideas or institutions. In the present case we are dealing, not with legal or scholastic texts, but with pieces of a decidedly oratorical tone.

(c) *Original character.* We must begin with the fact that we know nothing with certainty about the fate of our texts in the thirty-odd years between the time fixed now for their composition (1053/1054) and their discovery and publication by Deusdedit, at a date when their original setting was undoubtedly long forgotten, and by whom they are presented under false and misleading inscriptions. Nor is there anything explicit in the texts to relate them with certainty to contemporary circumstances. As in the solution of the problem of provenance, we are again forced to rely entirely on internal criteria.

Are there any grounds for reasonable conjecture about the original character of these documents? J. Haller suggested that Text B appeared to have the character of a *Festrede*.[17] This part of his opinion retains its value. Both Text A and B, in fact, could qualify as brief addresses by reason of their unity of composition, literary style and general tenor. This question has some bearing on the ultimate localization and interpretation of the texts. For a message prepared, let us say, for a synodal session, or for delivery on the occasion of other public or private meeting, may so intimately concern the background and agenda of that specific occasion that it will only be fully understood in relation to it.

In this connection it is interesting to consider, for the purpose of comparison only, the message of another cardinal, which was also carefully composed in behalf of the *privilegium Romanae Ecclesiae*, St. Peter Damiani's brief *Sermo ad populum* as papal legate in Milan, later reported by him in *Opusc.* V (1059);[18] it also had a fate analogous to that of Text A in later canonistic theory by reason

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fical (L'Eglise et l'Etat au moyen âge, IV, Paris, 1934), p. 316.

[16] *Op. cit.* I, p. 238. Nor is anything known of a 'lost work' from which they came, as in 'Bulletin d'hist. des doctrines ecclésiologiques', *Recherches de science rel.* XLIV (1956), 446.

[17] *Loc. cit.*

[18] PL 145, 91.

of an excerpt from it.[19] Did Damiani keep a copy of this *Sermo*, which he later incorporated in his report? If he did, and had this alone come down to us, we would then have been in somewhat the same position we are in now with respect to our texts. But, unlike the *Sermo* of Damiani, there is nothing in Text A and B to prove that they are addresses or to determine their addressees or audience.

Whatever the final judgment is to be on their original character, it is closely connected to the judgment on their historical setting and the situation of their author, which is the next step in evaluating the texts.

2. The Historical setting of the texts

P. Schramm insists, quite rightly, on the importance of determining their historical background for a proper understanding of the texts; and he holds that both texts were, in fact, composed with actual historical circumstances in mind. But for each of the texts he proposes an entirely different setting. Text A he considers to have been written in defence of the position of the Roman Church in the controversy in progress with Constantinople as a result of the attack of Michael Cerularius on the Latin Church and its practices.[20] Text B, in his view, has for its unnamed adversaries the members of the Roman group (*Graphia-Kreis*), which represented the enthusiastic supporters and proponents of a revival of imperial-secular Rome's civil eminence and institutions.[21]

The events of the Council of Sutri (1046), which opens the era of the reforming popes from north of the Alps, have also been mentioned as providing an historical background, at least for one of the texts. P. Schramm considered it an open question whether or not a recollection of those events and of the role of Henry III was in the author's mind in Text A, where he formulates the sentence on the immunity of a pope with its restrictive clause: *nisi forte deprehendatur a fide devius*; but held that the general change introduced by this synod must be kept constantly in mind for a proper appreciation of the text.[22] W. Ullmann, however, appeals to the same episode of Sutri to explain the actual structure and purpose of the entire Text A and its, to him, inordinate emphasis on the possible moral defects of a pope and casual treatment of the more important issue of the pope's orthodoxy.[23] J. Gauss, on the other hand, dissented from the Schramm opinion that Text B was aimed at the Roman *Graphia*-circle and considered both texts related to the Byzantine situation.[24]

It is not at all surprising to find a lack of unanimity here, given the nature of the problem. The uncertainties stem from the silence of the texts themselves on any concrete details that would relate them to a definite setting. But it would seem that we might seek some consistency even in our conjectures.

In the first place there is a real difficulty in maintaining entirely different and unrelated historical situations for the actual backgrounds of two texts that have been shown to be otherwise so closely related from many points of view. Their close relationship—time of composition, style and argument—to the other writings of Humbert in the exchanges with Constantinople, which served as the basis for the Schramm-Michel *critique de provenance*, also provided good grounds for looking to that situation as the actual setting for Text A. But is it not legitimate to ask whether Prof. Schramm, in the light of the main theme of his important study, was not influenced by his own preoccupation with the Roman *Graphia*-circle as witness to the perdurance of the aims of a secular *renovatio*, in assigning this entirely different set of adversaries for Text B? The position would certainly be strengthened if there were any convincing evidence that Leo IX or any of his close collaborators, including Humbert, amid the stresses of a major controversy with a formidable ecclesiastical antagonist and confronted with the stark facts of the political situation in South Italy, were actually concerned with the ideas of this rather nebulous group in Rome, the ideological heirs of the anonymous author of the *Graphia-Libellus*.

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[19] Cf. J. Ryan, *St. Peter Damiani and his Canonical Sources* (Studies and Texts, II, Toronto, 1956), p. 60.

[20] *Op. cit.* II, p. 125. A. Michel, 'Zusammenfassung', *Studia Gratiana* I, p. 92, considered this relation only probable.

[21] *Op. cit.* I, p. 245; and his later study on this group, 'Der "salische Kaiserordo" u. Benzo von Alba: ein neues Zeugnis des Graphia-Kreises', *Deutsches Archiv* I (1937), 389 ff.

[22] *Kaiser, Rom. u. Renovatio* I, p. 240.

[23] W. Ullmann, 'Card. Humbert and the Ecclesia Romana', *Studi Greg.* IV (1952), p. 124.

[24] Julia Gauss, 'Die Dictatusthesen Gregors VII. als Unionsforderungen: ein historischer Erklärungsversuch', *Zeitschr. der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgesch., kan. Abt.* XXIX (1940), 42 f. (Text B); 100 (A). The present study is in substantial agreement with this opinion, which appears not to have influenced subsequent discussion.

Similarly with respect to the Council of Sutri and its relation to Text A, we would be in a better position to accept the recollection of those events to explain the author's construction of this piece if we had evidence of an adverse judgment on what had taken place there, either on the part of Humbert, or Leo IX, or any of his other counsellors. The fact is that we are not informed of their attitude toward Sutri. We do know that both Pope Leo and Humbert had nothing but unstinted praise for the pious Emperor Henry and his zeal for reform.[25]

A reasonable procedure is to make a start with what we know with certainty to have been the main preoccupation of the author at the time of writing, and to look to the texts themselves to support or exclude at the outset the possibility that both texts are related to the same subject. Accepting the time of composition, which has been suggested as the late summer of 1053,[26] we know that Leo IX, with his closest collaborator and secretary, Cardinal Humbert, was then immersed in the complex ecclesiastico-political relations with the highest civil and ecclesiastical authorities of Constantinople. Humbert was, in fact, the most energetic and articulate protagonist of the papal cause;[27] and with the remains of his very considerable literary output, both our texts have been related by the Schramm-Michel studies.

The details of this controversy are too well known to require repetition here.[28] The immediate aim of papal policy was to effect the practical cooperation of the rulers of the *duo regna*, the Byzantine emperor, Constantine IX Monomachus, and the German emperor, Henry III, to subdue the Normans in South Italy as a prelude to a general restoration of church discipline (and of Roman church properties in the South) and of the *status regni*, under the universal leadership of the Roman See.[29]

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[25] Leo IX, *Ep.* 22, on *Conc. Moguntin.* 1049 (Jaffé 4188), where Henry III presided with Leo at this assembly of forty bishops and was the first signatory (PL 143, 621); *Ep.* 27? (Jaffé 4194), the *advocatia* of Goslar church for Henry (632A); *Ep.* 103 to Constantine IX, Jan. 1054 (Jaffé 4333), expresses hope in his trials: quandoquidem ex utroque latere tales astant filii (*Const. and Hen.*) religione et potentia praeclarissimi (779C); *Ep.* 2, Mar. 1049 (Jaffé 4157), confirms privilege of Clement II (Jaffé 4138) for a monastery in Perugia and cassates the acts in favor of the bishop: quae a Benedicto et Gregorio injustis pontificibus . . . collata sunt (593D).

There are no grounds to impute either to Leo IX or Humbert the ideas expressed in the *De ordinando pontifice* of 1047-48; on this cf. now A. Becker, *Studien zum Investiturproblem in Frankreich* (Saarbrücken, 1955, pp. 142 f. J. Haller, *Das Papsttum* II (1951), pp. 574-576, points out that the proceedings at Sutri-Rome Dec. 1046 were not contrary to canon law in the eyes of contemporaries (with lit.). For Humbert's views on Henry, cf. *Adv. simoniacos* III, c. 7 (MGH Lib. de lite I), written after 1056.

[26] Schramm, *op. cit.* II, p. 125, in agreement with A. Michel.

[27] A. Michel, 'Lateinische Aktenstücke u. —sammlungen zum griechischen Schisma (1053/54)', *Hist. Jahrb.* LX (1940), 56-60, treats the collection of five tracts (including translations) and seven letters (of Leo IX) written by H. in this controversy, which he calls the *corpus Humberti*, or H's *Briefbuch;* it is not, however, complete (*ibid.*, 67).

[28] A. Michel, *Humbert u. Kerullarios* I-II (1925-1930), remains fundamental. Cf. also M. Jugie, *Le schisme byzantin* (Paris, 1941), pp. 187 ff.; E. Amann, 'Léon IX', *Dict. théol. cath.* IX, 1 (Paris, 1926), 325 ff. (for CPL); *idem*, 'Michel Cérulaire', *ibid.* X, 2 (1929), 1677-1703; V. Grumel, 'Les préliminaires du schisme de Michel Cérulaire ou la question romaine avant 1054', *Rev. des études byzantines* X (1952, publ. 1953), 5-23; S. Runciman, *The Eastern Schism: A Study of the Papacy and the Eastern Churches during the XIth and XIIth Centuries* (Oxford, 1955), pp. 28-54.

This policy was blocked, and ultimately thwarted, by the ecclesiastical crisis precipitated by the attack instigated by the patriarch, who had no desire to see the papal position enhanced as a consequence of renewed relations between Rome and Constantinople. Beginning with the total defeat of the papal army near Civitella (in the Capitanata), 18/19 June 1053, which left the pope a prisoner at Benevento in the hands of the victorious Normans until the following March,[30] this controversy was passing from the first stage of opening attack and counter-attack to a second stage, a "Period of Negotiations." This was to come to a close only with the excommunication of the patriarch and the failure of the Roman mission to Constantinople under the leadership of Humbert himself in June/July 1054. With this began the third stage of open break, which was later to be aggravated and become the permanent split.[31]

The readiness to negotiate and the atmosphere of relaxed tension characteristic of the second stage in these relations were brought about by the desperate threat to the whole Byzantine position in South Italy, as well as to papal aims, posed by the Norman victory. At this point Michael Cerularius himself, who had originally introduced the regrettably bitter aspects of the quarrel, gave evidence of a more pacific and conciliatory attitude.[32] In brief, if Text A and B were written at this time, namely between the summers of 1053 and 1054, then they would fall within this "Period of Negotiations" between the defeat at Civitella and the events that brought it to its unhappy close a year later.

Now the general themes of our texts do not rule out the conjecture that both were composed with the concrete Roman-Byzantine situation in mind. For Text A this is already clear from the position of P. Schramm, A. Michel and J. Gauss, as we have seen. The supreme and universal authority of the Roman See constituted the key issue in the current ecclesiastical controversy. The main burden of Text A is the assertion of that authority and of the unlimited responsibility of the papal office together with the necessity of the union of all member-churches with the head-church of Rome for the unity of the body of the Church universal. That these ideas were conceived by their author to have had universal and timeless validity is quite readily understandable, but their immediate relevance to the situation created by Michael Cerularius as spokesman of the Church of Constantinople is unmistakable.

But can the same be said of Text B? What possible bearing can its dramatic contrast between Rome's secular-pagan past and the Christian origins and glories of Rome have on the controversy with the Byzantine patriarch? Does its denigration of pagan Rome and the exaltation of Christian Rome as basis for the respect due the Church of Rome have any peculiar relevance for the conflict in progress with the churchmen of Constantinople? It may be helpful to recall briefly some of the traditional elements in the long and too often stormy ecclesiastico-political relations between Rome and Constantinople.

From Constantine's foundation of the new imperial capital at Byzantium, his city became known both East and West as *Nova Roma*, the new *regia civitas*. At least in Byzantine eyes, it had never for a moment ceased to be the legitimate heir to all imperial Rome's ancient titles to glory, her heroes, her institutions, her laws and her universal dominion. Before the disasters of the mid-eleventh century in South Italy with the rise of Norman power, the recuperation of a wider actual rule in the West was considered within the range of practical possibilities.[33]

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[29] Cf. Leo IX, *Ep.* to Constantine IX (Jaffé 4333), PL 143, 779 f.

[30] Jaffé *ante* 4299 dates the pope's detention at Benevento from 23 June 1053 to 12 March 1054.

[31] A. Michel, *Humbert u. Kerullarios* I, pp. 77-80.

[32] Cf. E. Amann, 'M. Cérulaire', *sect.* 5: 'L'accalmie à CPL' (*DTC* X, 1686).

What is more pertinent, it was on the basis of this civil eminence as *Nova Roma*, the new (universal) imperial capital, that the city had traditionally made its claim for ecclesiastical rank from the fourth century on.[34] This is already explicitly stated in a canon which never ceased to circulate widely in the West.[35] For there were no apostolic foundations to appeal to (whatever attempts were made to supply with the adoption of St. Andrew),[36] no era of heroic origins in the religious domain in what had once been a suffragan see of Heraclea. The jurisdiction and the rank of the Church of Constantinople, as second only to the apostolic church of *antiqua—vetus—senior Roma*, rested solely on the civil status of the city itself as *Nova Roma*, the *urbs regia*, as clearly expressed in both its canon and civil law from the sixth century forward.[37] No new principle was ever invoked and Pope Leo I's cassation of canon 28 (so-called) of Chalcedon showed the recognition at Rome of the error inherent in the principle of making civil status the sole grounds of ecclesiastical rights and his rejection of the position that the Roman See owed its primacy in the universal Church to Rome's former status as the seat of empire.[38]

After the short-lived efforts of the youthful Otto III to make Rome again an imperial capital, the ideas and dreams of a renewal of Rome's secular grandeur and institutions were not to die.[39] But the heirs of such ideas at the mid-century would seem to represent an exclusively local phenomenon of undetermined strength and proportions, and, however important were their ideas and aims for the subsequent history of Rome and the West, these appear to have had but limited practical impact at the moment. In the clash with Constantinople, on the other hand, Rome's ecclesiastical circles were confronted with a serious, concrete situation that involved a direct challenge to the universalist ideas of the newly recruited papal personnel.[40] This challenge came entirely from the side of the *Universalis Patriarcha Novae Romae*.[41] Here the representatives of the Roman Church were faced, not with a threat posed by a set of ideas for a possible *renovatio* of Roman secular institutions on the banks of the Tiber, but with the actual attack on the traditions of the Roman See in the proud name of *Nova*

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[33] Cf. J. Gay, *L'Italie méridionale et l'empire byzantin depuis l'avènement de Basile 1er jusqu'à la prise de Bari par les Normands* (Bibl. des écoles fr. d'Athènes et de Rome, XC, Paris, 1904), p. 419.

[34] Cf. the important recent study by A. Michel, 'Der Kampf um das politische oder petrinische Prinzip der Kirchenführung', in A. Grillmeier—H. Bacht (ed.), *Das Konzil von Chalkedon: Geschichte u. Gegenwart* II (Würzburg, 1953), pp. 491-562.

[35] *Conc. CPLtan.* I (381), c. 3, in *Coll. canonum Dionysiana primitiva* as c. 2 (ed. A. Strewe, *Die Canonessammlung des Dionysius exiguus in der ersten Redaktion*, Berlin-Leipzig, 1931, p. 60); *Coll. Dion.-Hadriana*, *codex canon.* c. 164 *in fin.* (PL 67, 172A). *Coll. Hispana* (and *Ps.-Isidoriana*) c. 5 (P. Hinschius, *Decretales Ps.-Isidorianae*, Leipzig, 1863, p. 276). I cannot explain the insistence of A. Michel, *art. cit.*, p. 499, note 38, and p. 525, in his treatment of the history of the canon in the Western collections, that it was not in the Roman *Dion.-Hadriana*.

[36] Cf. W. Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages: A study in the ideological relation of clerical to lay power* (London, 1955), p. 77, note 4.

[37] Cf. A. Michel, *art. cit.*, pp. 492 ff. On *Conc. Chalcedon.* (451), c. 28, and *Novella* 131 (545), cf. also T. Martin, 'The Twenty-eighth Canon of Chalcedon', *Das Konzil von Chalkedon* II, pp. 433 ff.; and V. Monachino, 'Genesi storica del canone 28° di Calcedonia', *Gregorianum* XXXIII (1952), 261 ff.

[38] Cf. Leo I, *Ep.* 104, to Emperor Marcian (Jaffé 481), c. 3-4 (PL 54, 993 ff.).

[39] Cf. Schramm, *op. cit.* I, Kap. IV: 'Der römische Erneuerungsgedanke in der Zeit Kaiser Ottos III. (996-1002)', pp. 87 ff.

[40] Cf. W. Ullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 267, on this aspect of Humbert's thought before the break of 1054.

[41] Letter of Michael and Leo of Ochrida to Bp. John of Trani (trans. of Humbert), PL 143, 793C, the opening salvo in the whole engagement.

Roma, Rome's historic successor already in being and flourishing on the Bosphorus. When Text B is viewed in relation to this confrontation of the Churches of *antiqua Roma* and *Nova Roma*, its general theme seems particularly pertinent to the situation.

To sum up, both Text A and B, by reason of their themes, show a close relationship with the dispute in progress between Rome and Constantinople, in which their author was actively engaged, in addition to their recognized affinity on literary grounds with his other acknowledged writings in the same controversy.

II

The history of the interpretation of our texts really begins with the rubrics (*tituli-capitulationes*) written for them by the earliest compilers who made use of them in their canonical collections. The history of the interpretation of Text B might almost be said to have stopped there, until recent times, since the text shared the fate of the single collection that preserved it and was soon supplanted by the later improved compilations, in which it was not inserted. Quite different has been the history of Text A; from this the celebrated excerpt was taken that found its way ultimately into Gratian's *Decretum* (D. 40, c. 6).[42] The text was thus assured, by reason of this fragment properly so called, the continued attention of the commentators and a permanent place in canonistic theory on the relation of the pope to the universal Church.

Cardinal Deusdedit, describing the division of his collection in the *Prologus*, explains that *Lib.* I, in which both our texts appear: . . . *continet privilegium auctoritatis eiusdem Romanae ecclesiae.*[43] And his rubric for Text A reads: *Quod qualitati vitae ipsius* (papae) *respondent omnia ecclesiastica membra.*[44]

The first known excerpt from Text A appears in the so-called *Liber Tarraconensis* (*ca.* 1085/90, an augmented form of the *Collection in 74 Titles*), c. 85, with the rubric: *Quod prima sedes non iudicabitur a quoquam.*[45]

Ivo of Chartres gives the following rubric for his longer excerpt inserted in his *Decretum* V, c. 23: *Quod nulli mortalium praesumendum est Romanum pontificem etiam graviter delinquentem redarguere.*[46]

Gratian (D. 40, c. 6) gave the same excerpt the following rubric: *Dampnatur Apostolicus qui suae et fraternae salutis est negligens.*

These rudimentary comments epitomize the compilers' views of the text and the sense in which they intended this *auctoritas* to be taken.[47] They also illustrate the variety of themes that could be singled out in this one text. But it was none of these early themes that attracted the main interest of the decretists.

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[42] E. Friedberg (ed.), *Corpus Iuris Canonici* I (Leipzig, 1879). 145 f. The complete Text A was supplied by the *Correctores* (*ibid.*).

[43] *Ed. cit.* (note 2 supra), p. 2.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[45] Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale *MS lat.* 4281B, fol. 2ᵛ (*Index titulorum*). The *inscriptio* (as in Deusdedit) and text: Romani antistitis culpas istic redarguere praesumit mortalium nullus quia cunctos ipse iudicaturus a nemine est iudicandus nisi forte deprehendatur a fide devius (fol. 26ʳ). P. Fournier-G. LeBras, *Histoire des collections canoniques* II (Paris, 1932), p. 241, note 1, notes the presence of this text here.

This text follows a series of excerpts from the *Liber Pontificalis*, including the accounts of Liberius and Marcellinus. In the series appears the *titulus* (c. 78): Quod oves non debent accusare pastorem nisi a fide exorbitaverit (for Ps.-Euseb., fol. 21ʳ). Cap. 84 (fol. 25ᵛ-26ʳ) is *Conc. CPLtan.* IV, Actio X, can. 21 (PL 129, 159 f.), prohibiting injurious acts against the patriarchs, and especially the popes; and regulating proper procedure if any *ambiguitas et controversia* should arise at a universal council concerning the Roman Church: non tamen audacter sententiam dicere contra summos senioris (*ms* seniores!) Romae pontifices. This presents an interesting combination of texts. The *Coll. in 74 Titles* begins fol. 75ʳ.

[46] PL 161, 329.

[47] Cf. C. Munier, *Les sources patristiques du droit de l'Eglise* du VIIIᵉ au XIIIᵉ siècle (Mulhouse, 1957), p. 53, on the importance of the compiler's intention as expressed in his *titulus* to give an absolute value to his *auctoritates.*

It was rather the accountability of the pope to the Church and the restriction of his immunity in case of error in faith (based on the so-called heresy clause: *nisi forte deprehendatur a fide devius*) that they developed in their commentaries. It is no part of our present purpose to review the history of this interpretation, which in recent years has especially interested scholars by reason of its relevance to the historical background of the Conciliarist theories.[48] It is beyond question that the singular interest of Text A for this and for many other subjects has largely influenced the modern consideration of this text. Beginning with the comment of a scandalized Luther,who saw the words of the devil himself in the immunity from disciplinary action by the Church that it claimed for the Roman pontiff[49] (attacking Ivo's theme!), the text has continued to attract interest far beyond the ranks of the canonists. But the constant fixing of attention on one or another of the several themes that may be singled out, and above all, on the so-called heresy clause, tended to divert attention from the primary problem of interpreting the text as a whole and in its own setting.[50] Yet this is what remained to be done for both texts, if they were to be used with some security, not only for the history of the several subjects to which they have been related, but as historical documents originating, as we now know, in authoritative circles at a critical moment in the early history of the Reform Papacy and in Roman-Byzantine relations.

A new, and more promising, stage in the interpretation of the texts may fairly be said to have begun only with the work of Prof. Schramm.[51] It has been continued through the studies of other scholars (noted in Part I), but not always with attention to both texts or similar amplitude of treatment. The lack of unanimity in this current interpretation is perhaps sufficient of itself to show room for a further attempt to advance in our understanding and appraisal of these texts. This is done in what follows under the separate headings of Text A and B. No attempt is made to reconstruct the history of the highly interesting themes that have received such wide attention. While the subsequent history of the texts (especially of Text A after Gratian) retains all its interest, my concern here is with the texts seen as a whole in their own setting and in relation to their antecedents. Where the historical backgrounds of these subjects are touched upon, this is done within limits dictated by my present aim.

Text A

Since any interpretation must begin with the reading of the text, and since so much depends on how a text as widely discussed as the present one is read, we may perhaps best begin with the following version, not as a substitute for the text itself, but simply to report how I have read it. The translation follows the text as closely as possible in order to respect the construction of the piece and to avoid side-stepping the pitfalls by paraphrase or abridgment. The text as edited by P. Schramm[52] seems beyond criticism, but I have emended some of the references in the edition and added others, which, I believe, affect the understanding of the piece. The paragraphs, which are not found in the edition, are introduced for reasons given in the analysis that follows.

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[48] Cf. now the valuable studies by B. Tierney, *Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism* (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, n.s. IV, Cambridge, 1955), espec. pp. 7 ff., for a review of modern opinions, and pp. 56 ff., on D. 40, c. 6; *idem*, 'Pope and Council: Some new Decretist Texts', *Mediaeval Studies* XIX (1957), 197-218. E. Dublanchy, 'Infaillibilité du pape', *Dict. théol. cath.* VII, 2 (1923), 1714 f., gives a brief review of the commentators and theologians on D. 40, c. 6.

[49] 'Address to the German Nobility', *Luthers Werke* VI (Weimar, 1888), p. 410.

[50] Modern criticism (and polemics) shifted again to the heresy clause. E. g., J. von Schulte, *Die Stellung der Concilien, Päpste u. Bischöfe vom historischen u. canonistischen Standpunkte u. die päpstliche Constitution vom 18 Juli 1870* (Prague, 1871), p. 253, began his (still useful) list of canonistic texts (num. 299-343) with D. 40, c. 6 and arrays the commentators on it from the XIIth to XIXth century.

[51] Cf. note 5 *supra*.

[52] *Op. cit.* II, pp. 128 f.

Text A: *De sancta Romana ecclesia*

The holy Roman and apostolic Church, by divine and human dispensation[a] constituted the head, after Christ Jesus, of all the churches by the privilege of special authority, affects the members of the whole Christian body according to the condition and state of vigor of its bishop or ruler, so that the members correspond in their soundness to his soundness and rejoice with him, and no less do they feel his infirmities in their own infirmity;[b] and just as, according to the Apostle,[c] all the members glory with him in his glory, in like manner are they cast down by his being cast down,[d] with the result that that prophetical utterance is found fulfilled particularly in him: *The whole head is sick and the whole heart is sad; from the sole of the foot to the top of the head, there is no soundness therein.*[e] And indeed all look up with such reverence to the summit occupied by the aforesaid apostolic see that they more readily look for a large measure of the sacred canons' teaching, and for the ancient use and custom of the Christian religion, from the mouth of the one presiding in this see than from the sacred pages (of the law)[f] and the traditions of the fathers.[g] His aye and nay they search out to such an extent, that they also relax or tauten their own manner of Christian life and practice in line with his bidding.

But if, as is greatly to the advantage of himself and of everyone, being unceasingly consumed with zeal for the house of God,[h] showing himself to be the faithful and prudent steward,[i] he strive to keep himself blameless in work and word before God and man,[j] then truth to tell, he makes almost the whole world enthusiastic and eager with him to run after God;[k] leads the peoples in a throng, men and women alike, of diverse calling, condition and age of life, to their Lord, he himself to be set over all his goods.[l] If, however, negligent of his own and of his brothers' welfare, he is found slack and remiss in his deeds[m] and silent, moreover, in the cause of good when he should speak, which last is the more harmful to himself and to others, then no less does he lead countless peoples along with him in a throng to the first slave of hell,[n] he himself to be beaten with the many stripes[o] together with Satan for all eternity. Here no mortal presumes to rebuke his faults, because he, the one who is to judge all, is to be judged by none,[p] unless perchance he be found straying from the faith.[q] In behalf of his ever enduring steadfastness the whole body of the faithful the more earnestly prays, the more intimately dependent on his good estate, after God himself, they realize their own welfare to be.

For safeguarding the truth of divine omnipotence, as is right, those words of blessed Job can, not inappropriately, be applied in second place after God's power, to the holy Roman Church: *If he pull down, there is no one that can build up. And if he imprison a man, there is none that can release him. If he withhold the waters, all things shall be dried up. And if he send them forth, they shall overwhelm the earth.*[r] Nor is the application without grounds, since this church holds the reins of heaven and earth in an especial manner in Peter; since she is the special mother of all the faithful in Christ, none must refuse to be reached by her instruction, or to be chastened by her censure, according to those Proverbs of Solomon: *Forsake not the law of your mother, bind it in your heart continually.*[s] *For he who rejects instruction is unhappy.*[t] *And the foolish man despises his mother.*[u] And again: *He is cursed of God that angers his mother,*[v] and *the mother's curse roots up the foundations*;[w] those foundations assuredly, which arrogantly claim to stand divided from the see of him to whom it was divinely said: *Thou art Peter and through this rock I will build my church,*[x] and are shown to be placed on the sand of the lust of the flesh and human presumption.[y] For the course of the stream by no means prospers if it is divided from its source.

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[a] *Matth.* xvi, 18 and *Donatio Constantini* (ed.). But cf. also Zosimus (Jaffé 342): tam humanis quam divinis legibus (note 64 *infra*); Ps.-Julius, c. 6 (Hinschius, p. 459).

[b] I *Cor.* xii, 26.

[c] *Ibid.*

[d] II *Cor.* iv, 9.

[e] *Isaias* i, 5-6.

[f] sacrae paginae. On the addition: *of the law*, cf. *infra*.

[g] *Gal.* i, 14 (ed.).

[h] *Ps.* lx, 10 (ed.); also *Ps.* cxviii, 139.

[i] *Luc.* xii, 42 (ed.).

[j] *Luc.* xxiv, 19.

[k] *Cant.* i, 3; Prov. xviii, 10.

[l] *Luc.* xii, 44.

[m] *Ecclus* iv, 34 (ed.).

[n] Prudentius, *Hamartigenia* 127-8: gehennae/mancipium (CSEL 61, p. 133). Cf. Humbert, *Adv. simon.* II, c. 45: mancipium piceae sulphureaeque gehennae (MGH Lib. de lite I, p. 193, 38).

[o] *Luc.* xii, 47.

[p] I *Cor.* ii, 15 (ed.). Cf. Leo IX, Ep. I to M. Cerularius (Jaffé 4302), c. 39 (PL 143, 768D).

[q] Cf. S. Isidore, *Sent.* III, c. 39 (ed. Glanvell); also *Adv. simon.* III, c. 36 (A. Michel).

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While the unity of the piece is at once apparent, it is possible to distinguish three parts in its composition. These may be called (1) the expository, (2) the apologetical, and (3) the admonitory parts, and correspond to the paragraphs introduced in the foregoing version. Let us consider each of these briefly.

(1) The main burden of the exposition is to describe, without the development of any sustaining argument, the influential role of the Roman Church, as the head of all the churches after Christ. In the opening sentence the exercise of this function as head is most intimately connected with, and indeed made dependent upon, the status of its ruling bishop, the pope. This is done by the use of the two biblical metaphors of St. Paul (I *Cor.* xii, 26) and Isaias. In metaphorical language is thus expressed the unity and solidarity, the mutual solicitude and sensitivity existing between the head, personalized, as it were, in its ruler, and the members of the entire Christian body. The aim here is not to teach the members their proper place as subordinate to their head, but rather the common concern of all in its well-being and the common sharing of all the members in the exaltation or dejection of the chief one. The same Pauline text is used for the same purpose in the first letter of Leo IX to Michael Cerularius (c. 37).[53] In the next two sentences, abandoning the metaphorical construction, the author goes on to declare (*Et revera*) the recognition by all the faithful of the exalted position of the Roman Church, as evidenced by their confident attitude and docility towards its ruler, the pope, as normative teacher and supreme judge in matters pertaining to the practise of the Christian religion, past and present.

One possible source of difficulty in interpreting this paragraph lies in the meaning to be attached to the metaphorical terms of the first sentence. Do the terms *qualitas* and *valetudo* (translated *condition* and *state of vigor*) refer exclusively to the state of personal worthiness, or character, of the pope himself? This would appear to be the meaning already given to them in Deusdedit's rubric (which amplifies *qualitas* with *vitae*) and often shared later by others. Similarly, are *incolumitas* and *languores* (translated *soundness* and *infirmities*) to be

[r] *Job* xii, 14-15.
[s] *Prov.* vi, 20-21.
[t] *Sap.* iii, 11.
[u] *Prov.* xv, 20.
[v] *Ecclus* iii, 18 (ed.).
[w] *Ibid.* iii, 11 (ed.).
[x] *Matth.* xvi, 18.
[y] Cf. I *Johann.* ii, 16.
[53] PL 143, 767D f.

understood only in a moral sense? In addition to Deusdedit's rubric, this is suggested by the Isaias text. This text was used by St. Isidore, *Sent.* III, c. 38, 4,[54] in a passage later incorporated in Ps.-Anacletus, *Epist.* III, c. 37,[55] wherein the *caput languidum* refers chiefly to the personal failings of spiritual superiors, especially of the bishops. Furthermore, in the following paragraph (2), the author refers explicitly to the *culpae* of a pope in a phrase which for a long time has been held to be dependent on *Sent.* III, c. 39 (Ps.-Anaclet. c. 39).[56] This, too, suggests that the same themes may be introduced here by *languores.*

On the other hand, there are reasons to suggest that these terms are to be taken in a broader and less exclusive sense to embrace a condition resulting from any and all circumstances, arising from any source whatsoever, and which contribute in any way to the favorable or unfavorable estate of the pope in his influential office. In the first place, this seems more consonant with the Pauline text on the human body, wherein any affliction of one member affects all and is the concern of all, and anything that enhances one member in its proper function is for the common good of the whole body. Secondly, this seems also to be brought out by the use of *dejectio,* for which I believe the reference to II *Cor.* iv, 9 is justified, and which clearly implies a condition induced by an external agency. Thirdly, an interpretation in this more comprehensive sense is more consistent with the main burden of this part as I have interpreted it. After the opening statement that anything that affects, for good or ill, the status of the ruler of the Roman Church, by reason of its function as head, is felt by all the members; hence that anything detrimental to the proper exercise of his office is not only a private loss but a public calamity, the author goes on at once to stress (*Et revera*) the actual recognition of this spiritual headship in the Roman Church, as demonstrated precisely by the universal attitude of confidence and docility towards its ruler in determining and interpreting the norms of Christian life and practice. Furthermore, it is somewhat hazardous to rely overmuch on the earlier uses of the Isaias text, although even there the notion of infirmity induced by others is not entirely absent. There is no doubt that the Ps.-Anacletus passage was familiar to the author, but his present use of Isaias is more safely interpreted in its own context. In my opinion the *languores* should be taken to mean here anything detrimental to the pope's function, arising either from his own fault, or from the action of another or otherwise external circumstance. And, in fact, I take the intended emphasis to be on those things which might adversely affect the pope's position and hence excite sympathy, rather than on his own failings, which would be more apt to prompt feelings of recrimination and distrust and thus clash with the whole intent of the expository part of the message. Thus would be included any infringement of his prerogatives as ruler in the *sedes Petri,* any violation of his person or other harassment, all of which would be felt in common and lamented by all, just as all benefit in common and have reason to rejoice in all circumstances that enhance his proper function as pope.[57]

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[54] PL 83, 709.

[55] Hinschius, p. 85.

[56] Glanvell (ed. of Deusdedit), p. 178, note 31.

[57] A striking illustration of these ideas at work at this same time is seen in another Humbert composition; Leo IX, *Ep.* 84, to the African Bishops Peter and John, Benevento, 17 Dec. 1053 (Jaffé 4305): Quod autem scripsistis nobis pro s. Romanae Ecclesiae statu nostraque incolumitate vos Dominum gratias agendo exorasse: noveritis nos vestrae fraternitatis gratias agere, et pro consolatione vestra semper orare. Et revera, fratres, hoc acceptabile est Domino nostro Jesu Christo ut caput omnibus membris prospiciat et invigilet; membra vero sui capitis salutem sine intermissione quaerant et optent (PL 143, 729C). It will be noted that this was written in the sixth month of Leo's detention, ample time for news of the Civitella disaster and its consequences to have reached Africa. It is also to be noted that the correspondence was opened by the petition of Bishop Thomas of Carthage that the pope pronounce on an internal matter (cf. Leo IX, *Ep.* 83. Jaffé 4304).

A second possible source of difficulty lies in the term *sacrae paginae*. If this must be taken to mean the Bible, then the passage presents an extraordinary exaltation of the papal magisterial office on the part of an eleventh-century author. But this and equivalent terms, such as *sacra eloquia* and *sacrae scripturae*, were currently in use to designate not only the Bible, but also the sacred canons emanating from Church councils, and the venerated writings of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, and of the popes. These were all considered to be articulate organs of the Holy Ghost, actively guiding the Church, and hence inspired in their authentic utterances.[58] In the context this is the meaning to be understood here, since it was in the *sacrae paginae* in this sense that was enshrined the *sacrorum canonum disciplina*;[59] just as the *paternae traditiones* contained the *antiqua institutio* of the Christian religion, how things were done from the beginning. This accepted technical meaning cannot be conveyed in English or in any vernacular idiom simply by 'sacred pages', 'sacred writings' or 'sacred scripture', all of which are at least ambiguous, if not directly misleading, as terms referring exclusively to the Bible. I think that 'sacred pages of the law' perhaps renders best the present meaning. Even in this sense, it will be noted, the author's *magis quam* does not report, with apparent approval, an exclusive preference or choice as between two authoritative sources of law and interpretation. In such case he would undoubtedly have used *potius quam* to convey his intention.

(2)The discourse now proceeds (*Quodsi*) to its apologetical part, wherein the author restricts his consideration to the ruler of the Roman See, upon whom he has made the function of this Church as head of all the churches contingent in his opening. He first depicts in moving terms a pope's high opportunity and awesome personal responsibility for the general welfare, together with his full accountability before the divine judgment for the manner of his fulfilment of his office. To do this he makes use of Christ's 'Exhortation to Vigilance' which includes the Parable of the Faithful Steward and the Wicked Steward (*Luke* xii, 42-48), addressed to the Apostles in response to the query of St. Peter himself. This provides the basic framework of the passage; the other familiar biblical phrases serve to fill in the construction with appropriate details in terms which clearly place the stress on fidelity or negligence, respectively, in his official capacity. The author in no way tempers either the plenitude of the gospel promise of reward for the Faithful Steward (*Quodsi . . . ducit*), or the greater severity of the gospel condemnation decreed for the culpable abuse of the greater gifts by those entrusted with high office (*Si vero . . . vapulaturus.*).

To this explanation of the responsibilities of the pope's office the author adds at once the immunity of the pope from all human judgment, making sole exception for deviation in the matter of faith (*Cuius culpas . . . a fide devius.*). The reason given is the traditional one, namely that the one set over all as supreme judge in the Church on earth, cannot be subject to human judgment; the traditional character of the exception will be discussed below. As God alone is his judge, so God alone must be his guide and sustainer. For this reason the author makes the petitions of the faithful in the pope's behalf proportionate to their close dependence, under God, on his steadfastness not only in his teaching office, but in respect to the discharge of the whole complexus of duties, which devolve upon him as *tenens locum Petri.*

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[58] Cf. G. Bardy, 'L'inspiration des Pères de l'Eglise', *Recherches de science rel.* XL (Mélanges J. Lebreton II, 1951-52), 7-26; H. de Lubac, 'A propos de la formule: *Diversi, sed non adversi*', *ibid.*, 27-40, espec. the conclusion concerning canonical texts.

[59] Cf. Leo IX, *Ep.* I to M. Cer. (Jaffé 4302), c. 10: Quorum . . . sententiam, sicut veraciter divina inspiratione promulgatam (PL 143, 751B); c. 11: . . . reverentia divinorum canonum (752A). Contemporary examples in P. Damiani, *Opusc.* VII (1049), c. 11: sacra eloquia (PL 145, 171D); c. 12: sacrae scripturae (172C), both meaning the sacred canons.

While this part of the text has been widely discussed, containing as it does the Gratian excerpt (D. 40, c. 6), which by an odd fate opens only with the condemnation of the Wicked Steward, just one place has presented any problem in reading the text. This concerns the phrase: *nisi forte deprehendatur a fide devius.* The original opinion of A. Michel held that the subject of this clause was not the pope, but the one who would presume to rebuke his faults (*nullus mortalium*).[60] In view of the use of the same clause by Humbert, *Adv. simon.* III, c. 36, he later withdrew this opinion.[61] There does not appear to be now (as there never had been earlier) any doubt that the clause is an exception to the pope's immunity, and not a sanction for one who would presume to make charges against him.

(3) The final and admonitory part opens with the application to the Roman Church of the text of Job on divine omnipotence (xii, 14-15), which the author is careful to point out is used in an accommodated sense (*non incongrue aptari*). He then justifies this use (*nec immerito*) by an appeal to the prerogatives of universal jurisdiction of this Roman Church by reason of its peculiar relationship to the office of St. Peter (*in Petro*), which refers to the universal power of binding and loosing conferred by the keys (*Matth.* xvi, 18) and continued in the Roman Church in Peter's successors. The author then introduces a series of Sapiential texts on respect for maternal authority to inculcate the duty of accepting and submitting to this authority of the Roman Church by reason of her role as mother of all the faithful in a special sense, that is, as distinct from the sense in which the universal Church was conceived to be the mother of all the faithful. Here the note of warning, already present in the Job text, is sounded more sharply. It is not the mother's affection or solicitude, but the salutary effects of maternal teaching for the offspring, and, more particularly, the dire consequences of disrespect and of the flaunting of this authority, that are stressed here. The ruinous effects of the biblical 'mother's curse' are applied specifically, in the manner of a gloss, or more properly, by rhetorical amplification (*Illa utique*), to those foundations that claim to stand secure apart from the foundation-stone of Peter's office. In contrast to this divinely established source of unity and stability, are shown the instability and impermanence of a foundation built on worldly desire and pride, which, like the world from which these come, will one day pass away (cf. I *John* ii, 15-17).

After this analysis of the text and characterization of its parts, we may now consider the composition as a whole and certain problems that its interpretation presents. In his brief note concerning these texts, J. Haller considered Text A to contain nothing essentially new for our knowledge of Humbert's thought, although this does find here its sharpest expression.[62] In the first extended critical study of the texts, P. Schramm had already called attention to their traditional character, wherein ancient themes and terms are given new emphasis.[63] Indeed the reader familiar with the ancient papal decretals will readily recognize in Text A the recurrence of time-worn arguments, figures and conceptions, which were commonplaces for men like Humbert, nurtured as they were on the collections of canon law.[64] On the other hand, W. Ullmann, while fully recognizing the traditional elements in Text A, finds in it an originality that makes it "an astonishing piece."

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[60] Schramm, *op. cit.* II, p. 136.

[61] A. Michel, 'Das Papstwahlpactum von 1059', *Hist. Jahrbuch* LIX (1939), 346; and again in *Die Sentenzen des Kardinals Humbert, das erste Rechtsbuch der päpstlichen Reform* (MGH Schriften, VII, Leipzig, 1943), p. 32, note 1.

[62] *Das Papsttum* II (1951), p. 581.

[63] *Op. cit.* I, p. 242 (note 5 *supra*).

[64] For convenience, cf. F. Cavallera, *The-*

Professor Ullmann has explained in detail his conception of this strikingly new contribution by Humbert and its significance in a study which undoubtedly presents the most provocative interpretation to date of this text.[65] Reviewing the history of the principle of Roman jurisdictional primacy, and the related principle of a pope's personal immunity, from the age of Gelasius I to that of Nicholas I and Ps.-Isidore, he finds that Humbert here has combined for the first time the traditional *Prima sedes a nemine judicatur* with the Ps.-Isidorian reservation (derived from St. Isidore) in the immunity claimed for bishops, *nisi a fide devius.*[66] In the light of this deliberate innovation, the mind of the cardinal becomes clear. Humbert writes as a curialist for whom the *Romana Ecclesia* consists of cardinals and pope; and it is the Roman Church in this sense to which Christ's words were directed. This explains Humbert's emphasis on the *Romana Ecclesia* in the opening and closing parts of the piece. The pope on the other hand, as merely the head of this corporate entity, acts as its spokesman; but since in theory he may fall into error, he may, in the mind of Humbert, be judged by the Roman curia as constituted by the cardinals. Thus Text A "contains the germ of all the later constitutional quarrels between the pope . . . and the College of Cardinals . . . ; but it also contains the germ of the later canonistic theory that the Roman Church was a corporation to which all the consequences of a properly developed corporation theory could be applied (p. 123)."

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saurus doctrinae catholicae ex documentis magisterii ecclesiastici (new ed. Paris, 1936), Text 340-351, selections from Siricius (384-398) to Gelasius I (492-496), most of which were incorporated in the *Coll. Dion.-Hadriana* and/or *Coll. Hispana* (and *Ps.-Isidoriana*): e. g., *Siricius* (340a): . . . quia officii nostri consideratione non est nobis dissimulare, non est tacere libertas, quibus major cunctis christianae religionis zelus incumbit. Portamus onera omnium, qui gravantur; quin immo haec portat in nobis b. apost. Petrus . . . qui nolunt ab apostolicae petrae, super quam Christus universalem construxit Ecclesiam, soliditate divelli; (340b): cui omnium ecclesiarum cura est. *Innocentius I* (341a): . . .oportet eos hoc sequi quod Ecclesia Rom. custodit, a qua eos principium accepisse non dubium est . . . caput institutionum (here appears first the idea of the foundation of the Western churches through S. Peter or his disciples); (341b): . . . indeque sumerent ceterae (velut de natali suo fonte aquae cunctae procederent et per diversas totius mundi regiones puri latices capitis incorrupti manarent), quid praecipere . . .; (341c): sollicitudo omnium ecclesiarum; (341d): . . . ad nos quasi ad caput atque ad apicem episcopatus referre ut consulta videlicet Sedis Apostolicae ex ipsis rebus dubiis certum aliquid . . . pronuntiet . . . *Zosimus* (342): Cum ergo tantae auctoritatis Petrus caput sit et sequentia omnium majorum studia firmaverit, ut tam humanis quam divinis legibus et disciplinis omnibus firmetur Romana Ecclesia, cujus locum nos regere . . . (this decretal was not in above mentioned collections). *Bonifacius I* (343c): Institutio universalis nascentis Ecclesiae de b. Petri sumpsit honore principium in quo regimen ejus et summa consistit. Ex ejus enim ecclesiastica disciplina per omnes Ecclesias religionis jam crescente cultura, fonte manavit . . . Hanc ergo Ecclesiis toto orbe diffusis velut caput suorum certum est esse membrorum a qua se quisquis abscidit fit christianae religionis extorris cum in eadem non coeperit esse compage. (This is the first use of the Pauline figure *caput-membra* to express the relation of *Rom. Eccl.* to *universal. Eccl.;* thus F. Heiler, *Altkirchliche Autonomie u. pästlichen Zentralismus,* Munich, 1941, p. 212.)

Add *Coelestinus I* (Jaffé 369): Nec silere possumus, cum ad hoc, ut ab illicitis revocemus aliquos, officii nostri provocemur instinctu, in speculis a Deo constituti, ut vigilantiae nostrae diligentiam comprobantes, et quae coercenda sunt recesemus, et quae observanda sunt sanciamus (*Hadriana,* PL 67, 274C; *Hispana* and *Ps.-Isid.*, Hinschius, p. 559). After this date (through Leo I-Gelasius I) these themes received fuller development and elaboration. This material was, of course, widely used in the False Decretals and these IVth-Vth century formulations of ancient belief and praxis antedated; cf. O. Karrer, 'Das Petrusamt in der Frühkirche', in *Festgabe Joseph Lortz* I: *Reformation, Schicksal u. Auftrag* (Baden-Baden, 1958), pp. 507-525.

[65] 'Card. Humbert and the Ecclesia Romana', *Studi Greg.* IV (1952), pp. 111-127.

[66] A. Michel, 'Zusammenfassung', *Studia Gratiana* I (1953), pp. 90 f., also emphasizes the novelty of this combination. He explains the *Häresieklausel* through H.'s familiarity with the *Ps.-Isid.* texts: So sehr ist dem Kard. diese Wendung in Fleisch u. Blut übergegangen, dass sie ihm ohne Bedenken in die Feder fliesst auch bei dem Hymnus auf das Papsttums (p. 91). I doubt that H.'s use here of the clause was quite that casual. In his interpretation of H.'s meaning, however, Michel explains: Der unverletzliche Glaube Petri haftet unlösbar seinem Stuhle, dem "Officium" des Papstes an (p. 91). Of that I think there can be no doubt.

No one will fail to grasp the importance that accrues to Text A if it is thus intimately related to the whole subsequent history of constitutional development in church government and canonistic theory.[67] But our immediate concern must be confined to the meaning of the text itself, not in the light of what was later made of it, but in the light of its own setting and antecedents. Perhaps in this way it may also be possible to provide a broader base from which to judge its later use and influence.

Because so very much has been made over the years of the so-called heresy clause, it may be well to begin by sketching its literary career before it makes its appearance in our text. In a passage directly inspired by St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXV, c. 16 (in *Job* xxiv, 30: *Qui regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi*),[68] the *salva fide* proviso appears in St. Isidore, *Sent.* III, c. 39, 6,[69] in an entirely pastoral context on the duties of the members of the flock to submit to their shepherds and, mindful of their own frailty, to refrain from judging their superiors' faults. Such forbearance, however, was not counselled when error in faith was involved. This same chapter of St. Isidore was included in the decrees of the Council of Aachen of 816, *Lib.* I: *Institutio canonicorum,* c. 31.[70] By this conciliar sanction the text of St. Isidore was given a public character and its *auctoritas* enhanced thereby. The aptness of this material for their own purposes (to strengthen the position of the bishops) must have made a ready impression on the artisans of the Pseudo-Isidorian workshop, for in its productions it is exploited with notable insistence, frequently accompanied by the proviso on the faith in one form or another.[71]

It thus appears that there were three distinct stages in the diffusion and popularization of these texts: (1) the seventh and eighth centuries, when they were known in their pastoral context through St. Isidore's *Sententiae,* and their archetype, St. Gregory's *Moralia*; (2) from the early ninth century, after they were given increased circulation and weight in the *Institutio canonicorum* of 816;[72] (3) from *ca.* 850 on, when their frequent use in Ps.-Isidore not only contributed to their diffusion, but, more importantly, presented them as ancient papal pronouncements with universal normative force. Thus the transformation is accomplished from purely moral counsel to authoritative norm. The final stage in this process of "legalization" will be completed by the compilers of the systematic canonical collections (beginning notably with the *Collectio Anselmo dedicata*), wherein excerpts, cut off even from their Ps.-Isidorian context, are presented under the name (*inscriptio*) of their several supposedly ancient authors, signalized by a rubric (*titulus*) to epitomize the point of law they substantiate, and are thus ready to serve as independent and unanimous *canonicae auctoritates.*[73]

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[67] Cf. W. Ullmann, 'The Legal Validity of the Papal Electoral Pacts', *Ephemerides Iuris Canonici* XII (1956), 271-274.

[68] Num. 36 (*tit.*) 'Subditi praelatos etiam malos tolerent, si salva fide possint. Humilitas recti magistra.' . . . Igitur dum salva fide res agitur, virtutis est meritum, si quidquid prioris est toleratur. Debet tamen humiliter suggeri, si fortasse valeat quod displiceat emendari (PL 76, 344D, 345A). The entire c. 16 (used by S. Isidore) is full of the wisdom of the great pastoral pope and moral teacher of the Middle Ages.

[69] PL 83, 710.

[70] MGH Concilia II, 1 (1906), pp. 308 ff. Also PL 105, 815.

[71] These texts on immunity include the *salva fide* proviso and are all related to Isid., *Sent.* III (or Conc. Aquisgr. I): Clem. 42 (ed. Hinschius, p. 45); Anaclet. c. 39 (p. 85); Calixt. c. 3 (p. 136); Fabian. cc. 22, 23 (pp. 165 f.); Cornel. c. 4 (p. 174); Euseb. c. 11 (p. 237); Johan. I (p. 694); Synod. V Symmachi (p. 676).

[72] Cf. A. Anspach, 'Das Fortleben Isidors', in *Miscellanea Isidoriana* (Rome, 1936), pp. 345 ff., on the increase of S. Isidore's influence through the Carolingian revival; also A. Werminghoff, 'Die Beschlüsse des Aachener Concils im Jahre 816', *Neues Archiv* XXVII (1902), 637-645: 'Das Fortleben der *Institut. canon.*'

[73] E. g., Burchard, *Decretum* I, c. 136 (*tit.*) Episcopos a suis ovibus non reprehendendos, nisi in fide erraverint. Four separate *auctoritates* appear under this rubric (cc. 136-139); and the proviso is also in c. 135 (PL 140, 589 f.). *Coll. 74 Tit.*, Tit. IX: Quod non possunt oves accusare pastores (cc. 74-81). Two (cc. 74, 78) of these *Ps.-Isid.* excerpts

Beginning with the earliest critics there never seems to have been any doubt that the *nisi a fide devius* clause in Text A shows some dependence on one or another of the Ps.-Isidorian *loci* which have this proviso.[74] It was so often repeated (even *viva voce* we may assume), so long and so widely known, that it seems idle to try to attach it to one rather than to another of these texts (almost all have at some time been given), nor is it a matter of much moment: it had become a commonplace. But even though we know the literary lineage of the phrase, we are left with the more important problem of the history of its actual acceptance and application. Leaving aside the question of its use in defence of episcopal immunity,[75] which is quite apart from our present concern, was it ever previously considered applicable to a pope? Contrary to a wide-spread assumption that it was not, two instances can be cited in which it had been so applied, and which deprive Text A (and the excerpt D. 40, c. 6) of the supposed novelty that has so heightened interest in it and variously affected its interpretation.

Pope Hadrian II presided at the Roman Council in June 869, which condemned the council held by Photius and Emperor Michael in Constantinople in January 867.[76] In one of three allocutions addressed to the thirty bishops assembled in St. Peter's together with the legates of the patriarch Ignatius, occurs this passage:

> Siquidem Romanum pontificem de omnium ecclesiarum praesulibus judicasse legimus; de eo vero quemquam judicasse non legimus: licet enim Honorio ab orientalibus post mortem anathema sit dictum, sciendum tamen est quia fuerat super haeresi accusatus, propter quam solam licitum est minoribus majorum suorum motibus resistendi, vel pravos sensus libere respuendi: quamvis et ibi nec patriarcharum nec antistitum cuipiam de eo quemlibet fas fuerit proferendi sententiam, nisi ejusdem primae sedis pontificis consensus praecessisset auctoritas.[77]

The acts of this Roman council, including the papal allocutions, were read by the Roman legates at the Fourth Council of Constantinople (VIIIth Ecumenical 869-870), *Actio* VII, and incorporated in its acts.[78]

In this reference to the celebrated case of the posthumous condemnation of Pope Honorius, the pope appeals directly to the cause of faith (*super haeresi*) as the only reason justifying action by subjects against their superiors (*propter quam solam licitum est*). To this he adds the further qualification that the consent of the reigning pope (Agatho) was required to justify the proceedings. In the context of Hadrian's address it seems clear that the *salva fide* proviso is here applied to the traditional formula of papal immunity. Whether or not the Ps.-Isidorian texts had any influence in this is not our immediate concern, although the False Decretals were known in Rome from the time of Hadrian's predecessor, Nicholas I.[79] What is essential to note is that here we are not in the domain of private opinion or literary history, but of supreme ecclesiastical authority: a pope's synodal allocution in defence of the rights of the Roman pontiff (against the charges of Photius) formally incorporated in the acts of an ecumenical council.[80]

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have the *salva fide* clause (ed. J. Gilchrist, *The Political Ideas of Card. Humbert with an edition of the Diversorum Patrum Sententiae*, Univ. of Leeds, 1957, unpubl. diss., II, p. 259. Through the courtesy of the author.)

[74] C. Berardi, *Gratiani canones genuini ab apocryphis discreti*, etc., Pars II, c. 69: Appendix de aliq. Bonifacii ep. monumentis (Madrid, 1783) III, p. 195, points out affinity between D. 40, c. 6 and Ps.-Clem. (C. 2, q. 7, c. 8).

[75] Cf. H. Feine, *Kirchliche Rechtsgeschichte* I (3rd ed., Weimar, 1955), p. 143, on the earliest use of the False Decretals.

[76] Jaffé *ante* 2913.

[77] *Allocutio* III, Mansi 16, 126A; PL 129, 110A (vers. of Anastas. Bibliothecar.).

[78] Mansi 16, 373 f. (Greek vers. of the acts).

[79] H. Feine, *loc. cit.*

[80] Cf. J. Gauss, 'Die Dictatusthesen Gregors

The second instance brings us to the pontificate of Sergius III (904-911) and the defence of the ordinations of Pope Formosus by the priest Auxilius, undertaken against the official policy in vigor that held those ordinations to be null and void.[81] The last and best of his tracts published in this cause, the *Infensor et Defensor*,[82] was written by Auxilius (*ca.* 911) at the request of a bishop consecrated by Formosus, Leo of Nola, who urgently desired a response to the objections being aimed against the validity of all Formosus' ordinations. In reading this dialogue it is to be kept in mind that Auxilius is not presenting a fictitious debate. In adopting the device of the dialogue he purports to respond, as the *Defensor*, to the arguments being used by the supporters of the anti-Formosan policy, whose spokesman he makes the *Infensor*.[83] There are two chapters directly pertinent to our present concern:

> c. 18 (*tit.*) 'Quod aliud sint pontificales sedes, et aliud praesidentes, et quia praesidentes per devia sequenda non sint.'
> *Infensor.* Sancta Romana Ecclesia super Ecclesias primatum tenet, ideoque judicat omnes, et ipsa a nemine judicatur. Tu autem quis es, qui contra eam loqueris?
> *Defensor.* Absit ut ego infimus, vel potius vermis, contra eam loquar, sed, ut Deus donaverit, magis pro ea. Quaeso, diligenter attende quod dicturus sum longe incomparabiliter. Aliud sunt pontificales sedes, aliud praesidentes. Proinde honor et dignitas uniuscujusque sedis venerabiliter observanda sunt. Praesidentes autem si deviaverint, per devia sequenda non sunt; hoc est, si contra fidem vel catholicam religionem agere coeperint, in talibus eos nequadam sequi debemus, quod plerumque apud Constantinopolitanam et Alexandrinam sedem contigit: in his autem quae jure dicunt, et si non faciunt, libenter eis obedire debemus.[84]

Here Auxilius himself argues from the *salva fide* proviso against the contention that he has no right to speak in criticism of the Roman Church on the ancient principle: *Prima sedes a nemine judicatur.*

In a later chapter (c. 31) the *Infensor* presses the point that Auxilius has no right to speak in this matter and among his arguments quotes four Ps.-Isidorian texts on immunity, of which two contain the *nisi a fide* clause.[85] In his lengthy reply Auxilius justifies his literary activity and rebuts the argument based on the immunity texts by fastening on the *nisi a fide* proviso. He contends that reordination is in fact heretical (like rebaptism) as an offence against the Holy Ghost, and declares his opponents thus slain by their own sword.[86]

It would seem reasonably well established in this instance that both sides considered the *salva fide* clause applicable to the traditional papal immunity. It is beyond question that Auxilius considered it so; and in *cap.* 31 it is the *Infensor* who introduces the Ps.-Isidorian texts. I see no reason to doubt this report that these texts were currently being used by the supporters of the policy of Pope Sergius to silence criticism of it.

I have deemed it necessary to digress at this length on this single item in Text A in order to clear the ground of misconceptions and thus permit a more balanced view of the whole text. It is my conviction, in light of the instances cited, that the *salva fide* condition is no novelty here and in no sense central to

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VII.', p. 100 (note 24 *supra*).

[81] D. Pop, *La défense du Pape Formose*, Paris, 1933, is the best monograph (with bibliogr.). L. Saltet, *Les réordinations* (Paris, 1907), pp. 156-160.

[82] PL 129, 1073-1102 (ed. J. Morin).

[83] Cf. *Epist. praevia ad Leonem ep.* (*ibid.*, 1076D).

[84] *Ibid.*, 1088 f.

[85] *Ibid.*, 1099.

[86] *Ibid.*, 1100CD.

the construction of the entire piece. If it appears to be "tucked away," as has been observed, then this I consider entirely consistent with its relative importance with respect to the main message.[87] It was certainly no novelty in Roman relations with the East, given the fact that it had been introduced in the last solemn act of formal relations between Rome and Constantinople by Pope Hadrian II and preserved in the Latin and Greek versions of the *gesta synodalia* of the councils of 869-870. Its reappearance in a document so closely related to the resumption of these relations in 1053 can hardly cause surprise; and it is only in this setting that the whole piece is amenable to an interpretation that neither does violence to its structure and intent, nor loses sight of the facts of the situation as we know them.

In the stress of the ecclesiastical conflict with Constantinople the personnel of the Roman Church under the leadership of Leo IX had the additional burden to bear of the ill-repute of the Roman See, inherited from the previous period. The results of some recent studies indicate that the adverse judgment on the popes of the early eleventh century needs revision.[88] What is of particular relevance here is the fact of the existence of this derogatory opinion about the predecessors of the reform popes from beyond the Alps even in reform circles at this time.[89] The seriously impaired prestige of the Roman See had a long history behind it as a result of the disorders that spotted the history of the papacy from the death of Formosus (896) to the accession of Clement II (1046): thirty-six popes (and four anti-popes) in a century and a half, most of them obscure, some certainly unworthy, only one outstanding among them.[90]

There is evidence not only of an awareness of this situation in Rome itself, but also of a frank acknowledgment of it from the time of Leo IX. Cardinal Humbert, tracing the loss of ecclesiastical liberty to the reign of the Ottos, charged the popes of that period with *ignavia et insipientia*.[91] In a privilege of Leo IX his predecessors Benedict (IX) and Gregory (VI) are referred to as *injusti pontifices*.[92] (The 'victims' of Sutri!) And in Leo's letter to Emperor Constantine Monomachus, Jan. 1054, we find the following frank reference to the sorry state of the Roman See in the pre-reform period:

> Et quia abundante iniquitate et refrigiscente charitate (cf. *Matth.* xxiv, 12), s. Romana ecclesia et apostolica sedes nimium diu obsessa fuit mercenariis et non pastoribus, a quibus sua, non quae sunt Jesu Christi, quaerentibus, devastata jacebat miserabiliter hactenus: divinum consilium voluit meam humilitatem suscipere tantae cathedrae pondus.[93]

It was faith in the Roman See as the *cathedra Petri* that had enabled the Roman

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[87] If one must explore the mind of Humbert to conjecture what procedure he thought should be followed if doubts were raised about a pope (a question he never treated), it would perhaps be sounder to look to what had gone before than to the later commentators. Cf. *Conc. CPLtan.* IV, Act. X, c. 21 (note 45 *supra*); and Auxilius, *op. cit.*, cc. 28-29, where synodal procedure was envisaged in such extraordinary cases. On H.'s acquaintance with one tract of Auxilius, cf. J. Ryan, 'Card. Humbert and Auxilius', *Mediaeval Studies* XIII (1951), 218 ff. It is also to be noted that H. did not consider simony a *culpa*, but *simoniaca heresis* (and the worst of all heresies!), hence this was the one charge that could justify the proceedings at Sutri 1046 in his view.

[88] W. Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government*, p. 263, note 1 (with lit.).

[89] Peter Damiani, *Ep.* II, 19 (1045) *ad Petrum SRE Card. et Cancellarium*: Nisi enim ad rectitudinis statum sedes Romana redeat, certum est, quia totus mundus in suo lapsus errore perdurat. Et necesse est jam ut eadem sit renovandae principium, quae nascentis humanae salutis exstiterat fundamentum (PL 144, 288C).

[90] Cf. A. Fliche, *La réforme grégorienne* I (Louvain-Paris, 1924), *Introd.*, *sect.* 1: 'La crise romaine', espec. pp. 13 ff., on the impairment of Roman authority as a result of this, beginning with the Council of Saint-Basle (near Reims) in 991.

[91] *Adv. simoniacos* III, c. 11 (MGH Lib. de lite I, p. 211, 22). PL 143, 1156C.

[92] Cf. note 25 *supra* (*Jaffé* 4157).

[93] PL 143, 779C.

Church to weather the years of crisis, and the belief that its rulers were the successors of Peter and the heirs of his prerogatives had not been destroyed by the personal unworthiness of some of their number. The reformers who set themselves the task of recuperating this lost prestige (and none did more for this than Leo IX), and of making Rome the center and spearhead of the reform, did so with the awareness of the deficiencies of their predecessors, but with the same unshaken faith in the *sedes Petri.* They vigorously reasserted the universal claims of the Roman See, as they understood them from the sources at their command, and reavowed the full responsibility of this see for the welfare of all the churches (the ancient *sollicitudo omnium ecclesiarum*).

In the controversy with Michael Cerularius the problem of the personal merits of the holder of an ecclesiastical office is discussed at some length. In the first letter to the patriarch three chapters are devoted to it (c. 33-35). Here the pope makes no claim to equality of merits with St. Peter (*merita personae*), but refuses on that score to keep silent. (c. 33): *Nec ideo silebimus, si dicimur non esse quales debemus, nec qualis est Petrus. Quod utique agendum esset, si cuiquam commendaremus nosmetipsos.*[94] He does not believe that the patriarch himself would claim to be like his great predecessors in his own see, nor that the patriarchs of Antioch and Alexandria would dare make such claims: the priestly office is independent of the personal merits of its bearer. (c. 34): *Cur hoc, nisi quicunque sacerdotes, etsi dispares sunt merito, pares tamen sunt officio? Non potest denegari pro merito quod debetur officio.*[95] If he does not claim equality of merits, he does claim identity of office with Peter, and it is in virtue of the office that he has the right and the duty to speak.

> c. 35: Qua de re, fratres, utinam non ad judicium nostrum dicamus, profecto sumus qualis Petrus, et non sumus qualis Petrus, quia idem sumus officio, et non idem merito . . . Ac si meritum Petri non habentes, officium autem Petri exsequentes, officio nostro debitos reposcimus honores, Apostolo dicente: *Quandiu minister ero, ministerium meum honorificabo* (*Rom.* xi, 13) . . . Ita quod male vivimus nostrum est: quod vero bona dicimus, cathedrae, cujus occasione necesse habemus recta praedicare.[96]

And whatever the deficiencies of his predecessors, or indeed of himself, these provide no justification for doing injury to the office of those whose power is from the Lord:

> (*ibid.*) . . . et vos qui estis, qui negligentiam eorum ad injuriam apostolicae cathedrae retorquetis? Nos enim quid sumus? Nec contra nos est murmur vestrum, sed contra Dominum, cujus ordinationi resistendo, damnationem vobis acquiritis, cum nostra potestas, sicut et omnis, a nullo alio nisi ab ipso sit.[97]

This defense of the *officium Petri* was undertaken, as we have seen, with full awareness of the tarnished reputation that had so gravely obscured its position in the Church. But now a new order of things had begun. Earlier negligences were not brushed aside, or glossed over, but were the occasion for clarifying with new insistence the distinction between person and office. Personal charges were answered by an appeal to the primary importance of the office; they were not allowed to silence the voice of the one who held it, whatever his own merits or faults. Silence itself was considered a grave dereliction (Text A: *et insuper a bono taciturnus, quod magis officit sibi et omnibus*) in one whose office imposed the duty to speak, and upon the proper discharge of which depended the welfare of so many. In the same letter to the patriarch we read:

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[94] *Ibid.*, 765C.

[95] *Ibid.*, 766A. On the following argument that the priesthood judged according to personal merits would mean *tot sacerdotia quot homines*, cf. S. Jerome, *Contra Luciferian.*, 9 (PL 23, 165A).

[96] *Ibid.* Unable to identify the Pope Greg. quotation in this chap., I cannot fix its end. These last words are usually taken as the author's.

[97] *Ibid.*, 766D.

> c. 40: Nam si vos non erubescitis, nec timetis de loquacitate, nos non tantum erubescere, quantum timere debemus de taciturnitate, quia de nostra multorum pendent animae, quae falsis fratribus calumniantibus et nobis tacentibus, habent perire.[98]

There is not a new theme introduced in Text A, which is not touched upon in the other documents of the current Rome-Constantinople relations. The striking resemblances between this text and the first of Leo's letters to the patriarch (and the other Humbertine compositions) had already been indicated in detail by A. Michel: they are not only verbal, but reveal the same themes, arguments and biblical texts. Even the *mater-filia* relationship between the *Ecclesia Romana* and the *Constantinopolitana* is developed at considerable length in the letters to the East, including some of the Sapiential *mater*-texts used in the exhortatory closing of Text A.[99] Reading the diffuse first letter to Patriarch Michael, and then the condensed message of Text A, the reader finds himself moving within the same frame of reference and pattern of thought.

This is not to say, however, that there is nothing new here. In the above passages addressed to the patriarch it is the rights and duties of the *officium Petri* that are stressed. The distinction between office and person is sharply drawn to insist on the rights of the office; the divinely established *officium* is declared to be unassailable despite the failings of its occupants. The real novelty I find in Text A is the development given, not to the rights of office, but to the personal responsibilities that the office imposes on the one who holds it. It is the meaning of the conduct of the papal office for the whole body of the Church, and the burden this places on its occupant that are brought out here—the *pondus tantae cathedrae,* in Leo's phrase to the emperor. It is only near the end of the first letter to Michael Cerularius (c. 40 above) that the personal responsibility of the pope is touched on, upon whose fidelity to the demands of his office depends the salvation of many souls. In Text A (paragr. 1-2) this becomes the central theme. The author is not saying here: "Whatever a pope's faults may be, you must respect the authority of the office he holds" (c. 33-35 above). On the contrary, the office is here shown to be so meaningful for the life of the Church that upon the way in which it is exercised depends the salvation or damnation of the multitude. Hence the earnestness of the prayers of the faithful that this office may worthily be fulfilled. It is the supreme stewardship of the pope that holds the central place in the construction.

In this respect, in my view, there is a notable departure here from what may be called the Ps.-Isidorian "legalization" of the immunity of ecclesiastical *rectores.*[100] For it is not at all the toleration of *reprobi mores* in the interest of church order, and in view of the useful services that may be rendered by superiors deficient in virtue that is pressed here (the Ps.-Isidorian tack). Papal immunity, in any case, had been based historically on entirely different premises: it was deduced from the jurisdictional primacy of the Petrine office. But in Text A even this papal immunity (*Prima sedes a nemine judicatur*) is not emphasized at all: it is treated in a single sentence.

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[98] *Ibid.*, 769A.

[99] Of the five *mater*-texts in Text A, Leo IX, *Ep.* I to M. Cer. (Jaffé 4302), c. 26, quotes three (PL 143, 762); *Ep.* to Constantine IX (J. 4333), also quotes three (777D, 780C), but in a more amicable context. Such texts admitted a certain versatility. These texts (includ. *Job* xii) were not traditional in reference to the Roman Church. *Jer.* i, 10, so frequent later on, appears in Victor II (J. 4369), also written in H's style. The *mater-filia* relationship of *Eccl. Romana* and *CPLtana* is treated at length in *Ep.* I to M. Cer. (cc. 23-29).

[100] Charges against clerics had been regulated by positive law, e. g., *Conc. Chalced.*

Furthermore, far from implying a sharp distinction between the corporate *Romana Ecclesia* and its ruling bishop, the pope, the essential character and unique status of this church—as the *caput omnium ecclesiarum,* and the *specialis mater omnium in Christo fidelium*—are clearly grounded on the Petrine prerogatives (*in Petro*), which are perpetuated in his successors in the *officium Petri.* And so intimate is this relation (one might almost say identification) of pope and *Romana Ecclesia* that its function as head (not its essential character) is made contingent upon the manner in which the papal office is conducted. It is my opinion that the views expressed in 1098 by the schismatical cardinal deacon Hugh, who held the *privilegium Petri* (*Matth.* xvi, 17) *tocius Romanae sedis esse potius, quam solius pontificis*; and who saw in the pope a functionary of the *Romana Ecclesia*, i.e., of the cardinals, have no ideological precedent in Text A.[101]

With regard to the *nisi a fide devius* clause, if its appearance in Text A is no absolute novelty, as has been shown above, the fact remains that it is a novelty in the current Rome-Constantinople relations: it does not appear in any other item of the exchange.[102] How then is its introduction here to be explained? I am not sure that this is of great importance, but, in any case, I confess to see no ready answer. However, there are some considerations, which prevent it, I believe, from being judged incongruous. The charges levelled at the Latin Church by Michael Cerularius and his spokesmen were not on matters of faith, but chiefly concerned Western ecclesiastical practices. But the question of error in matters of faith was not entirely absent.

Michael Cerularius, in his *Panoplia*, refuting those who contended that the name of the pope could be retained in the diptychs even though he be held to be in error in faith, had written:

> c. 36, 2: Quomodo enim, si caput scilicet papa haereticus est, quomodo subiecti ei orthodoxi? "Si caput piscis putre est", quo pacto reliquum corpus sanum servabitur?[103]

In the opinion of A. Michel, the *Panoplia* was written before Leo, the Bulgarian archbishop of Ochrida, opened the attack on the Latin Church early in 1053, and

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c. 21 (*Hadriana,* PL 67, 175). It was the *Ps.-Isid.* falsifications that stressed toleration of *reprobi mores* in an entirely different sense from that intended in Greg. *Moralia*-S. Isidore. The abuse of these *auctoritates* aroused the protests of some reformers; cf. Damiani's protest to Alexander II, *Epist.* I, 12 (PL 144, 215 ff.). An example of unwholesome development in applying this notion of toleration to the pope is seen in a spurious text in the *Coll. in 13 Bks.* (1090/1100), *Lib.* I, c. 135 (ed. Fournier-LeBras, *Hist. des coll. canoniques* II, p. 257). Compare the so-called *Coll. in 2 Bks.* (*ca.* 1085) of *MS* Vat. *lat.* 3832: (*tit. sine num.*) Ut pastor patiatur humiliter reprehendi. *Gregorius Theoctistae patriciae.* Sicut pastor ecclesiae et apostolorum princeps . . . reprehensores nostros ratione humili placere debemus (fol 110^{r}). Greg. I, *Reg.* XI, 27 (MGH Epist. II, p. 294, 3-7). This is the authentic voice of Greg. I. Cf. also Gelasius I, *Tom. de anathem. vinc.* (Jaffé 701), on the example of S. Peter (in *Ps.-Isidoriana aucta,* PL 130, 947D f.).

[101] *Corpus* of the schismatical Cardinals, *Ep.* IV (MGH Lib. de lite II, p. 404, 17). See also *Ep.* X (1098) to Mathilda (*ibid.,* pp. 417 f.).

[102] The principle 'Summa sedes a nemine judicatur' is stated thrice in *Ep.* I to M. Cer., cc. 10,11,32 (PL 143, 751B-D, 765), without the *salva fide* proviso. Nowhere else does H. use the proviso for the pope; nor does he ever use the *Ps.-Isid.* texts on toleration of wrong-doing with respect to the pope, as far as I find.

[103] A. Michel, *Humbert u. Kerullarios* II, p. 255.

in fact supplied some of the ammunition for it.[104] Did the question come up again, possibly in the letter of the patriarch to the pope (unfortunately now lost) to which Pope Leo replied (Jaffé 4332) in Jan. 1054? It was at least in the background of the debate.

Another consideration is prompted by the presence of the name of Pope Honorius in the current controversy, at least in its later stage. In his *Libellus contra Latinos,* c. 10, 12 and 16, Nicetas Stethatus, monk of the monastery of Studium, quoted canons of the Quinisext Council (692) as canons of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, for they were so considered in the East.[105] In his reply to this tract, which he had himself translated into Latin, Humbert, *Contra Nicetam,* c. 24, retorted that Pope Agatho had approved only that part of the council's acts *quae promulgata fuerunt adversus Monothelitarum haeresim* (thus excluding the Quinisext canons);[106] and in his own summary of these duly approved proceedings he includes among those anathematized the name of Honorius (c. 17).[107] And in Leo IX's *Professio fidei*, incorporated in his letter to Peter of Antioch, Leo repeats the anathemas of the first seven ecumenical councils, including: *tertium Constantinopolitanum contra Monothelitas, sub Agathone papa et Constantino nepote Heraclii*, although no one is here mentioned *nominatim*.[108] Thus it seems clear that Humbert was quite aware of the case of Honorius, certainly when he wrote the *Contra Nicetam*. If the matter had come up in the progress of the debate, it is not impossible that the same justification came to his mind as that expressed by Hadrian II in the Roman synod of 869 and quoted above. In any case, the use of the *salva fide* clause in Text A to me presents no incongruity.

If I have read this text aright, it is neither "a hymn to papal power," nor "the trumpet-blast that heralds the catastrophe of Canossa." Nor is it "the programmatic declaration of a hierocrat concerning the Roman Church." It is an appeal for ecclesiastical unity, in Roman terms, with a warning on the perils of separation from the divinely established foundation of Peter's See. But it is accompanied by a profession of the responsibilities of the papal office and a full acceptance of the burdens it imposes on its incumbent that make it a remarkable document. It resembles a sermon, but not a legal text or manifesto, studded as it is with familiar phrases from the Vulgate, and with its expression of the personal accountability of the pope in the evangelical terms of the "Exhortation to Vigilance." Its emphasis on a pope's responsibility before God for the welfare of all the faithful complements the claims for full recognition of the rights of Peter's office. Since we know nothing of the destiny of the text until its rediscovery by Cardinal Deusdedit, we can say nothing of its possible effects on Eastern ears. It is notably more irenic, despite the vigor of its warning, than the other writings in which the fiery Cardinal Humbert gave full vent to his capacities for verbal violence. Could the restraining hand of Pope Leo be at work here? The controversy, in any case, was beyond the point of solution by admonitory messages. It is perhaps more noteworthy to the historian for the rare light it throws on the spirit that animated the first generation of reformers, who had undertaken the momentous task of the rehabilitation of the Roman See.[109]

The intriguing question suggests itself here, more strongly than for Text B: Did Humbert prepare this text, as he had prepared so many others, for the great reform pope himself? None knew better than Leo IX how all "looked up to the Roman See" and awaited the word of the one who ruled it; this man, who in the last sad months at Benevento could look back on a five-year reign spent largely in journeys in the cause of reform, in Italy, France and the Empire, where he had "spoken the law" at so many synods to recall high and low to their Christian duties and observance of the sacred canons.[110] Who more appropriately than he could have applied to the pope the "Exhortation to Vigilance" and pictured the high opportunity as well as the grievous burden that this stewardship imposed? There is no answer to such conjectural questions, but there is nothing to my mind in Text A which could not have been spoken by the first pope in so many years, who had translated into action the role of *universalis pastor* and reasserted the rights and responsibilities of his see, the *Sancta Romana Ecclesia.*

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[104] 'Die Friedenbotschaft Grados an Antiocheia im Schisma des Kerullarios u. ihr Widerhall', *Studi Greg.* II (1947), p. 613.

[105] PL 143, 979 ff.

[106] *Ibid.*, 995C.

[107] *Ibid.*, 990D.

[108] *Ep.* 101 (Jaffé 4297), ibid., 772D.

[109] Cf. Schramm, *op. cit.* I, p. 241.

TEXT B

Since there is less room here for divergency of opinion in reading the text than in the more widely discussed Text A, we may combine our analysis with a view of the contents without translating the whole piece. As in Text A it is possible to distinguish the parts of the composition, which here correspond to the two paragraphs of the edition.[1] In (1) Rome's pagan past and Christian past are contrasted to show on what part of Rome's historic traditions the Roman Church bases its titles; (2) is a brief conclusion on the *terrenum regnum* and the *coeleste regnum* as heirs to Christian Rome.

(1) The opening sentence is the key to the detailed contrast of Rome's pagan and Christian past that follows it:

> S. Romana ecclesia et reverenda et amanda est, non quia Roma fundata est super arenam per Romulum et Remum . . . sed quia hedificata est super Christum petram per Petrum et Paulum.

The Roman Church is to be revered, not because Rome was founded on sand by the brothers, but because Rome was built on Christ, the rock, by the Apostles. Beginning with these two distinct foundations of the City, by the two separate pairs of Founding Fathers, the distinction between the two traditions of the City is carried out through the several members of the contrast. Its positive effect is to multiply the titles of the Church of Rome through the exaltation of Christian Rome. The negative result is the denial of any indebtedness of its Church to the secular grandeur of the City.

Humbert's use of a celebrated sermon of Pope Leo I for this part of the text, which is confirmed by verbal dependence, has been fully established by P. Schramm.[2] One might also point in particular to Pope Leo's conception of the role of Ss. Peter and Paul as founders of the City, when he apostrophizes Rome as follows:

> Isti sunt patres tui verique pastores, qui te regnis coelestibus inserendam multo melius multoque felicius condiderunt, quam illi quorum studio prima moenium tuorum fundamenta locata sunt: ex quibus is qui tibi nomen dedit fraterna te caede foedavit.[3]

The same idea is expressed in the ancient hymn *Aurea luce et decore roseo,* which, like Leo's sermon, was later adopted for the liturgical office of the Feast of Ss. Peter and Paul:

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[110] Cf. Abbot John of Fécamp, *Ep. ad Leon. IX*, for the impression this pope's acts made on contemporaries (PL 143, 797).

[1] Schramm, *Kaiser, Rom. u. Renovatio* II, pp. 129-133.

[2] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 242 ff.

[3] *Sermo* 82 (PL 54, 422C).

Mundi Magister, atque coeli Janitor,
Romae parentes, arbitrique Gentium.[4]

Thus the idea of the two Apostles as 'Fathers of Rome' was quite traditional.

The following abbreviated version may suffice to convey the tenor of this part for present purposes. After the opening sentence the text continues:

> (The Roman Church is to be revered and loved) . . . Not because the City's walls were first dampened with fratricidal blood, but because the same walls were purified by the martyr's blood of Peter and Paul; nor because Rome once offered asylum to the wicked, defending yet not acknowledging their crimes, but because it was made a place of refuge for the truly repentant; nor because Rome instituted senate and civil curia, but because even now it promulgates universal instruction and the laws general and particular of the service of God for the whole Christian universe; nor again because Rome produced its proud civil and military heroes, who extended Roman sway over land and sea, but because it claims for its patrons, after Peter and Paul, a host of saints, popes and martyrs, men and women of every age and condition, by whose modesty and salutary instruction Rome not only rules the world, but lays claim to the very Kingdom of Heaven, to which it does not cease to do violence (cf. *Matth.* xi, 12). Although Rome once merited all the opprobrious biblical figures and epithets as 'Babylon the Great' of the *Apocalypse*, this same city, once espoused to Christ, became in turn the 'virgin spouse' of the *Canticle*. This city, with the destruction of its pagan shrines accomplished, has not alone decorated her own seven-hilled site but the whole world with the cross of Christ and the monuments and memorials of the saints. It is less a city of men than a burial-place of martyrs, every part of which, its gates and streets, all its quarters and buildings, upon which it once cruelly spilled their blood, it now looks upon with veneration in its own protection.

It clearly emerges from this that it is not the City of Romulus and Remus, but the Rome of Peter and Paul, of the martyrs, saints and popes, that is the city upon which the titles of its church, the *Ecclesia Romana*, rest. And this same Rome is the subject of the Virgilian inspired line which closes this part and marks the transition to the concluding paragraph: (*Et quid plura*?)

Haec regnum terris et famam terminat astris (cf. *Aen.* I, 287).[5]

(2) The author now turns to consider the order of succession to the Rome of Peter and Paul. Immediately following the Virgilian line, he continues: *Cui non prius terrenum regnum quam coeleste successit.* The origin and victorious career of this *coeleste regnum* he then goes on to describe by using the figure of 'the stone hewn from the mountain without hands' (*Dan.* ii) and the other 'stone texts' of the Old and New Testament.[6] This is the stone that completely destroyed the: *regnum Romanorum, et in ipso Graecorum, Persarum et Babyloniorum*; the stone which: *in fundamento apostolicae fidei fundatus implevit universam terram, mons magnus est factus* (*Dan.* ii, 35). And this same stone:

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[4] G. Dreves-C. Blume, *Analecta hymnica medii aevi* LI (Leipzig, 1908), p. 216.

[5] *Ed. cit.*, p. 132.

[6] Cf. E. Siegman, 'The Stone Hewn from the Mountain (Dan. 2)', *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly* XVIII (1956), 363-379.

> fecit nos ex omni tribu . . . regnum et sacerdotes Deo nostro regnare super terram (*Apoc.* v, 9-10), ut iam non regnet peccatum in nostro mortali corpore ad obediendum concupiscentiis eius (*Rom.* vi, 12), set iustitia sempiterna, quae est Christus, per fidem habitet atque regnet in nostris cordibus (*Ephes.* iii, 17) nosque cum eo perpetuo regnemus (II *Tim.* ii, 12; *Sap.* ii, 22). *Explicit.*

It is of some importance for the reading of this closing passage and ultimately for the understanding of the whole piece to determine the meaning of the *coeleste regnum* represented by the stone. Does it mean the Roman Church, as P. Schramm suggests?[7] Perhaps our best guide is the use made of these texts by the earlier writers.

The identification of the four World Kingdoms was inherited from the Fathers and is entirely common. That the other three kingdoms were somehow summed up in that of the Romans is also a view with patristic origins and was widely known in the Middle Ages. It is found in St. Jerome's *Commentariorum in Danielem liber,* which was put into catechetical form for Charlemagne by Peter the Deacon,[8] and later incorporated in the *Glossa ordinaria.*[9] The following *loci* are of particular interest here:

> Hieron. *in Dan.* vii, 7: . . . dum in uno imperio Romanorum, omnia simul regna cognoscimus, quae prius fuerunt separata. v. 11: Dei judicium venit propter humiliandam superbiam. Idcirco Romanum delebitur imperium, quia cornu illud loquebatur grandia . . . In uno Romano imperio propter Antichristum blasphemantem, omnia simul regna delenda sunt, et nequaquam terrenum imperium erit, sed sanctorum conversatio et adventus Filii Dei triumphantis . . . v. 17: Quatuor regna, de quibus supra diximus, fuere terrena. 'Omne enim quod de terra est, revertetur in terram' (*Eccl.* iii, 20): sancti autem nequaquam habebunt terrenum regnum sed coeleste. Cesset ergo mille annorum fabula.[10]

The 'stone hewn without hands' was generally interpreted by the Fathers as a figure of Christ, but it was also taken as a figure of the Church, the *regnum Christi*, or *corpus Christi.* This interpretation is found in St. Augustine:

> *In Joan. Tract.* 9, 15: Jam vero in quinta aetate . . . Daniel vidit lapidem . . . (*Dan.* ii, 34-35). Quid apertius, fratres mei? Lapis de monte praeciditur: ipse est lapis quem reprobaverunt aedificantes, et factus est caput anguli (*Ps.* cxvii, 22). De quo monte praeciditur, nisi de regno Judaeorum, unde Dominus noster Jesus Christus secundum carnem natus est? . . . Mons ille unde praecisus est, non impleverat universam faciem terrae: non enim tenuerat regnum Judaeorum omnes gentes. At vero regnum Christi, universum orbem terrarum cernimus occupare.[11]

> *Enarrat. in Ps.* 45, 9: Judaei in lapidem parvum non videndo offenderunt, haeretici in montem offendunt. Jam enim crevit ille lapis; jam dicimus illis, Ecce impleta est prophetia Danielis, Lapis ille qui erat parvus, factus est mons magnus et implevit universam terram (*Dan.* ii, 35).[12]

Gregory I, in a letter addressed to Alexandria and Antioch on the use of the term *universalis*, used the same text in a passage on the unity of the body of the universal Church:

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[7] *Op. cit.* I, p. 244.
[8] *Quaestiones in Dan.* PL 96, 1347 ff.
[9] Cf. PL 114, 63.
[10] PL 25, 530C, 533A, 534A.
[11] PL 35, 1465.
[12] PL 36, 522.

> *Reg.* V, *Ep.* 41: Gratiaque sit fermento illi, quod tribus farinae satis totius humani generis massam in unitate conspersit (*Matt.* xiii, 33), atque parvo lapidi, qui abscissus de monte sine manibus, occupavit universam faciem orbis terrae (*Dan.* ii, 34). Qui ad hoc se usquequaque distendit, ut ex omni humano genere in unitatem redactum, totius corpus perficeretur Ecclesiae atque ita ad totius compagis pertineret commodum membrorum partitialis ista distinctio.[13]

These widely read texts show the traditional character of the use of the 'stone texts' to signify the Church universal and I see no reason to restrict the meaning in Humbert's text to the *Romana Ecclesia* as one member, albeit the chief one (*caput*), of the universal body. The entire passage requires that the *coeleste regnum* be taken as the universal kingdom of the Church.

This is not to say, however, that there is nothing new here. The earlier interpretations—even those that saw a partial fulfilment in Christ and the Church—looked for the complete fulfilment of the prophecy in the future with the destruction of the Roman Empire and the realization of the eschatological reign of the holy ones of God.[14] St. Jerome's *delebitur* and *delenda* in the passages cited are typical and his own preoccupation was the refutation of the Millenarist position. He denies that the faithful will enjoy a *terrenum regnum,* a time of temporal bliss; the second coming of Christ will usher in the *coeleste regnum,* the Fifth Kingdom of eternal blessedness. St. Augustine, too, puts off the fulfilment and the advent of Antichrist to an indefinable future in *De civitate Dei* XX, 23. That the end of the Roman Empire was reserved for the last times and the advent of Antichrist was not only a common early opinion, but it had notable later developments. We find it, for example, in Adso's *Libellus de Antichristo ad Gerbergam reginam* (*ca.* 950), where the continuance of the dignity of the Roman Empire in the Frankish kings is thought to hold off the fateful consequences of its final disappearance.[15] Humbert seems completely alien to the line of thought that recognized any such mystical significance in the heirs of the ancient *regnum Romanorum*: he accepts its utter destruction as an accomplished fact, and with it the destruction of all the ancient World Empires.

The climax of the whole piece is in this descriptive exaltation of the new universal society of the Church: the *coeleste regnum* in a non-eschatological sense, which has united all peoples in a kingdom already established and reigning on earth and invites all equally to reign forever with Christ. This is the *regnum* that had priority of succession to the City of Peter and Paul, which thus becomes the possession of the whole Church. Nothing further is said of the *terrenum regnum* beyond denying it this priority of succession. Whatever its identity, it too would seem to be a descendant of the Rome of the Apostles, since the destruction of the old *regnum Romanorum* makes it hard to see how it could have any survivors at all.

After this review of the text we may now consider certain questions that its interpretation presents, particularly in relation to the Roman-Byzantine situation. As in the case of Text A, the earliest comment is contained in Cardinal Deusdedit's *capitulatio*, which reads: *Comparatio veteris et novae Romae.*[16] In the first place it is to be noted that the terms *vetus* and *nova Roma* do not appear in the next itself. This is the language of Deusdedit and what he means seems clear. For him, and undoubtedly for his readers, *vetus Roma* meant pagan Rome and *nova Roma* is Christian Rome; both terms apply to two distinct ages in the life of the same city.[17] But this is a nomenclature being used some thirty-odd years after the text was written and is entirely different from the meaning of these terms for its author and his contemporaries. For Humbert always used *vetus*, or *antiqua Roma* for the city on the Tiber, and *Nova Roma* for Constantinople. This semantic change is in itself quite interesting and perhaps merits further investigation. For there is in some sense a revolution accomplished here by which *vetus Roma* has taken over the proud title of *Nova Roma*: in its own way an ideological *renovatio antiquae Romae.*

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[13] MGH Epist. I, p. 333. Also PL 77, 772B.

[14] Cf. H. Rowley, *Darius the Mede and the four World Empires in the Book of Daniel* (Cardiff, 1935), for a review of the 'Preterist and 'Futurist' interpretations of the early writers, espec. pp. 73 ff., and *Table* p. 184.

[15] PL 101, 1294D f.

[16] *Ed. cit.* (I, note 2 *supra*), p. 15 (the last *cap.* for *Lib.* I).

Furthermore, the text is not well described as a *comparatio* of Rome's two traditions, although this is certainly a striking feature of it. As I read it there are five distinct entities in presence: (a) the *Romana ecclesia*; (b) Rome as the *Romulea urbs*, and (c) as the *urbs Petri et Pauli*; (d) the *terrenum regnum*; and (e) the *coeleste regnum.* These provide, as it were, the *dramatis personae.* In the lengthy first paragraph (b) and (c) are carefully distinguished in order to clarify the titles of (a), the *Romana ecclesia.* This is done by instituting the sharpest possible contrast between the two distinct traditions of the City for the exaltation of the *urbs Petri et Pauli.* In the concluding paragraph priority of succession to this Rome is denied to (d), the *terrenum regnum,* and claimed for (e), the *coeleste regnum.*

For my part, this document, originating at the time of the controversy of 1053-1054 and written by one engaged in it, is only amenable to interpretation in the framework of that same controversy. Indeed it is difficult to understand the elements and construction of the piece apart from it. This in itself would seem to confirm its relation to that debate. As already recalled above, that debate was solely between the spokesmen of the Church of Rome, the *Ecclesia veteris Romae*, and those of the Church of Constantinople, the *Ecclesia novae Romae.* In Text B no mention is made of the Church of Constantinople, nor is there any reference to the basis of its dignity. However, in the first letter of Leo IX to Michael Cerularius, Humbert had expressed succinctly what he conceived that basis to be: a *privilegium honoris* that the bishop of the *civitas Constantini* be honored as the *regiae civitatis episcopus*, conferred by synodal enactments through the benevolence of her *pia mater Romana Ecclesia,* without prejudice to the rights of the ancient sees of Antioch and Alexandria; although Justinian had wished to augment this in civil law with a right of precedence second only to the Roman pope (c. 28).[18] And the patriarch was directly challenged to exhibit any other *dignitatis privilegium* over and above this, either real or putative (c. 29).[19] Thus the theme of the titles of ecclesiastical dignity based on the status of the city had already been introduced in the debate.

This same theme is taken up in Text B, which exhibits the titles of the Roman Church on the basis of its own city, by glorifying Rome as the *urbs Petri et Pauli*; it disclaims, at the same time, any indebtedness of this Church to the secular traditions of Rome as the *Romulea urbs,* which is vilified to sharpen the distinction between the two, even adopting to this end an exegesis of the *Apocalypse* by no means common.[20]

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[17] That Deusdedit did not take his rubric for Text B to refer to CPL, I infer from the fact that several rubrics in the index of *Lib.* I refer explicitly to CPL, but none indicates this text; nor does this rubric appear in proximity to the CPL rubrics. Deusdedit never uses *nova Roma* for CPL, as far as I find, in his *Coll. canonum.*

[18] PL 143, 763C.

[19] *Ibid.*, 763D.

[20] E. Allo, *Saint Jean-L'Apocalypse* (Coll. d'Etudes Bibliques, 3rd ed. Paris, 1933), pp. CCXXXV ff., provides a review of the commentators. This interpretation is not in the main tradition of the major patristic authorities, nor did it find place in the *Glossa ordinaria*. This view of Rome's secular past was not shared by Humbert's Italian con-

In the above passage to the patriarch (c. 28) on the status of his Church, the recognition of its ranking as the *ecclesia regiae civitatis* is in sharp contrast to the stand taken by Gelasius I.[21] This is a milestone on the road travelled since the Acacian troubles, for now the conferral of this *privilegium honoris* is attributed to the maternal concern of the Roman Church herself. Furthermore, Humbert was unmoved by canon 21 of the Fourth Council of Constantinople, recognizing second place to this see among the five patriarchates.[22] But in Text B an even more remarkable turn is the presentation of the titles of the Roman Church on the basis of the dignity of its own city: not on the evangelical and juridical titles of the *sedes Petri*, which Humbert expressed with vigor elsewhere, but on the whole complexus of eminent and unique titles of *vetus Roma* as the *urbs Petri et Pauli* described in the text. This was, in effect, to plead the case for the *Ecclesia veteris Romae* on grounds traditionally held by the spokesmen of the *Ecclesia novae Romae,* a thing no Roman spokesman had ever done before.

On an earlier and less momentous occasion for an exchange of views between spokesmen of *Nova Roma* and the Latin West, one of the themes used in Text B, namely the fratricide that desecrated the foundation of the *Romulea urbs*, had already been used by Bishop Liutprand of Cremona, emissary of Otto I to Constantinople in 968, as pointed out by P. Schramm.[23] This Lombard bishop chided his Byzantine hosts on that occasion for their pride in an inheritance which had such inglorious origins, and vituperates the ancient *Romani* and all who bore their name.[24] He also reports one palace conversation touching on the relative value of Rome's heritage that had fallen to her medieval heirs, which included a very disparaging Byzantine appraisal of what had been left behind when Constantine abandoned Rome for his new capital. This uncomplimentary outburst by a high official is related following his complaint that Pope John XIII had affronted the *sanctissimus imperator*, Nicephorus, by addressing him, not as *Romanorum,* but *Graecorum imperator*:

> *Relatio,* c. 51: . . . Audi ergo; sed papa fatuus, insulsus, ignorat Constantinum sanctum imperialia sceptra huc transvexisse, senatum omnem cunctamque Romanam militiam, Romae vero vilia mancipia, piscatores scilicet, cupediarios, aucupes, nothos, plebeios, servos, tantummodo dimisisse.[25]

Liutprand's *Relatio* could but have exacerbated feelings in the West and contributed to the lamentable progress in mutual misunderstanding of the subsequent period. It merits comparison with the writings of Humbert in 1053-1054 on more than one count. But the above declaration by a Byzantine dignitary is of interest in its own right as a *comparatio veteris et novae Romae*. The totality of the transfer by Constantine I is clear: *imperialia sceptra . . . senatum omnem cunctamque Romanam militiam*; all undoubtedly with their unbroken traditions from a proud past, glorious alike in the achievements of the civilians and the feats of the warriors. The abasement of Rome, on the other hand, could not be more profound or complete: no longer a city of free men, but the dwelling place

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temporaries, who had a reverence, not disdain for its traditions. On Bonizo of Sutri, cf. Fournier-LeBras, *Hist. des coll. canoniques* II, pp. 148 ff.; for P. Damiani and Amatus of Montecassino, cf. Schramm, *op. cit.* I, pp. 247 f.

[21] Gelasius rejected with ridicule the notion of civil rank as the basis of ecclesiastical dignity (Jaffé 664).

[22] *Actio* X, c. 21. PL 129, 159 (vers. of Anastas. Bibl.). Cf. A. Michel, *Humbert u. Kerullarios* I (1925), p. 58 on H.'s ideas on the patriarchates and of a return to the pre-Chalcedonian system of the Petrine sees (Rome, Alexandria, Antioch); *idem*, 'Die römischen Angriffe auf Michael Kerullarios wegen Antiocheia (1053/54)', *Byzantinische Zeitschr.* XLIV (Festschrift F. Dölger, 1951), 420 f.; *idem*, 'Der Kampf um das politische oder petrinische Prinzip' (note 34 *supra*), 517 ff.

[23] *Op. cit.* I, p. 244.

[24] *Relatio*, c. 12 (PL 136, 915).

[25] *Ibid.*, 929.

of slaves, an agglomeration of fishers and fowlers, cooks and menials, of the ill-born and the ill-bred. Truly the pope could not have known that he was shepherd to such a flock!

If these views had any currency in the West as representative of Byzantine opinion, they certainly suggest in general a reason for the *exaltatio veteris Romae* of Text B. Perhaps it may be allowed that they also suggest in particular the aptness of the elaborate listing of Rome's civic and military figures in Text B and its explicit reference to *senatus* and *curia civilis*; and also its "resettlement," with a noble host of confessors and martyrs, of old Rome: *quae non tam civitas hominum quam martyrum dicenda est cymiterium.*[26] I am not aware that Liutprand has been recognized among the writers known to Humbert, nor have I undertaken to examine the point in detail. But the very presence of such depreciatory ideas of *vetus Roma* in the West, which at least was assured in literate circles through the *Relatio* of Liutprand, is in itself a notable part of the background of Roman-Byzantine relations.

Moreover, the circumstances peculiar to the controversy of 1053-1054 and its ecclesiastical character make it possible to interpret the treatment of the *terrenum regnum* in Text B, which in any other context presents more than one difficulty. The Byzantine emperor, on this occasion, had neither initiated nor seconded the controversy. His active cooperation was being earnestly sought for joint action in South Italy against the Normans in territories recognized as part of his lawful jurisdiction, the two imperial themes in Italy. That Constantine (IX) Monomachus, whom Leo IX addresses as *gloriosus et religiosus imperator Novae Romae*,[27] was legitimate successor of Constantine I in the civil order, it was no part of current papal policy to deny. Much was hopefully expected from the cooperation of this exalted son, . . . *cujus fida ope statum sanctae et catholicae Ecclesiae relevari, et terreni imperii rempublicam meliorari confidamus.*[28] He was being urged to be a worthy successor of his most noble predecessor: . . . *cujus genealogia gloriaris et potentia magnificaris, cujusque de nomine dictam urbem famosam regis . . .*[29] Pope Leo carefully avoids using the title *imperator Graecorum*, which was always offensive in Byzantine eyes. It is noteworthy, by way of contrast, that the patriarch is not addressed as *patriarcha Novae Romae* in Leo's two letters, but simply as *Constantinopolitano episcopo*, or—*archiepiscopo*. In fact, on the Roman side in the correspondence, the term *Nova Roma* is never used in reference to the Church of Constantinople, but is reserved exclusively for the civil status. In the context of the current exchange, therefore, there is no doubt possible about the recognition of a legitimate *terrenum regnum* in the *Nova Roma* of Constantine and no quarrel with his namesake and successor, who presently rules there. On the contrary, every effort was made to observe a scrupulous courtesy in his regard.

What was thought, however, of the origin and nature of this *terrenum regnum* was also revealed in some detail in two places in Leo IX's letters on the foundation of Constantinople and its church and their relation to Rome. One passage appears in the first letter to the patriarch (c. 23-24) and its main burden is to elucidate the *mater-filia* relationship between the Churches of Rome and Constantinople, although it also touches upon the foundation of the new city.[30] The second passage is in the letter to the emperor just cited and is more revelatory of the ideas on the temporal rulership.[31] The foundation of Constantinople (and its church) was conceived to be the work of *antiqua Roma.* The transfer was made only after *antiqua Roma* had triumphed over the traditional tenth and final persecution. It was accomplished through her own *gloriosus filius,* Constantine I, whom she had raised to the supreme honor in the temporal order. And the same *antiqua Roma* had bestowed the imperial crown on his successor, Constantine IX, the present ruler of *Nova Roma.* In these passages no distinction is discernible between *antiqua Roma* and the *Romana Ecclesia.*

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[26] *Ed. cit.*, p. 132.

[27] Jaffé 4333. PL 134, 777.

[28] *Ibid.*, 777C.

[29] *Ibid.*, 778B.

[30] Et vere: nunquid enim Romana et apostolica sedes, quae per Evangelium genuit Latinam Ecclesiam in Occidente, mater non est CPLtanae Ecclesiae in Oriente . . . (PL 143, 760D f.). On the resemblances in these two chapters to Text B, cf. A. Michel, in Schramm, *op. cit.* II, p. 135.

[31] Porro haec catholica mater . . . aeterni

In my view this is the same temporal rulership that is referred to in Text B. The *terrenum regnum* is introduced in a negative way, only to deny that it had priority of succession over the *coeleste regnum* as heir to the *urbs Petri et Pauli.* It is not directly referred to otherwise, although its inheritance is indirectly reduced by cutting off its pre-Christian past. What is left for the first Christian prince to transfer to the Bosphorus are not the accumulated glories of the *Romulea urbs*, but the civil authority of Rome's new Christian era as the *urbs Petri et Pauli*; the old universal *regnum Romanorum* was completely destroyed. How these ideas on the *translatio imperii* would be received in Byzantine circles is, of course, quite another matter. But these considerations do explain the otherwise enigmatic treatment of the *terrenum regnum* here. It is a subject on which there was no reticence observed in the other items of the exchange. The *civitas Constantini* was heir to *antiqua Roma* in the civil order in a real, but clearly defined and limited sense. It provided scant grounds for exalting the Church of this *Nova Roma* when compared to the titles of the Roman Church on the basis of its own city, founded by Peter and Paul, which is what the cardinal from Lorraine set out to show.

This demonstration, however, is only one part of the piece. The climax comes in the conclusion with the introduction of the *coeleste regnum.* To take this to mean the *Ecclesia universalis* might appear at first sight to rob the whole piece of its meaning: for what then becomes of the *Ecclesia Romana*? In Humbert's conception the Roman Church was only one church among all the churches of Christ, *quae unam catholicam in toto mundo efficiunt*; but this church was the Church of Peter:

> cui proprie praesidet ipse qui coelestis regni meruit gubernacula obtinere, Domino Jesu Christo sibi dicente: Tibi dabo claves regni coelorum, et, in speciali potestate ligandi et solvendi, summi sacerdotii privilegium.[32]

As Peter's own church, it was the chief member, the *caput omnium ecclesiarum* (Text A and elsewhere); the ruling member, which in Peter and his vicars, the popes, held from Christ the *gubernacula coelestis regni,* the government of the whole kingdom of the Church. Thus the Roman Church is not excluded from consideration in the closing with the introduction of the *coeleste regnum.*

But what, then, is the peculiar force of the climax? In Text A Humbert introduces the theme that the *gloria capitis* is also the *gloria membrorum,* according to the Pauline figure (I *Cor.* xii, 26). This theme had been developed at length in the first letter to Patriarch Michael in a passage on the unity of the *corpus Christi, quod est Ecclesia* (c. 37-39). And in the same passage the patriarch was urged, by the observance of the divinely established *ordo corporis,* to share in the supreme dignity of the chief member: . . . *nolite invidere vel detrahere Romanae Ecclesiae apici, quem per charitatem totum valetis adipisci, et in nobis regnare et ipsi* (c. 38 *in fin.*).[33] By the love and respect of member for member,

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regni gloria cumulavit (777D-778B).

[32] Leo IX, *Ep.* I to M. Cer., c. 12 (PL 143, 752A).

[33] *Ibid.*, 768B.

the harmony of the body was not only enhanced, but the prerogatives and honors of the supreme member were shared as a common endowment of the whole by the other members. Seen in the light of this same theme the exalted dignity of Rome as the *urbs Petri et Pauli* is made the ornament of the whole Church, not the exclusive possession of the Roman Church. Thus the assertion of the titles of the *Romana Ecclesia* to respect as the church of this city concludes with the declaration of the rights of the other heirs to share in the glories of this same city, which the entire *coeleste regnum* can claim as its chief sanctuary and capital.

In the setting of the Roman-Byzantine controversy there is a notable absence of polemical utterance in Text B. The unique relationship of the *Romana ecclesia* with the *urbs Petri et Pauli* is made plain, but there is greater stress placed on the rehabilitation of *antiqua Roma*, against the background of Byzantine disparagement, than on the superior status of its church. In the passages cited above from the letters to the patriarch and emperor, the Roman spokesman is recalling past indebtedness, in his view, and insisting on the filial duty of respect for the special prerogatives of the Roman Church, especially on the part of the 'daughter-church' of Constantinople.[34] There *antiqua Roma* and *Romana Ecclesia* are used interchangeably. But in Text B the emphasis is not on what is owed the *Romana Ecclesia*, but on what *antiqua Roma* means to the Church universal as its beneficiary. Here *antiqua Roma* as the historic *urbs Petri et Pauli* is more amply described and distinguishable from the *Romana Ecclesia* as a separate juridical entity. Not the *Romana Ecclesia* alone but the *coeleste regnum* as a whole was heir to *antiqua Roma*, whose Christian victory was not the triumph of one church, but the victory by which was achieved the triumph of the whole Church. As in the case of Text A, the aim of the piece as a whole is revealed in the closing. Here again the aim is an appeal from the Roman position as conceived by Humbert for the unity of the universal Church, which in this instance is even more irenic than the warning tones of Text A. But whatever the intentions of its author, it is very doubtful how much this piece would move a more sophisticated Byzantine audience, which could hardly be expected to have been readier to accept a view of ancient Rome not shared by all even in the West, than the unhistorical views expressed in the letters on the origins of Constantinople and its Church, and the source of its civil power.[35]

As in the case of Text A, this product of the Roman-Byzantine relations in 1053-1054 is of interest to the historian not only for the light it sheds on the ideas at work in Rome in this controversy. It is also of interest for the conception of the Rome of Peter and Paul as the capital of the *coeleste regnum*, the Fifth Kingdom in a non-eschatological sense, uniting all the nations under its leadership.[36] This comes at the very moment when the rehabilitation of the Roman See under the Reform Papacy was about to make the influence of such ideas and ideals on the rapidly changing course of history in the West a practical possibility.[37]

This essay in internal criticism must leave unanswered many other questions concerning these two texts. The problem of their fate from the time of composition until they found their way into Cardinal Deusdedit's collection remains unsolved. If they were among the private papers of Humbert, how did they find their way

[34] Note 30-31 *supra*.

[35] Cf. A. Michel, 'Der Kampf um das politische oder petrinische Prinzip', 548 f.

[36] Cf. W. Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government* (1955), pp. 234 f., note 8, on the idea of the Fifth Kingdom, the *imperium Christi*, in the XIIIth century.

[37] Cf. G. Tellenbach, 'Die Bedeutung des Reformpapsttums für die Einigung des Abendlandes', *Studi Greg.* II (1947), pp. 125-149, who points out that the Christian East was in no wise ready to follow papal leadership in the unification of Europe and was in fact further estranged by it (p. 140).

to Rome? Why are they not included in what Anton Michel calls the *Briefbuch* of Humbert, or *corpus* of his writings in the controversy with Constantinople?[38] Is it possible that they were among papers of Leo IX brought back to Rome, where they were preserved, and thus accessible to Deusdedit? I remain strongly inclined to believe that these pieces were originally written not as literary manifestos, but with the intention of presenting them as oral messages on some specific occasion. Julia Gauss suggests that Text B was written before, or even during, the 1054 mission to Constantinople.[39] Were they intended to be ready for use there on some formal occasion of the legation? Or were they intended for delivery at the Council of Bari, about which we know so little, but at which Pope Leo spoke and Cardinal Humbert assisted just before the papal legates left Italy for the East?[40] The answers cannot be supplied by conjecture, but will only be made possible with new evidence that research may one day provide.

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[38] Cf. I, note 27 *supra*.

[39] *Art. cit.*, p. 43, note 1 (note I, 24 *supra*).

[40] Humbert, *Rationes de s. Spiritus processione*, c. 5, 2: . . . sed et sapientissimus iam supra nominatus papa Leo tale me audiente in Barensi concilio coram universis, qui aderant, de s. Spiritus processione a P. et F. dedit exemplum . . . (ed. A. Michel, *Humbert u. Kerullarios* I, p. 101). Cf. S. Runciman, *The Eastern Schism* (1955), p. 47.

Themistius' Paraphrasis of the Posterior Analytics in Gerard of Cremona's Translation

edited by

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The Manuscripts.

HE text of this edition has been established from three manuscripts.

M:—Munich, Staatsbibliothek, MS. Lat. Clm. 317, ff. 129r—151r. See G. Lacombe, *Aristoteles Latinus*, pars prior (Rome, 1939), p. 722, no. 1017. End of 13th or early 14th c. I am grateful to Dr. Daniel Callus O.P. for his examination of this MS.

P:—Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS. Lat. 16097, ff. 226r—237v. See G. Lacombe, *Aristoteles Latinus*, pp. 559-560, no. 668. End of 13th or early 14th c., a MS. bequeathed to the Sorbonne by James of Padua, concerning whom, see *Histoire littéraire de la France*, XXXVI (Paris, 1927), p. 425.

T:—Toledo, Biblioteca Capitular, MS. Lat. 17.14, ff. 54r—77v. See L. Minio-Paluello, *Aristoteles Latinus*, pars posterior (Cambridge, 1955), p. 851, no. 1229; also José Millas Vallicrosa, *Las traducciones orientales en los manuscritos, Catedral de Toledo*, (Madrid, 1942), pp. 49-50. 13th c.

Of the three manuscripts *T* is surely the best. *P* is very poor, abounding, as it does, in numerous absurd readings. *M* carries a text which compromises between *P* and *T*; it has been extensively corrected, often with a marginal note to the effect that another MS. reads differently; these notes are often preceded by *alias* or *in alio*. Yet, in spite of its many corrections it is, I think, inferior to *T*. In a number of cases corrections have been introduced into *M* without the original reading being deleted. A portion of its text has been copied out of order; this has been noted in the proper place. All of the MSS have numerous marginal notes which are, for the most part, either corrections or indices. There is one curious exception in *M*, f. 151r: *Deficit hic multum de litera commenti Aristotelis libri, cujus gratia reus est derisione expositor cum defecerit in difficilibus.* I am inclined to agree with the annotator. *T* lacks the last part of chapter 19 of book II; its text ends at *p.* 63, *l.* 15 of the Greek, as found in M. Wallies, 'Themistii Analyticorum Posteriorum Paraphrasis', *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, (Berlin, 1900), pp. 1-66.

The Edition

Since *T* appears to be of superior quality, it seemed best to use it as the basis of the edition. Except in cases where *T* is evidently corrupt I have followed its readings in the hope, at least, of providing a traditional text, and not one which would be neither that of Gerard of Cremona nor of any historical influence. Because of the numerous corruptions of *P* many of its variant readings have not been noted; nonetheless, each time these might be of even doubtful service to the reader, they can be found in the *apparatus criticus*. Again, unless affecting the meaning, or caused by differences in the original language, variants of moods and genders have not been set down. This is true also of variants due merely to pronunciation, such as *sit* and *scit*. None of the scribes is consistent in his use of *non scire* and *nescire*; such details have not been recorded.

Although the Latin text is more or less faithful to the Greek, there are, nonetheless, serious divergencies; this is all the more emphasized by the pronounced Arabic stamp of the Latin prose style. For an analysis of the thought of Themistius, with its curious mixture of Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic and Euclidian elements, recourse must be had to the Greek text. Nevertheless, the Latin translation has exercised a considerable influence on mediaeval commentaries; this I shall attempt to prove at a later date.

For some reason or other Gerard of Cremona has left a few Arabic expressions in the text, which the scribes have not been too successful in interpreting. I am grateful to Professor M. Wickens, professor of Arabic, department of Near Eastern Studies, University of Toronto, for his many suggestions, without which I could not have resolved the difficulties raised thereby. Any misuse, however, of these suggestions is my own responsibility. The proper names are very often corrupted beyond recognition. Foreign names were not current in Arabic; Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hippocrates and Galen represent about the sum total of Greek names mentioned in Arabic. Ghazali taunted the 'Arab rationalists' with the fact that they let themselves be bewitched by such terrifying names as Suqrat, Buqrat, Aflatun and Aristatalis. Some of the disagreements between the Greek and Latin texts are due, I suspect, to the ambiguity in the Arabic intermediary, e.g. *homoios* and *obediens* through *numtathil*, *dianoia* and *providentia* through *hikma*; likewise the confusion between *propria* and *proportio* can probably be traced to the problem already existing in the Arabic. Gerard was evidently impressed with the difficulty of rendering exactly the Arabic *al-ʿaql* into Latin and therefore left it as *alachil*.

The excellent edition of Gerard of Cremona's translation of the *Posterior Analytics* by L. Minio-Paluello, in *Aristoteles Latinus*, IV, 3 (Bruges, Paris, 1954) has been of considerable help in establishing the text of the present edition. The Renaissance edition of a Latin translation from the Greek has, at times, been of some service. See *Themistii Euphradae Peripatetici Nobilissimi, Paraphrasis in Posteriora Analytica Aristotelis, Interprete Hermalao Barbaro, Patritio Veneto, Viro Clarissimo*, (Venice, 1552), pp. 1r—13r.

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The chapters are numbered according to the Greek Text, Maximilianus Wallies, 'Themistii Analyticorum Posteriorum Paraphrasis', *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca,* V (Berlin, 1900), 1-88. These in turn coincide with the chapter headings in the text of Aristotle.

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INCIPIT COMMENTUM
Themistii Super Librum Posteriorum

LIBER PRIMUS

PROLOGUS

SCIO quod si intendo[2] ad exponendum[3] unamquamque litteram libri Aristotelis, cum jam praecesserint me ad illud[4] illi, qui praecesserunt me, ex expositoribus[5] librorum ejus,[6] quamvis multi fuerint, et secundum finem scientiae eorum in ipsis, non ero longinquus, quin comparer in illo ad multiplicationem in qua non est comprehensio. Cum ego[7] non inveniam illos,[8] qui fuerunt ante me, abbreviatos in multitudine eorum, qui conati sunt, inde[9] et qui[10] intendit propter pauca puncta edere librum totum est sicut vir, de quo narratur, qui voluit confringere simulacrum, quod fabricavit kidis,[11] cum decoratione suae artis et bonitate suae fabricationis, quoniam putavit quod erat ei possibile ponere ligamentum basis decentius et melius. Et quamvis non videatur mihi hoc[12] esse rectum, tamen video quod si intendam ad intentiones quae sunt[13] in libris ejus et colligam eas et[14] enuntiem[15] de eis, prout planiore sermone mihi possibile fuerit similiore[16] viae hujus sapientis in brevitate, incedam jam[17] in illo itinere juvativo[18] ad quod[19] non antecedit[20] aliquis.[21] Et de utilitate quidem ejus est quod qui aspicit in eo quod[22] composui[23] ex eo, et[24] non aspexit in libris hujus sapientis, formantur in anima[25] ejus intentiones ad quas intendit.[26]

Et est ad intelligendum illud in quo considerat ex libris ejus velocior. Et est absolutio ejus, quod occultavit et clausit in eis, facilior ei. Et qui aspicit in illo, postquam jam consideravit in libris ejus est rememoratio ejus[27] de eo, quod jam quandoque legit in libris illis, facilior.[28] Et excusatur a multitudine iterationum[29] in eis, si illud est ei grave propter longitudinem eorum et ipsorum difficultatem.

Et propter illud vidi propterea[30] quod rogasti me ut exponam tibi[31] librum suum *in Demonstratione*,[32] cum habeas de[33] doctrina manifesta et de[34] dilectione pura; cum quo confidam quod[35] non[36] effugiet te aliquid ejus, si pertranseam in eo quod aequum est,[37] aut ut retineas quin facias[38] me rememorari aliquid, si sciveris (54v) illud ex libro,[39] ut incedam in expositione illius tibi hac semita, quod[40] nos quidem invenimus hunc[41] virum usum fuisse occultatione et scienter[42] in multis suis libris.

Et invenimus ipsum fecisse[43] illud in hoc[44] libro suo proprie ex duobus modis. Quorum unus est quia ipse utitur brevitate, et est ejus consuetudo, et alter est quia ipse non distinguit capitula quae sunt[45] in eo et facit singulare unumquodque capitulum eorum per se. Quod si videris me[46] in aliquibus capitulis pertransisse

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[1] incipit commentum Themistii super eandem translationem posteriorum analyticorum *T;* other headings are, for the most part, my additions.

[2] intendero ? *T.*

[3] exponendam *M.*

[4] illum *P*; *a frequent confusion in P.*

[5] me expositores *M*; *om.* ex *P.*

[6] *om. M.*

[7] ergo *M.*

[8] eos *M.*

[9] veri ? *T.*

[10] quod *P.*

[11] krides *T*; *corrected from* heredas *M;* Pheidiou *gr. tx.*

[12] *om. P.*

[13] sint *P.*

[14] *om. P.*

[15] enuntiatione *P.*

[16] si meliore via *M*; et simili omnes vias *P.*

[17] ideo *M.*

[18] *corrupt T.*

[19] a quo *P.*

[20] antecessit *P.*

[21] Aristoteles *M.*

[22] quo *MP.*

[23] *add.* ab *P.*

[24] *om. T.*

[25] aliqua ? *P.*

[26] *add.* Aristoteles *M.*

[27] est *P.*

[28] faciliorum *MP.*

[29] iterationis *M*; irationis *P.*

[30] *om. P.*

[31] sibi *T.*

[32] For a list of the titles of the books of the *Organon* cf. Ibrahim Madkowr, *L'organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe*, (Paris, 1934), pp. 10–11.

[33] *om. P.*

[34] *om. T.*

[35] quae *P.*

[36] *om. PT.*

[37] ei *P.*

[38] facies *P.*

[39] isto *M*; illo *P.*

[40] et quod *M*; et *T.*

[41] *add.* librum *P.*

[42] scientur *T.*

[43] *add.* hoc *P.*

[44] in suo libro *P.*

[45] dicit *MT.*

[46] *om. P.*

quantitatem sermonis ejus ad illud quod est longius eo, tunc excusatio in illo erit manifesta, quoniam[47] impossibile est ut sit sermo meus manifestior sermone ejus quantitate ejus aequalis[48] ei. Et si videris me permutavisse aliquid a loco, in quo dixit illud,[49] ad alium, non videatur tibi extraneum illud.[50] Ego namque non permutavi[51] totum quod permutavi nisi ad locum qui est ei convenientior, donec sit[52] omne capitulum singulare per se et completum quod meretur.

Et si inveneris me praetermisisse iterum[53] dicere quaedam quae ipse dicit, non oportet ut videatur tibi extraneum illud, quoniam vir iste[54] in libro suo dicit[55] res quae sunt de scientia dialecticae; verumtamen[56] per eas[57] non fit juvamentum in eo ad quod intendimus de scientia demonstrationis proprie. Et cum[58] intentio est ad intelligendum illud, quod[59] fit juvamentum in hoc capitulo proprie, et dimittitur[60] studium suum in eo[61] quod est praeter[62] illud a se, non oportet ut occupetur super illud.[63]

CAPITULUM PRIMUM[1]

Qui studiose, inquit,[2] intendit ad discendum[3] aliquid, quidquid sit, aut[4] ex arte aut aliis, aut ad aliquam[5] scientiarum comprehensam[6] mente quamcumque[7] scientiarum[8] intendit[9] ne labor ejus in ipsa in vanum prodeat,[10] procul dubio est non excusatus quin habeat scientiam alicujus extremitatis rei ad quam[11] intendit ante disciplinam. Quoniam[12] non est possibile ut sit totum, quod addiscit discipulus de esse rei, ad quam intendit, propter magistrum, immo necessarium est ut cum discipulo sint res juvantes ipsum ad discendum[13] illud quod addiscit. Addiscit enim discipulus a geometra[14] quod punctum[15] est illud cui non est pars. Et non intelligit illud ab eo nisi per illud prius formatum est in anima ejus de intentione partis. Et addiscit ab arithmetico[16] quod numerus impar est qui[17] non dividitur in duas[18] partes aequales. Et non intelligit illud ab eo nisi per illud quod prius[19] scivit de aequali et inaequali. Et non tantum scientiarum disciplinae, sed omnium artium per hanc existunt viam. Ei[20] namque, qui cementariam addiscit, non est possibile ipsam addiscere ex magistro suo nisi postquam prius[21] cognoscit lutum et lapides et reliqua quae narret[22] ei, et ad quae[23] innuit ei[24] magister ejus. Et ille qui addiscit cerdonicam scientiam non addiscit eam nisi postquam prius[25] intelligit[26] rem qua indiget in illa. Et similiter est dispositio[27] in fabricatione navis et argentaria[28] et reliquis artibus. Et hoc (129$^{\text{v}}$) quod narravimus manifestius est in doctrina quae est per sermonem sicut doctrina opificum[29] Topicae et opificum[29] sermonis per quem intenditur[30] intentio[31] non sufficiendi ei ad quem fit sive per verum sit illud sive per falsum.

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[47] quando *P.*

[48] aequali *P;* aequale *T.*

[49] aliud *T.*

[50] ad aliud *P.*

[51] pervertam *P.*

[52] *om. P.*

[53] *om. P.*

[54] *om. T.*

[55] dixit *M.*

[56] videtur tamen *P.*

[57] ea *P; corr.* ea *from* eas *M.*

[58] cujus *M; om. T.*

[59] quo *M.*

[60] dimittit *M.*

[61] hoc *M.*

[62] propter *T.*

[63] illum *P.*

[1] incipit explanatio Themistii super libro Aristotelis de arte resolutiva capitulum, *marginal M.*

[2] inquit qui studiose *T.*

[3] studium *P;* discernendum *T.*

[4] *om. P.*

[5] aliam *T.*

[6] *add.* in alio sillogismo *T.*

[7] quamque *P.*

[8] scientiam *T; corr. from* sententiam *M.*

[9] intendat *M.*

[10] pereat *T.*

[11] quem *P.*

[12] unde *P.*

[13] discernendum *T.*

[14] geometro *P.*

[15] punctus *MP.*

[16] arismetico *habitually written thus; perhaps based on mediaeval etymology*: Ab ares et rithmos. Cf. Huguccio, *Liber Derivationum, MS.*, Cambridge, Gonville and Caius. 459/718, fol. 15*vb.*

[17] *om.* est qui *P;* est quia *M.*

[18] *om. P.*

[19] *add.* quod *P.*

[20] et *P; corr. from* ei quidem *M.*

[21] *om. P; del M.*

[22] narrantur *P.*

[23] quid *P.*

[24] *om. P.*

[25] *om. P.*

[26] *add.* in animo proprietatem coriorum et eorum quae fiunt *T; add.* in alia: proprietatem coriorum et eorum quae fiunt ex eis *M. Evidently M based on two versions; perhaps* proprietatem . . . ex eis *was a gloss, since it cannot fit into the syntax of the sentence, which is correct in P.*

[27] dispositus *P.*

[28] *lacuna T.*

[29] opificis *P.*

Opifices enim Topicae utuntur sillogismo composito qui est per inductionem, et sillogismus est sumptus ex particularibus, et[32] sillogismo composito qui nominatur sillogismus, et est sumptus ex universalibus.

Et opifices[33] sufficientiae utuntur[34] sillogismo, qui nominatur compositus, per occultationem. Et est sillogismus diminutus, et semita ejus est semita sillogismi sumpta ex universalibus. Et utuntur[34] sillogismo simulativo. Et est sillogismus per exemplum et semita ejus est semita sillogismi sumpti ex particularibus. Et necesse est in omnibus his[35] sillogismis ut discipulus prius sciat res particulares et propositiones universales et quae sunt eis similia. Et non tantum addiscens ab illo alio est[36] qui indiget eo quod narravimus, sed qui quaerit etiam per se comprehendere et[37] per cogitationem suam (55^{r}) scientiam alicujus rerum, non potest comprehendere quod occultum est ab eo et non scit illud, nisi quando cum eo sunt res manifeste planae, per quas ducatur super eam. Si ergo est quod narravimus verum, tunc[38] et omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina, quae sunt per sillogismum, non sunt nisi a scientia praecedente.

Et non oportet ut te consequatur dubitatio in eo quod diximus, propter illud quod cognoscitur sensu, cum non sit in eo necessarium prius scire aliquid ante ejus cognitionem, propterea quod cognitio illius, quod non est per disciplinam neque per viam sillogisticam; et ex rebus sunt[39] in scientia, quarum cogitur discipulus addiscere prius res ante eas.[40] Et ex rebus sunt[41] quaedam quae cogunt discipulum[42] ad sciendum eas vel in scientia earum[43] prius addiscere res ante eas.

Quod[44] enim in earum scientia est necessario,[45] praemittendum[46] ante[47] ipsas est secundum duos modos. Quod est quoniam ex rebus,[48] in quibus[49] sunt, oportet prius scire[50] quod sunt.[51] Et ex rebus sunt in quibus oportet ut intelligatur intentio, quam significat dictio, quae[52] de ea enuntiatur. Cum enim cogitamus quare[53] lapis magnetis attrahit ferrum, jam ante illud scimus quod attrahit ipsum. Et quando volumus scire quid sit motus aut quid sit[54] tempus,[55] tunc jam scimus ante illud quod motus est et[56] quod tempus.[57]

Iste ergo unus est duorum modorum in cujus scientia fit antecessio. Modus vero[58] alter est quando intendimus in inquisitione de aliqua rerum occultarum ad hoc ut sciamus an res sit aut[59] non sit virtus aut instrumentum naturale aut moralitas,[60] sicut inquisitio an[61] in corporibus an in[62] aliis sit natura praeparans ea aut[63] non. Oportet enim ante illud ut intelligamus intentionem quam[64] significat nomen quo nominatur res de qua quaerimus, quoniam non est nobis[65] possibile ut sciamus an res sit[66] nisi sciamus quid[67] significet nomen quo nominatur. Et possibile est nobis ut sciamus quid significet[68] nomen quo nominatur praeter[69] quod sciamus quod est, sicut nos[70] intelligimus intentionem quam significat[71] noster sermo 'hircocervus', praeter quod[72] sciamus quod est. Verum[73] et[74] non oportet ut[75] putemus quod scientia ejus quam[76] significat nomen quo nominatur res, est scientia definitionis significantis substantiam rei, quid[77] est. Verum oportet quod sciamus quod differentia inter hoc, ut sciamus quid[77] sit res et ut sciamus quid[77] significet[78] nomen, est magna valde.

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[30] *add.* item *P.*
[31] *add,* non *P.*
[32] *add.* in *T.*
[33] *add.* oratores *T.*
[34] utantur *T.*
[35] istis *P.*
[36] *om. T.*
[37] et cogitationem suam *M;* et cogitatione sua *P.*
[38] *om. P.*
[39] *om* et ex rebus sunt *MP.*
[40] ipsas *P.*
[41] *om.* et . . . sunt *T.*
[42] scientiam *T.*
[43] *om.* vel . . . earum *PT.*
[44] quid *P.*
[45] necessarium *P.*
[46] prius intendendi *P.*
[47] apud *T.*
[48] nihil extra in rebus *P.*
[49] *add.* sunt *P.*
[50] *om.* prius scire *P.*
[51] sit scire *P.*
[52] qua *M.*
[53] qualiter *M.*
[54] *om. M.*
[55] temporis *P.*
[56] aut *M.*
[57] *add.* est *M.*
[58] autem *M.*
[59] an *P.*
[60] *om.* in alio: virtus aut instrumentum naturale aut moralitas *P; marg. M.*
[61] ante *P.*
[62] animalis *T.*
[63] an *M.*
[64] quid *P.*
[65] *om. P.*
[66] *add.* vel non *P.*
[67] quoniam *T.*
[68] *om.* quid significet *M.*
[69] ita *T.*
[70] *om. P.*
[71] significet *M.*
[72] quam *T.*
[73] *om. T.*
[74] *om. P.*

Intentionem[79] enim quam significat unaquaeque[80] harum dictionum jam intelligit qui non contemplatus[81] est in aliqua doctrina, nedum alius.[82] Nullus enim puerorum est qui linguam intelligit, quando praecipitur ei ut vocet hominem, qui afferat equum, nec[83] quando praecipitur ut[84] afferat pulvinar, qui afferat aquam. Et sit[85] difficile ut sciat quid sit unaquaeque harum[86] rerum, et quid sit substantia[87] ejus, ei qui non exercuit se ipsum in illo et assiduationem[88] considerationis in eo.

Jam igitur manifestum est ex eo, quod ante diximus, quod differentia inter hoc ut[89] cognoscamus rem et ut addiscamus[90] non est parva, quoniam cognitio quandoque est rei quam cognovimus[91] ante et disciplina non est ejus quod ante scivimus. Et cognitor quidem cognoscit[92] quod ante cognovit et non addiscit quod ante scivit, quamvis sit possibile ut cognoscamus rem quando vidimus[93] eam,[94] et sciamus ejus esse[95] simul. Verum illud est in rebus quas comprehendit res universalis, cujus scientia jam praecessit apud nos, antequam videremus[96] rem illam individualem. Ille enim qui scit quod tres anguli[97] omnis trianguli sunt aequales duobus rectis antequam sciat quod[98] figura descripta coram eo (226^{v}) sit triangulus, cum imprimis videt eum,[1] cognoscit ipsum et scit scientiam angulorum ejus in dispositione una. Verumtamen illud non est ex modo uno, sed[2] cognoscit quia est triangulus et scit videndo ipsum cum[3] cognitione ejus quod anguli ejus tres sunt aequales duobis rectis. Quod est quoniam ipse non cognoscit quod[4] est triangulus nisi in hora visionis ejus; sed esse angulorum ejus trium et quod sunt aequales duobus rectis jam[5] praecessit scientia illius apud ipsum. Et ad summum inveniuntur in scientia trianguli formati duae res, quarum una est quod[6] est triangulus et altera quod anguli (130^{r}) ejus sunt aequales duobus rectis. Cognitio[7] igitur[8] quod est triangulus non est nisi per sensum; scientia vero angulorum ejus et quod sunt aequales duobus rectis non est nisi per sillogismum, quoniam comprehendens hoc capitulum (55^{v}) non est sensus, sed est sillogismus et demonstratio.[9]

Et demonstratio non est nisi per illud cujus scientia praecessit apud nos ex re universali. Quod est quia oportet, cum haec sit dispositio omnis trianguli et sit hic triangulus, ut sit illa dispositio ejus. Dum ergo permanet triangulus formatus in tabula occultus a sensu, tunc oportet ex modo alio[10] ut dicamus quod sciamus esse ejus. Et oportet ex modo alio ut dicamus quod sciamus esse ejus. Et oportet ex modo altero ut dicamus[11] quod nescimus[12] ipsum. Quod est quoniam[13] non oportet ut absolvamus sermonem et dicamus quod nos scimus quod anguli ejus sunt aequales duobus rectis, cum nesciamus quod est triangulus, neque absolute dicamus quod nescimus[14] esse ejus, cum nos[15] sciamus[16] rem communem universalem,[17] quae[18] comprehendit ipsum.[19]

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[75] quod *P.*

[76] quod *PT.*

[77] quod *P.*

[78] significat *T.*

[79] intentione *M.*

[80] unaquaque *M.*

[81] contemptus *P.*

[82] nedum alius: ne tamen enim *P.*

[83] *add.* ut *M.*

[84] quod *P.*

[85] fit *MP.*

[86] iterum *M.*

[87] scientia *P;* scientia *superscript M.*

[88] corrupt. *P.*

[89] quod *P;* quod *corr. to* ut *M.*

[90] discamus *M.*

[91] cognoscimus *T.*

[92] cognitorum qui cognoscunt *P.*

[93] videmus *M.*

[94] causam *P.;* eam *corr. to* causam *M.*

[95] *corr. to* causam *M.*

[96] videamus *P;* videremus *corr. to* videamus *M.*

[97] trianguli *T.*

[98] *om. M.*

[1] eam *M.*

[2] si *M.*

[3] *om. PT.*

[4] quoniam *M.*

[5] *om. T.*

[6] ut *M.*

[7] si ergo *P.*

[8] quidem *M.*

[9] *om.* et demonstratio *MP.*

[10] aliquo *T.*

[11] *om.* quod sciamus . . . dicamus *T.; marg.* ejus esse et oportet ex modo altero M.

[12] *corr. from* nos scimus *M.*

[13] enim *P.*

[14] nesciamus *P.*

[15] om. *MT.*

[16] scimus *T.*

[17] *om. P.*

[18] quod *T.*

[19] *om. P.*

Et propter illud[20] non oportet ut eveniat[21] nobis protervitas, qua utuntur, errare facientes in eo quod occultant. Quod est quoniam ipsi occultant binarium. Deinde interrogant illum cum quo loquuntur et dicunt ei: 'Scis quod omnis binarius est par?' Cum ergo 'ita', dicit,[22] detegunt binarium quem ipsi occultaverant. Deinde dicunt:[23] 'Nescivisti usque ad hunc finem quod ille binarius esset, neque quod esset[24] neque quod esset par.[25] Si ergo dixeris cum hoc quod[26] jam scivisti eum, tunc[27] necessarium[28] est inde[29] ut sit[30] res una scita et non scita'[31] Et nos dicimus quod illud non est mirandum. Quod est quia[32] nos scimus rem universalem inhaerentem[33] omni binario. Et potest esse ut non[34] sciamus de re hujus numeri ejusdem quod est binarius, dum non apparet nobis. Et non[35] est res,[36] quam[37] scimus tunc, illud ipsum quod ignoramus. Verum scimus[38] rem universalem et ignoramus rem particularem. Et exemplum illius est[39] quod scimus, quod omnis homo est vivus,[40] et potest esse ut sit in terra Indorum in hac nostra[41] hora homo[42] ambulans; et nesciamus quod ipse est[43] homo neque quod[44] est vivus. Et non oportet ut sit responsio in hac quaestione, secundum quod quidam respondent in ea et dicunt: 'Nos nescimus quod omnis binarius sit par; verum non scimus nisi quod omnis binarius, quem scimus esse binarium, est par'. Haec enim responsio non est sana, quoniam ipsi non sciunt[45] nisi rem super quam fit ejus[46] demonstratio; et [47] demonstratio non erigitur secundum hanc conditionem[48] quod binarius, quem sciunt esse binarium, est par. Verum[49] demonstratio erigitur[50] absolute quod omnis binarius est par et omnis trianguli anguli tres sunt aequales duobus rectis angulis.[51] Et non est inconveniens in eo quod video ut addiscens in habitudine disciplinae[52] suae sciat rem et ignoret rem, et praecedat apud[53] eum scientia rei et sit in inquisitione[54] et perscrutatione de re. Et hoc eodem sermone[55] oportet uti in destructione[56] protervitatis, quam dixit Plato in[57] libro suo quem nominavit nomine *Menonis*.

Et intentio in illa protervitate est ut ostendat per ipsam quod quaestio et inquisitio est vana, quoniam omni quaerenti non est necessarium ut quaerat nisi illud quod non novit; et non potest, qui non novit rem, quaerere eam, cum ipse non novit[58] ipsam[59] quod est. Quod[60] si[61] accidat ei ut inveniat eam non sciet quod ipsa sit res quam quaerit: nam si omnis quaestio non est nisi ut sciat quaerens rem quam[62] quaerit[63] et de qua perscrutatur, et non est possibile[64] ut quaerat quod novit, tunc non est possibile ut sciat quod non scivit.[65] Jam ergo remanet una duarum rerum, aut ut non addiscamus neque sciamus[66] aliquid, aut ut non discamus et sciamus nisi quod jam scivimus,[67] quoniam nos[68] non cognoscimus rem nisi quando invenimus eam et quia est res in inquisitione cognitionis, cujus fuimus,[69] quando[70] jam cognovimus eam.

Et exemplum[71] illius est quod non potest quaerere servum fugientem, donec inveniat ipsum qui non cognovit eum; illi[72] vero qui eum cognovit possibile est ut quaerat et inveniat ipsum. Et nos[73] quidem invenimus Platonem quasi[74] concessisse auctoribus hujus[75] ratiocinationis.[76] Et dignius quidem est ut nominetur errare faciens, vel deceptio,[77] non ratiocinatio. Et fortasse est ut dicat[78] quod[79] non addiscimus nisi quod jam novimus quoniam posuit[80] disciplinam[81] rememorationem et res apud eum est quod non est disciplina discentis ad illud, quod addiscit aliquid, nisi ut cognoscat illud. Apud nos vero ista duo sunt diversa et illud quod hic[82] dicimus est quod nos non addiscimus, et docemur, nisi quod nescimus[83] ante, et nos non cognoscimus[84] nisi illud, quod jam cognovimus, antequam ostendatur nobis. Et non est inconveniens si docens et discens[85] rem in dispositione suae disciplinae et suae doctrinae cognoscat eam. Verumtamen illud est ex modo et nos jam praemisimus (130^{v}) et narravimus modum quo illud est. Et dicimus omnino (56^{r}) quod omnis doctrina et disciplina non componuntur nisi a rebus super quas conveniunt, manifestis quibus ostenditur res, quae non fuit manifesta. Jam ergo manifestum est ex eo quod narravimus quod est possibile ut quaeramus et perscrutemur[86] et ut[87] ostendemus[88] et demonstremus. Et sequitur illud ut sciamus quid est demonstratio.

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[20] hoc *M.*
[21] conveniat *T.*
[22] dicunt *P.*
[23] dicit *T.*
[24] *om.* neque quod esset *M.*
[25] *om.* neque . . . par *P.*
[26] *add.* tu *M.*
[27] *om. P.*
[28] necesse *P.*
[29] tum *P.*
[30] scit *P.*
[31] *om.* et non scita *T.*
[32] *om.* est quit *P.*
[33] *add.* in *MP.*
[34] ne *T.*
[35] nos *T.*
[36] *om. T.*
[37] quando *T.*
[38] sciamus *P.*
[39] *om. M.*
[40] unus *P.*
[41] *om. T.*
[42] *om. T.*
[43] sit *M.*
[44] *om. T.*
[45] nesciunt *P.*
[46] eis *P.*
[47] sed *P.*
[48] contradictionem *P.*
[49] unde *M.*
[50] exigitur *M.*
[51] *om. M.*
[52] scientiae *M.*
[53] ante *T.*
[54] adquisitione *T.*
[55] modo *s.s. M.*
[56] demonstratione *T.*
[57] *om. P.*
[58] noscat *M;* sciant *P.*
[59] eam et *M.*
[60] quia *MT.*
[61] quod *T.*
[62] *add.* ipse *M.*
[63] *om. P;* alias: non sciet eam quod ipsa est res quam quaerit non cognoscit eam *marginal M.*
[64] *add.* vel *M.*
[65] scit *M.P.*
[66] *om.* neque sciamus *P.*
[67] scimus *P.*
[68] *om. P.*
[69] sumimus *P.*
[70] cum *P.*
[71] ex vi *T.*
[72] ille *P.*

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM

Dico ergo quod scientia dicitur[1] secundum modos diversos. Quod est quia[2] dicitur per viam[3] transumptionis secundum intentionem communem[4] et dicitur vere[5] secundum intentionem propriam. Secundum intentionem quidem communem,[6] quando nominamus inventionem omnis,[7] quod invenimus, qualitercumque inveniamus illud, scientiam[8] sive sit illud per illud, quod concomitatur[9] rem per viam accidentis, aut aliter. Et secundum intentionem[10] propriam veram[11] scientia[12] non est nisi quando verificatur apud nos quod nos jam invenimus causam propter quam est esse illius rei quam scimus et scimus quia est[13] causa ejus, et credimus necessario quod[14] non est possibile[15] ut sit aliter. Et ex eo quod significat[16] quod scientia vera non est nisi ista et[17] quod omnis qui intendit ut sciat rem, tunc si non scit[18] eam, videt[19] quod oportet ut[20] sit ad sciendum eam secundum hanc dispositionem. Et si jam scivit eam, tunc est de esse ejus secundum hanc dispositionem.

Et dicitur scientia vera secundum modos alios. Et[21] ex illis est quod scientia definitionum est scientia quae dicitur vera, et scientia radicum communium, quae non indigent[22] demonstratione, est ex scientia quae dicitur vera. Verumtamen nos non[23] indigemus in hoc loco nisi ut sciamus quod haec species, quam narravimus,[24] scientiae est[25] ex scientia quae dicitur vera; et haec species scientiae est quam nominamus scientiam demonstrativam. Quod est quia demonstratio non est nisi sillogismus compositus necessario creditus.[26] Cum ergo oporteat ut sint propositiones, quas praemittit utens sillogismo,[27] causa

[73] non *T.*

[74] *corr* to ita *M.*

[75] *om. P.*

[76] rationis *P.*

[77] *om.* vel deceptio *T; marg. M.*

[78] *add.* scilicet propinquum *T; del. M.*

[79] et *T.*

[80] possint *M;* ponit *P.*

[81] discipulum *P.*

[82] de hoc *MP.*

[83] nos non scimus *M;* scimus *T.*

[84] cognovimus *MP.*

[85] et addiscens *after* dispositione *T.*

[86] perscutationem *M.*

[87] *om. MP.*

[88] ostendamus *MT.*

[1] *om. P.*

[2] quod *P.*

[3] summam *P.*

[4] convenientem *M.*

[5] vera *P.*

[6] *corr. from* convenientem *M.*

[7] omnem *P; corr. from* omnem *M.*

[8] scientia *P.*

[9] communicatur *PT.*

[10] *add.* quidem *M.*

[11] *om. M;* verum *P.*

[12] *add.* quae *T.*

[13] et *P.*

[14] *add.* ei *P.*

[15] non est possibile: est impossibile *T.*

[16] *add.* tibi *T; del M.*

[17] est *MT.*

[18] sit *P.*

[19] videat *M.*

[20] *add.* ipse *M.*

[21] sed *P; om. T.*

[22] indiget *P; corr. from* indigent *M.*

[23] *om. M.*

[24] numeramus *P.*

[25] *om. M.*

[26] credimus *P.*

[27] ut . . . sillogismo: sicut utens pertractat propositiones quas sillogismo *P.*

conclusionis necessariae ab eis, et oportet ut ille, apud quem jam verificata est scientia rei, jam[28] cognovit causam per quam oportet[29] esse illud, tunc necessarium est ut aggrengentur in demonstratione duae res simul. Et est ut propositiones non sint tantum causa conclusionis,[30] sed sint cum hoc causa rei quae demonstratur per eas. Nam si aliquis dixerit in omni loco, in quo accenditur ignis, fit cinis et in isto loco[31] est cinis, tunc oportet ut jam sit accensus ignis in eo,[32] erit[33] quod in hoc sillogismo fiet sermo[34] ejus quia in hoc loco[35] est cinis causa sermonis[36] ejus quod jam accensus est ignis in hoc loco. Et non est ita[37] quia non est nisi conclusio quod est, quia non est cinis causa ignis, immo ignis est causa cineris. Oportet ergo ut aggregentur[38] res utraeque. Est ergo causa conclusioni ipsa causa, quae est[39] ut[40] perveniat[41] res quae concluditur, et propterea[42] quod omnis causa est antiquior re, cui ipsa est causa, et est ei proportionalis. Plus omni re oportet ut[43] sint propositiones antiquiores conclusione et ut sint ei proportionales, et[44] propterea quod scientia non est nisi quando verificatur apud nos de esse rei. Quod non est possibile ut[45] sit diversum[46] ab eo quod[47] scivimus,[48] oportet ut[49] sint propositiones verae. Quod est quia, si[50] fuerit[51] in eis[52] falsitas,[53] accidet[54] ut videatur quod[55] illud quod non est sic[56] necessario, sicut si ponat aliquis propositiones falsas, concludetur[57] ei quod diameter quadrati est communicans lateri.[58] Et propterea quod omnis doctrina et disciplina non sunt nisi ex rebus, quarum scientia praecedit, oportet ut sit[59] illud[60] servatum[61] in demonstratione et oportet propter illud[62] ut sint propositiones notiores conclusione[63] et ut non sint notiores ea in una duarum partium quas exposuimus ante, et ut intelligatur quod significant,[64] sed[65] sint cum illo in parte altera iterum[66] notiores[67] ea. Et est[68] ut sciatur quod sunt[69] secundum veritatem. Veritas enim[70] non est nisi in illo.[71]

Et ego numero conditiones quas ostendit quod oportet ut sint in propositionibus demonstrativis.[72] Ex illis ergo conditionibus est ut sint propositiones causa conclusionis[73] et esse rei quae (227^{r}) concluditur ab eis, quare sunt propter illud antiquiores ea,[74] et ut sint proportionales ei,[75] et ut sint verae, et ut sint[76] notiores conclusione.[77]

Et omnis demonstratio est ex propositionibus antiquioribus conclusione.[78] Et est demonstratio quae est[79] ex propositionibus non tantum antiquioribus ea, sed quae sunt primae. Quod est quia, si[80] propositiones egent ut declarentur per res alias, tunc sunt antiquiores conclusione et non sunt primae. Quod est quia, si propositiones illae non egent,[81] ut ostendantur per res alias, sed sunt ex eis[82] manifeste per se ipsas receptae, sunt antiquiores et sunt primae. Et antiqui[83] quidem nominaverunt has propositiones propositiones,[84] quarum receptio est manifesta et necessaria[85] absque medio.[86] Et ad ipsam provenit quae[87] est sine ea ex propositionibus aliis, et per eam ostenduntur propositiones quae indigent ostensione[88] in[89] syllogismo composito doctrinali, et (56^{v}) propter illud nominantur[90] principia demonstrationis.

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[28] *om. M.*
[29] debet *P.*
[30] conclusionum *M.*
[31] *add.* sic *P.*
[32] *add.* loco *M.*
[33] extra *P.*
[34] sit demonstratio *P.*
[35] hoc loco: loco isto *M.*
[36] *add.* est *M;* sermoni *T.*
[37] illa *P.*
[38] agentur *P.*
[39] *om. P.*
[40] si *M.*
[41] pervenerit *M;* proveniat *P.*
[42] praeterea *P.*
[43] quod *P.*
[44] *om. P.*
[45] quod *M; om. P.*
[46] diversis *P.*
[47] ut *P.*
[48] scimus *MP.*
[49] quod *M.*
[50] *om. P.*
[51] fiunt *P.*
[52] ea *P.*
[53] falsitates *P.*
[54] accidunt *P.*
[55] *om. M.*
[56] sicut *M.*
[57] concluditur *P.*
[58] communitas lati *P.*
[59] *om. P.*
[60] *om. T.*
[61] servatur *P.*
[62] *om.* propter illud *P.*
[63] relatione *P.*
[64] quid significat *P.*
[65] si *M.*
[66] verum *P.*
[67] necessariores *P.*
[68] iterum etc. *P.*
[69] quae sint *M.*
[70] autem *M.*
[71] non . . . illo: nullos non *P.*
[72] *add.* et *P.*
[73] *corr. to* conclusionis *M;* conclusioni *T.*
[74] illa *M.*
[75] illi *M.*
[76] *om. PT.*
[77] *om.* et . . . conclusione *P.*
[78] *add.* et ut sint verae, et ut sint necessariores conclusione *P.*
[79] quae est: quod *P.*
[80] non *P.*
[81] egeant *M;* egerent *P.*
[82] *add.* quae sunt *M.*
[83] antiquae *P.*
[84] *om. M.*
[85] necessaria manifesta *P;* nota et manifesta *T.*
[86] immediata *T.*
[87] et ipsa provenit quod: et ad ipsam pervenit quae *T;* ad *and* m *are deleted M.*

Cum ergo non sunt nisi[92] (131^{r}) antiquiores, et sunt[91] primae secundum hanc viam, tunc earum antecessio et earum primatus non est apud nos, sed est[93] in natura. Res enim antecedentes apud nos sunt res particulares, quae inveniuntur per sensum; et res antecedens in natura est res universalis[94] longinqua a[95] sensu. Et similiter est earum dispositio in hoc[96] quod ipsae sunt notiores; nam ipsae non sunt notiores nisi in natura, et illa est via[97] demonstrationis. Et ipsae non pendent per hoc quod cognoscimus eas et inclinamur[98] ad eas, sed earum apprehensio est per veritatem et secundum illud secundum quod est res in natura sui, quamvis non appareat nobis res in illo.

Syllogismus enim compositus, necessario creditus,[99] diversificatur per hoc a reliquis speciebus syllogismi compositi, quoniam in speciebus aliis[1] syllogismi[2] compositi ostenditur res vera per res falsas sicut multotiens ostendunt illi de quorum[3] proprietate est[4] sufficientia. Et ostenditur quandoque in eis res quae est antiquior per res quae sunt post eam,[5] sicut ostenditur per syllogismos[6] compositos, qui[7] sunt per[8] vestigia et significationes. Et ostenditur in eis res iterum per res veras; verumtamen non sunt proportionales ei[9] quod ab eis concluditur. Et illius exemplum est ut ostendat[10] medicus quod vulnera rotunda sunt difficilioris sanationis propterea[11] quod figura rotunda comprehendit plus quam comprehendunt[12] reliquae figurae. Haec namque[13] demonstratio non est nisi ex demonstrationibus geometrarum,[14] non ex[15] demonstrationibus medicorum.[16] Illae ergo res omnes[17] oportet ut serventur in propositionibus quando[18] volumus verificare[19] demonstrationem.[20]

Et propositio quidem[21] manifesta absque medio[22] est quam non antecedit alia; neque est possibile ut super[23] eam veniat demonstratio neque indiget illo. Et ex istis quaedam est[24] quae est[25] ex rebus universalibus et quaedam quae est ex sensibus.[26] Sermo enim quod iste pannus est albus est ex propositionibus manifestis absque medio. Verumtamen illae propositiones non sunt propositiones quae sunt[26] principia demonstrationis. Et non sunt principia demonstrationis nisi propositiones universales. Et cognoscemus causam in illo in[27] eo quod est post.[28]

Et de propositionibus manifestis absque medio quae sumuntur ad demonstrationem, quaedam sunt quae sunt in natura sua[29] cum dispositione quae necessario facit discentem[30] per rem aliquam, quaecumque res sit, venire cum eis per se ipsum et scire eas, sicut sunt propositiones[31] quae nominantur quarum receptio est necessaria.[32] Nam hominibus[33] per naturam sunt scientiae communes[34] quas sciunt ex quibus non evacuatur aliquis eorum, neque est aliquis vacuus ex eis cui sit possibile ut discat et doceat aliquid.

Et[35] Theophrastus[36] jam determinavit propositionem cujus receptio est necessaria[37] et dixit: Propositio cujus receptio est necessaria est sententia[38] super quam aggregatur.[39] Et ex ea est quaedam,[40] quae[41] est in rebus, quae sunt generis unius, sicut si tu demas de aequali aequale, remanet aequale. Et ex ea est[42] quae est absolute in omni re, sicut oportet necessario[43] in omni re[44] ut verificetur[45] affirmatio aut[46] negatio. Nam istae res omnes naturales sunt communicantes inter omnes homines, et propter illud nominantur quarum[47] receptio est necessaria.[48] Quod est quia res, quae necessaria[49] est necessitate absoluta[50] super omnem rem, oportet ut necessario consequatur quamcumque unitatem ad quam innuitur. Et similiter quae est necessaria super omnem rem generis unius oportet ut necessario consequatur quamlibet unitatem, ad quam innuitur. Et similiter quae est necessaria super omnem rem generis unius, oportet ut necessario consequatur quamlibet unitatem, ad quam innuitur, illius generis.

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[88] enunciatione *P.*
[89] *om. T.*
[90] denominantur *M.*
[91] sint *M.*
[92] *om.* nominantur . . . nisi *P.*
[93] *om. P.*
[94] *om. P.*
[95] *om. P.*
[96] *om. T.*
[97] *om. P.*
[98] inclinamus *T.*
[99] conditus *P.*
[1] in illis speciebus *P.*
[2] syllogismis *T.*
[3] qua *P.*
[4] et *M.*
[5] ea *P.*
[6] syllogismum *T.*
[7] quae *P.*
[8] *om. P.*
[9] *om. P.*
[10] ostendit *M.*
[11] propter *P.*
[12] comprehendant *M.*
[13] enim *P.*
[14] geometricorum *P;* geometricum *T.*
[15] de *P.*
[16] medico uni *T.*
[17] *om. T.*
[18] quoniam *P.*
[19] *om. T.;* verificari *M;*
[20] demonstratione *MP.*
[21] quod est *P.*
[22] *add.* idest immediata *MP.*
[23] supra *M.*
[24] *om. M.*
[25] *om. P.*
[26] singularibus *P.*
[26] *om.* propositiones quae sunt *T.*
[27] et *P.*
[28] prius *P.*
[29] *om. M.*
[30] discernere rem *P;* discere *corr. fr.* discentes *M.*
[31] proportiones *P.*
[32] nota *T.*
[33] omnibus *T.*
[34] Cf. T. L. Heath, *Euclid in Greek* (Cambridge, 1920), p. 46.
[35] *add.* etiam *M.*
[36] Cf. F. Wimmer, *Theophrastus, Fragmenta, Theophrasti Eresii opera quae supersunt omnia,* III (Leipzig, 1852), *frag.* lxxi.

Haec est igitur species vera ex speciebus[51] propositionis manifestae absque medio; et ex[52] speciebus ejus est species alia quae est positio,[53] et haec[54] propositio[55] iterum[56] non indiget demonstratione. Verumtamen discipulus non potest affirmare,[57] idest recipere, eam per se; verum[58] non oportet[59] ut recipiat eam nisi[60] a magistro. Et positio quidem[61] habet duas species, quarum una[62] dicitur definitio et altera dicitur radix posita. Et[63] definitio est sermo qui non enuntiat de re quod ipsa sit aut quia non est, quamvis quandoque sequatur ut[64] illa res, cujus definitionem affert[65] aliquis,[66] sit; sed non intendit ad enuntiandum per hoc intentionem primam,[67] verum non sequitur nisi per viam accidentis. Quod autem intendit intentionem ejus secundum intentionem primam[68] est ut indicet quid est res. Nam non oportet ut sit contentus ex definitionibus ad hoc ut[69] intelligat quid significent tantum sicut est contentus[70] nominibus super illud, quamvis definitiones aequantur nominibus in potentia.[71] Et propter illud, licet ut[72] aliquis[73] dubitet in definitione an[74] est omnis propositio, cum (57^{r}) sit aequalis in potentia nomini, et ipsa, sicut dicit Aristoteles,[75] non recipit[76] esse rei et contrarium esse ipsius. Quomodo[77] igitur est propositio? Et si[78] definitio non est propositio, tunc quomodo licet ut sit (131^{v}) aliqua specierum propositionis manifestae absque medio? Verumtamen hoc est[79] ex eis in quibus oportet contemplari, et de quibus oportet quaerere in sequentibus.

Nunc autem[80] dicimus quod haec[81] est una specierum positionis; et ejus[82] alia species sicut diximus[83] est[84] radix posita.[85] Et communicat[86] omnis radix posita quia[87] non pendet per scientiam naturalem ex scientiis cognitionis; verum non ponit eam nisi positione auctor syllogismi[88] et facit eam propositionem. Quod[89] est quia non evacuatur quin sit[90] secum quod est res[91] aut[92] non est; cujus exemplum est ut dicatur quia motus est, aut ut[93] dicatur: 'res non est absque re quae est,' aut ut dicatur: 'pervenitur ex omni puncto ad omnem punctum per lineam rectam.'

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[37] nota *T; homoeoteleuton P.*
[38] scientia *M.*
[39] aggregantur *M.P.*
[40] *om.* est quaedam *P.*
[41] *add.* jam *P.*
[42] *om. P.*
[43] necessaria *T.*
[44] *om.* in omni re *P.*
[45] verificatur *M.*
[46] vel *P.*
[47] quorum *M.*
[48] nota *T.*
[49] nota *T.*
[50] *add.* est *T.*
[51] *om.* vera ex speciebus *T.*
[52] *om. P.*
[53] compositio *P.*
[54] *om. P.*
[55] propositio *corr. to* positio *M:* positio *P.*
[56] *om. P.*
[57] conferre *P; om.* id est recipere *T.*
[58] iterum *M;* verumtamen *P.*
[59] *add.* nisi *T.*
[60] *om. T.*
[61] quam *P.*
[62] *om. T.*
[63] *om. P.*
[64] *om. P.*
[65] aufert *P.*
[66] alias *T.*
[67] propriam *P.*
[68] per primam *M;* propriam *P.*
[69] *om. T.*
[70] *add.* ex *T.*
[71] potentiam *T.*
[72] *om. P.*
[73] aliquid *M.*
[74] anti *P.*
[75] *(67b35).*
[76] recepit *M.*
[77] quod non *P.*
[78] *om. P.*
[79] *add.* etiam *M.*
[80] *om. P.*
[81] *om. P.*
[82] *add.* est *MP.*
[83] dicimus *MT.*
[84] *om. M.*
[85] composita *P.*
[86] *add.* et *P.*
[87] qua *P.*
[88] auctorum syllogismi *P.*
[89] *add.* autem *P.*
[90] sint *T.*
[91] *om. P.*
[92] *add.* quod *M.*
[93] *om. P.*

Verumtamen quae[94] ex istis propositionibus est manifesta ita[95] ut recipiat eam discipulus cum quaestione quam facit ei magister de ea, appropriatur nomine[96] radicis[97] positae. Et quae ex eis non est[98] manifesta neque cognita appropriatur nomine petitionum,[99] sicut sermo noster[1] in geometria quod omnes duae lineae exeuntes[2] a minore duorum angulorum rectorum concurrunt.[3] Et ad ultimum similes istis ex radicibus positis manifestis non sunt manifestae absque medio, neque sunt excusatae a demonstratione, sed indigent demonstratione; verumtamen sumuntur in sermone absque demonstratione. Et non sunt absolute radices positae[4] neque ex petitionibus iterum. Verum ipsae[5] non sunt ita[6] nisi apud illum qui concedit eas et convenit super eas tantum. Demonstrationes autem non sunt ex propositionibus similibus istis; verum non sunt nisi ex propositionibus quarum conditiones praecesserunt.

Jam igitur manifestum est ex[7] eo quod diximus quid[8] sit propositio manifesta absque medio et quid[9] est positio demonstrativa et quid[9] radix posita[10] et quid[9] sint petitiones manifestae. Et nos[11] quidem[12] revertimur[13] ad res de quibus diximus quod oportet ut sint in principiis demonstrationis; et numerabimus unamquamque earum et considerabimus an illud quod diximus in eis sit rectum. Dico igitur inprimis quod necessario diximus quod propositiones in demonstratione oportet ut[14] sint notiores conclusione, cum[15] non oporteat ut[16] verificetur conclusio et sciatur ejus verificatio nisi[17] propter propositiones. Quod[18] est quia nos semper invenimus esse rei unius et ejusdem[19] inventae[20] in duabus rebus, verumtamen in una earum per causam alterius dignius in re, cujus causa[21] sequitur aliam[22] illa res eadem. Oportet igitur, inde[23] cum conclusio non verificetur, et sciatur[24] ejus verificatio,[25] nisi ex propositionibus, ut sint propositiones digniores illo quam ipsa; nam si nos non diligimus magistrum nisi causa pueri, tunc dignius est ut diligamus puerum. Jam ergo oportet necessario[26] ut sint propositiones, per quas est syllogismus, notiores conclusione; et fortasse erunt omnes propositiones[27] ex quibus est syllogismus compositus ita, et fortasse non erunt omnes ita; verum quaedam earum[28] necessario sunt ita. Quaedam enim propositiones sunt non valde notae; quare[29] declaramus eas per propositiones alias; deinde utamur eis.

Cum igitur oporteat ut simus[30] magis scientes propositiones[31] quam conclusionem,[32] tunc necessaria est una duarum rerum: aut ut scientia nostra de propositionibus etiam sit per demonstrationem, aut ut[33] sit cognitio nostra de eis melior cognitione nostra[34] per scientiam demonstrationis, et similiter cognitio nostra de propositionibus quarum receptio[35] est necessaria.[36] Et non oportet, ut sint propositiones, quas sumimus,[37] digniores credulitate vera quam conclusio[38] quae concluditur[39] ab eis tantum, donec sint digniores ut vere credantur quam propositiones contrariae eis. Nam[40] si non sunt propositiones digniores credulitate vera quam contrariae eis, tunc conclusio, quae concluditur ab eis,[41] non est dignior credulitate vera quam conclusio contraria ei. Oportet igitur inde ut videamus quod possibile est ut sit[42] res secundum contrarium, et non sit[43] scientia de re, quae concluditur scientia fixa, quae non movetur.[44]

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[94] *add.* est *P.*
[95] *om. P.*
[96] nomen *M.*
[97] radix *T.*
[98] *om. P.*
[99] petitionem *P.* Cf. Themistius, *loc. cit.*, 1. 26; Euclid, *loc. cit.* T. L. Heath (tr.) *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements*, I (Cambridge, 1926), pp. 119-120. The latter is referred to by the translator himself in *Mathematics in Aristotle* (Oxford, 1949), p. 56.
[1] videtur *M.*
[2] existentes *P.*
[3] concurrant *T.*
[4] *om.* et . . . positae *P.*
[5] verumtamen *P;* numeri prae *T.*
[6] tria *T.*
[7] *om. T.*
[8] quod *PT.*
[9] quod *P.*
[10] ponitur *P.*
[11] *om. P.*
[12] quod *P.*
[13] revertamur *P.*
[14] uti *MP.*
[15] et tamen *P.*
[16] quin *M.*
[17] non *P.*
[18] *add.* autem *P.*
[19] eidem *P.*
[20] in mente *P.*
[21] *om. P.*
[22] autem *P.*
[23] tamen *P.*
[24] scientia *P.*
[25] *om. P.*
[26] *om. P.*
[27] *om. P.*
[28] eorum *M.*
[29] quia *P.*
[30] scimus *P.*
[31] propositionem *P.*
[32] conclusiones *M.*
[33] *add.* non *T.*
[34] *om. P.*
[35] *add.* nostra *P.*
[36] *om. P.*
[37] fuimus sicut *P.*
[38] conclusiones *P.*
[39] concluduntur *P.*
[40] *om. P.*
[41] *add.* tantum *M.*

CAPITULUM TERTIUM

Sed[1] quidam utuntur eo, quod diximus rectum, secundum quod non est rectum, et conantur[2] per illud destruere[3] demonstrationem. Quod est quia nos putamus quod oportet,[4] si est demonstratio, ut[5] sint propositiones in ea[6] veriores[7] conclusione; illi autem conveniunt nobiscum[8] super hoc, verumtamen putant[9] quod non est aliqua[10] rerum scita quae ostenditur sine[11] demonstratione. Propter illud ergo dicunt quod nos non pervenimus ad hoc ut magis sciamus propositiones nisi[12] verificemus eas etiam[13] per demonstrationem; et si nobis (57^{v}) necesse est ut ostendamus etiam semper[14] omnem propositionem, quam sumimus, ad declarandam aliquam rerum[15] (132^{r}) per propositionem[16] aliam,[17] erit[18] incessus noster ad aliquid[19] quod est infinitum, et non est possibile aliquem abscindere viam cui non est finis. Si igitur stamus in loco viae et retinemus nos, tunc necessario oportet ut illae propositiones, apud quas stetimus, sint non scitae,[20] cum non perveniamus ad sciendum eas nisi per demonstrationem. Et cum fuerint[21] principia non scita, tunc quomodo[22] erit[23] possibile ut sit ex eis res scita? Quod[24] est[25] quoniam si non pervenimus ad[26] hoc ut sciamus prima rerum et earum principia, tunc non pervenimus iterum ad hoc,[26] ut[27] sciamus res quae sunt ex illis, nisi adjungamus eas cum illis et ponamus illis[28] radicem positam et dicamus: 'si illae[29] sunt inventae, tunc istae sunt inventae,'[30] et sermo eorum in hoc est rectus.[31] Quod est quoniam non[32] est possibile,[33] si[34] nescimus prima, ut sciamus quae sunt post ipsa.[35] Verum[36] ipsi non bene invenerunt in eo quod dixerunt quod scientia[37] non est scientia rei[38] nisi per demonstrationem tantum, propterea quod nos scimus multas res in quarum scientia non indigemus demonstratione.

Et error ejus, qui putavit[39] quod omnes res indigent[40] demonstratione,[41] similis est errori illi qui putat quod omnis res[42] non indiget demonstratione.[43] Et sicut[44] manifesta res[45] est quod multae res sunt quae[46] indigent[47] ut[48] demonstrentur per alias, similiter declaratio rei non est minor illa,[49] quod ex rebus sunt multae cognitae per se, et illae res sunt digniores credulitate vera quam res[50] quae sciuntur per alias. Et non est possibile ut sint principia demonstrationis[51] demonstrationes. Verum[52] non[53] sunt nisi propositiones manifestae in se ipsis[54] absque medio. Et principium illarum propositionum iterum est ratio qua[55] capiuntur termini ex quibus componuntur propositiones quarum receptio est necessaria. Sermo enim cum hoc[56] melior est[57] quam concessio eorum quod[58] omnes res scitae non sunt scitae nisi per demonstrationem. Amplius si fugerimus[59] ut consequatur[60] nos incessus ad[61] infinitum, erit nobis necessaria demonstratio circularis. Illud enim est medicatio aegritudinis cum aegritudine majore ea, et ille qui nititur affirmare demonstrationem per hanc viam non minus destruit eam quam ille qui ponit intentionem suam ad destruendum eam. Quod[62] est quia, cum[63] oporteat ut[64] demonstratio sit ex rebus quae sunt priores et notiores, et non sit possibile ut res, quae sunt priores, sunt[65] eaedem quae sunt posteriores etiam eisdem, non est ergo possibile ut sciamus rem per demonstrationem circularem,[66] cum demonstratio circularis non sit nisi quando intendimus ad res, quibus utimur in declaratione aliarum rerum, et intentio nostra est ad ostendendum eas iterum per res quas declaravimus[67] per eas. Et licet ut sit possibile quod dicimus[68] in rebus eisdem quod ipsae sunt priores eisdem rebus et posteriores eis; illud vero[69] non est ex uno modo, sed est[70] ex modo et modo,[71] sicut si sit per dispositionem aliquam[72] apud nos et per[73] dispositionem aliam in natura. In demonstratione autem numquam utitur nisi modus unus[74] rerum quae sunt priores[75] in natura; ostensio autem rerum, quae[76] apud nos sunt priores, fortasse quandoque dicitur demonstratio, sed non absolute, sed apud nos.

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[42] sint *M.*

[43] *om. T.*

[44] removetur *MT.*

[1] et *T; corr. to* sed *M.*

[2] conatur *P.*

[3] distinguere *P.*

[4] sicut *M.*

[5] quod *P.*

[6] *om.* in ea *P.*

[7] priores *M.*

[8] nos cum *P.*

[9] putat *P.*

[10] alia *M.*

[11] scire *M.*

[12] non *P.*

[13] at *PT.*

[14] super *T;* super *corr. to* semper *M.*

[15] *om. T.*

[16] propositiones esse *P.*

[17] alias *P.*

[18] *om. P.*

[19] illud *PT;* aliud *corr. to* aliquid *M.*

[20] scire *P.*

[21] fiunt *T.*

[22] questio *P.*

[23] esset *P.*

[24] *add.* autem *P.*

[25] *om. M.*

[26] *homoeoteleuton T.*

[27] *add.* non *M.*

[28] illas *P.*

[29] *om. T.*

[30] *om.* tunc . . . inventae *T.*

[31] erectus *T.*

[32] jam *P.*

[33] *add.* quod *M.*

[34] ut *P.*

[35] ipsam *T.*

[36] verumtamen *P.*

[37] *om. M.*

[38] rerum *M.*

[39] putant *P.*

[40] indigerent *P.*

[41] om. similis . . . demonstrationis *P;* indigent *T.*

[42] *om.* demonstratione . . . res *T.*

[43] Cf. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics* (Oxford, 1949), p. 514.

[44] sic *M.*

[45] manifesta res: manifestum *M.*

[46] sunt quae *om. M;* quae *P.*

[47] *add.* demonstrations *M.*

[48] uti *P.*

[49] ea *T.*

[50] *om. P.*

[51] demonstrationum *M.*

[52] verumtamen *P.*

[53] *om. P.*

[54] propositiones . . . ipsis: proportio in se ipsa manifesta *M.*

[55] quando *T.*

Et non haec tantum[77] absurditas sequitur[78] demonstrationem circularem, sed comitatur[79] ipsam[80] absurditas major ea, ita ut mereatur[81] auctor ejus vituperari et ut de eo rideatur.[82] Quod est quia sequitur eum necessario ut dicat quod, si *A* est, tunc *A* est. Quod est quia,[83] cum non ostendatur *B* nisi[84] per *A* et declaretur[85] per[86] *B C* et ostendatur per *C A* iterum, jam[87] manifestum est quod non declaratur *A* nisi per *A*. Quod est quia non pervenitur nisi ad[88] rem[89] a qua inceptum est. Et[90] secundum hanc viam sit[91] facile declarare omnem rem, et comitantur[92] hanc viam demonstrationis res aliae secundae[93] quas jam declaravimus[94] in libro *de Syllogismo*;[95] et non cogit nos aliquid iterare quod[96] jam explevimus semel et jam quidem[97] prolongavimus in[98] hoc capitulo plus eo[99] quod sufficiebat nobis[1] in eo, quamvis sit exiens[2] a[3] sermone[4] in demonstratione. Redeamus igitur nunc[5] ad illud[6] in quo fuimus a loco[7] ubi[8] dimisimus.

CAPITULUM QUARTUM

Dico ergo quod oportet ut sint propositiones doctrinales cum reliquis, quae narravimus de eis,[1] creditae vere, et non sufficit ut[2] sint creditae vere,[3] donec non[4] sit possibile ut sit res secundum contrarium ejus per quod judicatur. Et intentio in hoc capitulo non est aliquid praeter quod sint[5] necessarie.[6] Haec autem etiam est ex eo[7] in quo procedimus via recta. Quod est quia[8] propterea quod est[9] res super quam[10] erigitur demonstratio (132^{v}) iterum[11] est necessaria; cum sit haec dispositio rei (quam non est possibile esse secundum contrarium ejus quod est in scientiis demonstrativis, et non sit nobis via ut sciamus quod ipsa est cum illa dispositione nisi ut sit nobiscum demonstratio[12] super ipsam et syllogismus compositus disciplinalis), oportet necessario (58^{r}) ut sint propositiones iterum,[13] ex quibus est conclusio, necessariae.

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[56] cum hoc: est hic *M.*
[57] *om. M.*
[58] quoniam *T.*
[59] fugimus *P.*
[60] sequatur *P.*
[61] in *M.*
[62] sed est autem *P.*
[63] si *P.*
[64] quod *M.*
[65] sint *P.*
[66] per circularem: particularem demonstrationem *M.*
[67] declaramus *P.*
[68] dicamus *M.*
[69] *om. P.*
[70] *om. P.*
[71] *om.* sed . . . et modo *T.*
[72] aliam *M.*
[73] *om. T.*
[74] vere *P.*
[75] *add.* scilicet res quae sunt priores *P.; marginal M.*
[76] *om.* sunt . . . quae *T.*
[77] tamen *P.*
[78] sequatur *P.*
[79] communicatur *P.*
[80] eam *P.*
[81] mereamur *T.*
[82] videatur *M.*
[83] *om. P.*
[84] ut *P.*
[85] declaratur *M.*
[86] *om. P.*
[87] tunc *MP.*
[88] apud *T; corr. to* ad *M.*
[89] *om. T.*
[90] *add.* est *M.*
[91] sic *M.*
[92] comitant *P.*
[93] fere *M.*
[94] declaramus *P.*
[95] Cf. *Prior Analytics* II, 5-7.
[96] quae non *P.*
[97] quid *P.*
[98] et *M.*
[99] *om. M.*
[1] illud *M.*
[2] exigens *M.*
[3] ad *P.*
[4] sermonem *P.*
[5] *om. T.*
[6] illum *P.*
[7] a loco: ab eo in quo *MP.*
[8] vel ubi *P.*
[1] his *T.*
[2] quod *M.*
[3] verum *P.*
[4] *om. M.*
[5] sit *P.*
[6] necessaria *P;* necessarie *corr. to* necessaria *M.*

Et sequitur quod praecessit ex sermone nostro ut consideremus in quaestionibus super quas cadit demonstratio, quomodo sunt et secundum quem modum inveniamus viam ad inveniendum propositiones, quibus indigemus in illis quaestionibus. Et principium in hoc est sermo in propositionibus, cum syllogismus compositus non sit nisi ex propositionibus. Dico igitur quod cum[14] omnis propositio non sit nisi ex subjecto et praedicato aliquo, tunc oportet ut sciamus quod non[15] oportet in propositionibus demonstrativis ut praedicemus[16] praedicatum[17] de subjecto praedicatione absoluta, sed secundum viam qua praedicatur res de re per se. Narremus ergo inprimis quae res sit in qua dicitur haec dictio, scilicet sermo noster per se, postquam narraverimus[18] quae sit res quae praedicatur de omni re, quoniam non est possibile ut ostendatur res, quae praedicatur per se, nisi declaretur res quae praedicatur de omni re.

Dico igitur quod res, quae[19] praedicatur de omni re est quando res non praedicatur de parte[20] ejus sine parte[21] neque in tempore neque[22] sine tempore. Et iste modus rei praedicatae de omni re est praeter modum quem accepisti[23] a nobis[24] in libro *de Syllogismo*.[25] Illic enim dictum est quod res praedicatur de omni re, quamvis non praedicetur[26] de omni nisi in hora aliqua. In hac autem[27] parte scientiae, in qua sumus, oportet ut evitemus[28] hoc iterum. Et ejus exemplum est quod[29] dicimus[30] vivum[31] de omni homine. Quod est quoniam, in quo verificatur quod est homo, oportet ut[32] verificetur in eo, quod est vivum;[33] et si verificatur una duarum intentionum in eo nunc,[34] tunc altera ita[35] verificatur. Et ex eo, quod significatur tibi quia intentio in[36] re praedicata de omni re est[37] quam narravimus, est[38] quod illi, qui conantur contradicere ei, vident quod ipsi[39] jam destruxerunt rem praedicatam de omni re, non quando ostenditur tantum quod ipsa non est[40] parti illius rei, sed quando ostenditur etiam quod non est in ea in aliqua[41] horarum. Haec est igitur intentio rei praedicatae de omni re.

Intentio autem in re praedicata per se est omne quod praedicatur de omni re; et ejus est praedicatio cum hoc[42] de omni[43] subjecto ex via quid est,[44] sicut praedicatur vivum de homine et vegetatio de palma[45] et linea de triangulo. Triangulus enim non est nisi figura quam continent tres lineae rectae. Et non omne, quod praedicatur de omni re, praedicatur de ea per se.[46] Quod est quia albedo praedicatur de omni ave quae nominatur[47] cignus. Quod est[48] quia invenitur in eo semper et in omni individuo ejus; verumtamen praedicatio ejus[49] de ipso non ingreditur[50] in ejus definitione.[51] Iste est ergo modus unus ex modis rei praedicatae per se, et est ille qui utitur in demonstrationibus in pluribus dispositionibus.

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[7] haec autem etiam est ex eo: hoc igitur etiam est ex eo *M;* etiam est haec igitur ex eo *T.*

[8] quod est *P.*

[9] *om. M.*

[10] quas *P.*

[11] tam *T.*

[12] demonstratione *P.*

[13] tantum *T.*

[14] *om. P.*

[15] *om. P.*

[16] praedicetur *M.*

[17] praedicatus *M.*

[18] narravimus *M;* narramus *P.*

[19] *om. T.*

[20] corrupt *T.*

[21] *add.* ejus *T.*

[22] *om. PT.*

[23] accepistis *M.*

[24] *om.* a nobis *P.*

[25] Cf. *Prior Anal.* I, 1.

[26] praedicatur *T.*

[27] *om. T.*

[28] devitemus *T; corr. to* evitemus *M.*

[29] quia *T.*

[30] *add.* quidem *M.*

[31] unum *P.*

[32] quod *MP.*

[33] unum *P.*

[34] non *M.*

[35] tantum *M;* verum *T.*

[36] de *M.*

[37] *om. M.*

[38] et *P.*

[39] *add.* quod *T.*

[40] inest *M.*

[41] alia *PT.*

[42] *om. P.*

[43] *om. T.*

[44] quae est *M;* quidem *T.*

[45] planta *M.*

[46] esse *T.*

[47] vocatur *M.*

[48] *om. T.*

[49] *om. P.*

[50] egreditur *M.*

[51] definitionem *P.*

Et ejus est modus alius quem ego narrabo nunc.[52] Dico ergo quod quae[53] ex accidentibus sunt comitantia[54] rem. Et quando intendimus ad hoc ut definiamus illud accidens, non invenimus excusationem quin[55] intromittamus[56] in definitione[57] ejus subjectum de quo[58] praedicatur. Tunc in illis accidentibus dicitur quod ipsa[59] illis subjectis, quae intromittimus in sermone significante[60] quid sunt, sunt[61] per se; cujus exemplum est quia alfatam[62] nasi,[63] scilicet simitas, est[64] per se. Quod est quia[65] quando definimus[66] alfatam[67] dicimus quia est[68] depressio nasi, et similiter[69] rectitudo lineae. Quod est quia quando definimus rectitudinem, dicimus quia est positio[70] quaedam lineae. Quod est quia[71] rectitudo est dispositio lineae positae super spatium aequale longitudini inter omnia duo puncta cadentia super eam;[72] et similiter imparilitas numero. Quod est quia, si definimus numerum imparem, dicimus quia est ille qui non dividitur[73] in[74] duas partes aequales. Et similiter bonitates[75] animae; nam cum intendimus,[76] ut definiamus unamquamque earum, non invenimus[77] excusationem quin[78] intromittamus in definitione quasdam partes animae aut virtutes ejus et ex eo quod praedicatur de aliquo per se. Est[79] modus tertius[80] qui est ex accidentibus, quando[81] non insunt alii quam ei, cui insunt[82] inprimis, sicut color superficiei.

Secundum hos ergo modos tantum dicimus in rebus praedicatis quod sunt per se. Etiam dicimus in re secundum modum alium quod est per se, non ex via quod ipse[83] praedicetur de alio, sed secundum semitam absolutam; et est[84] res quae est non propter rem aliam neque in re alia. Et haec est (228^{r}) dispositio individuorum substantiarum[85] sicut Socrates et Callias.

Et dicitur[86] in quibusdam causarum quod ipsae sunt causae per se quando non sunt causae rerum quae accidunt fortuitu, sicut ut ambulet ambulator et coruscet coruscatio. Quod est quia non coruscavit coruscatio[87] quoniam ille ambulavit, sed illud accidens accidit. Et similiter si aliquis intendat (58^{v}) fodere in radice vitis et inveniat censum; nam ille etiam[88] non intendit in fodiendo ut quaerat censum; verum illud accidens accidit. Si autem aliquis decollet hominem et moriatur, non dicimus quod illud sit accidens quod[89] (133^{r}) acciderat,[90] sed dicimus quod decollatio per se est causa morti.[91] Et nos non dicimus has intentiones ex intentionibus rei, quae dicitur per se, nisi ut esset[92] sermo completus.

Ex[93] esse autem duorum modorum primorum[94] jam manifestum est quod ipsi sunt ex rebus quae necessario[95] sunt. Quod est quia non est possibile ut non[96] inveniantur res praedicatae in definitione aut[97] res in quarum definitione ingreditur subjectum de quo praedicantur;[98] et res in hoc quod res praedicata in definitione oportet necessario ut sint[99] cum[1] rebus subjectis de quibus praedicantur[2] est manifeste plana;[3] non est necessarius in ea sermo.

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[52] non *T.*

[53] *add.* est *M.*

[54] communicantia *MP.*

[55] quam *P; om. T.*

[56] intromittimus *T.*

[57] definitionem *T.*

[58] de quo: quod *P.*

[59] *add.* et *M.*

[60] significare *P.*

[61] *om. M.*

[62] Cf. *Greek tx.* simotes, p. 10, *l.* 33; fatas *and the article in Arabic.*

[63] naturaliter *P.*

[64] nasi *M.*

[65] *om. M.*

[66] definiamus *P.*

[67] Cf. *note* 62.

[68] *om. M.*

[69] *add.* est *P.*

[70] potentia *P.*

[71] *add.* dispositio *P.*

[72] Cf. Euclid, *Book* I, *Definition* 4.

[73] dividuntur *P.*

[74] per *T.*

[75] bonitatem *M;* bonitas *P.*

[76] tendimus *M.*

[77] *add.* unamquamque earum *M.*

[78] quam *P.*

[79] cum *T.*

[80] *add.* praedicationis *M.*

[81] quoniam *T.*

[82] sunt *PT.*

[83] ipsa *P.*

[84] *om. P.*

[85] subjectorum *MP.*

[86] add. haec *M.*

[87] *om.* quod est . . . coruscatio *M.*

[88] qui *M.*

[89] et *M.*

[90] accidat *P.*

[91] mortis *P.*

[92] stet *M.*

[93] et *P.*

[94] primorum *T.*

[95] *necessarie P.*

[96] non *P.*

[97] quoniam *P.*

[98] praedicatur *MP.*

[99] fuerit *P.*

[1] *om.* subjectae *P.*

[2] praedicatur *P.*

[3] et in anima plana *P;* manifesta *T.*

Quod autem est ex accidentibus, quae est impossibile definiri absque intromissione substantiae subjectae,[4] de qua praedicantur[5] in definitione sua jam manifesta est nobis res in eo iterum[6] quod oportet esse necessario postquam prius attulerimus illud quod tolerat[7] hoc capitulum[8] de ambiguitate et protervitate.

Dico ergo quod non est de proprietate cujuscumque[9] hujusmodi accidentium ut sit in tota re susceptibile ejus. Inde est[10] quod simitas non est in omni naso neque paritas[11] in omni numero. Et alicui inest[12] ut dicat quod non oportet necessario ut sit simitas in[13] naso neque paritas in[14] numero. Et verificatur sermo hic, cum homo singulariter ponit unumquodque hujusmodi accidentium per se. Quod si[15] intelligat quod unicuique hujusmodi[16] accidentium[17] est[18] accidens quasi sibi oppositum,[19] sicut[20] oppositio paris et imparis[21] et oppositio aquileitatis simitati[22] et cujusque[23] aliarum rerum suae diversae, sciet quod necessarium est[24] ut sit una harum rerum praedicata super subjectum suum. Inde est quod omnis numerus non evacuatur quin sit aut par aut impar, et omnis linea non evacuatur quin sit aut recta aut[25] fluxuosa. Et negativa unius hujusmodi rerum facit esse alteram necessariam, cum dicitur de genere susceptibili ejus. Inde est quod numerus, quando non[26] est impar, tunc procul dubio est par; et nasus quando non est aequalis neque aquilinus, tunc est procul dubio simus. In quibusdam autem[27] rebus invenitur[28] oppositio[29] inter plures duabus rebus, et illud[30] invenitur in rebus in quibus cadunt[31] additio et diminutio, quoniam in istis rebus cadit etiam mediatio. Cum ergo verificetur in omni re aut affirmativa aut negativa, et negativa hujusmodi accidentium[32] faciat esse necessarium accidens aliud in rebus susceptibilibus ejus, tunc jam manifestum est quod unum duorum accidentium[33] oportet necessario ut inveniatur in toto ad quod intenditur ex illa natura subjecta de qua praedicantur illa accidentia.[34] Secundum hoc[35] oportet ut sit expositio rei quae praedicatur de omni re et rei quae praedicatur de re[36] per se.

Res autem, quae praedicatur de re universaliter, dico quod est res, quae inde[37] aggregavit,[38] ut[39] praedicetur de omni re et ut praedicetur de ea per se. Et ex via quid est et non quando res inest rei per se est necessarium ut insit omni rei ejus. Nam modus secundus rerum praedicatarum per se et modi, qui sunt post eum, non praedicantur de omni[40] re universaliter. Quod est quia non[41] praedicantur de omni re neque etiam quando res praedicantur de omni re est necessarium ut insit rei[42] universaliter. Inde est quod albedo dicitur de omni cygno et nigredo de omni corvo, et non inest illud rei universaliter quoniam non inest rei[43] per se. Oportet ergo ut aggregentur in re, quae universaliter inest[44] rei,[45] duae res simul. Et[46] intentio in sermone nostro nunc, quod res inest rei per se, et in[47] sermone nostro 'res inest rei ex via quid est,' est intentio una et eadem.

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[4] *om.* subjectae *P.*
[5] praedicatur *P.*
[6] *om. P.*
[7] tollat *MP.*
[8] haec capitula *P.*
[9] cujusque *T.*
[10] inest *T.*
[11] imparitas *P.*
[12] rei est *P.*
[13] *add.* omni *P.*
[14] *add.* omni *P.*
[15] *om.* si *P.*
[16] *om.* hujusmodi *M.*
[17] accidenti *P.*
[18] non est *P.*
[19] appositum *MT.*
[20] *om.* sicut *T.*
[21] paris impari *M.*
[22] simitatis *P.*
[23] cujuscumque *P.*
[24] fit *M.*
[25] an recta an *P.*
[26] *om.* non *T.*
[27] *om.* autem *P.*
[28] *add.* quandoque *P.*
[29] oppositum *P.*
[30] aliquid aliud *P.*
[31] est *M.*
[32] *add.* non *M.*
[33] *add.* aut media accidentium *M; add.* aut accidentium *T.*
[34] *add.* Hoc est ut praedicetur de omni re et ut de ea re per se et ex via quid est et non quando res inest rei per se est res ut insit omni re ejus. Nam modus secundus rerum praedicatarum per se et modi qui sunt post eum non praedicantur de re universaliter *M.* Et hoc est ut praedicetur de omni re et ut praedicetur de ea re per se et ex via quid est, et non quando res inest rei per se et modi qui sunt post eum non praedicantur de re universaliter *P.*
[35] ergo *P.*
[36] *om.* et rei quae praedicatur de re *P.*
[37] ideo *P.*
[38] *om.* ut praedicetur . . . de omni re universaliter *P.*
[39] quod est quia *M.*
[40] *om. M.*
[41] *om. P.*
[42] *om. P;* ei *M.*
[43] re *T.*
[44] est *M.*
[45] *add.* et *M.*
[46] est *M.*
[47] *om. P.*

Nam res, quae[48] meretur unam duarum dictionum, meretur dictionem alteram etiam,[49] verbi gratia, nos dicimus in longitudine quia est in linea per se quando[50] praedicatur de ea ex via quid est; et non dicimus in ea quia[51] inest ei[52] per se tantum, sed dicimus in ea iterum quia est ex[53] via quid est. Et rectitudo[54] iterum inest linea[55] per se et[56] ex via quid est, quoniam non est possibile ut inveniatur[57] rectitudo vacua de[58] linea.

Jam ergo remanet super nos ut consideremus[59] an[60] omnes res, quae ingrediuntur in definitione (59ʳ) alicujus rerum, et sint genera et differentiae, praedicentur de ea ex via quod praedicatur de re universaliter. Cum nos inveniamus quod genera et differentiae praedicantur de omni re et de re per se, aut[61] indigeamus expositione[62] tertia, donec subtiliter perscrutati sumus definitionem rei quae praedicatur universaliter de re. Dico ergo quia oportet ut res, quae praedicatur universaliter de re, cum hoc quod inest omni rei et inest rei per se sit iterum in ea primo, ita ut non sit alicui rerum omnino nisi ipsi,[64] sicut aequalitas trium[65] angulorum duobus rectis in[66] triangulo; illud enim est in omni triangulo et triangulo per se, quod est in natura ejus, et est in triangulo iterum inprimis. Quod est quia non inest ante triangulum alicui[67] nisi ipsi. Inde est quod tu[68] non invenis[69] aequalitatem angulorum trium[70] duobus rectis existentem in omni figura absolute, cum non[71] invenias illud dici de[72] omnibus figuris et de qualibet[73] figura ad quam intendis, quoniam non invenitur in quadrato neque in polygonio, neque invenis eam iterum[74] in triangulis diversorum laterum primum;[75] nam quamvis invenias eam[76] in omnibus triangulis[77] diversorum laterum et[78] ad quamcumque rem intendis ex eis, tamen tu[79] non invenies[80] eam ipsi primam quoniam triangulo est ante ipsum.

Res ergo, quae ostenditur esse in re primum, et in quacumque re, ex ea ad quam intenditur est[81] res quae illi rei inest universaliter. Et demonstratio quae vere est demonstratio non est nisi quod est secundum hanc viam, scilicet universaliter, quamvis sit iterum in rebus quae sunt sub illo praedicato universaliter. Inde est quod illud quod ostensum est[82] in trianqulo quod[83] anguli ejus tres sunt aequales duobus rectis jam manifestum est, quod illa dispositio est trianguli diversorum laterum.[84] Verumtamen cum geometria non est demonstratio ex parte quod triangulus est diversorum laterum,[85] sed ex parte quod triangulus est triangulus,[86] et non oportet ut consequatur[87] nos dubitatio ex hoc exemplo ita, ut[88] putemus quod praedicatur universaliter, oportet ut aequetur[89] subjecto de quo praedicatur et redeat super ipsum[90] cum aequalitate. Verum oportet ut sciamus quod genera etiam sunt in differentiis sibi propinquis secundum semitam quae[91] praedicatur universaliter, quamvis genera plus contineant quam differentiae. Et differentiae[92] iterum sunt in speciebus secundum hoc[93] exemplum. Nam qui non concedet hoc non pervenit apud eum demonstratio nisi in definitionibus tantum.

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[48] *om.* res quae *P.*
[49] *om. M.*
[50] quoniam *MP.*
[51] quid *T.*
[52] *om. P.*
[53] in *M.*
[54] *add.* linea *P.*
[55] *om. P.*
[56] *om M; add.* est *P.*
[57] reperiatur *M.*
[58] ex *MP.*
[59] videamus *P.*
[60] autem *P.*
[61] an *P.*
[62] alia conditione exceptione *M;* exceptione *T.*
[63] ei *MP.*
[64] ipsam *P.*
[65] trianguli *P.*
[66] *om. P.*
[67] aliter *P.*
[68] *add.* ipsa *T.*
[69] invenies *P.*
[70] *om.* trium *P.*
[71] *add.* tamen *P.*
[72] *om. P.*
[73] qualibus in *T.*
[74] *om. M.*
[75] *om. T.*
[76] *om. M.*
[77] in omnibus diversorum laterum triangulis *M.*
[78] *om. T.*
[79] *om. PT.*
[80] invenis *MP.*
[81] cum *T.*
[82] *om. M.*
[83] quid *M.*
[84] *add.* iterum *MT.*
[85] *add.* iterum *M.*
[86] *om.* diversorum laterum . . . est triangulus *T.*
[87] sequitur *P.*
[88] *om. P.*
[89] aequatur *MP.*
[90] eum *P.*
[91] quod *T.*
[92] *om.* et differentiae *P.*
[93] *om. P.*

CAPITULUM QUINTUM

Et oportet ut[1] non occultetur nobis quod multotiens decipimur et erramus in re praedicata universaliter; nos enim quandoque ostendimus ipsam et putamus quod non ostendimus eam[2] et fortasse non ostendimus ipsam[3] et putamus nos jam ostendisse eam. Et huic deceptioni et errori sunt tres causae.

Una earum est quando[4] res super quam constituitur demonstratio est aliqua ex rebus singularibus individualibus sicut sol et luna et mundus.[5] Quod est[6] propterea[7] quod non est[8] super[9] hujusmodi aliqua ex rebus neque res communicat ea, sed unumquodque eorum est individuum tantum, cum sol sit unus et luna[10] una et terra una et caelum unum. Nam quando[11] ostendimus aliquam rerum existentem in his rebus, sicut quia est[12] in terra, quoniam ipsa est posita in medio, aut quia est in caelo, quod ipsum movetur secundum revolutionem, non aestimamus quod ostendimus[13] rem existentem universaliter[14] in unaquaque[15] harum rerum, quamvis non constituimus demonstrationem supra unamquamque harum rerum ex via quod est haec res et aliquod individuorum. Inde est quod nos non constituimus demonstrationem[16] super solem quia ipse[17] non eclipsatur nisi quando est concursus lunae[18] sub[19] eo ex via quod ipse est sol unus. Verum demonstrationes, quas erigimus[20] super illud, non erigimus nisi cum dispositione: 'si essent soles multi; esset constitutio demonstrationis[21] super eos[22] secundum semitam constitutionis earum eo existente[23] uno.

Et sicut si[24] non esset triangulus nisi diversorum laterum, deinde ostenderemus[25] quod in eo inventum est[26] quod anguli ejus[27] tres aequales sunt[28] duobus rectis. Propter quod uteremur in declaratione illius dispositionis ipsius[29] in diversitate laterum ejus. Sed si[30] sufficeret[31] nobis uti[32] dispositione ejus in quantum ipse est triangulus tantum, non ostenderemus quod illud est inventum ex via quod ipse est diversorum laterum, sed ex via quod ipse est[33] triangulus, quamvis non[34] posuissemus quod non est[35] triangulus nisi diversorum laterum tantum.

Et similiter quando[36] ostendimus[37] de esse solis quod ipse[38] major terra non ex via quod ipse est sol unus, sed ex via quod ipse est sol, tunc manifestum est[39] quod demonstratio non constituitur[40] super hunc solem, sed constituitur absolute super omne cujus est haec[41] habitudo. Oportet ergo inde (228^{v}) quando constituitur demonstratio super aliquam rerum singularium ne[42] putemus nos non[43] constituisse demonstrationem[44] nisi super rem singularem, sed constituimus ipsam universalem.

Et causa secunda ex causis deceptionis et erroris est[45] quando sunt res, quae communicant in demonstratione una et eadem, species multae et[46] diversae, verumtamen non est illi rei in qua communicant nomen notum.[47] Inde est quod numerus et magnitudo et[48] tempus diversificantur ad invicem in specie, verumtamen si sunt numeri quatuor proportionales, tunc ipsi, quando permutantur, etiam sunt proportionales; et similiter si sunt quatuor quantitates ex magnitudine et si sunt quatuor tempora. Et demonstratio non constituitur[49] super unumquodque istorum nisi secundum se, quoniam non est eis nomen commune communicans[50] ea, neque hoc est natura aliqua super numerum et magnitudinem et tempus aggregans ea, donec sit possibile ut ostendatur in ea quod haec res est[51] existens in ea universaliter. Et ad summum sermo, quod si sunt res proportionales, tunc quando permutantur (134^r) sunt etiam res[52] proportionales, est sermo verus. Verumtamen propterea quod non pervenient[53] homines ad hoc ut ponant rebus nomen commune; determinatam singularem faciunt demonstrationem[54] super eas et putant quod ipsi jam[55] ostenderunt[56] demonstrationem in unaquaque harum rerum[57] quas diximus secundum semitam universalis. Et non ostenderunt illud secundum hoc exemplum, et non est[58] demonstratio universalis nisi quando est ostensio in numero non ex parte quia est numerus, et in magnitudine non ex parte quia est magnitudo, et in tempore non ex parte quia est tempus. Quod est quia ipsi non ostendunt[59] demonstrationem super numerum ex parte quod est numerus neque super magnitudinem ex parte quod est magnitudo neque super tempus ex parte[60] quod est tempus. Et similiter[61] si aliquis ostendat[62] in triangulo diversorum laterum per se quod anguli ejus sunt aequales duobus rectis,[63] et ostendat illud in illo qui est duorum aequalium crurium per se et in aequilatero secundum se; nam qui facit hoc in istis non scit[64] rem communem, et in quibusdam rebus non invenitur penitus.

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[1] non oportet ut *MP*.
[2] *om. P.*
[3] eam *P.*
[4] *om. P.*
[5] *add.* caelum *M.*
[6] *add.* quoniam *T.*
[7] super ea *P.*
[8] *om. M.*
[9] *add.* ea est super *P.*
[10] *add.* sit *P.*
[11] cum *M.*
[12] *om. M.*
[13] ostendemus *M.*
[14] *add.* et *T.*
[15] utroque *P.*
[16] *om.* super . . . demonstrationem *P.*
[17] *om. M.*
[18] lineae *P.*
[19] super *P.*
[20] derigimus *M.*
[21] demonstrationum *M.*
[22] eas *P.*
[23] exigente *M.*
[24] *om. T.*
[25] ostendimus *P.*
[26] *om. P.*
[27] *om. P.*
[28] *om. P.*
[29] illius *T.*
[30] *om. MT.*
[31] sufficient *MT.*
[32] in *T.*
[33] *om. P.*
[34] nos *M.*
[35] *om. M.*
[36] *add. nos P.*
[37] ostendemus *M.*
[38] ipsa est *M.*
[39] *om.* ipse est . . . manifestum est *T.*
[40] *add.* tunc *T.*
[41] *om. P.*
[42] ut *P.*
[43] *om. P.*
[44] *om. P.*
[45] *om. M.*
[46] *om. MT.*
[47] totum *T.*
[48] est *T.*
[49] constituatur *M.*

Causa autem tertia ex causis deceptionis et erroris est ut ostendamus quod aliqua ex rebus existit in omni et putamus quod jam ostendimus[65] quod res illa[66] est universalis iterum; cujus exemplum est quod ostendunt quidam geometrice[67] quod quando[68] cadit linea recta super duas lineas rectas et facit unumquodque duorum angulorum intrinsecorum qui sunt in parte[69] una rectum, tunc illae duae lineae non concurrunt. Haec enim[70] est res inventa in omnibus[71] lineis quae faciunt similes horum duorum angulorum, sed non est haec causa causa[72] prima[73] ut sint duae lineae aequidistantes.[74] Quod est quia si non facit linea cadens[75] unumquodque duorum angulorum rectum, sed facit duos angulos aggregatos aequales duobus angulis rectis,[76] tunc jam manifestum est iterum quod duae lineae aequidistantes non concurrentes ostensione quae non est minor ostensione prima. Demonstratio igitur in hoc quod duae lineae non concurrunt[77] non est inprimis universalis[78] nisi per hoc ut sint[79] duo anguli intrinseci qui sunt in parte una aequales duobus rectis. Quod si fuerit unusquisque duorum angulorum intrinsecorum qui sunt in parte una rectus, tunc est res de omni, sed non existit in universali. Si autem dixeris:[80] quomodo poterimus ut sciamus quod ostendimus rem quae est de omni aut rem quae est universalis? dicemus[81] quod manifestum est quod si intentio[82] inesse trianguli est intentio inesse ejus ex ipso qui est diversorum laterum, sicut intentio inesse ensis est intentio gladii,[83] tunc ille, qui ostendit quod existit in triangulo diversorum laterum quod anguli ejus sunt aequales duobus rectis, scit[84] rem quae est universalis quoniam, quamvis sit triangulo quod anguli ejus sunt aequales duobus rectis,[85] tamen[86] jam exposuimus[87] quod intentio[88] inesse trianguli est intentio eadem inesse diversorum laterum ex eo.[89] Et si non est intentio in utrisque intentio una et eadem, sed intentio hujus est praeter intentionem hujus, et est illud in[90] triangulo ex parte quod est triangulus non diversorum laterum,[91] eo[92] quod est diversorum laterum, deinde putet aliquis quod[93] demonstratio constituitur ex via quod est diversorum laterum, tunc non scit[94] illud universaliter. Verum[95] jam remanet ut enuntiemus[96] de hoc eodem (60^{r}) qualiter est homini ut inveniat et sciat quod aequalitas angulorum trium duobus rectis non est[97] ei qui[98] est diversorum laterum ex triangulo ex via quod est diversorum laterum, sed ex via quod est triangulus. Hoc namque est quod remansit[99] nobis in distinctione rerum ad quas intendimus.

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[50] communicat *P*.
[51] *om. P*.
[52] *om. P*.
[53] perveniunt *M; superveniunt P*.
[54] *add.* in unaquaque rerum harum *M*.
[55] *om. P*.
[56] ostenderint *M*.
[57] *om. P*.
[58] *om. P*.
[59] ostenderunt *M*.
[60] eo *M*.
[61] *add.* non ostendit in triangulo *M; add.* quod *P*.
[62] ostendit *M*.
[63] *add.* non ostendit illud *M*.
[64] sit *P*.
[65] ostenderimus *M*.
[66] *om. P*.
[67] metrice *P*.
[68] non *P*.
[69] potentiae unum *P*.
[70] *om. P*.
[71] *add.* in *M*.
[72] *om. P*.
[73] *add.* autem igitur duae lineae equidistantes non concurrant *M*.
[74] equistantes *P*.
[75] *om. T*.
[76] *add.* et *P*.
[77] concurrant *T*.
[78] universaliter *P*.
[79] *add* per *M*.
[80] dixit his *M*.
[81] *add.* eis *M*.
[82] *add.* ante *M*.
[83] quod si intentio trianguli inesse ensis est inesse ejus in ipso quod est eadem gladii *P*.
[84] jam scis *M*.
[85] *om.* scit rem . . . duobus rectis *T*.
[86] cum *T*.
[87] possumus *M*.
[88] *om. P*.

Dico ergo quod res existens[1] in re cum[2] qua procul dubio, quando removetur, removetur inprimis praedicatum,[3] tunc propter illam rem[4] oportet ut dicamus[5] quod ipsum inest ei. Cujus exemplum est quia existit in hoc triangulo, verbi gratia, quod est ex aere et quod est diversorum laterum[6] et quod est triangulus et quod est figura et quod[7] ei sunt extremitates.

Inquiramus ergo nunc propter quam harum rerum, quarum praemisimus rememorationem, praedicatur[8] de eo quod anguli ejus[9] sunt aequales duobus rectis. Remove ergo ex eo in cognitione tua quod est ex aere, deinde considera an[10] removeatur cum hoc quod anguli ejus sunt aequales duobus rectis; nam tu non invenis illud; deinde remove ab eo quod est diversorum laterum; nam tu invenis[11] angulos ejus adhuc[12] secundum dispositionem suam; deinde remove ab eo quod est triangulus; nam tu tunc[13] invenies primum praedicatum de eo jam destructum.[14] Quod est quia non potes tunc ostendere quod anguli ejus sunt aequales duobus rectis. Et est alicui[15] ut[16] dicat quod, si tu (134^{v}) removeas[17] ab eo quod est figura etiam, aut quia[18] est superficies aut quia[19] sunt ei[20] extremitates, removeatur cum illo ab eo ut[21] anguli ejus sunt[22] aequales duobus rectis. Verum illud non est per remotionem harum rerum, sed[23] per remotionem trianguli[24] cum eis, et si non tunc, si invenimus[25] triangulum existentem absque figura aut extremitatibus, tunc nos[26] faciemus te invenire aequalitatem[27] angulorum duobus rectis remanentem post remotionem illorum. Verumtamen haec est res impossibilis, et illud, in quo oportet considerare[28] et praeparare ipsum,[29] est quod si[30] tu ponis illas res remanere[31], scilicet figuram et extremitates et triangulum[32] jam remotum esse,[33] destruitur cum ea aequalitas[34] angulorum duobus rectis. Oportet ergo inde ut ejus[35] esse non sit nisi propter triangulum et propter illud sit[36] inprimis universalis; nam per[37] remotionem quarundam aliarum[38] rerum non removetur aequalitas duobus rectis, sicut quod triangulus est ex aere et[39] quod[40] est diversorum laterum, et quamvis remaneat quibusdam earum remanentibus[41] sicut[42] figura et extremitates,[43] tunc possibile est ut figura etiam existat et non[44] existat aequalitas angulorum trium duobus rectis, sicut figura quadratum et polygonium, et non remaneat illa aequalitas[45] per remanentiam rei neque corrumpitur per corruptionem rei nisi trianguli solius. Jam ergo manifestum est rectum esse quod diximus quod illud, per cujus remotionem removetur inprimis praedicatum de eo, est illud causa cujus[46] oportet ut dicamus quia[47] existit[48] in eo; nam aequalitas angulorum duobus rectis removetur per remotionem figurae et per remotionem extremitatum, sed non secundum quod ipsae sunt primae.[49]

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[89] *add.* quod *M.*
[90] *om. P.*
[91] *add.* demonstratio *T.*
[92] *add.* ex via *PT.*
[93] *om.* aliquis quod *P.*
[94] sit *P.*
[95] vera *P.*
[96] ennuntiamus *M.*
[97] inest *M.*
[98] quod *P.*
[99] rem an sit *M.*
[1] exeuntes *M.*
[2] in *M.*
[3] praedicatio *M;* praedicatis *P.*
[4] *om. M;* esse *T.*
[5] dicatur *M.*
[6] *om.* et quod est diversorum laterum *T.*
[7] ex eis *P.*
[8] praedicat *P.*
[9] *om. MP.*
[10] autem *MP.*
[11] *om.* illud . . . invenis *T.*
[12] *add.* aequales *M;* ab hoc *P.*
[13] nunc *T.*
[14] *add.* est *M;* destruitur *T.*
[15] *om. P.*
[16] et *M.*
[17] removes *MT.*
[18] aut quia: quando *P.*
[19] *om. T.*
[20] *om. M.*
[21] quod *M.*
[22] sint *M.*
[23] secundum permutationem harum rerum sed *M.*
[24] *om.* harum rerum sed per remotionem *T.*
[25] *om.* si invenimus *T.*
[26] *om. M.*
[27] qualitatem *P.*
[28] conservare *P.*
[29] ipse *P.*
[30] *om. M.*
[31] remove *P;* manere *T.*
[32] triangulus *M.*
[33] et *P.*
[34] qualitas *P.*
[35] *om. P.*
[36] fuit *P.*
[37] propter *M.*
[38] quorundam aliorum *M.*
[39] aut *M.*
[40] *om. P.*
[41] removentibus *P.*
[42] *add.* et *M.*
[43] in extremitatibus *P.*
[44] *om. T.*

CAPITULUM SEXTUM

Quia ergo jam conditionavimus[1] has conditiones, tunc manifestum est quod demonstratio non est nisi ex rebus praedicatis universaliter[2] et de rebus per se. Quod est quia[3] propterea quod scientia demonstrativa non est nisi ex principiis[4] necessariis quae[5] impossibile est esse secundum diversitatem quod[6] sunt, et non est ex rebus aliqua, quae praedicetur praedicatione[7] necessaria, nisi res quae insunt[8] rebus per se et res praedicata universaliter tantum. Tunc[9] manifestum est quod demonstratio non est nisi ex rebus currentibus hoc cursu.

Et quidam contradicunt huic sermoni per sermonem, quem composuerunt, secundum hoc exemplum: dicunt 'si corpora animalium sunt[10] ex sicco et humido, et sunt cibus et vinum sicca et humida, tunc corpora animalium sunt ex cibo et vino'. Et nos dicimus auctoribus hujus sermonis: 'Vos non ostenditis quod haec[11] duo tantum sunt sicca et humida'.

Et Aristoteles jam[12] ostendit inprimis quod res existentes cum hac dispositione sunt solae necessariae, quamvis sunt res aliae multae ex accidentibus in quibus licet tibi dicere quod sunt necessario[13] in rebus subjectis sibi,[14] sicut albedo in nive. Verumtamen oportet[15] propterea quod albedo in natura sua est[16] in rebus aliis inventa non[17] necessario; non sunt hujusmodi res necessariae sicut res quae praedicantur per se et res quae predicantur universaliter. Et nobis quidem possibile est[18] ut sumamus res veras et[19] certas, et syllogizemus ex eis praeter hoc quod demonstremus. Cujus exemplum est ut dicamus: 'Socrates ambulat; et omnis, qui ambulat, movet pedes suos et permutat eos; ergo Socrates movet pedes suos et permutat eos'. Demonstrationem vero[20] erigere impossibile est nisi cum principiis (60^{v}) necessariis, et ex eo quod significat quod demonstratio non est nisi ex rebus necessariis, est quod ex eo quo[21] contradicimus[22] illi[23] qui aestimat quia erexit demonstrationem super rem et non erexit eam,[24] est quod ostendatur illi quod illud non est necessarium.

Ex hoc (229^{r}) iterum manifestum est[25] quod ille, qui ponit causam demonstrativae propositionis susceptionem opinionis, ei est in sinum[26] erroris adeo ut mereatur quatenus de eo derideatur[27] et vituperetur, sicut aestimat secta Protagorae[28] in istis propositionibus quod ipsae[29] sunt propositiones demonstrativae. Dicit enim quod qui[30] scit, apud eum est scientia; et ille, apud quem[31] est scientia, scit quid est scientia. Quod est quia tum non sufficiat in demonstratione veritas propositionum, sed oporteat[32] ut sint cum ea[33] etiam[34] proportionalitas et reliquae conditiones

[45] qualitas *P.*

[46] causa illud cujus *P.*

[47] quid *M.*

[48] existat *M.*

[49] quod ipse fit vel non sunt prime quid dicimus sit ex his qui predicantur per se *M.*

[1] conditionamus *P.*

[2] universalium *M.*

[3] quod autem est *P.*

[4] primis *P.*

[5] quod *M.*

[6] quae *M.*

[7] *om. T.*

[8] sunt in *P. add.* et *M.*

[9] posuerunt *P.*

[10] *add.* et *M.*

[11] *om. T.*

[12] ideo *P.*

[13] necessariae *P.*

[14] *om. P.*

[15] non oportet *M;* verum propterea *T.*

[16] *om. M.*

[17] *om. P.*

[18] *om. M.*

[19] *om. PT.*

[20] non *T.*

[21] quod ex eo quod *M;* ex eo quod quo contradicatur *T.*

[22] contradicitur *M.*

[23] ille *MT.*

[24] *add.* est *M.*

[25] *om. M.*

[26] fine *MT.*

[27] rideatur *T.*

[28] Protagoras gr. tx. p. 16, 1. 4; Pretagorice *M;* Pythagorae *PT.*

[29] iste *T.*

[30] *om. P.*

[31] quod *P.*

[32] oportet *MP.*

[33] *om. P.*

[34] *om. M.*

quas excepimus. Tunc quanto magis non sufficit in propositione ut sit sufficiens! Et ex eo quod[35] declaratur quod demonstratio oportet ut sit ex rebus necessariis. Et[36] hoc iterum dico quod, qui non scit quod propositiones sunt[37] necessariae, non scit quare conclusio sit necessaria ab eis; et fortasse scit quod conclusio est[38] necessaria, sed quare facta est[39] necessaria non scit. Inde[40] est quod intentio vivi est necessario in homine. Verumtamen si aliquis putat[41] quod intentio vivi[42] non sit homini nisi quia ambulat, tunc[43] jam scit rem[44] quae[45] necessario inest homini, sed quare insit necessario homini non scit penitus. Et dico iterum quod possibile est ut corrumpatur iste terminus medius et remaneat[46] conclusio. Et ab illo qui scit conclusionem per hujusmodi terminum medium,[47] quando corrumpatur[48] ille terminus medius ab hoc[49] ut sit sicut fuit,[50] separatur[51] scientia quare est res, quamvis sit mirum et sciens remaneat et res scita iterum[52] remaneat et syllogismus ejus[53] unus et idem sit; deinde quare[54] non sciat? (135^{r})

Et omnes quidem homines conveniunt in hoc[55] quod oportet ut[56] conclusio in demonstrationibus[57] sit necessaria. Verumtamen quidam eorum aestimant quod est possibile ut ostendatur ex termino medio qui non est necessarius. Et possibile est ut concludatur conclusio necessaria ex rebus[58] non[59] necessariis, sicut possibile est ut[60] concludatur conclusio vera[61] ex rebus non veris. Et aestimant quod oportet procul dubio a rebus necessariis rem necessariam esse; et non oportet procul dubio ut sint res necessariae a rebus necessariis.[62] Quod est quia non oportet, sicut res possibilis non est nisi a propositis possibilibus, similiter res perpetua[63] sempiterna sit[64] a propositis[65] perpetuis, sempiternis. Et nos quidem jam[66] locuti fuimus in his rebus in *Libro de Syllogismo*[67] plus hac expositione.[68] Verumtamen qui dicit hoc jam ignorat, quia[69] non sufficit ut conclusio necessaria sit nisi ut sit propter demonstrationem. Et intentio sermonis nostri 'propter demonstrationem' non est aliud[70] nisi ut in ea medius terminus, quando non est necessario, non scitur per demonstrationem; neque si ostensor ostendat quod res est, neque si ostendat quare est res. Verum si putat quod ille terminus medius est necessarius, et non necessarius est, putat quod[71] scit et ipse nescit. Et si[72] scit[73] naturam ejus, scit cum illo quod ipse non scit. Et faciam scire in eis, quae sunt post sufficientem[74] scientiam quae sit differentia inter[75] quod sit res et inter[76] quare sit res.[77]

Nunc autem[78] sufficit nobis ut ponamus in eis duo exempla. Dico ergo quod quando[79] nos ostendimus quod corpus motum circulariter est[80] corpus quintum[81] egrediens a quatuor naturis, tunc nos jam[82] ostendimus quod res est. Et quando ostendimus quod[83] eclipsis lunae est propterea quod terra tegit in eo quod est inter eam et[84] solem, tunc nos jam ostendimus quare[85] est res. Et qui[86] ostendit has duas res[87] per terminos medios[88] non necessarios, non scit eas per demonstrationem. Et necessario non est accidentibus quae comitantur res non per se[89] secundum conditiones, quas conditionavimus in rebus existentibus per se, scientia demonstrativa. Quod est quia[90] nos non[91] invenimus viam ad hoc ut ostendamus quod conclusio est necessaria. Accidens enim possibile est ut non sit. Sermo enim meus verus[92] est nisi in eo cujus est haec[93] dispositio ex accidentibus.

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[35] quo *M*.
[36] est *MP*.
[37] sint *M*.
[38] sit *P*.
[39] scit *P*.
[40] illud *P*.
[41] putet *M*.
[42] *om. T*.
[43] et *P*.
[44] *om. M*.
[45] *om. M*.
[46] *add.* et *P*.
[47] *om. T*.
[48] *om. T*.
[49] adhuc *M;* ad hoc *P*.
[50] *om. M*.
[51] separetur *T*.
[52] *om. M*.
[53] *om. P*.
[54] qualiter *P*.
[55] *om.* in hoc *T*.
[56] quod *M*.
[57] demonstrative *M*.
[58] *om. P*.
[59] *om. T*.
[60] quod *M*.
[61] nam *T*.
[62] *om.* rem . . . necessariis *PT*.
[63] *om. P*.
[64] sicut *P*.
[65] propositionibus *P*.
[66] *om. P*.
[67] cf. *Prior Anal.* II, 2-4.
[68] dispositione *P*.
[69] *add.* quod *T*.
[70] aliquid *MT*.
[71] *add.* ipse *M*.
[72] *add.* ipse *M*.
[73] sciant *P*.
[74] sufficiente *T*.
[75] *om. P*.
[76] *om. P*.
[77] *om.* sit res *P*.
[78] nunc quod *P;* non autem *T*.
[79] *om. PT*.
[80] et *P*.
[81] quantum *MP*
[82] *om. M*.
[83] *om. T*.
[84] *add.* inter *T*.
[85] quod *T*.
[86] quod ostendimus *P*.
[87] *om. P*.
[88] *om. T*.
[89] *om.* res non per se *T*.

Consideremus ergo quare quaeruntur et inquiruntur hujusmodi propositiones cum non concludant aliquid[94] necessarium. Dico ergo quod conclusio, quamvis non sit in[95] natura sua necessaria ex propositionibus, quae sunt ex accidente, sed[96] tamen[97] sequitur necessario quod concedit illas propositiones,[98] et licet etiam ut sit quaestio[99] non existens ex demonstratione in aliquo penitus. Quod est (61^{r}) quoniam non oportet[1] ut[2] sit[3] syllogismus compositus veridicus necessario[4] pendens per hoc ut[5] sit propositio concessa aut[6] non concessa.[7] Verum[8] non oportet nisi ut sit pendens per ipsam naturam rerum. Et res digniores, ut considerentur in eis, sunt res, quae sunt per se in unoquoque generum, super quae constituitur demonstratio. Syllogismi enim compositi veridici non sunt nisi ex hujusmodi rebus et[9] in hujusmodi rebus. Reliqua autem accidentia non sunt necessaria; neque[10] eorum[11] est possibile ut non tantum sint, sed quae eorum est[12] cum haec sunt simul semper, verumtamen non insunt[13] rebus per se. In syllogismis enim compositis, qui sunt per impressiones et[14] significationes, etiam inveniuntur cum terminis mediis res existentes simul semper in re. Inde est quod invenimus in muliere ut sit ei lac cum hoc ut jam sit feta, et fumus[15] est cum igne. Verumtamen isti syllogismi etiam[16] compositi non licet nobis ut dicamus vere quod sint demonstrativi, quoniam ipsi concludunt ex re postrema quod est antiquius ea.

CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM

Et nos quidem loquendo in hoc quod oportet, ut sint propositiones necessariae, plus processimus quam sufficiebat nobis, nedum[1] a sufficientia. Et declaratur iterum ex eo quod narravimus quod oportet ut sint etiam proportionales. Quod est quia, cum oporteat[2] ut[3] medium insit tertio[4] per se, et similiter primum medio, tunc manifestum est quod non licet ut permutentur demonstrationes ex genere ad genus aliud, neque ut conjungantur cum demonstrationibus geometricis res arithmeticae, quoniam res existentes in re per se sunt ex natura illius ejusdem rei et ex genere illius ejusdem rei, cum sint ex substantia cujusque[5] rerum. Etiam oportet ut redeamus et ostendamus quod diximus parumper. Dico ergo quod propterea quod res, quae sunt in demonstratione, sunt tres.[6] Quarum una est res quae ostenditur esse aut[7] non esse, et illa est praedicata[8] in conclusione. Et alia[9] est[10] propositiones quarum receptio est necessaria ex quibus ostenditur, et illae sunt in ea.[11] Et tertia est genus subjectum de quo praedicatur[12] praedicatum et in natura et in illis, quae contingunt ex[13] rebus existentibus per se, quare sunt in ea, ex quibus[14] declarantur demonstrationes sicut numerus et magnitudo. Tunc[15] oportet ut inquiramus et consideremus quando et qualiter sit possibile ut permutentur demonstrationes.[16] Dico ergo quod manifestum est quod in scientiis quarum genera sunt penitus diversa, sicut scientia arithmeticae et scientia geometricae,[17] non licet ut intendamus, verbi gratia (135$^{\text{v}}$) ad demonstrationem arithmeticam[18] et conjungamus cum ea accidentia comitantia, mensuras magnitudinis. Et significo[19] per 'comitantia'[20] ut utamur quod jam ostendimus in scientia alia[21] in rebus quae ostendentur ex rebus[22] scientiae alterius ab ea. Scientiae vero inter quarum[23] genera est communitas et non diversificantur naturae[24] subjectae[25] illis scientiis ad invicem diversitate universali, possibile est in hujusmodi quidem scientiis ut utamur propositionibus quarum susceptio est necessaria in una[26] duarum[27] scientiarum et[28] in scientia altera.

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[90] quoniam *PT*.

[91] *om. T*.

[92] *om. PT*.

[93] *om. P*.

[94] aliud *M*.

[95] inde *P*.

[96] *om. M*.

[97] qui *MT*.

[98] rationes *P*.

[99] vere *P*.

[1] *om. T*.

[2] *om. T*.

[3] *om. M*.

[4] *om. T*.

[5] quod *M*.

[6] vel *M*.

[7] *om. P*.

[8] verumtamen oportet aut nisi ut *P*.

[9] *om. P*.

[10] non que *T*.

[11] *add.* vis *M*.

[12] *om. PT*.

[13] sunt in *M*.

[14] *om. P*.

[15] cinis *P*.

[16] et *P*.

[1] necdum ad *P*.

[2] oportet *P*.

[3] quod *M*.

[4] postremo *T*.

[5] earundem *P*.

[6] res *T*.

[7] et *P*.

[8] res pura *P*.; praedicati *T*.

[9] res *P*.

[10] *add.* quod *M*.

[11] *om.* quae sunt in ea *MT*.

[12] *add.* illud *T*.

[13] et *T*.

[14] *om.* ex quibus *T*.

[15] nunc *P*.

[16] *om. T*.

[17] *om.* et scientia geometrice *P*.

Et haec quidem dispositio est dispositio scientiae de aspectibus apud scientiam geometricam, quoniam subjecta utriusque sunt homogenea; immo una earum est sub altera. Lineae enim rectae et anguli et quod[29] lineae sunt aeque distantes et quod[30] concurrunt. Et omnes res, quibus utuntur auctores scientiae de aspectibus, non sunt nisi ex[31] scientia geometriae; et neque accipit haec scientia principia sua nisi ex illa scientia. Et similiter invenimus dispositiones scientiae compositionis cantuum apud scientiam arithmeticae, quoniam non fiunt tonis usitatis in scientia compositionis cantuum[32] duplum et aequale et tertium et aequale et medium nisi ex scientia numerorum. Et scientia medicinae iterum[33] utitur in multis rebus[34] demonstrationibus naturalibus quoniam corpus hominis, quod intendit medicus, est sub corpore naturali. Et quod significat[35] tibi, quod illud quod diximus de hoc est verum, est aliqua ex rebus penitus extra lineas et superficies, non potest super eam[36] constituere demonstrationem geometricam. sicut quod scientia duorum contrariorum est scientia[37] una, sed cum illo[38] non potest in rebus existentibus in lineis et superficiebus; verumtamen non sunt in eis per se neque ex via quod[39] sunt superficies et lineae, sed sunt extra substantiam earum.[40] Super hoc ut judicet in eis sicut ut judicet quod linea recta est melior linearum et quod est vehementius contraria lineae rotundae quam lineae recurvae, quoniam non licet geometrae ex via quod ipse est geometra (61$^{\text{v}}$) ut locatur in re[41] bona neque in contraria.[42] Quoniam res istae sunt res communes existentes in rebus multis, oportet ergo propter hoc ut caveamus in demonstrationibus rationes[43] disserendi usitatas[44] in rebus[45] multis quas accepimus ab eo ex[46] libro suo[47] *in Topicis.*[48] Significo autem rationes disserendi assumptas ex re opposita rei; et ex eo quod[49] est aequale ei[50] et ex eo quod est compar ei, quoniam istae rationes disserendi sunt communes inter res multas.[51] Et non est inter eas et inter unum generum proportionalitas neque comparitas.[52] Quod si aliquis dixerit: 'Quomodo ergo dicitis[53] quod inveniuntur propositiones, quarum receptio est necessaria, communes?'[54] sicut sermo noster: 'quando[55] auferentur ex aequali aequale, remanet[56] residuum aequale'. Et oportet ut verificetur in omnibus rebus aut affirmativa aut negativa.[57] Dicemus[58] quod istae propositiones non utuntur in scientiis secundum[59] quod ipsae sunt communes, sed[60] fiunt singulares ad unamquamque scientiarum[61] per exceptionem materiae,[62] quae est ei propria, ita ut quando est sermo in[63] geometria, dicitur: 'si auferuntur ex quantitatibus

[18] arithmetica *P.*
[19] significate *P.*
[20] conjunctionem *P.*
[21] quae *M.*
[22] *om. P.*
[23] quorum *P.*
[24] natura *P.*
[25] substantiae *M.*
[26] via *M.*
[27] dictarum *M.*
[28] *om. MP.*
[29] quidem *M.*
[30] *om. P.*
[31] de *MP.*
[32] *om.* apud scientiam . . . cantuum *T.*
[33] *om. M.*
[34] in rebus ipsis multis *M.*
[35] significet *M.*
[36] *om. T.*
[37] *om. M.*
[38] re *P.*
[39] quaedam *T.*
[40] eorum *P.*
[41] *om. PT.*
[42] *add.* non enim secundum quod est proprium genus ipsarum inest, sed secundum commune quid *M.*
[43] rationem *M;* res *T.*
[44] visitas *P.*
[45] mediis *T.*
[46] de *MP.*
[47] in libris suis *M.*
[48] *Top.* II, 8-10.
[49] *om. T.*
[50] *om. P.*
[51] in res sunt communes multas *M.*
[52] paritas *M.*
[53] dicetis *M;* dicis *P.*
[54] communis *M.*
[55] quia ipsa *T.*
[56] removeam *P.*
[57] affirmatio aut negatio *M.*
[58] *add.* ergo *M.*
[59] secundum sed *PT.*
[60] licet *P.*
[61] *add.* et *M.*
[62] materiei *MP.*
[63] *om. M.*

aequalis[64] magnitudinis quantitates aequales, remanet residuum aequale'. Et[65] quando sermo est[66] in arithmetica dicitur: 'quando auferuntur ex numeris[67] aequalibus aequale,[68] remanet residuum aequale'. Et similiter est dispositio in affirmativa et negativa, quoniam auctor omnis scientiae dicit eas postquam ipsa utraque adjungit ad rem in qua est[69] ejus comparatio. Sicut ut dicat in arte arithmeticae[70] quod omnis numerus non evacuatur quin[71] sit impar aut non sit impar et in unaquaque scientiarum reliquarum[72] secundum hoc exemplum. Jam ergo manifestum est quod non sufficit in demonstrationibus ut sint propositiones certe verae neque ut (229^{v}) sint non[73] indigentes demonstratione et sint manifestae absque medio, sed oportet ut sint cum illo proportionales non conjunctae generibus multis.

Et propter id non convenit alicui ut aestimet[74] quod quadratura qua Brisso[75] quadrat circulum sit demonstratio geometrica. Quod est quia utitur in[76] ea propositione, cujus receptio est necessaria, et quamvis ipsa[77] sit certa, vera, verumtamen communis. Et est quia dicit quod res quae sunt majores et minores[78] unis et eisdem rebus, et minores, sunt aequales ad invicem. Haec enim propositio non verificatur in magnitudine tantum,[79] sed verificatur et[80] in numero et in tempore et in rebus aliis multis. Et iste sermo, quem[81] addidit Brisso ad hoc, et putavit quod jam quadravit circulum, non est ex eis; quod sit necessarium in hoc nostro sermone: [Verumtamen rememoror[82] ejus diligenti scientiam et[83] desideranti eam.] Inquit[84] Brisso: circulus est major omnibus[85] figuris[86] polygoniis, (136^{r}) quae describuntur intra ipsum, et minor omnibus figuris multorum angulorum, quae describuntur[87] super ipsum deforis. Et similiter est dispositio figurae multorum angulorum descriptae in eo quod est inter figuras descriptas intra circulum et super ipsum deforis. Necesse est ergo ut sit circulus et haec figura polygonia major rebus unis et eisdem et minor rebus unis et eisdem. Oportet ergo inde ut sint haec[88] duo aequalia propter propositionem[89] susceptam[90] quae dicta est. Verumtamen haec propositio, quamvis sit vera,[91] et[92] si vis[93] quod est manifesta absque medio et quod ipsa non indiget demonstratione, tamen in hoc tuo syllogismo non est principium proportionale rei ostensae in eo. Quod est quia tu non accepisti in eo rem ex via quod circulus est, neque ex via quod est magnitudo, ergo enim tu es sicut illi qui[94] syllogizant[95] ex accidentibus. Illi enim iterum assumunt propositiones pendentes[96] ex natura subjecta. Ille autem, qui scit rem secundum veritatem, non ex via accidentis, non scit eam nisi ex principiis illius rei et ex rebus existentibus[97] in essentia sua. In quibus necessario oportet ut sint[98] terminus medius et propositiones per[99] quas est essentia syllogismi aut unius ejusdem[1] generis universaliter aut generis homogenei ei; et non sit longinquum ab eo, sicut diximus in dispositione apud numeros. Et propter hoc[2] auctor[3] scientiae compositionis cantuum potest uti propositionibus arithmeticis, propterea quod ante omnes propositiones hujusmodi jam ostensum est quod res est[4] sicut quod harmonia, quae est cum quatuor, est conveniens; et quia apparet post in lineis aequidistantibus quia concurrunt; quod[5] autem[6] non recepimus nisi ex propositionibus quae sunt superiores eis. Intervallum enim quod est per quatuor non sit conveniens nisi propter proportionem aequalis et tertiae. Et lineae aequidistantes non videntur ex longinquo concurrere nisi propter esse[7] angulorum qui[8] sunt minores[9] duobus rectis. Et differentia inter hujusmodi demonstrationes et inter demonstrationes in quibus genus est unum, vere[10] est quod tres termini in illis sunt[11] geminati[12]; sed in istis est[13] conclusio ex scientia propinqua, et (62^r) medium est ex scientia superiore. Quod est quia aequale et medietas inprimis non est nisi unus per se, et propter illud[14] spatium quod est per[15] quinque sit[16] conveniens.

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[64] *om. P.*

[65] *om. P.*

[66] *om. P.*

[67] *om.M.*

[68] aequales *M.*

[69] *om. M.*

[70] arithmetica *P.*

[71] quando *P.*

[72] relictarum *M.*

[73] *om. P.*

[74] existimet *M.*

[75] Cf. T. L. Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics*, I (Oxford, 1921), pp. 223-5.

[76] *om. M.*

[77] *om. M.*

[78] eisdem rebus et minores *P; om. T.*

[79] *om. P.*

[80] *om. M.*

[81] quam *T.*

[82] rememoratur *P.*

[83] *om. MT.*

[84] ita quid *P.*

[85] *om.* omnibus figuris *M.*

[86] *add.* in *P.*

[87] scribuntur *M.*

[88] *om.* inde *M;* rebus eisdem quod ergo tamen ut sit haec *P.*

[89] positionum *T.*

[90] susceptivam *P.*

[91] verum *T; om.* si vis *T.*

[92] *Here begins a long passage marked* vacat, *with a marginal note*: Haec est digressio commentatoris Themistii a serie verborum Aristotelis. In hoc facit ut inquirit veritatem super illud quod nititur innuere Aristoteles quod scilicet propositiones sint secundum universale; quod conclusio possit esse similiter secundum universale. Hoc enim multam habet dubitationem si verum sit vel non *M.*

[93] *add.* dico *M.*

[94] *om. P.*

[95] ille qui syllogizavit *M.*

[96] proponentes *M.*

[97] *add.* ei *T.*

[98] sit *MP.*

[99] parem essentialiter *T.*

[1] *om.* ejusdem generis universaliter *P.*

[2] *om. P.*

[3] angulorum *P.*

CAPITULUM OCTAVUM

Et manifestum est quod propositiones iterum, ex quibus fit[1] syllogismus compositus, quando sunt universaliter necessario, oportet ut sit[2] conclusio[3] necessaria,[4] sempiterna, perpetua in demonstrationibus, quarum dispositio haec est, et in[5] demonstrationibus quae dicuntur absolutae, quoniam propositionibus necessariis est conclusio necessaria; et ex propositionibus sempiternis, perpetuis sit conclusio perpetua, sempiterna.

Oportet ergo ut consideremus et inquiramus in hoc loco, qualiter fit conclusio iterum super universale, quando[7] propositiones ante eam sunt super universale. Quod est quia principalitas non est possibile[8] ut sit[9] inventa in conclusione, quando est inventa[10] in propositionibus ante eam. Et quidam dixerunt in responsione hac duos sermones; quorum primus est quod non oportet necessario semper ut propositiones sint universales. Quod est quia Aristoteles non dixit 'si sint'[11] et non dixit[12] quia oportet ut sint[13] procul dubio ita.[14] Et secundus est quia non est quod[15] prohibeat ut non[16] sit praedicatio universalis, prima[17] per naturam inventa[18] in conclusione. Verum prima est[19] ex rebus quae est[20] possibile ut ostendantur. Et fortasse Alexander in hoc suo sermone dixit aliquid, et melius quidem est, ut non ad ultimum perveniatur in perscrutatione rationis disserendi in hoc, et ut[21] non aestimetur de Aristotele quod ipse diviserit[22] praedicationem universalem et praedicationem per se hac divisione, ita ut posuerit[23] quod oportebat[24] ut[25] praedicatio universalis sit inventa[26] in conclusione et praedicatio secundum se sit in propositionibus, quoniam Aristoteles non judicavit hoc in aliquo locorum judicio manifesto.[27] Et non est possibile iterum ut concedatur in conclusione praedicatio universalis inprimis, sive ostensio ejus fuerit ex propositionibus in quibus est praedicatio per se, sive ex propositionibus in quibus est universalis praedicatio. Manifestum est enim quod oportet necessario ut praedicatum sit[28] inventum prius in re media, sed quod[29] conclusio sit universalis ex via[30] quod ipsa est res prima. Fortasse possibile est ut aliquis dicat illud per viam sufficientiae in conclusione prima conclusa a propositionibus declaratis absque medio. In conclusionibus autem[31] quae sunt post illam et quae non concluduntur nisi (136^{v}) a[32] rebus quarum declaratio praecessit, quomodo est possibile ut sit disputationi[33] per illud locus, cum illae conclusiones non sint[34] primae ex via quod ostensae[35] sunt?[36] Oportet ergo inde[37] aut[38] ut expellantur omnes demonstrationes, quarum habitudo haec[39] est ex via quod praedicatio universalis sit inventa[40] necessario[41] in conclusione;[42] aut ut concedatur[43] quod praedicatio de omni dicitur in propositionibus sicut dicitur in eis praedicatio per se; et[44] ex propositionibus[45] illis digniores sunt quae non indigent demonstratione ad quas pervenit demonstratio. Veritas enim demonstrationis non est nisi in propositionibus. In conclusione vero sufficit ut sit ejus[46] conclusio a similibus istis propositionibus ita ut sit compositus syllogismus necessarius. Et Aristoteles etiam jam ostendit hoc a se.[47] Quod est quia postquam dixit quod, quando[48] sunt propositiones de omni, non dixit quod[49] conclusio iterum est[50] de omni; sed conjunxit illud[51] quia dixit quod conclusio est sempiterna, perpetua. Jam ergo manifestum est quod aut oportet ut dicamus[52] hunc sermonem, aut quia possibile est ut sint utraeque res inventae de omni, res, scilicet, quae declarantur, in conclusione et res quae declaratur,[53] verbi gratia, in triangulo aequalitas angulorum ejus duobus rectis, et est res quae ostenditur et aequalitas anguli[54] extrinseci[55] ab eo duobus angulis intrinsecis oppositis ei, et est res qua ostenditur illud. Et illae quidem[56] res indigent necessario expositione propter necessitatem earum.

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[4] *om. P.*
[5] quare *MT.*
[6] *om. M.*
[7] est *T.*
[8] quae *M.*
[9] *om.* quae sunt minores *P.*
[10] *add.* naturae *M.*
[11] sibi *P.*
[12] continuati *T.*
[13] *om. P.*
[14] *om. P.*
[15] *om. P.*
[16] fuit *MP.*

[1] *om. P.*
[2] *om. M.*
[3] *add.* cum *P.*
[4] *om. M.*
[5] *om. P.*
[6] *om. M.*
[7] *om.* quando . . . universale *T.*
[8] quando est principalitas non est possibile *M.*
[9] *om. P.*
[10] *om.* quando est inventa *P;* quoniam est inventa *M.*
[11] nisi fuerint *P.*
[12] dicit *M.*
[13] fuerit *P.*
[14] *om. T.*
[15] ut *P.*
[16] *om. P.*
[17] primus *P.*
[18] innumeratam *P.*
[19] *add.* quae est *P.*
[20] *om.. M.*
[21] *om. M.*
[22] divisit *P.*
[23] possit *M.*
[24] oporteat *MP.*
[25] quod *M.*
[26] *om. P.*
[27] Cf. *Prior Anal. I,* 26; 43.
[28] si *P.*
[29] *om. M.*
[30] *add.* una *P.*

Et Aristoteles dixit quod non sequitur ex[57] sermone quod demonstratio non est nisi in rebus quae sunt universales, sempiternae, perpetuae, confessio formarum. Quod est quia positores formarum non praedicant eas universaliter neque quod ipsae sunt[58] stantes. Et res quidem singulares non sunt sicut res quae sunt universales. Verum ipsi aestimant quod[59] unaquaeque[60] earum est singularis a multitudine secundum se. Et causa ejus[61] est intentio[62] multitudinis et rei iterum, quae est universalis praedicatio, est[63] super res singulares secundum semitam quod dat[64] nomen suum et suam definitionem rei de qua[65] praedicatur. Formae autem non[66] praedicantur de rebus singularibus nisi[67] praedicatione, quod dant eis nomen suum, sine definitione sua. Jam ergo manifestum est propter has res, quod non oportet necessario ut formae existant quando demonstratio existit. Res autem dicta universaliter oportet[68] ut sit necessario, quoniam non est possibile sine (62^{v}) ea ut sciatur terminus medius.

Et res quidem[69] manifesta est et[70] conclusio, quia[71] oportet ut sit sempiterna in demonstrationibus. Tunc non est alicui ex rebus quae corrumpuntur demonstratio neque scientia absolute. Illud vero est[72] propterea quod inest praedicatio ejus universaliter. Et quomodo est possibile ut sit conclusio sempiterna, perpetua in re subjecti de quo praedicatur, cum[73] ipsum sustineat corruptionem[74] et non sit[75] illa res, quae praedicatur de ea,[76] inventa in ea semper neque absolute,[77] sed

[31] *om. P.*
[32] in *P.*
[33] disputatio *P;* dispositioni *T.*
[34] sunt *T.*
[35] ostendens *P.*
[36] *om.* sunt *P.*
[37] *om. M.*
[38] *om. M.*
[39] *om. P.*
[40] innumerata *P.*
[41] necessaria *M;* et necessaria *P.*
[42] *om. P.*
[43] *om.* non concedatur *M;* non concludatur *P.*
[44] *om. P.*
[45] *add.* in *T.*
[46] ei *T.*
[47] *add.* ipso *M.*
[48] *om. M.*
[49] *om. T.*
[50] sit *M.*
[51] illum *P.*
[52] dicat *P.*
[53] *om.* quae declaratur in conclusione et res *P.; om.* quae declaratur *T.*
[54] angulorum *P.*
[55] intrinseci *M;* intrinseca *P.*
[56] quod *P.*
[57] *om.* sequitur ex *M.*
[58] sint *MP.*
[59] *om. P.*
[60] unamquamque *P.*
[61] hujus *P.*
[62] inventio *PT.*
[63] *add.* et *M.*
[64] *add.* ei *M.*
[65] quo *M.*
[66] formae aut praedicantur *P.*
[67] *add.* quod *M.*
[68] *om. M.*
[69] quando *P.*
[70] quod *M; om. P.*
[71] quae *M.*
[72] *om. P.*
[73] et *M.*
[74] *end of long vacat M.*
[75] *om. T.*
[76] re *T.*
[77] *om.* Illud vero est . . . absolute *T.*

in hora aliqua[78] et ex modo aliquo?[79] Cujus exemplum est quod intentio vivi est in Socrate; verumtamen non in omni hora neque ex parte quod ipse est Socrates, sed ex parte quod ipse est homo. Et iterum in[80] propositionibus non est vestigium ex dicto super totum in hujusmodi rebus et re[81] dicta per se, cum sit conclusio sustinens corruptionem. Verum oportet necessario ut sit[82] una duarum propositionum sustinens corruptionem et non sit super totum. Et sicut demonstratio[83] non est penitus super aliquam[84] rerum sustinentium corruptionem, similiter definitio non est rei quae sustinet corruptionem. Quod est[85] quia definitio[86] aut est principium demonstrationis, aut est demonstratio alterata[87] in situ, aut est conclusio demonstrationis. Principium quidem demonstrationis est quando est secundum viam propositionis manifestae absque medio aut accepta[88] secundum viam termini in propositione. Demonstratio vero alterata[89] in situ est syllogismi[90] quibus est causa. Cujus exemplum est ut quaerat aliquis quid sit eclipsis solis, et dicatur ei quod est obtenebratio luminis ejus per cursum lunae sub eo. Nos[91] enim possumus alterare locum hujus definitionis et facere ipsam demonstrationem, verbi gratia, nos dicimus: 'luna currit sub sole et quod currit sub eo tegit ipsum.' Et definitiones quae sunt conclusiones demonstrationis sunt definitiones quae dimittunt dicere[92] causam. Et faciam scire scientiam[93] definitionum in sequentibus sufficientius hoc.[94]

Nunc[95] autem inest alicui ut dicat (230^r), demonstrationes rerum, quae accidunt multotiens et scientiae earum, sicut demonstratio eclipsis et scientia (137^r) ejus, quomodo[96] est possibile, ut sint demonstrationes, cum eclipsis non sit res[97] sempiterna, perpetua? Dico ergo quod videmus in istis rebus etiam formam quandam communem rebus, quae accidunt secundum revolutiones similes. Quod est quia demonstratio non erigitur[98] super hanc eclipsim unam, quae[99] accidit in hac[1] hora, sed constituitur super omnem eclipsim, quae currit hoc cursu, quod ipsa propter hanc causam oportet necessario ut sit semper. Ex hac ergo via fit[2] in hujusmodi rebus, quod nunc declaratur res, quae est universalis, nisi ex re singulari, nisi[3] sit declaratio rei singularis ex via quod ipsa[4] est comprehensa sub re, quae est universalis, sicut jam ostendimus iterum in rebus sustinentibus corruptionem. Et jam sumus contenti eo, quod diximus de hoc, ut sciamus qualiter oportet ut inveniatur[5] in demonstratione res, quae est[6] per se, et res quae est universalis.

CAPITULUM NONUM

Et oportet jam ut incipiamus inceptione[1] alia. Dico ergo quod si omnis demonstratio non est nisi ex rebus, quae sunt antiquiores, tunc manifestum est quod nulli scientiarum penitus est, ut principia sua ostendat.[2] Quod est quia illa non erunt principia ei, si illa scientia ostendit ea per principia alia antiquiora eis. Et si oportet ut principia illa declarentur, non erit incessus nisi ad illud quod est infinitum.[4] Et si[5] oportet ut ponatur positio, quod ipsa sunt ostensa, tunc illa sunt principia. Et ille, qui scit illa principia et ostendit ex illis, est magis sciens quam ille, qui scit principia[6] postrema[7] et utitur illis. Inest ergo[8] alicui, ut quaerat in hoc loco, an sit impossibile,[9] ut praeparetur erectio demonstrationis super principia geometrica et super principia arithmetica et super scientiam musicae et super principia reliquarum scentiarum. Dico ergo quod illud praeparatur,[10] sed[11] non praeparatur illi scientiae, quae[12] utitur illis[13] principiis, secundum[14] quod ipsa sunt principia. Quod est quoniam non est possibile in[15] illa scientia, ut ponat[16] principiis[17] principia. Verum[18] illud non praeparatur[19] nisi scientiae alii[20] altiori omnibus scientiis; et omnes scientiae sunt sub[21] ea.[22] Quod est quoniam non est possibile, ut utantur illis principiis in[23] illis scientiis reliquis, nisi quando sunt omnes sub illa scientia, sicut scientia de aspectibus est sub scientia geometriae.[24] Secundum vero modum praeter istum non est possibile, cum demonstratio non sit nisi ex rebus proportionalibus homogeneis; et illa est[25] sapientia[26] magna completa; et est[27] illa quam oportet, ut nominemus absolute scientiam, et appropriemus[28] eam (63^r) nomine scientiae absque reliquis scientiis, cum sit speculatio in ea in causis primis omnis rei, et quae sunt digniores eis omnibus, ut sint[29] causae, ut sciantur conclusiones.[30]

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[78] alia *M.*
[79] alio *M.*
[80] *om. MT.*
[81] res *M.*
[82] si *T.*
[83] demonstrationem penitus super *M.*
[84] aliam *M.*
[85] *om. P.*
[86] *add.* est *M.*
[87] altera *T.*
[88] recepta *M;* acceptiva *P.*
[89] altera *T.*
[90] *add.* in *P; add.* cum *T.*
[91] non *M.*
[92] facere *T.*
[93] *corr. from* causam *M.*
[94] *om. M;* hic *P.*
[95] non *T.*
[96] quo *P.*
[97] *om. P.*
[98] exigitur *M.*
[99] quam *M.*
[1] alia *M.*
[2] *om. P.*
[3] *add.* si *T.*
[4] ipse *T.*
[5] inveniantur *P.*
[6] sunt *P.*
[1] interceptione *P.*
[2] *add.* ei *M.*
[3] erit *M.*
[4] *om.* et si . . . infinitum *P.*
[5] non *M.*
[6] *om.* et ostendit . . . principia *T.*
[7] extrema *M.*
[8] *om. P.*

Oportet ut sit nobis[31] difficile, quoniam digniores[32] causae sunt causae quibus non est causa. Propter has ergo causas omnes sit nobis difficile, an scientia[33] nostra sit scientia veridica, an[34] non sit veridica.[35] Quod est quia[36] difficile sit, ut[37] sciamus,[38] an scientia nostra sit ex principiis proportionalibus unicuique rerum, an[38] non; et illa est scientia veridica. Sed nos, quando invenimus propositiones[39] certas, veras tantum, aestimamus statim syllogismum assumptum ab[40] eis syllogismum[41] demonstrativum;[42] et res non est ita. Verum[43] oportet, ut sint principia homogenea rebus, quae declarantur ex rebus assumptis per se.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM

Et significo per 'principia cujusque[1] generum' principia, quae oportet ut necessario sint, et[2] non est possibile[3] ut veniant super eadem[4] demonstratio. Duae namque res primae, quas necesse est scire ante omnem scientiam syllogisticam, sunt,[5] quod res est[6] et quid significent.[7] Scientia ergo quid significet oportet necessario ut praemittatur non principiis tantum, sed rebus, quae declarantur ex principiis, cum est necessarium intelligere demonstrationem. Verum[8] quod res sit, oportet ut sciatur ante principia; quod vero est, postea oportet ut declaretur; melius namque est,[9] ut ponatur divisio secundum hanc viam.

Dico[10] quod res, super quas ordinavimus omnem scientiam,[11] sunt tres. Una earum[12] est genus subjectum ei, quod praedicatur de eo sicut numerus et magnitudo. Et alia est res, quae est[13] in genere subjecto per se, sicut par et impar, et aequalitas angulorum duobus rectis, et quod apparet ex[14] concursu[15] linearum aequidistantium. Et tertia est propositionis[16] primae necessario sicut sermo tuus: 'quando de aequali demus aequale, remanet aequale.' Genus ergo

[9] possibile *T*.
[10] praeparetur *M*.
[11] si *P*.
[12] qui *M*.
[13] vel *T*.
[14] sed *P*.
[15] *om. M*.
[16] ponatur *T*.
[17] *om. P*.
[18] verumtamen *P*.
[19] *add.* illi scientiae *P*.
[20] *om. P*.
[21] *om. T*.
[22] *add.* membra *M*.
[23] et *T*.
[24] geometricae *MP*.
[25] *om.* illa est *P*.
[26] *add.* scientia *M*.
[27] *om. M*.
[28] propriemus *M*.
[29] *om. P*.
[30] omnes *T*.
[31] *om. M*.
[32] *add.* ut sint *M*; *add.* causae ut sint *P*.
[33] sciamus an *P*.
[34] aut *T*.
[35] *om. P*; ita *T*.
[36] *add.* fit nobis *P*.
[37] *om.* sit ut *P*.
[38] aut *T*.
[39] proportiones *M*.
[40] de *P*.
[41] *om.P*.
[42] demonstratum *M*; demonstrandum *P*.
[43] verumtamen *MP*.
[1] cujuscumque *P*.
[2] *om. T*.
[3] *om. M*.
[4] eandem *P*; ea *T*.
[5] sicut *T*.
[6] sint *M*.
[7] significent *M*.
[8] verumtamen *M*.
[9] *om. P*.
[10] *add.* ergo *P*.
[11] omnes scientias *P*.
[12] eorum *M*.
[13] sunt *PT*.
[14] in *M*.
[15] cursu *P*.
[16] propositiones *PT*

oportet, ut ponatur positione, et res,[17] quae sunt in eo[18] per se, indigent ut intelligatur[19] quid[20] significant.[21] In propositionibus autem necessariis oportet,[22] ut sciatur quod ipsae sunt et quid[23] significant.[24] Et[25] oportet ut sciamus,[26] quare in[27] unaquaque[28] illarum[29] duarum non quaeritur nisi res in una,[30] et in propositionibus necessariis quaeruntur utraeque res[31] simul. Dico ergo quod illud fit quoniam propositiones necessariae continuant illas[32] ad (137^{v}) invicem et aggregant[33] eas, et concluditur ex[34] eis, et nos ponere quasdam rerum superfluum est, quando sunt manifeste positae, sicut si[35] ponimus naturam subjectam[36] praedicationi,[37] quia est, quando est[38] manifesta valde, apparens[39] omnibus hominibus. Auctor enim scientiae naturalis non indiget ut ponat quod frigidum et calidum sunt, neque medicus indiget, ut ponat quod corpus hominis est.[40] Sed[41] auctor scientiae numerorum[42] eget, ut ponat numerum[43] et unum. Quod est quia[44] substantia harum rerum non est manifesta secundum similitudinem dispositionis earum. Et alii[45] dimittunt[46] referre significationem rei, quid[47] significet, quando est manifesta, patens. Quod est quia expositio rerum manifestarum est vanitas, et nos non quaerimus[48] contrarietatem super esse propositionum necessariarum[49] receptarum in se ipsis manifestarum aestimatum[50] in eis. Et quando dico[51] 'aestimatum' [52] non dico quod[53] ipsae procul dubio sunt[54] concessae, super quas sit[55] convenientia. Propositiones enim necessariae valde paucae sunt, si posuerimus experientiam earum[56] per hunc modum.[57] Quoniam unicuique hominum est, ut contradicat in eis per verbum extrinsecum; per verbum autem intrinsecum[58] non[59] est illud[60] in[61] omnibus hominibus.[62] Verum[63] enim[64] quod si auferatur de aequali aequale, remanet aequale, patet[65] quod[66] utitur deceptione et resistentia ut contradicat,[67] verumtamen ille contradicit[68] hoc, sicut[69] dicit Afritalidis[70] non nisi lingua sua, sed ejus ratio et ipsius anima, et[71] non demonstratio quidem,[72] non inclinatur ad sermonem extrinsecum. Verum[73] non inclinatur nisi ad verbum quod est in rationibus. Non ergo oportet ut nos experiamur[74] propositiones necessarias ex eo quod[75] loquuntur homines, sed ex eo quo aestimatur;[76] multotiens enim loquimur cum nominibus, et nos intendimus mentibus nostris ad alia, sicut geometrae non utuntur lineis, in quibus loquuntur et quas nominant, sed in se ipsis lineis, quarum significationes sunt illae lineae quas formant.[77] Et dicunt quod haec linea est s<emis>, et non est ipsa s<emis>, et ponunt quod triangulus est aequalium laterum, et non est ipse aequalium laterum. Non ergo oportet ut consideremus ad illud[78] quod formavit[79] sed ad illud quod intelligunt[80] (63^{v}). Illae enim sunt res quibus utuntur in demonstrationibus. Quod est quia ipsi[81] docent in demonstratione super lineam apud eos universalem, et ostendunt lineam descriptam, cum non eis[82] sit possibile significare per illud lineam veram.

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[17] *add.* quidem *M.*

[18] *add.* semper *MP.*

[19] intelligant *P*

[20] quod *MP.*

[21] significantur *MP.*

[22] *om.* In propositionibus . . . oportet *M.*

[23] quod *P.*

[24] significatur *P.*

[25] *ob. P.*

[26] sciamur *P.*

[27] *om. M.*

[28] una est *M.*

[29] viarum *M.*

[30] via *M.*

[31] *om. P.*

[32] has ad invicem *M;* ad invicem illas *P.*

[33] aggregavit *M;* aggregantur *T.*

[34] ab *M.*

[35] *om. M.*

[36] *om. P.*

[37] praedicationem *MP.*

[38] *om.* quando est *P.*

[39] appositis *M.*

[40] sit *M.*

[41] si *P.*

[42] numerum *M.*

[43] unum *M.*

[44] *add.* est *M.*

[45] aliis *P.*

[46] dimitte *M;* dicunt *P.*

[47] quod *P.*

[48] inquirimus *M.*

[49] necessarium *T.*

[50] estimantur *MP.*

[51] *om. M.*

[52] estimatur *M.*

[53] *add.* sint *P.*

[54] *om. P.* sunt *T.*

[55] fuit *P.*

[56] ipsarum *P.*

[57] *marginal*: In hoc loco in arabico est quod significat frequentationem utentis eo quod vult extolli contradictio *M.*

[58] *om.* per . . . intrinsecum *P.*

[59] si *P.*

[60] nobis *T.*

[61] *om. T.*

[62] *add.* illud *T.*

[63] verbum *MP.*

[64] autem *P.*

[65] potest *T.*

[66] qui *T.*

[67] contradicatur *P.*

[68] contradicat *T.*

[69] *om.* hoc sicut *M.*

[70] Euripides *M;* Aristoteles *P;* Arumtilidis *T;* Cf. *Hippolytus* 612; *gr. tx.* p. 23, l. 25.

[71] *om P.*

[72] quod *P;* quid *T.*

[73] unde *M;* verumtamen *P.*

[74] experiamus *P.*

[75] quo *MP.*

[76] estimantur *MP.*

[77] sumant *M.*

[78] *om. P.*

[79] formantur *M.*

[80] intelliguntur *M.*

[81] *om. M.*

CAPITULUM UNDECIMUM

Et manifestum est quod[1] ex propositionibus necessariis sunt propositiones manifestae valde, et non est manifestior quam quia non est possibile, ut verificentur in re una et eadem simul affirmativa et negativa. Nam ex nostra[2] verificatione, qua ipsam verificamus, pervenimus[3] ad hoc ut sciamus quod ejus usus sit[4] in demonstrationibus, ita ut ponamus eam in loco propositionis et videamus[5] quod[6] est superfluum propter vehementiam suae declarationis. Verumtamen nos fortasse cogimur ponere eam et oportet ut ostendamus quando est illud et qualiter est illud. Dico ergo quod quando[7] est intentio[8] nostra in aliqua rerum, quod ipsa est cum aliqua[9] dispositione, et non est cum contrario ejus, cogimur[10] uti ea, verbi gratia, quando nos conamur[11] ostendere quod mundus est finitus et non est infinitus,[12] tunc enim oportet ut accipiamus quod non[13] est[14] possibile in aliquo corporum in aliqua dispositionum,[15] ut per affirmationem et negationem affirmetur de[16] ipso quod sit finitum simul nisi per affirmationem quia est[17] finitum, et via ejus est illud, et mundus est corpus. Ergo oportet ut ponamus super[18] propositionem[19] majorem secundum hoc exemplum; nam conclusio iterum secundum hanc viam fit ei[20] simul.

Et non hoc[21] tantum est manifestum et planum quod non est possibile ut una et eadem res simul recipiat affirmationem et negationem,[22] sed manifestum[23] est etiam quod oportet ut una earum necessario verificetur super omnem rem. Haec enim est natura contradictionis, et non est dispositio in eis sicut dispositio in duobus contrariis, in quibus non est possibile ut aggregentur simul. Sed non oportet necessario, ut sit unum eorum in omni re. Et utuntur hac propositione necessaria in quibusdam demonstrationibus secundum semitam, quae est manifestior et planior, et praecipue in modis[24] demonstrationum quae sunt per contrarium. Utens enim hoc modo, cum non pervenit ad hoc ut declaret unam duarum rerum oppositarum[25] super quam vult conclusionem,[26] ponit rem aliam oppositam ei, et ipse in illo non facit necessitatem syllogismo suo de re alia, nisi quia omnis res ex rebus[27] non evacuatur, quin in ea verificetur affir(138^{r})mativa vel negativa Inde est quod dicit (230^{v}) quoniam oportet necessario ut diameter aut sit communicans[28] lateri quadrati aut incommunicans; et sermo ejus autem,[29] ut sit communicans, non est res alia nisi quod una duarum partium contradictionis necessaria est. Et ipsi quamvis non explanent expositione manifesta, tamen utuntur virtute ejus et ipsius intentione, et ponunt hanc propositionem propriorem[30] ad hoc, ut ipsi[31] permittent eam a re, quae est universalis, ad genus ad[32] quod intendunt.

Jam enim diximus quod non oportet ut utamur etiam propositionibus necessariis communibus in demonstrationibus, secundum quod ipsae sunt communes, sed oportet ut conjungamus cum eis[33] naturas subjectas praedicationi, et ponamus eas propinquius proportionales per nostram intentionem de eis super genus, in quo volumus aliquid ostendere. Ex propositionibus enim necessariis sunt propositiones, in quibus communicant omnes scientiae ad invicem, et non scientiae tantum, sed cum illo duae virtutes aliae, quarum una est vilior scientia et altera est melior scientia, scilicet, potentia[34] disputandi et sapientia. Et communitas earum istis duabus virtutibus est quoniam utraeque utuntur propositionibus necessariis sicut utuntur eis, sed ex via quod earum utrarumque opifices conantur firmare eas,[35] verumtamen ars disserendi conatur affirmare[36] eas ex rebus receptis in aestimatione, et auctores sapientiae conantur firmare eas ex medio altero. Nos enim non concedimus in potentia disserendi quod ipsa est scientia, propterea quod intentio ejus non est intentio generis determinati sicut lineae et numeri, et non intendunt opifices ejus ostendere ex rebus, quae sunt per se, sed ex rebus aestimatis in unaquaque rerum. Et propter illud audent auctores dialecticae super quaestionem et aestimant quod ipsi ostendunt, quod volunt; concedat[37] interrogatus, quod quaeritur[38] ab eo, aut[39] non concedat[37] illud. Quod est quoniam res quam volunt[40] non est res existens, et si non esset illud, non[41] uteretur omni quod conceditur ei. Quod est quoniam non est possibile,[42] ut ostendatur res una et eadem per duas res oppositas. (64^r) Et non intendit opifex dialecticae ad rem unam et eandem, sed intendit, verbi gratia, ad hoc ut syllogizet super animam, et concluditur,[43] quod ipsa moritur; deinde quod ipsa non moritur. Opifex autem demonstrationis non intendit nisi intentionem unius[44] duarum rerum oppositarum. Quod est quia ipse non quaerit nisi veritatem, et propter illud non quaerit quoniam, quando quaesitus non concedit quod anima est sempiterni[45] motus, non concedit[46] quod altera, sed stat.

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[82] *om. M.*

[1] *om. P.*

[2] *om. P.*

[3] perennius *M; om.* pervenimus . . . ut *T.*

[4] *om. MT.*

[5] videmus *P.*

[6] quid *M.*

[7] non *T.*

[8] inventio *T.*

[9] qua *P;* hac *T;* in hac *corr. to* cum aliqua *M.*

[10] cogitur in *M.*

[11] cogamur *M.*

[12] finitus *P.*

[13] autem *T.*

[14] *om. M.*

[15] dispositione *M.*

[16] *om. P.*

[17] *om. T.*

[18] *om. M.*

[19] compositionem *M.*

[20] eis *M.*

[21] *om. P.*

[22] affirmativam et negativam *T.*

[23] necessarium *M.*

[24] modum *M.*

[25] *om. T.*

[26] conclusio *T.*

[27] *om.* ex rebus *P.*

[28] conveniens *M.*

[29] *om.* diameter . . . ejus *T;* aut *MP.*

[30] priorem *M.*

[31] *om. M.*

[32] *om. M.*

[33] certas *T.*

CAPITULUM DUODECIMUM

Quod[1] si interrogaverit nos auctor[2] demonstrationis, an non est via in aliqua dispositionum, an non, est quaestio sapientialis, et est quaestio dialectica et quaestio sophistica, dicemus immo possibile est,[3] quoniam possibile est ut sit quaestio demonstrativa, cum sit propositio demonstrativa; verumtamen non conceditur, quod omnis[4] quaestio sit[5] demonstrativa, cum omnis propositio non sit demonstrativa,[6] verum[7] propositionem, ex qua est syllogismus[8] proportionalis unicuique rerum, potest recipere, et facere in ea quaestionem proportionalem scientiae. Et geometra interrogat non ita ut recipiat[9] ex responsione propositionem,[10] qua indiget in syllogismo proportionali, cum ipse auferat[11] eam a se ipso, et non recipiat ipsam ab alio, sed quando vult experiri illum qui profitetur illam eandem scientiam. Et oportet ne respondeat omnis[12] sapiens in omni quaestione, sed respondeat in[13] quaestione geometrica geometra, non[14] auctor scientiae[15] musicae; et respondeat musicus[16] in quaestione musicae, quod[17] est scientiae[18] illius, non[19] geometra. Quod si interrogaverit nos aliquis et dixerit an aestimatis quod non licet opifici scientiae cantus quaestio arithmetica,[20] neque medico quaestio naturalis, neque geometrae quaestio scientiae de aspectibus, quamvis declarentur quaestiones multae scientiae compositionis cantus ex capitulis scientiae numerorum, et quaestiones multae de aspectibus ex capitulis geometriae, dicemus quod oportet opificibus harum scientiarum, ut respondeant in istis quaestionibus, et in quantum communicant scientiis eorum scientiae[21] communiores eis. In principiis vero[22] earum non oportet ut respondeant, neque utantur[23] eis in sermone, sicut jam praecessit ex sermone nostro. Jam ergo manifestum est quod, quamvis detegatur de geometria, quod non potest dividere consonantiam in duo media, tamen non est ejus detectio ex via[24] quod est geometria. Verum non est nisi ex via quia accidit ei, qui ignorat scientiam musicae, ut sit geometra. Ergo oportet ut non loquatur cum eo apud quem[26] non est scientia geometriae in capitulis geometriae, quoniam ille, qui loquitur in illo sermone malum, occultabitur ei cum quo loquitur. Quod est quia non[27] est manifestum quod sicut vulgus hominum[28] pervenit ad judicium (138^{v}) de rebus praedicatis in aestimatione, similiter actio ejus pervenit apud quem non est[29] scientia ad[30] judicium[31] in rebus scientiae.

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[34] potestas *M.*
[35] ex medio altero *P.*
[36] firmare *P; om.* verumtamen . . . eas *T.*
[37] concedit *M.*
[38] quaerit *M;* quaerunt *T.*
[39] an *P.*
[37] concedit *M.*
[40] noverit *T.*
[41] *om.* esset illud non *P.*
[42] *add.* ei *M.*
[43] concludit *M;* concludat *P.*
[44] *om. P.*
[45] sempiterna *P.*
[46] concedat *T.*
[1] *add.* est *P.*
[2] an oportet *P.*
[3] *om.* immo . . . est *T;* impossibile *M.*
[4] *om.* ut sit . . . omnis *T.*
[5] *om. T.*
[6] *add.* an cum sit . . . omnis *T.*
[7] verumtamen *M.*
[8] similis *M;* similiter *T.*
[9] accipiat *PT.*
[10] proportionem *M.*
[11] affirmet *P.*
[12] *om. P.*
[13] *add.* omni *T.*
[14] enim *M.*
[15] *om. P.*
[16] *om. PT.*
[17] que *M.*
[18] scientia *M.*
[19] *om. P.*
[20] arithmeticae *MP.*

Et ille quidem apud quem non est scientia dicitur secundum duos modos, aut quia[32] apud eum penitus[33] non est scientia de re quam ignorat, aut quia apud eum est aestimatio mala, quoniam proportionatur ad ignorantem geometriam[34] qui non scit aliquid de esse duarum linearum aequidistantium, et qui putat quod utraeque concurrant. Quoniam haec ignorantia, quamvis quodammodo comparetur ad ignorantem geometriam,[35] quoniam est in aliquo[36] eorum,[37] quae[38] sunt in illa scientia, verumtamen est difficilior quam prima et vehementior caecitas.[39] Et ego narrabo in sequentibus qualiter est difficilior, et secundum quot[40] modos accidit,[41] et qualiter oportet ut utamur ea.[42]

In disciplinis autem non currit malitia syllogismi hoc[43] cursu. Quod est quoniam[44] esse mediorum in eis est minoris[45] occultationis, aut est communicans[46] in nomine aut non. Quod est quia unaquaeque[47] rerum,[48] quae sunt in eis, est determinata; et nomen cujusque earum fortasse minuit ad illud. Quod est quia, quando audit 'circulum,' videt eum statim formatum in anima sua et non declinat ad intentionem aliam, sed stat secundum illam intentionem cujus definitio praecessit apud eum. Et quamvis quidam sermones dicantur 'circulus,' tamen definitio circuli stans in anima geometrae non perducit ad hoc, ut aestimetur quod[49] intelligantur per 'circulum' illi sermones.

In sermonibus[50] autem dialecticis[51] non sunt media determinata; cujus exemplum est, ut dicant, quod sapientes addiscunt, et discentes non sapiunt; ergo sapientes non sapiunt. Quod est quoniam disciplina quandoque cadit super rem, quae intelligitur, et rem, quae addiscitur ab alio; deceptio igitur non cadit in syllogismis (64^{v}) propter continuitatem in nomine nisi propter rem medii; nam terminus bis assumptus[52] non est nisi iste. Ergo est possibile in eo, ut permutetur ad intentionem post intentionem. Et fortasse error in syllogismo non est per[53] medium terminum, sed propter figuram, sicut si homo utatur in figura secunda[54] duabus propositionibus affirmativis et utatur[55] ad habentiam[56] medii[57] duobus extremis.

Et si esset impossibile[58] ut declaretur veritas ex falsitate, esset resolutio facilis. Et significo per 'resolutionem'[59] per conversionem, ut ponatur conclusio aliqua vera, et extrahentur propositiones a quibus concluditur. Nam si fecerimus, illud

[21] *om. P.*
[22] non *T.*
[23] ut videantur *P.*
[24] illa *T.*
[25] quae *T.*
[26] quod *M;* quam *P.*
[27] *om. P.*
[28] *om. P.*
[29] inest *MP.*
[30] *om. T.*
[31] *om.* de rebus . . . judicium *P.*
[32] *om. P.*
[33] positus *P.*
[34] *add.* sicut *T.*
[35] geometriae *P.*
[36] alio *MP.*
[37] earum *M.*
[38] qui *P.*
[39] caecitate *M;* karitas *T.*
[40] quos *T.*
[41] accidat *MP.*
[42] *add.* id est caveamus ab ea *M.*
[43] *add.* de *M.*
[44] *add.* est *M.*
[45] mirioris *T.*
[46] *lacuna M;* et aut est communitas *P.*
[47] quaeque *T.*
[48] *om. M;* ratio *T.*
[49] *add.* in tertio *P.*
[50] rationibus *P.*
[51] dialecticae *M.*
[52] sumptus *P.*
[53] propter terminum medium *PT.*
[54] *om.* figura secunda *P.*
[55] *om. MP.*
[56] habendi *P.*
[57] mediis *P.*
[58] possibile *P.*
[59] *add.* et *M.*

erit[60] facile, si[61] fuerit quaestio[62] proprie in rebus determinatis.[63] Verum propterea quod, quando propositiones sunt verae, est iterum conclusio vera. Et non convertitur illud aequaliter, sed est possibile ut concludatur conclusio vera, quamvis propositiones sint receptae in aestimatione. Tunc propter illud est difficile nobis resolvere per conversionem. Quod est quia in eo[64] est inquisitio propositionum infinitarum.

Et disciplinae quidem diversificantur a sermonibus dialecticis ex hoc modo.[65] Et est quod resolutio per conversionem in disciplinis est facilior. Et causa in illo est quia non invenitur in disciplinis res falsa in ostensione conclusionis. Neque invenitur in eis omnis veritas absolute, et quia non[66] invenitur in eis res communis neque res propria, sed quod ostenditur in eis non ostenditur nisi per definitiones et res quae existant in eis[67] per se. Et istae quidem res sunt res, quarum comprehensio[68] est facilis, et resolutio per conversionem simplicior est in disciplinis[69] quoniam compositio in eis est simplicior et similiter additio causae; nam[70] non sicut in sermonibus dialecticis est additio secundum duos modos, aut ita ut addatur ad conclusionem aliquid deforis, aut ita ut aliquid in medio propositionum, sed usitatus in disciplinis est unus duorum modorum tantum. Quod est quia ipsi semper adjungunt ad rem quam declarant.[71] Deinde procedunt in re propterea quod ipsi adjungunt[72] ad figuram primam figuram secundam, et ad figuram secundam figuram tertiam, et similiter secundum continuitatem Intromissio[73] autem medii non est apud eos, quoniam[74] ipsi non utuntur propositione quae ostenditur per medium. Sicut[75] ergo compositio est ex eis secundum modum unum, similiter resolutio per conversionem est ex eis secundum modum unum.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM TERTIUM

Et scientia quidem per causam dicitur secundum duos[1] modos, quorum unus est, ut sit scientia per medium aliquod, quoniam omne medium est causa concludendi conclusionem; et aliter est, ut sit scientia propter causam rei (139^{r}) declaratae.

Et[2] secundum intentionem primam est[3] omnis syllogismus propter causam. Quod est quia omnis syllogismus (231^{r}) non est nisi per rem mediam. Et secundum intentionem secundam non est omnis[4] syllogismus ita, sed syllogismus qui est propter causam rei declaratae, et haec est dispositio illius solius syllogismi quem nominant syllogismum demonstrativum. Et dicitur alter[5] syllogismus demonstrativus quando in eo sunt reliquae conditiones[6] quas conditionavimus. Dicimus[7] ergo unum duorum syllogismorum, et est ille, qui est propter causam rei declaratae, syllogismus[8] quare est res. Et dicitur[9] alius[10] syllogismus syllogismus quia est. Et in una quidem et eadem scientia est[11] ut sciatur vice[12] una quare est res[13] et sciatur vice[14] alia quod est res. Et est ut sciatur quod est res[15] in[16] scientia alia, et sciatur quare est res[17] scientia alia ab illa.

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[60] erat *M;* et *P.*

[61] *add.* non *P.*

[62] *om. P.*

[63] terminatis *P.*

[64] ea *T.*

[65] *marginal* Via resolutionis in doctrinis facilior est quam in dialecticis quia brevior, nam qui utitur tali resolutione in doctrinis non intendit nisi aliqua quae intrant definitionem rei quia concludunt ex aliis verum dialecticus non habet aliqua determinata ad quae intendat in hoc et ideo comprehensio illorum difficilior *M.*

[66] *om.* invenitur . . . non *M; marginal* quia non invenitur in eis veritas accidentalis unde sillogizet ex omnibus veris debet ex per se veris ex hoc est resolutio ipsarum facilior quia ad pauciora est aspicere *M.*

[67] *add.* sunt *MP.*

[68] prehensio *M.*

[69] doctrinis *P* .

[70] tunc *P.*

[71] quae declaratur aliquid *PT.*

[72] adjunguntur ad rem quae declaratur et *P.*

[73] intermissio *M.*

[74] quando *T.*

[75] si *T.*

[1] diversos *M.*

[2] *add.* hoc est *M.*

[3] et *T.*

[4] *om. T.*

[5] aliter *P.*

[6] demonstrationes *P.*

[7] dicamus *P.*

[8] syllogismum *T.*

[9] dividitur *P.*

[10] omnis *MT*

[11] *om. M.*

[12] in re *M.*

Dicamus ergo inprimis qualiter[18] est illud in scientia una et eadem. Unus ergo modorum in illo est iste[19] quem narro. Dico[20] quod propterea quod[21] oportet ut[22] causa rei declaratae sit per se et propinqua rei, quae est causa ejus,[23] tunc ille qui syllogizat[24] per propositiones quae[25] ostenduntur per medium non syllogizat nisi quod res est. Ille vero, qui syllogizat per propositiones[26] manifestas absque medio,[27] syllogizat ut[28] in pluribus quare est res, verbi gratia,[29] in scientia stellarum ille, qui demonstrat quod stellae meridianae[30] velociores sunt stellis septentrionalibus, quoniam motus earum est[31] super circulum minorem, demonstrat quare est res. Quod est quoniam est ejus[32] ostensio per propositiones manifestas absque medio et[33] per causam propinquam rei declaratae. Et qui concludit hoc idem per hoc quod stellae meridianae[34] longinquiores[35] sunt[36] polo septentrionali, tunc ostendit hoc iterum res veras per res[37] veras, sed non ostendit illud per causam propinquam continuatam cum re declarata, neque cum propositionibus manifestis absque medio. Et iterum in[38] scientia naturali, nam ille, qui ostendit (65^{r}) quod anima non moritur, propterea quod ipsa est mota per se, non ostendit illud[39] per propositiones ostensas absque medio. Ille autem, qui ostendit quod non facta[40] est neque[41] generata nisi quia est inceptio vitae, ostendit illud per propositiones manifestas absque medio. Et qui ostendit quod plantae non respirant propterea quod non sunt animalia, tunc ipse ostendit illud per propositiones quae ostenduntur per medium. Et qui ostendit illud propterea quod non habent pulmonem, tunc ipse ostendit illud per propositiones manifestas[42] absque medio. Quod est quia[43] non est causa propinqua in hoc ut non respiret res ne sit animal propterea quod, si esset ita, sequeretur quod res esset animal per causam propinquam ut respiraret; verumtamen res multae sunt animalia et ipsae cum hoc non respirant, sicut insecta[44] ex animalibus. Verum causa prima in hoc ut non respiret est ut non[45] sit ei pulmo. Animal ergo assumitur ei causa ex longinquo[46] et extrinseca valde, et praedicatum non est absque medio super respirationem, sed per[47] medium quia est ei pulmo. Videtur ergo quod omnis causa accepta[48] secundum hunc modum non accipitur nisi secundum hanc viam profundationis in declaratione et apparitione in ea. Quod est quia sufficit quod non est ei pulmo; per sermonem autem quod non est animal non inceditur[49] nisi via apparitionis. Et secundum hanc viam attulit Anachars[id]is causam propter[50] quam non sunt apud Sclavos sibilatores quando dixit quia apud eos non sunt vineae; iste enim iterum accepit causam ex longinquo. Quod est quia causa propinqua in hoc[51] est quod ipsi non bibunt vinum ut delectentur, et causa in hoc est quod non sunt[52] apud eos vineae. Et syllogizantur syllogismi in secunda figura secundum hunc modum causae, sicut syllogismi[53] qui sunt ex causa longinqua, sicut isti syllogismi quos dixi nunc. Quod est quia, propterea quod animal est praedicatum[54] de omni quod respirat et non praedicatur de aliqua plantarum, fit quod plantae non respirant, et propterea quod vineae sunt apud illos quibus sunt sibilatores et apud Sclavos non sunt sibilatores.

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[13] *om. M.*
[14] *om. MT.*
[15] *om.* et . . . res *T.*
[16] *om. P.*
[17] *om. P.*
[18] naturaliter *P.*
[19] *om. P.*
[20] *add.* quia *M.*
[21] *om. M.;* ut *P.*
[22] quod *P.*
[23] *add.* et *P.*
[24] syllogizet *M.*
[25] non *P.*
[26] *om.* ostenduntur . . . propositiones *T.*
[27] *om.* medio *P.*
[28] *om. M.*
[29] *om. MT.*
[30] meridionales *M.*
[31] *om.* earum est *MP.*
[32] *om.* est ejus *M.*
[33] *om. T.*
[34] meridionales *M.*
[35] longiores *M.*
[36] *om. M.*
[37] *om. P.*
[38] *om. P.*
[39] *om. M.*
[40] facta, fisica ?? *MSS.*
[41] non facta est non generata nisi *M.*
[42] om P.
[43] et quia *M.*
[44] *om. P;* fit *M.* fibra *T.;* entoma *gr. tx. p.* 28, *l.* 3; *insecta; trans.* of Hermalaeus Barbarus. (Venice, 1552), p. 6^{r}.
[45] *om. T.*
[46] longinqua *M.*
[47] *om. P.*
[48] recepta *M.*
[49] intenditur *P.*
[50] *om. P;* per *T.*
[51] *om.* in hoc *M.*
[52] quod oportet ut sint *M.*
[53] syllogistici *M.*
[54] praedicatum *PT.*

Et modus alter est quando duo syllogismi sunt per propositiones[55] manifestas absque medio; verumtamen unus eorum est per causam et alter per significationem. Ille enim, qui ostendit quod mulier peperit quia est ei lac, ostendit quod est res, et ille, qui ostendit quod mulieri est lac quia peperit, ostendit quare est res.[56] Et ille qui ostendit additionem[57] lunae[58] per sphaeritatem ejus, ostendit[59] quare[60] res est, et qui ostendit sphaeritatem lunae per ejus additionem, ostendit quod res est. Et multotiens accidit ut convertatur unaquaeque[61] causa et significatio super aliam per aequalitatem et unaquaeque earum ostendatur ex alia: per significationem quidem quod res est, et per aliam quidem quare est res. Et per primam quia est notior conclusione et per secundum propterea[62] quia est causa rei declaratae. Et multotiens quidem[63] non convertuntur significationes super causas suas aequaliter. Quod est quia si fumus est, tunc ignis procul dubio est; quod si ignis est, non procul dubio est fumus. Et si mulier[64] peperit, tunc appropinquavit ei vir; quod si appropinquavit ei vir[65] non peperit procul dubio. Et in hujusmodi rebus est ostensio quod res est per significationem inventa[66] et ostensio quare est res privata. Quod est quoniam est ostensio causae per significationem,[67] sed significatio non ostenditur per causam. Et sicut non omnes causae et res, quarum ipsae sunt causae,[68] convertuntur ad invicem per aequalitatem, similiter non omnes res, quae[69] convertuntur ad invicem per aequalitatem, sunt causae et res quarum illae causae sunt, quoniam possibile est ut sint causae uni et eidem significationes multae, quae ad invicem convertuntur. Cujus exemplum est quod ex significationibus febris sunt inquietudo venarum et mutatio caliditatis corporis.[70] Et ostenduntur istae res ad invicem; verumtamen non est aliqua harum duarum significationum syllogismus super quare[71] facta est res, sed fit per utrasque syllogismus[72] super quod[73] est res. Secundum ergo hoc in scientia una et eadem fit syllogismus quandoque super quod est res et quandoque super quare sit res.

Dicamus ergo nunc qualiter fit syllogismus quod res est et quare res est in duabus scientiis diversis. Et jam diximus quod de scientiis sunt quaedam[74] quarum dispositio ad invicem est (65^{v}) et sit una duarum scientiarum sub altera, sicut dispositio scientiae de aspectibus apud scientiam geometriae, et dispositio scientiae machinarum apud mensurationem corporum, et dispositio scientiae[75] compositionis cantuum apud numeros, et dispositio scientiae judiciorum stellarum navalium apud judicia stellarum disciplinalia. Multae enim harum scientiarum fortasse conveniunt in nomine et definitione, quoniam nomen cujusque earum est unum et idem, et definitio hujus non est praeter definitionem significantem ex omni modo.[76] Proportionatur enim ad scientiam musicae ille qui exercuit auditum suum in hoc capitulo et ille qui scit radicem[77] hujus disciplinae. Cum ergo sit dispositio alicujus scientiarum haec dispositio[78] quarumdam apud quasdam, sequitur illam[79] quae est ex scientiis sensata ut faciat scire quod res est et illam[80] quae est disciplinalis,[81] oportet ut faciat scire quare est res, quoniam cum illis[82] scientiis sunt demonstrationes per[83] causas et multotiens quidem non est cum opificibus ejus scientia quod res sit, sicut illi qui considerant in essentia quae est de universali multotiens non sciunt singulare propter paucitatem curae ipsorum de eo.

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[55] res *P.*

[56] mulier peperit quia est ei lac ostendit quare est res *M;* mulieris est lac quia peperit ostendit quia res est et ille qui ostendit quod mulier peperit quia est ei lac ostendit quod res est *P*; mulier peperit quia est ei lac ostendit quare est res et ille qui ostendit quod mulieri est lac quia peperit ostendit quod est res *T.*

[57] additione *M.*

[58] hac *M.*

[59] *om. P.*

[60] quare: quae *P.*

[61] *add.* scilicet *P.*

[62] *om. P.*

[63] quidem: quoniam *P.*

[64] et si mulier: similiter si *P.*

[65] et hic non appropinquavit ei *P; om. T.*

[66] inventam *PT.*

[67] ostensionem *T.*

[68] *add.* non *P.*

[69] res quae: qui *M.*

[70] dispositionis mutatio qualitatis caliditatis (*marg.*) cordis *M*; mutatio caliditatis cordis *P*; imitatio dispositionis caliditatis corporis *T.*

[71] quam *P.*

[72] *om. P.*

[73] quam *M.*

[74] *add.* rerum *M.*

[75] *om. T.*

[76] materia *M.*

[77] judicem *M.*

[78] *add.* est *P.*

[79] illa *M.*

[80] illa *MT.*

[81] disciplina *MT.*

[82] universalis *MT.*

Inde est quod ego jam scivi ex eo quod novi ex disciplinis[84] quare sit neuma,[85] nominata ankoria,[86] conveniens neumae mediae, sed ego non possum sentire passionem utrarumque[87] propter paucitatem exercitus[88] in hoc capitulo. Verumtamen quae[89] ex scientiis est[90] propinquior ad disciplinas in syllogismo et dignior ut utatur speciebus absque subjectis quae sunt ei, est illa quae affert[91] causam semper,[92] sicut illud quod facit auctor scientiae geometriae apud opificem scientiae de aspectibus. Auctor enim scientiae geometriae non utitur nisi specie tantum lineae rectae, et non est[93] illa species singularis[94] secundum se, sed[95] procul dubio est in substantia aliqua,[96] quoniam rectitudo illa[97] non est nisi in aere aut in lapide aut in ligno aut in re alia praeter illam. Verum[98] geometra non inquirit de ea ex via quod ipsa est in aliqua[99] harum rerum, sed inquirit de ea singulariter per se. Opifex autem scientiae de aspectibus non utitur linea recta nisi quae est in regula et quae est in aere. Et dispositio hujus iterum apud auctorem scientiae naturalis in rebus multis est sicut dispositio geometrae apud eum, sicut invenimus in iride. Nam auctor scientiae naturalis dicit quod est conversio visus apud nebulam, quae est per aliquam dispositionum ad solem et auctor de aspectibus narrat quare fit per hanc dispositionem ex figura et colore. Et multarum etiam ex scientiis, quarum quaedam non sunt sub aliis, dispositio est haec dispositio, sicut scientia medicinae apud scientiam geometriae. Res enim in hoc, quod[99a] vulnera rotunda sunt tardioris sanationis, est ex eo cujus scientia est medico, sed quare sit ita scientia ejus (231v) est geometrae.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM QUARTUM

De figuris autem syllogismorum majoris[1] scientiae est figura prima proprie. Scientiae enim disciplinales non afferunt[2] demonstrationes nisi in hac figura, sicut scientia numerorum et geometriae et scientia de aspectibus et omnes scientiae quas diximus (140r) inquirere esse rei quare est. Et fiunt demonstrationes de re quare est in quibusdam rebus in figura media; verumtamen illud non fit nisi raro et in rebus quarum parvus[3] est numerus. Quod est quoniam dignius est[4] causae et quod in ea proprie necessarium est ut sit secundum semitam affirmationis et secundum viam[5] esse. Et dignior scientia est speculatio in re quare est et propter illud[6] sit figura prima dignior figurarum[7] veritati scientiae. Deinde post illud quoniam scientia definitionum non capitur nisi per hanc figuram tantum,[8] propterea quod definitiones non sunt nisi ex via quod[9] res sunt universaliter,[10] et non est in figura media syllogismus[11] de hoc quod res sit neque[12] in figura postrema[13] de hoc quod res sit universaliter,[14] et cum illo iterum elevatio propositionum, quae declarantur per medium, ad propositiones, quae sunt manifestae absque mediatione, non est nisi per hanc figuram, quoniam unaquaeque propositionum, quae declarantur[15] per medium,[16] non elevatur ad propositiones manifestas absque medio[17] nisi in illa figura in qua est earum conclusio, et non est possibile ut concludant propositiones affirmativae in figura secunda neque propositiones universales in figura tertia, jam ergo manifestum est in propositionibus, quae declarantur per medium, quod non est possibile[18] penitus ut eleventur in his duabus figuris ad propositiones manifestas absque medio.

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[83] super *MP*.
[84] disciplinis: disciplina *M*.
[85] *om. P*.
[86] ankocia *M*; *perhaps a corruption of Arabic ankurija, i.e., a note characteristic of Ankara.*
[87] utrarum *MP*.
[88] exercitum *MP*.
[89] *om. M*.
[90] quem *M*.
[91] auferet *MP*.
[92] quod *T*.
[93] *om. T*.
[94] *add.* id est separata *M*.
[95] *om. MP*.
[96] alia *MP*.
[97] *om. PT*.
[98] unde *MP*.
[99] alia *MP*.
[99a] *add.* multa *MP*.
[1] verioris *M*.
[2] auferunt *M*.
[3] parcius *T*.
[4] *om. T*.
[5] *add.* ejus *M*.
[6] quid *M*.
[7] *add.* sed *P*.
[8] *om. P*.
[9] quae *T*.
[10] similiter *P*.
[11] syllogistica *P*.
[12] nisi *M*.
[13] prima *P*.
[14] similiter *P*.
[15] quae declarantur: declaratarum *T*.
[16] *om.* ad propositiones ... per medium *P*.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM QUINTUM

Et non sunt affirmativae tantum, sed sunt negativae et secundum similitudinem illius sunt omnes propositiones negativae in quibus non est possibile ut ostendantur per syllogismum. Et illae sunt in quibus non praedicatur[1] neque de aliquo[2] duorum terminorum terminus aliquis penitus. Oportet ergo necessario in hujusmodi ut unus duorum terminorum non sit (66^r) inventus in altero absque medio. Quod est quia, si medium est inventum, tunc oportet necessario ut praedicetur de uno duorum terminorum[3] quare erit propter[4] illud in[5] illa negativa syllogismi.[6]

CAPITULUM DECIMUM SEXTUM

Et nos redimus ad rem quam diximus in eo quod praemissum est, sed non perscrutati fuimus[1] sermonem in ea; ergo compleamus eam.[2] Dico ergo quod ignorantiae duae sunt species. Quarum una est quando non est apud nos scientia de re[3] penitus, sicut dicitur de[4] pueris quod ipsi ignorant de esse trianguli aequalitatem angulorum ejus duobus rectis. Dimittamus ergo hanc speciem ignorantiae cum in ea non sit aliquid quod sit necessarium ad speculationem syllogisticam.

Species autem altera ignorantiae est quae dicitur secundum viam aegritudinis animae, et illud est quando cum eo qui eam habet est aestimatio de esse rei, sed est aestimatio mala, sicut[5] si quis[6] aestimet in triangulo quod in eo sunt tres anguli[7] recti et quod anguli ejus sunt majores et minores duobus rectis. Et non dicitur iste modus ignorantiae aegritudo nisi quia anima illius, in quo est, est[8] infirma per aliquam[9] dispositionem aegritudinis. Quod est quia aestimat quod scit illud quod non scit.[10] Et licet ut[11] accidat eventus hujus ignorantiae in rebus quae sunt et privatis[12] absque medio, et potest esse eventus ejus in rebus existentibus per mediationem medii alicujus, ita ut sit eventus illius in duabus rebus simul secundum duos modos aut[13] absque syllogismo[14] secundum aestimationem nudam, sicut si aliquis aestimet[15] in triangulo[16] quod anguli ejus non aequantur duobus rectis, aut in diametro quadrati quod communicat lateri. Jam ergo possibile est[17] ut aliquis aestimet has res absque syllogismo et decipiatur; et error in hoc similis[18] est errori in sensibus. Et licet ut sit illud per syllogismum, cujus conclusio sit erronea, et iste modus est vehementior demonstrationum[19] et plus usitatus. Quod est quia syllogismi iterum sunt multi diversi, praecipue qui[20] ex eis currunt cursu erroris ita ut decipiatur per illud propositor et appareat res quae non existit absque medio, ita ut putetur quod existit[21] per medium, donec syllogizetur in figura prima. Quod est[22] quia veritas[23] propterea quod est negatio de universali fit quod falsitas est affirmata de universali. Et non est possibile ut concludatur hoc in figura praeter primam.

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[17] mediatione *P.*

[18] *add.* per syllogismum *PT.*

[1] ponitur *MT.*

[2] alio *M.*

[3] *om.* terminus . . . de uno duorum terminorum *M.*

[4] per *M.*

[5] *om. P.*

[6] negatio syllogismi *P.*

[1] sumus *M; marg.* Ignorantia autem non secundum negationem sed secundum dispositionem *T.*

[2] *om. T.*

[3] *om.* de re *T.*

[4] in *PT.*

[5] *om. T.*

[6] si aliquis *MP.*

[7] *add.* aequales duobus rectis *M.*

[8] *om. MP.*

[9] aliam *M;* quam *T.*

[10] *om.* quod non scit *T.*

[11] licet ut: hoc licet *P.*

[12] privatur *P.*

[13] *om. MP.*

[14] medio *T.*

[15] aestimationem habeat *M.*

[16] *om.* in triangulo *P.*

[17] *om. MT.*

[18] sillogismus *MT.*

[19] diversionum *M.*

[20] quae *M.*

[21] *om.* absque existit *P.*

[22] quod est: sed *P.*

[23] *om. P.*

[23] *om. P.*

Et oportet necessario ut sit falsitas iterum de universali, si[24] est conclusio ejus per demonstrationem deceptricem in[25] syllogismum. Et propter illud dicitur quod haec[26] ignorantia est pravior (140^{v}) ignorantia omni[27] quoniam est aestimatio scientiae et inquirit ille, cujus est, in ea viam scientiae cum incedat in ea incessu[28] rei quae est universalis et utatur canonibus[29] scientiae. Deceptionis autem rei existentis in universali, sive sit ejus esse absque medio aut sit per medium, possibile est ut sit conclusio in figura prima et in figura secunda, et fortasse erunt utraeque propositiones acceptae[30] simul[31] falsae et fortasse erit una tantum falsa. Si autem diligis ut scias qualiter erit illud et quando erit illud, non est[32] qui prohibeat te quin exercearis in quibusdam dictionibus Aristotelis.[33] Nos autem non lucrabimur inde aliquid nisi longitudinem nostri libri, et res quam ipse dixit est melior nobis. Quoniam oportet quando intendimus ad contradicendum propositiones falsas, ex quibus fiunt syllogismi deceptionis, ne ponamus propositiones quas praemittimus secundum partem, neque intendamus[34] ad hoc ut sit earum oppositio ut oppositio[35] contradictionis, sed[36] ponamus eas contrarias universales. Quod est quia oportet ut utamur[37] eis in demonstratione veritatis contraria deceptioni. Nam cum nos faciemus illud, perveniemus[38] per contradictionem ad ostendendam veritatem.[39] Et opifex dialecticae in ea adversatur per[40] propositionem quae est secundum partem. Quod est quia non est ejus intentio ut procul dubio veniat cum conclusione[41] secundum universale.[42] Opifici vero demonstrationis expedit necessario ut sit ejus[43] adversatio propositioni secundum[44] universale, cum[45] sit conclusio cum qua venit secundum universale.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM OCTAVUM

Et manifestum est quod, quando caremus aliquo sensuum oportet necessario ut careamus cum eo scientia, ita[1] ut non perveniamus ad eam cum nos non utamur quo utimur[2] nisi per syllogismum particularem aut per demonstrationem. Et demonstratio quidem est ex rebus quae sunt secundum universale et syllogismus particularis est ex rebus[3] particularibus. Et non est possibile ut comprehendatur in[4] rebus sensu perceptis res quae est secundum universale nisi per syllogismum particularem, et nos non pervenimus ad syllogismum particularem[5] per res sensatas, si non habemus[6] scientiam per quam sciamus eas. Non est ergo possibile ut acquiramus ex eis scientiam. Quod est quia non pervenimus ad cognitionem earum ex rebus quae sunt secundum universale absque syllogismo particulari, et non pervenimus ad cognitionem earum[7] per syllogismum particularem absque sensu, ita quod res quas singulares facimus in mente, quamvis putetur de eis quod sunt[8] egressae a sensu et quod ipsae non sciuntur[9] nisi per mentem proprie, tamen ipsae etiam secundum dispositionem[10] fiunt per syllogismum particularem et sensum manfestiores et planiores illo. Quod est quia esse superficiei apud nos (66^{v}) est verior,[11] quod non est[12] ei nisi longitudo et latitudo tantum cum[13] nos imus[14] ad syllogismum particularem; et similiter quod triangulo sunt

[24] sed *MP*.
[25] et *MP*.
[26] hujus *M;* et *T*.
[27] causam *T*.
[28] in sensu *P*.
[29] ea nominibus *MP*.
[30] *om. M*.
[31] *om. P; add.* et *M*.
[32] *om. T*.
[33] harum *M*.
[34] intendimus *M*.
[35] *om.* ut oppositio *T*.
[36] si *T*.
[37] utatur *M*.
[38] pervenimus *PT*.
[39] *om. T*.
[40] *om. M*.
[41] inveniat conclusionem *P*.
[42] *add.* cum sit conclusio cum venit secundum universale *M*.
[43] ea *M;* ei *P*.
[44] per *P*.
[45] et *T*.

[1] qua *P*.
[2] utamur *P*.
[3] *om.* quae . . . rebus *T*.
[4] *om. P*.
[5] *om.* et . . . particularem *T*.
[6] licet non habeamus *P*.
[7] *om.* ex . . . earum *MP*.
[8] quae sint *T*.
[9] sequitur *T*.
[10] dispositiones quae *M*.
[11] major *P*.
[12] *om. T*.
[13] cujus *P;* apud *T*.
[14] ivimus *P; om. T*.

tria latera. Quod est quia istae res, quamvis non sint singulares per se neque stantes per se singulares, tamen possibile est nobis quandoque ut declaremus quasdam earum per syllogismum particularem et quod unaquaeque earum est secundum hanc proprietatem.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM NONUM

Et quia jam diximus non semel quod necesse est opifici demonstrationis ut utatur rebus praedicatis per se et quod illud non sequitur necessario opificem dialecticae procul dubio; verum non utitur nisi quod praedicatur[1] per[2] viam accidentis, cum est susceptum in aestimatione aut cum illo est manifestius[3] in rebus acceptis per se, tunc oportet ut exponamus secundum quot[4] modos dicitur in re quod praedicatur[5] super rem ex via accidentis. Dico ergo quod dicitur[6] secundum multos modos.

Ex his est quod res dicitur super rem aliam, sicut corpus[7] dicitur album super rem aliam. Quod est quia non dicitur quod est album nisi super[8] superficiem ipsius. Et similiter dicitur in vite quod est alba super rem aliam, propterea quod defert racemos albos.[9] Et dicitur quando[10] praedicatur[11] accidens super accidens,[12] sicut scriba[13] super album. Et dicitur quando praedicatur super substantiam aliquod accidentium quod non est per se, sicut album super hominem. Et dignius, in quo dicitur et[14] quod praedicatur[15] per viam accidentis, est quando praedicatur super accidens secundum diversitatem hujus cursus naturalis res subjecta deferens ipsum, sicut sermo dicentis quod illud album est homo, et non currit[16] hic sermo ex nobis cursu sermonis nostri quod aliquis hominum est albus.[17] Quod est quoniam dicens in aliquo hominum, quia est albus,[18] non accipit rem existentem in re alia, et ponit subjectam[19] eam de qua praedicetur, neque accipit rem cujus essentia sit propter illud.[20] Quod est quia homo est substantia in suo esse. Dicens autem quod albus[21] est homo ponit subjectum de quo praedicatur albus,[22] cujus essentia non est nisi propter[23] illud cujus est accidens. Et illi,[24] cujus intentio est disceptatio[25] secundum viam dialecticae, inest ut utatur[26] hujusmodi modis praedicationis cum sint aggregati super ipsam notatam.[27] Auctor autem demonstrationis oportet ut caveat quod est ex praedicatione[28] secundum diversitatem cursus naturalis et omnem praedicationem quae est secundum semitam[29] accidentis plus quam cautela ejus ab omni re nisi quod existit per se, sicut jam exposuimus illud.

Et haec res dignior est ut jam sit convenientia super eam in eo quod praemissum est. Et sequitur quod praeteriit res in qua est necessaria inquisitio ultima de rebus quae existunt per se an stent per istas partes praedicationis aut currant ad infinitum. Et ita[30] est intentio sermonis mei. Dico quod si nos posuerimus quod subjectum ultimum est *C* et quod hoc subjectum non praedicetur de alio subjecto penitus, sed praedicatur de eo *B* absque medio et per intentionem primam praedicatur iterum de *B E*, et de *E F*, secundum illam dispositionem,[31] tunc necesse est ut stet hoc aut possibile est ut currat ad infinitum, ita ut praedicetur iterum de *F* (232^{r}) *G* et de *G H*, et sit illud semper[32] secundum[33] continuitatem[34] praeter quod adveniat nobis in aliqua dispositionum res quae praedicetur de omni quod accepimus. Iste est ergo unus modorum quaestionis.

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[1] ponitur *M.*
[2] secundum *P.*
[3] manifestum *P.*
[4] quos *P.*
[5] ponitur *M.*
[6] *om.* quod praedicatur . . . dicitur *T.*
[7] corvus *M.*
[8] *om. PT.*
[9] *add.* super accidens *P.*
[10] quoniam *M.*
[11] ponitur *M.*
[12] *om.* super accidens *P.*
[13] alba *MT.*
accidens super . . . praedicatur *T.*
[14] *om. M.*
[15] quod praedicatur: quod ponitur *M; om. P.*
[16] *add.* homo *M.*
[17] album *M.*
[18] album *MT.*
[19] substantiam *T.*
[20] per aliud *M;* propter aliud *T.*
[21] album *M.*
[22] album *T.*
[23] *om. M.*
[24] illi: illius *M.*
[25] deceptatio *M.*
[26] utamur *M.*
[27] nota *MT.*
[28] demonstratione *P.*
[29] semitam *MT.*
[30] ista *M.*
[31] depositionem *M.*
[32] *om. MP.*
[33] super *P.*
[34] continuationem *MP.*

Et ejus est modus alius currens hoc cursu. Quod est quia, si posuerimus iterum per dispositionem quod res sit[35] de qua non praedicetur alia res penitus, sed sit prima et in[36] superiori ordine,[37] verumtamen *H* sit in ea absque medio et *H* iterum in *G* et *I* in E. An[38] oportet[39] ut stet hoc an sit possibile ut currat usque[40] ad infinitum iterum, donec non[41] inveniamus omnino speciem ultimam quae non praedicatur[42] de subjecto alio?

Et differentia inter hanc inquisitionem et[43] inquisitionem, quae est ante eam, est quod inquisitio nostra fuit in prima an ascendant[44] res praedicatae ad infinitum, et inquisitio nostra in hac secunda an descendant[45] res subjectae ad infinitum. Et inquisitio tertia post has duas est an sit possibile, cum duo extrema sunt determinata et inveniatur praedicatum primum et subjectum postremum, ut sint res inter utraque infinitae, donec sit ut semper omni[46] propositioni terminus aliquis[47] et non praedicetur[48] omnino aliquid de re alia absque medio. Et inquisitio de his rebus est inquisitio de demonstrationibus, an currant ad infinitum et an[49] res quae invenitur, super qua declaratur res alia, sufferat iterum ut declaretur, an[50] stent demonstrationes apud propositiones manifestas absque medio et terminos postremos. Et haec eadem inquisitio currit in esse propositionum negativarum, an inveniantur ex eis quae sunt manifestae absque medio, an[51] non. Et nos quidem jam narravimus in eo quod praemissum est quod[52] propositiones negativae sunt manifestae absque medio.

In propositionibus autem, quae convertuntur, non oportet ut exponamus hanc inquisitionem[53] secundum hanc similitudinem. Quod est quia, quando nos ponimus subjectum postremum, non est possibile ut inquiramus an aliquod praedicatum primum sit inventum; et quando nos accipimus praedicatum primum, non est possibile ut consideremus[54] an inveniatur subjectum postremum. Quod est quia propterea quod convertuntur[55] ad invicem aequaliter, tunc, quando tu inquiris de uno eorum,[56] est inquisitio tua de utrisque simul. Et similiter si est[57] possibile ut inveniatur in hoc subjectum postremum quando convertitur, tunc est possibile ut inveniatur iterum praedicatum primum. Quod est quia subjectum postremum sit praedicatum primum.

CAPITULUM VICESIMUM ET VICESIMUM PRIMUM

Oportet ergo ut incipiamus a quaestione prima.[1] Ostendamus ergo quod res, quae sunt a duobus[2] extremis, non est possibile (67^{r}) ut sint infinitae, cum praedicatio[3] stet in descensione sua ad inferius et in ascensione sua ad superius. Et significo per sermonem meum 'superius'[4] rem quae est super omnem,[5] et significo per sermonem meum 'inferius'[6] rem quae est super partem.[7] Quod est quia, quando est[8] praedicatum primum et subjectum postremum, deinde dicit aliquis quod inter utraque[9] sunt res infinitae, sequitur inde ut sit[10] illud, quod incipit[11] ab[12] *A* tantum,[13] non descendat donec perveniat in aliqua dispositionum penitus ad *B*; et quod incipit iterum a *B* non elevatur iterum in aliqua dispositionum[14] donec perveniat ad *A* (141^{v}). Oportet ergo inde ut non sint duo extrema finita. Et illud est res quae jam fuit posita[15] in radice. Et illud quod sequitur ex hoc[16] simile est ei quod sequitur. Si aliquis dicat quod ab uno ad decem sunt finiti, deinde ponat numerum qui est inter utrosque infinitum. Sicut ergo hoc impossibile est, cum sit necessarium ex istis ut sint numeri infiniti[17] existentes actu inter duos numeros determinatos, ita ut non sint termini numerorum infiniti per hoc[18] quod accepimus eos inprimis, sed quia sunt stantes et[19] per se existentes.

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[35] *om. PT.*

[36] *om. M.*

[37] ordini *M.*

[38] aut *M.*

[39] oportet *MP.*

[40] hoc *MT.*

[41] *om. M.*

[42] praedicetur *T.*

[43] *add.* inter *MT.*

[44] ostendant *MT.*

[45] ascendant *T.*

[46] ut semper omni: in omni *P.*

[47] medius *M.*

[48] ponitur *M;* praedicatur *P.*

[49] *om. PT.*

[50] aut *MT.*

[51] aut *M.*

[52] *add.* quae *T.*

[53] quaestionem *M.*

[54] inquiramus *M.*

[55] convertantur *T.*

[56] duorum *M.*

[57] *om.* si est *M.*

[1] *om.* oportet . . . prima *T.*

[2] duabus *T.*

[3] praedicatum *P.*

[4] *add.* scilicet *P.*

[5] omne *M.*

[6] superius *T; add* scilicet *MT.*

[7] rem *M.*

[8] *om.* quando est *M.*

[9] utramque *M.*

[10] *om. MT.*

[11] inceptio *P.*

[12] ad *PT.*

[13] iterum *M.*

[14] *om.* penitus . . . dispositionum *P.*

Similiter in terminis, quorum extrema sunt determinata, non est possibile ut sint inter utraque infinita. Et non est dispositio in istis sicut dispositio in divisione rerum continuarum in quibus extrema[20] sunt determinata et sunt divisiones quantitatum quae sunt inter illa extrema infinita. Quod est quia[21] res, quae[22] inveniuntur illic,[23] non existunt antiquitus in actu.[24] In hoc autem capitulo oportet necessario ut termini[25] accepti jam existant antiquitus actu. Quod est quia existunt quamvis[26] non assumantur. De rebus autem, quae dividuntur, non est aliquid penitus ex eo quod assumitur[27] existens actu ante exceptionem[28] sui. Oportet ergo necessario, quando duo extrema sunt determinata, ut stent res mediae inter utraque. Et haec quidem res non reperitur in demonstratione affirmativa tantum, sed invenitur iterum secundum similitudinem in demonstratione negativa. Quod est quia negativa semper declaratur per[29] adjunctionem affirmativae ad ipsam. Cum ergo adjunctio propositionum affirmativarum[30] stet,[31] tunc negativarum stat[32] semper.

Jam ergo ostendimus[33] declaratione[34] sufficiente quod, quando duo extrema sunt determinata, non est possibile ut sint res mediae inter utraque infinitae. Et jam oportet ut ostendamus in eo quod futurum est quod duo extrema oportet necessario ut sint determinata ad sursum et ad deorsum.[35] Et[36] ponemus ostensionem nostram ad illud inprimis per rationem quae est communior, qua declarantur res praedicatae non[37] per se tantum, sed[38] qualitercumque[39] sit earum praedicatio, non currere ad infinitum.

CAPITULUM VICESIMUM SECUNDUM

Et rerum quidem praedicatarum omnium aliae sunt, quae[1] praedicantur ex via quid[2] est res, et aliae sunt quae[3] praedicantur absque hac via. Et quaedam earum praedicantur secundum cursum naturalem, et quaedem earum currunt secundum contrarium illius. Secundum cursum quidem naturalem, quando aliquod accidentium praedicatur de aliqua substantiarum, et quod est non secundum cursum naturalem, est ut praedicetur substantia de aliquo accidentium. Nos ergo sumus dimittentes[4] narrationem omnis praedicationis currentis per contrarium cursus naturalis, cum non sit praedicatio penitus, et inquirentes de reliquis speciebus praedicationis an stent an non stent.[5]

Et ex manifesto in seipso est quia oportet necessario ut sint res intrantes in capitulo 'quid est res' infinitae. Quod est quia, si termini non starent, omnis res non staret[6] semper, quoniam[7] esset ei genus superius ipsa ita ut reciperet ejus definitionem; immo non inveniretur penitus definitio nota cum unicuique generum inveniretur semper genus ante ipsum et ad cognitionem illius generis non perveniretur nisi per definitionem, quoniam non esset primum neque in superiore[8] ordine, et non esset possibile ut definirentur genera illa omnia, cum non sit possibile ut definiatur quod est infinitum. Propter has ergo causas oportet necessario ut res praedicatae intrantes[9] in capitulo 'quid est res' sint terminatae.[10] Ergo oportet ut ostendatur quae substantia sit, aut ex via 'quanta est' aut ex via relationis suae ad aliquid, aut ex accidentibus iterum per terminos. Dico igitur quod manifestum quod accidentia non praedicantur de substantia subjecta nisi ex[11] via actionis suae aut ex via passionis suae aut ex 'ubi est' aut ex via 'quando' et sic de ceteris, cum praedicatum sit res una de re una. Quod est quia[12] faciamus pertransire in albo quia est cubitus et in ambulante[13] quia loquitur et in pari quia est duplum. Verumtamen hae omnes species praedicationis non sunt nisi per viam accidentis sicut fecimus te rememorari ante. Quod est quia nos non[14] dicimus 'in albo quia est cubitus' nisi ex parte rei alterius, non quoniam[15] existit per se cum hac quantitate, sed propterea quod lignum,[16] verbi gratia, in quo est color albus, est cubitus. Quod est quia, si aliquis dixerit in aliqua albedinum quod existit per se et in ambulante,[17] an in numero an in scientia, sermo ejus non erit similis nisi voci cui non est intentio. Manifestum est igitur, sicut diximus, quod omnia accidentia non praedicantur[18] nisi de substantia et res praedicatae de substantia omnes sunt finitae ex duabus extremitatibus simul.

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[15] jam fuit posita: supposita jam *P.*

[16] *add.* in alio *P.*

[17] *add.* determinatum ponat . . . utrosque infinitum *MP.*

[18] *om.* per hoc *M; add.* quidem *P.*

[19] *om. MT.*

[20] postrema *T.*

[21] *add.* quaecumque *M.*

[22] res quae: re *P.*

[23] in illo et *P.*

[24] in actu: et actus *MP.*

[25] iterum *M.*

[26] quia *M.*

[27] assumuntur *P;* assumptus *T.*

[28] acceptionem *PT.*

[29] *om. T.*

[30] *om. P.*

[31] *om. T.*

[32] stet *M.*

[33] ostendamus *M.*

[34] ostendimus declaratione: declaramus *P.*

[35] seorsum *P.*

[36] quem et *M;* quem *P.*

[37] *om. P.*

[38] *add.* per *T.*

[39] cum *M.*

[1] *See folio* 150va *l.* 18 *for sequence M.*

[2] quae *M.*

[3] *om.* ex via . . . sunt quae *P.*

[4] demonstrantes *P.*

[5] stant aut non stant *MP.*

[6] careret *M;* caret *P.*

[7] quin *T.*

Et disputatori[19] quidem inest ut disserat[20] per viam[21] resolutionis per conversionem via breviore et ostendat per istas res, quas narro, quod non est possibile in terminis praedicatis neque in terminis subjectis ut curratur ad infinitum in demonstrationibus scientialibus, in quibus tantum nunc[22] est nostra speculatio. Quod est quia demonstrationes non sunt nisi[23] per res[24] existentes per se et istae res sunt duobus modis. Quod est quia quaedam earum intrant in capitulo 'quid est res' et in definitionibus sicut dicuntur magnitudo et quantitas in numero quia existunt in eo[25] per se, et quaedam earum sunt accidentia comitantia res in quorum definitionibus ingrediuntur illae res, sicut numerus in impari, et non est possibile ut sint[26] in aliqua harum duarum specierum res infinitae. Quod est quia impar, quamvis praedicetur de numero, non tamen est[27] possibile ut[28] praedicetur res alia de numero existens in definitione ejus quoniam termini praedicati inveniuntur semper pauciores quam[29] termini subjecti, et termini qui praedicantur secundum hanc semitam perveniunt in postremo ad singularitatem individualem quae non dividitur. Quod est quia, sicut impar est minus in numero, similiter est minor[30] impari res praedicata de eo. Oportet ergo inde necessario ut stent[31] istae species praedicationis aut per hanc causam aut quoniam[32] res existens in impari est existens per se, etiam in numero, et res, quae sequuntur illud, omnes sunt existentes in subjecto primo. Igitur oportet ut numerus existat in definitione earum omnium. Verum non est possibile ut existant actu infinitae et simul neque est possibile iterum ut res existant per se et sit[33] accidens accidentis alterius existentis per se. Quod est quia, si hoc esset, esset accidens natura aliqua subjecta et aliqua substantiarum. Et res substantiarum et[34] res[35] iterum intrantes in capitulo 'quid est res' non sunt infinitae. Quod est quia, si essent infinitae, non esset possibile definire. Jam ergo manifestum est quod oportet necessario ne demonstrationes currant ad infinitum, neque ut res omnes tolerentur demonstratione.[36] Et illud est quod diximus in[37] initio nostri sermonis[38] quosdam dixisse. Nam non omnes res tolerantur demonstrationem[39] cum non perveniatur ideo in[40] propositione[41] ad acceptionem termini medii, verum propositiones stant in aliqua dispositionum apud propositiones ostensas absque medio. Quod est quia jam ostendimus quod, quando duo extrema sunt determinata,[42] non est possibile ut sint res, quae[43] sunt inter[44] utraque, infinitae. Non ergo demonstrationes currunt ad infinitum,[45] cum non sit possibile ut perveniat semper per conclusionem terminus post terminum neque propositio post propositionem.

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[8] inferiore *P.*

[9] manentes *M.*

[10] sint finitae *P;* terminata sint *T.*

[11] an *P.*

[12] *om.* aut ex via quando . . . quod est quia *T; add.* ut *T.*

[13] in ambulante: ambulantem *MP.*

[14] *om. PT.*

[15] quare *P; om. T.*

[16] ligam *MP;* signum *T; emended from gr. tx., p.* 35, *l.* 1.

[17] ambulatione *T.*

[18] *om.* non praedicantur *T.*

[19] disputator *MP.*

[20] dissimulat *P.*

[21] *om.* per viam *T.*

[22] *om. MP.*

[23] *om. P.*

[24] *add. PT.*

[25] *om.* in eo *P.*

[26] *add.* neque *T.*

[27] *om. P.*

[28] nisi *P.*

[29] quoniam *T.*

[30] minus *M.P.*

[31] instent *M.*

[32] quando *P.*

[33] sicut *M.*

[34] *om.* substantiarum et *T.*

[35] *om. MP.*

CAPITULUM VICESIMUM QUARTUM

Et oportet ut inquiramus et consideremus quae duarum ostensionum sit melior: ostensio[1] quae est super[2] totum aut[3] ostensio quae est secundum partem.[4]

Inest enim ei ut dicat quod ostensio secundum partem est dignior[5] ut sit per se. Quod est quia[6] ille qui[7] scit, verbi gratia, quod[8] Callias est rationalis est dignior ut sciat quod Callias est rationalis[9] quam ille qui scit quod omnis homo est rationalis et scit per illud iterum quod Callias est rationalis.[10] Quod est quia nos non scimus ex ostensione,[11] quae est secundum partem, rem nisi ex se ipsa, et scimus ex ostensione, quae est super totum,[12] rem[13] quae est secundum totum. Et est ei ut dicat iterum quod res, quae est super totum, non existit per se, et res, quae est secundum partem, est dignior ut existat. Demonstratio igitur 'sunt existentes' dignior est demonstratione[14] super res quae[15] non[16] existunt.[17] Et est ei ut dicat iterum quod error non cadit nisi in re[18] quae est super totum. Quod est quia ipse ponit ostensionem quasi[19] res, quae est super totum, existat vacua ex ea quae est secundum partem.[20] Et error per illud dicitur id quod non est existens. Et illae deceptiones omnes sunt deceptivae sufficientes et non sunt verae, sed omnes falsae. Quod est quia res existens per se dignior est, ut inveniatur in re quae est super totum, quam ea quae[21] inveniatur in re quae est secundum partem. Et inde est aequalitas angulorum cum duobus rectis dignior, ut ostendatur ex hoc quod figura est triangulus per se, quam ut ostendatur quod est diversorum laterum.

Et cum res quae est super totum sit existens, tunc ostensio est quoniam[22] res, quae est super totum, non est[23] ex rebus communibus in nomine tantum neque est vox communis tantum, sed est res stans per se existens et non fit[24] res[25] singularis[26] sicut non fiunt singularia accidentia iterum.[27] Sed videtur in rebus visione manifesta quod res multae inveniuntur individuis quae sunt per rem communem[28] digniores quam sint per propriam sicut quod Socrates est rationalis, non propterea quod est Socrates, sed propterea[29] quod est homo.

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[36] tollerent demonstrationem *T*.

[37] *om. MP*.

[38] *om. M; add.* secundum *P*.

[39] *om. P*.

[40] *om.* nam non omnes . . . ideo in *T*.

[41] omni propositione *T*.

[42] declinata *T*.

[43] *om. P*.

[44] *om. MP*.

[45] *add.* cum ergo currunt demonstrationes ad infinitum *MP*.

[1] *om. P*.

[2] *om. T*.

[3] an *MT*.

[4] *add.* est dignior *P*.

[5] *om.* inest enim . . . dignior *T*.

[6] quasi *T*.

[7] *om. P*.

[8] quo *MP*.

[9] *om.* est dignior ut . . . est rationalis *P*.

[10] *om.* quam ille . . . est rationalis *T*.

[11] ex ostensione: et ostensionem *MP*.

[12] totam *P*.

[13] *add.* rei *MT*.

[14] *om.* sunt existentes . . . demonstratione *T*.

[15] *add.* res *T*.

[16] *om. P*.

[17] *om.* quod res quae est super totum non existit per se . . . super res quae non existunt *M; cf.* 141^{va} *l.* 48 *M*.

[18] *add.* sua *P* .

[19] quare *M*.

[20] *add.* et in alio *P*.

[21] ea quae: quod ut *P; add.* ut *T*.

[22] non *T*.

[23] *om. T*.

[24] fuit *P;* sit *T*.

[25] *om. PT*.

[26] *add.* vel *MT*.

[27] *om. P*.

[28] omnem *T*.

[29] *om.* quod est Socrates sed propterea *T*.

Et iterum demonstratio quae est ex re, quae est dignior ut sit causa, est dignior demonstratione per aliud. Et res quae est super totum est dignior, ut sit causa, quam res quae est secundum partem, quoniam inquisitio de re 'quare fit' non stat nisi[30] apud rem quae est super totum, verbi gratia, quando quaerit aliquis quare anguli extrinseci trianguli sint aequales quattuor rectis, et dicitur ei quod illud est quoniam est ex ligno, non est hoc sufficiens, aut quoniam est diversorum laterum, neque hoc sufficiens, aut quoniam est[31] triangulus absolute, neque hoc iterum est sufficiens. Si autem dixerimus quia est figura rectarum linearum, stabit inquisitio rei 'quare factum est' apud illum. Et cum hoc iterum ostensio est secundum partem proprinquam rebus infinitis. Quod est quia res singulares sunt infinitae, et ostensio super totum dignior est ut sit super res finitas.[32] Et ut sciatur iterum res major dignius est quam ut sciatur res minor.[33] Et ille qui scit iterum per se quae[34] sunt digniores[35] ut sint super totum est dignius ut sciat ex rebus manifestis absque (142^r) medio. Et ille, qui scit etiam rem, quae est super totum, scit per potentiam rem quae est secundum partem. Ille vero qui scit rem, quae est secundum[36] partem, non scit rem quae est super totum. Et res quae est super totum iterum est dignior ut sit[37] intellecta; res vero quae est secundum partem pervenit apud sensum. Et nos quidem contenti sumus per illud quod diximus de hoc in ostensione illa, quae est super[38] totum, quod est melior ostensione quae est secundum partem.

CAPITULUM VICESIMUM QUINTUM

Volo ergo ostendere quod[1] ostensio affirmativa est dignior ostensione negativa.[2] Et illud declaratur ex eo quod narro. Dico igitur quod demonstratio affirmativa non indiget propositione negativa. Verum demonstrationis negativae non completur (68^r) conclusio per propositionem negativam tantum. Et dico iterum quod affirmativa[3] est prior negativa et simplicior ea.

CAPITULUM VICESIMUM SEXTUM

Et demonstratio iterum perducens[1] ad ostensionem melior est demonstratione perducente ad contrarium. Quod est quoniam prima non sillogizat nisi super rem ad quam intendit ab initio rei, donec concludat eam quod demonstratio non sillogizat super contrarium ei ad quam intendit ab initio rei.[2] Et prima[3] iterum currit[4] secundum praedicationem singularem tantum, et secunda est permixta. Quod est quia nos utimur cum praedicatione radice posita.

CAPITULUM VICESIMUM SEPTIMUM

Et est quidem scientia certior scientia et prior ea secundum modos multos. Quorum unus est quando ostenditur ex capitulo 'quare res est' capitulum 'quod res est'. Nam haec scientia certior est et prior quam scientia quod res existit tantum praeter quod sciatur quare existens sit. Quod est quoniam haec scientia non est per causas primas;[1] verum non ostenditur nisi per causas postremas et per vestigia.

Et modus alius est quando[2] una duarum scientiarum est per res aliquas subjectas sensatas.

[30] stat nisi: ut fiat *MP.*

[31] *om.* diversorum laterum . . . quoniam est *T.*

[32] infinitas *T.*

[33] *add.* in numero *MP.*

[34] qui *P.*

[35] *add.* est *M.*

[36] super *MP.*

[37] scit in *P.*

[38] secundum *M.*

[1] *om.* ostendere quod *T.*

[2] demonstrata *T.*

[3] affirmatio *P.*

[1] adducens *T.*

[2] *om.* donec concludat . . . ab initio rei *T.*

[3] primo *P.*

[4] erit *M;* sum *P.*

[1] proprias *T.*

[2] quoniam *M.*

Et modus alius est per res intellectas currentes super universale sicut dispositio scientiae numeri apud scientiam ordinis cantus, et sicut dispositio geometriae apud scientiam de aspectibus, et similiter scientiae superiores apud illas[3] quae sunt sub eis.

Et modus tertius est ut una duarum scientiarum utatur principiis, quae sunt simpliciora, et scientia altera utatur eis et sit in eis additio rei, et cui[4] est compositio, sicut scientia numerorum, est certior scientia geometriae. Quod est quia scientia numeroum utitur principio cui non est situs. Nam[5] illa dispositio est unius et geometria utitur principio cui non est situs; et illa est dispositio puncti; et mensuratio corporum iterum certior est[6] quam scientia stellarum. Quod est quia illa utitur corpore absolute et haec utitur corpore moto.

CAPITULUM VICESIMUM OCTAVUM

Et scientia una est in qua considerantur in genere uno ipsae res quae existunt in eo per se. Et genus unum est illud cujus principia sunt una et eadem. Et propter hoc fit geometria et mensuratio corporum scientia una. Et scientiae diversae sunt[1] quarum sunt principia diversa. Et non sunt quaedam earum ex quibusdam sicut est dispositio in geometria et scientia in aspectibus. Et illud manifestum est nobis quoniam[2] ultimamus principia quae tolerat demonstratio. Nam cum inter illa principia non est homogeneitas[3] penitus, tunc duae scientiae sunt diversae. Quod est quia propterea quod principia[4] sunt in illo eodem genere in quo sunt res quae ostenduntur, tunc quando[5] est inter ista principia communitas omnino,[6] tunc inter res quae ostenduntur[7] communitas omnino.

CAPITULUM VICESIMUM NONUM

Et possibile quidem est ut super rem unam et eandem sint demonstrationes multae et media multa non ex eo quod quaedam sunt sub aliis tantum, sed multotiens est illud ex rebus quae ad invicem diversificantur in genere. Ex rebus autem quarum[1] quaedam sunt sub quibusdam, quando ostendimus in dulb,[2] verbi gratia, quod est substantia quandoque quia[3] ponimus terminum medium arborem et quandoque quia[4] ponimus ipsam plantam; arbor enim et planta ejusdem[5] sunt expositionis. Ex rebus autem diversis quando[6] ascendimus in homine, verbi gratia, quod est substantia quandoque quia est rationalis et quandoque quia est bipes. Et accidit ut hujusmodi media sint quaedam quibusdam secundum partem quoniam omnia media duo secundum totum sunt duarum extremitatum.

CAPITULUM TRICESIMUM

Et non est in re cadente[1] per convenientiam[2] scientia demonstrativa[3] quando[4] res cadens[5] per[6] convenientiam non necessario existit, nec est in ea sillogismus absolute, cum quod[7] cadit per convenientiam nec sit necessarium nec cadens in pluribus.[8] Et omnis sillogismus non est vacuus quoniam[9] sit aut mediis multis necessarius aut ex mediis currentibus secundum rem plurimam.

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[3] eam *M;* illam *T.*
[4] cum *MP.*
[5] jam *PT.*
[6] *om. PT.*
[1] sumuntur *T.*
[2] quare *M.*
[3] homo genitus *MSS;* suggeneian *gr. tx. p.* 37, *l.* 26.
[4] *om.* non est homo . . . quod principia *P.*
[5] *add.* non *P.*
[6] *om.* communitas omnino *MP.*
[7] *om.* tunc quoniam . . . quae ostenduntur *M; add.* non est *M; add.* sicut *P.*
[1] quarumdam *P.*
[2] in dubio *MP; lacuna T;* platanon *gr. tx., p.* 37, *l.* 31; *probably* Arabic, *dulb.*
[3] *om.* quandoque quia *T.*
[4] *om. T.*
[5] ejusdem *T.*
[6] quandoque *M.*
[1] *om. P;* eadem *T.*
[2] *add.* cadere *P.*
[3] demonstratam *P.*
[4] quoniam *MP.*
[5] *add.* quoniam res cadens *P.*
[6] super *M.*
[7] *om. MP.*

CAPITULUM TRICESIMUM PRIMUM

Et ex sensu quidem non est demonstratio. Quod est quoniam demonstratio est super res quae sunt secundum totum; sensus autem est ex[1] rebus[2] singularibus, individualibus. Nam si nos sentiremus ex triangulo quod anguli ejus tres sunt aequales duobus rectis angulis, non esset apud nos demonstratio quod illa esset apud nos demonstratio quod illa esset dispositio omnis trianguli et neque sciremus quod illa dispositio esset nisi hujus trianguli solius quem sentimus. Et si videremus[3] eclipsim in luna, quando[4] cooperit (142^{v}) terram[5] inter ipsam et[6] solem, non sciremus per illud quod omnis eclipsis sic est; verum[7] non sciremus nisi hanc[8] eclipsim solam quam vidimus sic esse. Sensus ergo est principium demonstrationis et nos non[9] intelligimus rem quae est super[10] totum nisi per iterationem[11] super nos multotiens. Quod est quoniam res,[12] quae est secundum totum, non discernitur et declaratur (233^{r}) nisi ex rebus singularibus, individualibus multi[13] numeri. Et non oportet ex hoc ut sensus sit demonstratio, quoniam sensus non ascendit in aliqua dispositionum quare sit res. Et non ostendit[14] nisi[15] quod res est tantum,[16] quoniam ostensio quare [17] sit res est secundum totum. Et causa non est huic[18] rei solum[19] proprium quod videtur,[20] sed est omni[21] quod est[22] ei[23] simile. Tegumentum enim luminis, verbi gratia, non est causa hujus eclipsis solum, sed est causa eclipsis[24] absolute. Etiam quando sunt duae res quarum una est causa alterius, tunc cognitio rei, quae[25] est secundum totum in utrisque, est altior quam sensus, et non sensu tantum, sed intellectu[26] etiam separato a causa, sicut si homo intelligat intellectu[27] absoluto de esse trianguli quod anguli ejus tres[28] intrinseci sunt aequales duobus rectis, (68^{v}) praeter[29] quod sciat quod angulus ejus extrinsecus est aequalis duobus angulis intrinsecis qui ei opponuntur. Et non omne[30] intellectum, cui associatur quare est res, est alterius, sed res est secundum quod diximus quod illud verificatur in omnibus duabus rebus quarum una est causa alterius, cum intellectum[31] enim[32] causae primae non est causa, et est altius[33] omnibus intellectis. Verumtamen inest[34] alicui ut dicat: 'si sensus non est scientia, tunc quomodo[35] est aestimatio nostra quod, quando deficit sensus aliquis, deficit[36] scientia aliqua'? Et responsio quidem[37] in hoc est: 'nos non[38] dicimus hoc secundum quod sensus sit scientia'. Verum non[39] dicimus illud nisi secundum quod res, quae est secundum totum, non capitur[40] nisi ex sensu, et quando deficit principium, deficiunt cum eo necessario res quae sunt post principium. Nos igitur ignoramus nunc qualiter penetret[41] vitrum sol, et si nos videremus illud et sentiremus ipsum, sed per hoc quod aggregaremus rem quae est secundum[42] totum, et causa[43] esset ex eo quod sentiremus.

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[8] utri saepe *P; om. T.*
[9] quando *M.*
[1] in *P; om. T.*
[2] *om. M.*
[3] viderimus *P.*
[4] quoniam *P.*
[5] terra *PT.*
[6] *add.* inter *T.*
[7] verumtamen *P.*
[8] *om. M.*
[9] *om. P.*
[10] secundum *PT.*
[11] intentionem sensuum *P;* narrationem *T.*
[12] rem *T.*
[13] multa *M.*
[14] ostenditur *M.*
[15] non *P.*
[16] *add.* et causa non est *M.*
[17] non *P.*
[18] hujus *MP.*
[19] vel terminum *M.*
[20] dividitur *M.*
[21] omnium *P.*
[22] *om. M.*
[23] *om. T.*
[24] *om.* eclipsis . . . eclipsis *T.*
[25] non *P.*
[26] intellectum *M.*
[27] intellectum *M.*
[28] *om. P.*
[29] propter *T.*
[30] esse *M;* omnem *T.*
[31] intellectio *PT.*
[32] ejus *P.*
[33] alterius *MP.*
[34] *om. PT.*
[35] quando *T.*
[36] *om.* aliquis deficit *P.*
[37] quod *P;* quaedam *T.*
[38] enim *P.*
[39] verum non: verumtamen *M.*
[40] capit *P.*
[41] *om. T.*
[42] super *M.*
[43] causam *P.*

CAPITULUM TRICESIMUM SECUNDUM

Et non est possibile ut sint principia scientiarum omnium una eadem, neque propinqua est eis neque communia,[1] prima.[2] Et manifestum quidem est quod non est possibile ut sint principia propinqua una eadem. Quod est quia, cum principia sint homogenea rebus, quae per ea ostenduntur,[3] res quae ostenduntur non sunt unae eaedem, sed sint multae in genere diversae, tunc necessario oportet ut sint propositiones hujusmodi ex[4] rebus diversis in genere, cum non sint nisi res existentes per se.

Principia igitur geometriae, verbi gratia, sunt praeter principia scientiae[5] cantuum, et similiter est dispositio in reliquis scientiis, ita ne conveniant ad invicem donec aut[6] ut dicantur illae de istis aut ut ingrediantur in medio aut ut ponantur sub eis. Neque principia iterum communia[7] prima sicut sermo tuus quod[8] in omni re aut verificatur affirmativa aut verificatur negativa. Quod est quia non[9] ostenditur[10] ex istis singularibus solum aliquid, sed adjungitur ad unamquamque earum[11] procul dubio propositio pertinens scientiae cui accipitur propinqua. Neque servant ea[12] penitus communiter utentes eis in demonstrationibus, sed conantur[13] approximare eas[14] generi[15] convenienti. Inde est quod principia communia, quando sunt quattuor res proportionales, tunc si tu permutaveris eas, erunt proportionales. Et geometra quidem recipit si sunt quattuor quantitates, et opifex numeri si sunt quattuor numeri,[16] et opifex naturarum[17] recepit si sunt quattuor motus[18] aut quattuor tempora. Et dico iterum quod si principia scientiarum essent principia una eadem, essent determinati numeri sicut litterae. Nos vero inveniemus ea augmentari additione multa in unaquaque scientiarum. Quod est quia conclusiones currunt una post aliam ad longinquum tempus.

Et dico iterum quod si essent principia omnium rerum una eadem, esset possibile ostendere quamcumque[19] rem ad quam intenditur ex[20] omnibus scientiis. Verum non ostenditur quaestio geometriae ex scientia cantuum. Oportet ergo inde ne sint principia rerum una eadem, neque principia omnium rerum iterum sunt diversa, neque principia omnium earum[21] sunt homogenea.

CAPITULUM TRICESIMUM TERTIUM

Scientia ergo est praeter opinatum et opinionem; et intelligo per ‘opinionem[1] opinionem veram. Res enim in opinone falsa manifesta[2] est quod non est similis scientiae neque in aliquo[3] modorum. Et opinio quidem[4] vera diversificatur a scientia in duabus rebus, scilicet in subjecto et in via sententiae.[5] Quod est quia (143^r) subjectum scientiae[6] est res necessaria in eo quod non potest esse secundum[7] aliud[8] quam[9] sit, et subjectum opinionis est iterum possibile; et scientia est[10] per propositiones necessarias,[11] et opinio est per[12] propositiones possibiles. Haec est enim unaquaeque duarum[13] extremitatum sententiae. Et ex eo quod significat tibi, quod opinio est in rebus, in quibus est possibile, ut sint secundum contrarium illius, et[14] quia non est possibile ut sit in illis rebus scientia. Et si eis esset scientia, non esset possibile ut esset[15] secundum contrarium ejus[16] quod sunt.

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[1] *add.* propinqua *M.*
[2] primis *M.*
[3] *add.* et *MP.*
[4] in *P.*
[5] *om. T.*
[6] *om. T.*
[7] contraria *P.*
[8] qui *M.*
[9] *om. P.*
[10] extenditur *T.*
[11] rerum *P.*
[12] eas *P.*
[13] coguntur *P.*
[14] eis *P.*
[15] gratia *T.*
[16] *om.* numeri . . . numeri *T.*
[17] *om. P*; materiarum *T.*
[18] modi *P.*
[19] unamquamque *P.*
[20] in *M.*
[21] eorum *T.*

[1] sermonem *T.*
[2] manifestum *M.*
[3] alio *M*; aliquibus *P.*
[4] qualis *P.*
[5] scientiae *T.*
[6] animae *P.*
[7] vel *M.*
[8] aliquod *M.*
[9] quibus *P.*
[10] *om. PT.*
[11] et necessaria *P.*
[12] secundum *P.*
[13] suarum *P.*
[14] est *T.*

Neque sunt iterum ex eo quod comprehendit intellectus.[17] Intelligo in hoc loco per 'intellectum' principium scientiae quo sciuntur definitiones. Neque licet[17] iterum alicui ut nominet hoc[18] scientiam non egentem demonstratione. Et significo per 'scientiam quae non eget demonstratione' acceptionem[19] propositionum absque medio. Quod si res, quas verificamus iterum,[20] sunt intellectus et scientia et opinio, tunc remanet ut opinio sit in re quae est vera; verumtamen est possibile ut sit aliter quam est. Quapropter sit opinio non fixa neque firma, quoniam natura ejus ponitur[21] secundum hanc dispositionem. Et cum istis rebus iterum nullus hominum videt quod ipse opinetur quando[22] videt quod non est possibile ut sit illa res nisi[23] secundum quod ipsa est; verum non videt tunc nisi quia scit. Et cum videt quod res existit per illam dispositionem, verumtamen est possibile ut sit per contrarium ejus,[24] tunc est opinio ejus. Et[25] oportet ut narretur iterum res scientiae et opinionis quod utraeque sunt diversae in via sententiae.[26] Possibile namque est ut res una eadem et propositiones eaedem sciantur[27] scientia vice una et opinentur opinione altera, sive sit syllogismus secundum quod res est tantum sive quare[28] res est. Et propter illud licet ut[29] aliquis opinetur ut duorum, qui sciunt rem unam eandem per res easdem, sit scientia de ea secundum similitudinem unam, ita ut unus sciat (69$^{\text{r}}$) eam scientia[30] vere credita[31] et alter similiter. Sed illud non est verum. Quod est quia unus videt quod non est possibile[32] ut propositiones sint secundum contrarium quod sunt, sed sunt ex rebus existentibus per se in substantia rei. Non ergo opinatur opinione, sed scit scientia veridica quod sententia est sententia vera. Verum alter[33] non complet in illis propositionibus quod sint cum illa dispositione, quam narravimus, scilicet an ipsae sint an non sint ex rebus existentibus per se. Ergo ipse opinatur per illud rem opinione et non scit eam scientia veridica. Secundum hanc ergo dispositionem possibile est ut unius ejusdem rei sint scientia et opinio, quoniam utraeque sunt in subjecto uno, verumtamen una earum ex modo quodam et altera ex modo altero. Et sunt propositiones[34] unae eaedem, verumtamen scientia utitur eis secundum quod ipsae sunt necessariae et opinio secundum quod ipsae sunt[35] possibiles. Secundum vero quod scientia et opinio sunt res una eadem, illud est quod non est possibile. Quod est quia unaquaeque earum est praeter alteram, quoniam definitio cujusque earum est praeter alteram et via sententiae in utrisque est diversa valde. At vero sicut possibiles[36] sunt in re re una eadem opinio vera et opinio falsa, sed non est possible ut duae opiniones[37] sint opinio una, cum non sit possibile ut falsitas sit veritas. Similiter possibile est ut sint in re una eadem opinio et scientia. Verum non est possibile ut sit unaquaeque earum altera, cum non sit possibile ut res fixa, firma sit ipsa res quae non est fixa neque firma, et res, quae est possibile ut removeatur, non est illa, quae non est possibile, ut removeatur. Et propter illud non est possibile ut cum uno eodem sint in re una eadem opinio et scientia simul. Et si non, ille unus videbat simul, quod non est possibile ut sit res illa secundum contrarium quod est. Et accidit ut sit cum uno opinio in aliquam rerum, et sit cum alio ab illo de illa eadem re scientia. Inde est quod illud quod fuit cum Anaxagora,[38] quod sol eclipsatur quando currit luna sub eo, non fuit nisi opinio, quoniam videbat quod possibile est ut sit res per contrarium illius. Illud vero quod fuit cum Abrakis[39] fuit scientia veridica. Cum anima autem una, eadem non est possibile ut sint in re una, eadem in hora una eadem[40] scientia et opinio. Haec est ergo opinio.

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[15] ut esset: ut essent *M*; *om. P.*

[16] eis *P.*

[17] *add.* hoc *M.*

[18] hanc *P.*

[19] acceptione *T.*

[20] tantum *M.*

[21] praedicatur *M.*

[22] quoniam *M*; quod *P.*

[23] *om. T.*

[24] ei *P.*

[25] vel *P.*

[26] scientiae *T.*

[27] vertuntur *T.*

[28] quod *P.*

[29] *om. PT.*

[30] eam scientia: eam scientiam *M*; scientiam unam *P.*

[31] creditam *M.P.*

[32] *om. T.*

[33] aliter *M*; alteri *P.*

[34] *add.* iterum propositiones *T.*

[35] *om.* sunt . . . sunt *MP.*

[36] sit possibile *P.*

[37] propositiones *P.*

[38] Epicurio, *gr. tx., p.* 40, *l.* 28.

CAPITULUM TRICESIMUM QUARTUM

Solertia autem est bonitas aestimationis in hora non spatiosa, et est[1] acceptio termini medii, sicut ut[2] homo videat quod pars[3] luminosa lunae[4] semper est versus solem, et intelligat causam[5] in illo cum velocitate quod illud non sit nisi quoniam luna recipit lumen a sole, aut videt hominem alloquentem cambitorem[6] et scit quod vult ut accipiat. Quod est quia qui[7] videt aut audit quod duo extrema aggregata[8] sunt et intelligit cum illo terminum medium, est ille qui dicitur solers, et dicitur haec virtus ejus solertia; et est quasi resolutio per conversionem conclusionis ad duas propositiones a quibus est et inventio termini medii cum velocitate.[9] (70^{r})

LIBER SECUNDUS

CAPITULUM PRIMUM

Et sequitur quod[1] praecessit[2] ut inquiramus de speciebus[3] rerum quaesitarum, et illae species eaedem sunt species rerum inventarum a quaestione,[4] quoniam omnis quaestio non est nisi per causam esse rei quaesitae. Et res quaesita aut est res simpliciter non composita aut est res composita in propositione. Et intelligo per[5] 'rem simplicem' rem, quam significat nomen unum,[6] sicut sermo tuus 'deus' aut 'homo'. Et intelligo per 'rem[7] compositam', sicut est sermo tuus, 'an eclipsatur luna et an justitia est[8] natura.' Et quando quaestio nostra est de re simplici, tunc inprimis quaeramus an sit, deinde[9] quaeramus[10] post illud quid sit ipsa res, verbi gratia, nos quaerimus inprimis an deus est, deinde quaerimus post, quid est deus. Et quando quaestio nostra est de re composita in propositione, tunc nos quaerimus inprimis[11] an praedicatum sit in subjecto in propositione. Rursus, postquam scimus hoc, quaerimus post illud quare est in illo et qualiter est. Inde est quod quando[12] scimus quod luna eclipsatur, quaerimus post illud propter quam causam eclipsatur. Jam ergo colligitur[13] quod res quaesitae sunt quattuor:[14] an res sit et quid est res et an hoc existat in hac,[15] quare[16] sit quod hoc[17] existit in hoc,[18] et duae harum quattuor quaerunt in rebus singularibus simplicibus, et duae reliquae quaerunt in rebus collectis compositis.

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM

Neque oportet ut consequatur[1] te ambiguitas propterea quod ipse ponit divisionem rerum quaesitarum in libro suo in[2] *Locis Disputationis*[3] praeter hanc divisonem, quam ipse non intendit illic nisi ad distinguendum species quaestionum dialecticarum tantum, et[4] illae omnes sunt inventae[5] in compositione, et diversitas earum[6] non est nisi in via compositionis[7] tantum. Quod est quia nos non quaerimus in illis quaestionibus nisi aut an haec res sit genus huic[8] rei aut an haec res sit principium huic rei, aut an[9] accidat haec res rei aut an haec res sit definitio huic rei. Nos enim quaerimus rem[10] definitionis secundum semitam dialecticae, postquam posuimus[11] eam propositionem; deinde quaerimus de ea, sicut sermo ejus qui dixit an anima numerus movens se,[12] sicut opinatur Kesypokrans.[13] Quando vero[14] quaerimus secundum semitam scientiae quid est res, tunc res quaesita non est tunc propositio neque quaestio. Neque sermo noster iterum, quare sit hoc, ita[15] est quaestio dialectica, quoniam quaerens non absolvit[16] interrogato ut eligat unam duarum partium contradictionis. Quod est quia non quaerit ad vituperandum; verum non quaerit nisi de causa quaesiti ad sciendum. Nam qui quaerit an vacuum existat et an eclipsaretur[17] luna, quaestio ejus de illo similis est quaestioni[18] ejus[19] an causa facit necessarium ut[20] sit vacuum, aut[21] causa per quam eclipsatur luna. Qui autem scit quod vacuum existit et scit quod luna eclipsatur,[22] deinde quaerit quid est vacuum et quare eclipsatur luna, tunc apparet ex esse ejus quod jam posuit quod esse[23] vacui[24] est causa existens et[25] eclipsi lunae est[26] causa existens. Verum[27] non[28] quaerit nisi[29] quid est illa causa. Et ex eo quod declaratur, illud est quod quando invenit quid est vacuum, jam invenit quid est causa in esse vacui, quoniam definitio et quid est res est causa esse cujusque rerum. Et quando invenit iterum quare eclipsatur luna, jam tunc invenit in tenebra lunae[30] quid est. Quod est quia si non eclipsatur luna [31] nisi quando terra cooperit eam a lumine, fit quod coopertura luminis est causa eclipsationis ejus. Et quaestio tua de[32] causa est in omni loco aut ad esse rei absolute aut ad esse ejus[33] in hac re.

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[39] absolutis *P; lacuna T;* Hipparchus, *gr. tx. p.* 40, *l.* 30.

[40] *add.* cadet *MP.*

[1] *om. P.*

[2] *om. P.*

[3] p^{2}as *M;* pas *P.*

[4] luna *P.*

[5] *om. T.*

[6] *om. P;* scambitorem *T.*

[7] *om. MP.*

[8] congregata *T.*

[9] *om.* a quibus . . . velocitate *P.*

[1] *om. P;* quid *T.*

[2] *om. P.*

[3] *add. out of place* a quibus est et inventio cum velocitate *P*......

[4] *om.* a quaestione *T.*

[5] *om. T.*

[6] et non *T.*

[7] *om.* simplicem . . . rem *P.*

[8] *add.* tamen *T.*

[9] contrarium *P.*

[10] quaerimus *T.*

[11] *om.* an deus . . . inprimis *MP.*

[12] ante *P.*

[13] tollitur *MP.*

[14] quaeritur *T.*

[15] in haec *M; om.* in hac *T.*

[16] qualiter *MP.*

[17] *om. T.*

[18] *om.* et quare . . . hoc *M.*

[1] sequatur *T.*

[2] de *M.*

[3] cf. *Topica* II, 1.

Et ex eo quod significat tibi veritatem hujus est quod causa, quando est sensata aut in esse rei aut[34] in hoc quod[35] est cum hac dispositione, non quaeritur de illo penitus neque an res sit neque quid est cum hac dispositione.[36] Nam si non[37] sentiremus de luna coopertura ejus ex lumine, non quaereremus neque an eclipsis sit neque an accidat lunae neque quare [38] accidit.[39] Et ego non dico quod sensibilitas de re sit ipsa scientia de re eadem. Verum non[40] dico nisi quia est ab acceptione rei quae est de omni, et scientia vera per[41] sensibilitatem est per illud quod sentitur. Inde[42] et quando quaerimus[43] quare est res, existit res apud nos. Et quando ostendimus quod res est, tunc nos invenimus procul dubio cum esse ejus, quare est illa res, quoniam per demonstrationem certam, veram declaratur cum hoc quod[44] res existit, quare iterum existat. Sed hoc[45] quod diximus (70^v) est certum[46] de hoc, quod medium in demonstratione est causa, non in essentia conclusionis tantum, sed in esse illius rei. Et non est dispositio ita[47] in capitulo, quid est res et an res existit, sed oportet ante quaestionem quid est res quod jam positum sit quia existit.[48] Esse autem rei, quando quaeritur, fortasse declarantur cum eo definitiones, et fortasse non[49] declarantur cum eo, sed nos[50] contenti sumus ut accipiamus rem ex impressionibus rei et ex rebus quae sequuntur eam[51] in significatione[52] ejus de substantia rei quaesitae; et hujusmodi res licet ut[53] sint sicut[54] principia esse rei, sed[55] non sunt causae[56] rei. Jam ergo diximus, in eo quod praemissum est, qualiter declarantur quaestiones compositae; ergo dicamus nunc, in capitulo quid est res, an est possibile ut erigatur super hoc iterum demonstratio. Et hoc quidem[57] est principium inquisitionis et clavis ejus.

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[4] *add.* ideo *M.*

[5] unitae *T.*

[6] eorum *M*; rerum *P.*

[7] quaestionis *M.*

[8] hujus *P.*

[9] non *P.*

[10] res *T.*

[11] ponimus *T.*

[12] per se *T.*

[13] Xenocrates: cf. W. D. Ross, Aristotele's *Prior and Posterior Analytics* (Oxford, 1949), p. 618.

[14] non *P.*

[15] illud *T.*

[16] *add.* an *MP.*

[17] eclipsatur *PT.*

[18] quaestio *P.*

[19] *add.* quae quaerit *MP.*

[20] an *P.*

[21] an *P.*

[22] *om.* et . . . eclipsatur *T.*

[23] est *T.*

[24] vacuum *MP.*

[25] in *MP.*

[26] *om. MP.*

[27] verumtamen *P.*

[28] si *P.*

[29] non *T.*

[30] lunam *T.*

[31] *om. M.P.*

[32] tua de: et unum *T.*

[33] hujus *M*; *add*, rei *P.*

[34] an *M.*

[35] quare *M.*

[36] *om.* non quaeritur . . . dispositione *MP.*

[37] nos *MP.*

[38] quando *M.*

[39] *om.* lunae . . . accidit *P.*

[40] *om. T.*

[41] propter *T.*

[42] et ille *T.*

[43] quaeritur *MP.*

[44] *om. P.*

[45] *om. MP.*

[46] iterum *M.*

[47] disposita *T.*

[48] *ob.* jam . . . quia; *add.* esse *T.*

CAPITULUM TERTIUM

Dico autem quod oportet ut consideremus an sit possibile ut sciamus rem unam, eandem ex via una, eadem per definitionem et demonstrationem, aut non sit possibile illud. Et non excepi in sermone meo[1] ex via una, (144^{r}) eadem, nisi[2] quia[3] quandoque[4] scimus triangulum, verbi gratia, per definitionem suam quid est, et quia est figura plana contenta[5] tribus lineis, et scimus per demonstrationem iterum quod anguli ejus sunt aequales duobus rectis; verum illud non est ex via una, eadem,[6] sed res prima est ex via quid est, et res secunda ex via quia[7] sequitur[8] ipsum res[9] alia.

Et consideremus[10] inprimis an omni, cui est[11] demonstratio, sit definitio. Dico ergo quod illud non est possibile, quoniam demonstratio erigitur[12] super omnem rem[13] universalem negativam[14] et definitio non est per propositionem[15] negativam. Et consideremus an omni cui definitio sit demonstratio.[16] Et dico iterum[17] quod hoc secundum illud exemplum non est possibile ut sit.[18] Quod est quia principia demonstrationum et termini primi[19] cognoscuntur per definitionem et non cognoscuntur per[20] demonstrationem, et sic non curret[21] res ad infinitum.

Consideramus ergo an inveniatur res aliqua, una, eadem cui[22] sit definitio et demonstratio. Hoc namque est res quae remansit. Dico autem quod[23] postquam jam narravimus in eo quod praemissum est, quod ad scientiam rei, quae[24] indiget demonstratione, non pervenimus nisi quando erigitur nobis super eam demonstratio tantum; tunc[25] si possibile est ut sciatur res quae indiget demonstratione per definitionem, tunc[26] licet ut sciatur quod indiget demonstratione praeter quod statuatur super ipsum demonstratio. Nam non est quod prohibeat quin non sciatur per utrasque simul, et hoc est magis inconveniens.

Jam ergo manifestum est quia non est aliqua rerum scita per demonstrationem et definitionem simul. Et sufficit nobis in illo syllogismus particularis sufficientia ultima. Quod est quia nos non[27] invenimus aliquam[28] definitionem[29] declarantem penitus aliquam rerum existentium per se aut[30] rerum existentium esse absolute.[31] Et [32] si acciptur iterum[33] in definitione aliqua rerum existentium per se, non accipitur per demonstrationem. Quod est quia definitio non ostendit quod res sit animal.[34] Et verum [35] non accipit illud nisi acceptione, neque ostendit quod est rationalis, sed[36] non ponit nisi illud[37] esse positione.[38] Et dico iterum quod definitio ponit totam substantiam cognitam, sed demonstratio non ostendit nisi res quae insunt rei per se, et res in hoc manifesta non[39] est; nescitur ergo per demonstrationem quid est res[40] quia [41] ipsa non est substantia.[42] Et dico iterum quod definitio ostendit de re[43] definita quid est in se, sed de[44] demonstrationibus nulla penitus est quae ostendit substantiam ejus super quam[45] erigitur et[46] concludit. Verum ponit illud positione et accipit illud acceptione, sicut demonstrationes disciplinales, verbi gratia, nos ponimus positione quid est unum et quid est impar, et reliquae demonstrationes secundum hanc similitudinem. Et dico iterum quod omnis demonstratio non ostendit nisi quod res dicitur de re. In definitione vero non praedicatur aliqua rerum de aliqua rerum,[47], non animal, verbi gratia, de gressibili neque gressibile de animali, neque figura de plano neque planum de figura. Quod est quia non utuntur[48] in ea conditiones universales, neque verificantur si utantur in ea.[49] Neque praedicatur[50] iterum de homine summa hominis, quoniam homo non est pars suae definitionis sicut terminus positus pars conclusionis. Dicens[51] autem quod homo est animal gressibile bipes non dicit definitionem, sed dicit propositionem in qua definitio est praedicatum. Et dico iterum quod quaestio de re, quid est, est praeter quaestionem[52] si hoc (71^{r}) existit in ea, et hoc est praeter hoc universale,[53] neque ex via quod unum eorum est universale et alterum est comprehensum in eo, sicut duorum aequalium crurium et[54] triangulus. Etiam cum duae quaestiones sunt diversae hac diversitate, tunc scientia de una earum est praeter scientiam de altera. Ergo jam manifestum est quod non est possibile ut scientia de una et eadem re sit per definitionem et demonstrationem.

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[49] si *P*.
[50] non *T*.
[51] ea *MP*.
[52] in significatione: insignata *M*; in figura *P*.
[53] non *M*.
[54] *om. MP*.
[55] licet *P*.
[56] esse *M*.
[57] quid *P*; qui deus *T*.
[1] me *M*.
[2] *om. P*.
[3] *om. M*.
[4] quando *MP*.
[5] contentis *MP*.
[6] *add.* per definitionem et demonstrationem *M*.
[7] quae *MP*.
[8] sequi *T*.
[9] *add.* ab *P*.
[10] consideramus *T*.
[11] inest *T*.
[12] exigitur *MP*.
[13] *om.* omnem rem *MP*.
[14] negationem *MP*.
[15] proportionem *M*.
[16] an . . . demonstratio: iterum sicut ponimus *MP*.
[17] ergo *MP*.
[18] *om. T*.
[19] post *T*.
[20] *om.* definitionem . . . per *P*.
[21] sic non curret: sic non current *P*; sciuntur et *T*.
[22] cum *T*.
[23] *add.* in alia sicut posuimus *MP*; alio *M*.
[24] *om. T*.
[25] *add.* tamen *MP*.
[26] *add.* jam *MP*.
[27] *om. T*.
[28] aliquid *P*.
[29] definitionum *MP*.
[30] an iterum *M*; an *P*.
[31] absoluto *T*.
[32] non *MP*.
[33] res *MP*.
[34] anima licet *T*.
[35] et tantum *M*; iterum *P*.

CAPITULUM QUARTUM

Inquiramus ergo an sit possibile statuere[1] demonstrationem super definitionem[2] quia est huic rei, sicut sermo noster 'animal gressibile bipes' est definitio hominis. Et haec est res, quae jam fuit manifesta ex eo quod praecessit[3] in eo quod diximus,[3] et oportet ut singularem eam faciamus et inquiramus de ea nunc. Dico ergo quod omnis syllogismus non ostendit nisi quod res dicitur de re per medium aliquod. Oportet ergo, quando volumus ostendere quod definitio est homini, verbi gratia, ut sit declaratio ejus per medium aliquod. Et oportet necessario in hoc termino medio ut sit iterum ipsa definitio hominis, ita ut statuatur demonstratio secundum hanc similitudinem: homo est animal rationale mortale, et animal rationale mortale est animal gressibile bipes; ergo[4] homo est animal gressibile bipes. Praeter autem hunc modum non fit syllogismus super definitionem. Quod est quia terminus medius, si est major homine aut est minor eo aut si est aequalis ei, ita ut convertatur super eum, deinde non fit praedicatum de eo ex capitulo quid est. Non erit iterum praedicatum extremitatis majoris ex capitulo quid est res. Si ergo istae res verae sunt, tunc ille, qui vult ostendere quid est homo, indiget ut accipiat rem quae sit iterum quid est homo. Verumtamen ergo[5] scimus quod sermo noster 'animal gressibile bipes' sit praedicatum de hoc, quia est animal rationale mortale ex capitulo quid est, aut[6] quod sermo noster 'animal rationale mortale' sit praedicatum de homine ex capitulo quid est. Quod est quia non sequitur, si primum sequitur secundum et secundum sequitur tertium, quod primum sit definitio tertii et quid est, quoniam non omnes res, quae sequuntur, non sequuntur nisi secundum quod ipsae sunt definitiones; nam genera etiam et propria et accidentia inseparabilia sunt consequentia. Quod si accipiatur (155^{v}) res absolute quod primum sequitur secundum et secundum sequitur tertium, non ostenditur quod primum sit definitio tertii. Verum non ostenditur nisi quia existit in eo; nam acceptio[7] in propositionibus quod secundum praedicatur de (234^{r}) tertio ex capitulo quid est,[8] quod jam accepta est res prima[9] acceptione secundum semitam petitionis. Quod est quia intendit ad rem, cujus definitionem vult ostendere, et antecedit et accipit quod est definitio inventa et absque demonstratione. Et dico iterum quod non[10] est una duarum definitionum dignior ut ostendatur per alteram.[11] Et haec est longinquior res a via demonstrationis.

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[36] si *T.*

[37] illis *P*; *add.* ita *T.*

[38] ratione *T.*

[39] *om. MP.*

[40] *om.* nescitur ergo per demonstrationem quid est res *MP.*

[41] et *M.*

[42] *add.* rei *T.*

[43] definitio ostendit de re: res *T.*

[44] *om. T.*

[45] quod *MT.*

[46] *add.* quod *PT.*

[47] *om.* de aliqua rerum *T.*

[48] utor *often used thus.*

[49] eo *MP.*

[50] praedicantur *M*; praedicatum *P.*

[51] dicimus *T.*

[52] conclusionem *P.*

[53] universaliter *T.*

[54] *om. T.*

[1] ut statuamus *M;* ut stamus *P.*

[2] definitione *MP.*

[3] diximus in eo quod praecessit *MP.*

[4] sicut *P.*

[5] verumtamen ergo: verbi gratia *P.*

CAPITULUM QUINTUM

Nec est iterum per[1] viam divisionis[2] syllogismus, sicut jam dictum est in resolutione figurarum per conversionem,[3] quoniam res, quae ostenditur, non sequitur in aliqua dispositionum necessario res,[4] quae ponuntur, sicut non sequitur in syllogismis particularibus, quoniam sermo usque ad finem suum currit secundum semitam quaestionis donec concludet eam; et non accipitur nisi quia conceditur, non quia sequatur ex rebus, verbi gratia, quaerat aliquis an homo est animal an non spirans; cumque conceditur ei quia est animal, et non est nisi quia accipit quia est animal,[5] non quod concludatur illud, deinde dicit iterum: 'si est animal, tunc est aut gressibile aut volatile, quodcumque genus horum est. Si ergo conceditur ei quia est gressibile, tunc tantum ponit illud positione, et non concludit illud. Deinde dicit: 'Omne animal aut est bipes aut non est bipes[6], quodcumque genus est.' Quando conceditur ei, quia est bipes, complet et dicit quia est animal gressibile bipes. Et dispositio in hoc sermone toto non est nisi secundum semitam quaestionis et concessionis, non secundum semitam quod in eo sit res faciens ipsum necessarium. Et iterum dico quia non oportet, quando omnis res est res secundum singularitatem[7] suam vera,[8] aut si[9] quando aggregatur totum, iterum sit verum. Inde est ut dicamus: 'ille est artifex' et est verum, et: 'ille est bonus' et iterum verum est; et non oportet ex hoc quod unusquisque horum duorum sermonum est verus ut sit sermo, quod ille est artifex bonus, verus. Neque, etsi sint omnes simul veri, est necessarium ut sit in capitulo quid est res. Et summa divisionis in eo quod praemisimus, est quod omnes res, quas possibile est ostendere per syllogismum, inveniuntur facilius. (71^{v})

Jam ergo pervenimus [10] ad hoc ut syllogizemus et concludamus ut[11] intentio animalis existat[12] in homine per hoc quod accipimus[13] 'sensibile' terminum medium. Et pervenimus ad hoc ut ostendamus quod intentio gressibilis existat[12] in homine, ita ut ponamus in illo rem aliam terminum medium. Non est ergo per divisionem syllogismus; verumtamen utitur secundum viam aliam. Per syllogismum enim particularem iterum non est conclusio; sed docetur per eum[14] aliquid, et ostenditur per ipsum aliquid. Et magis quidem juvativa est divisio quando incedit aliquis in ea via[15] necessarii; et accipit res existentes in capitulo quid est res omnis, donec non dimittat[16] aliquod ex eis neque pertranseat usquequo perveniat ad species quae non dividuntur.[17] Nam ille, qui dividit animal in principio in[18] illud cui sunt duo pedes et quod est multorum pedum, pertransit in divisione. Quod est quia divisio est prima[19] in gressibile et volatile, et qui dividit gressibile in bipes et quadrupes dimittit[20] in divisione aliquid. Quod est quia dimittit[20] dicere 'multorum pedum' et 'cui non est pes'. Cum ergo secundum dispositionem, si serves has conditiones[21] in divisione, tunc divides[22] per eas cum scientia; verum quod syllogizes per eas et concludas aliquid non. Et sicut in conclusionibus, quae concluduntur absque termino medio, non declaratur quare est res. Similiter non ostenditur hoc in sermone quod[23] aggregatur divisio.[24] Et fortasse utens divisione potest afferre[25] causam in unaquaque rerum quae sunt in summa sermonis, sicut si dicat in hoc quia est spirans et quia est rationale, quoniam non est belua, sed non ostendit quod sermo totus est definitio.

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[6] quod est autem *M*; an *P*.
[7] exceptio *MT*.
[8] *add.* est *M*; et *P*.
[9] praeter *P*.
[10] *om.* *T*.
[11] *add.* quando fit altera dignior ut ostenditur per alteram *MP*.

[1] quod *M*.
[2] demonstrationum *T*.
[3] *cf.* *Anal. Pr.* I. 31.
[4] *om.* *T*.
[5] *om.* et non . . . animal *T*.
[6] *om.* bipes . . . bipes *T*.
[7] significationem *P*.
[8] veram *MP*.

[9] sit *MP*.
[10] perveniamus *T*.
[11] conducamus quod *MP*.
[12] existit *MP*.
[13] accepit *T*.
[14] propterea *MP*.
[15] in eo viam *MP*.

CAPITULUM SEXTUM

Et si accipiatur iterum sermo significans super quid est res, et ponatur loco propositionis majoris, et ponatur una definitio in loco propositionis minoris, non erit per illud iterum syllogismus compositus. Verbi gratia, si aliquis ponat et accipiat quod omne compositum ex rebus intrantibus in capitulo quid est res,[1] et proprium sibi est definitio, et significat super quid est res in se, deinde adjungat ad illud quod hic sermo, verbi gratia, quod hoc est animal gressibile bipes, est compositus hac compositione; deinde concludat inde quod hic ergo sermo est definitio hominis, erit incedens etiam in[2] hac via dignius ut ludatur[3] de eo et rideatur. Quod est quia ponit rem, ad cujus declarationem intendit, manifestiorem et planiorem[4] re per[5] quam ostendit eam. Quod est quia sermo ejus, quod est animal gressibile bipes,[6] est ex rebus intrantibus in capitulo quid est; et praedicatum de eo proprie[7] non est aliquid praeter sermonem ejus, si[8] dicat quod istae res sunt definitio hominis; jam enim ponitur conclusio in propositionibus non per potentiam; nam si esset in propositionibus[9] per potentiam, non esset[10] illud inconveniens, sed[11] posuit eam actu. Et dico iterum quia non est magna differentia inter hoc ut, quando intendimus afferre syllogismum compositum, ponamus loco syllogismi propositionem et inter hoc quando intendimus[12] ostendere definitionem, ponamus sermonem significantem super quid est res loco propositionis. Et sicut quando intendimus afferre[13] syllogismum, non dicimus quid est syllogismus; similiter non oportet, quando intendimus erigere[14] demonstrationem super definitionem, ut dicamus quid est definitio. Et non oportet ut scimus scientia certa[15] quid est syllogismus, et quid est definitio, donec sciamus ex nobis ipsis, quando[16] scimus [17] utrumque, quod[18] jam scimus utrumque. Verum non (145^{r}) oportet ut ponamus hos duos sermones partem demonstrationis.

Et forsitan[19] aliquis dicet[20] quod,[21] quamvis non sit possibile hoc ex hac[22] via, tamen hoc[23] ut sit possibile ex via radicis[24] positae; et significo nunc per 'radicem positam' syllogismum positum. Et illud quidem est secundum hanc viam; ponamus quod definitio mali est res divisibilis. Si ergo definitio mali est res divisibilis,

[16] dicat *P.*
[17] dicuntur *P.*
[18] *om. MP.*
[19] *add.* est *MP.*
[20] dividit *P.*
[21] conclusiones *T.*
[22] vides *P.*
[23] quidem *M;* quoniam *T.*
[24] aggreget divisione *T.*
[25] affirmare *P.*
[1] *om.* est res *T.*
[2] *om. PT.*
[3] laudatur *P.*
[4] *add.* est *MP.*
[5] in re propter *M.*
[6] quod est animal gressibile *M;* quod est gressibile bipes *T.*
[7] *om. MP.*
[8] quod si *P.*
[9] *add.* non *P.*
[10] *om. T.*
[11] *om. P;* si *T.*
[12] *om.* afferre . . . intendimus *MP.*
[13] affirmare *MP.*
[14] erigimus *T.*
[15] vera *T.*
[16] *om. T.*
[17] sunt jam *T.*
[18] quando *T.*
[19] *om. T.*
[20] *om. P.*
[21] *om. T.*
[22] *om. PT.*
[23] non *P.*
[24] judicis *T.*

est definitio contrarii ejus contrarium; ergo definitio boni est res quae non dividitur. An vides in hoc iterum, postquam voluisti ostendere quid est res in se, accepisti quod res alia existit, quamvis illa res, quam accepisti, sit ex occultatione cum dispositione quae non est minor dispositione rei ad cujus declarationem intendisti, quoniam duae[25] res simul sunt cum dispositione una ex manifestatione aut ex occultatione? Et manifestum est iterum quod incedens[26] hac via, quando vult ostendere definitionem mali, accipit definitionem boni. Et hoc non est aliquid praeter ostendere unamquamque duarum rerum per alteram.[27] Et ponamus quod hoc licet in eo quod habet contrarium. Quomodo ergo perveniet nobis hac via in eo cui[28] non est contrarium?

CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM

Et forsitan aliquis dicet quod possibile est in hoc ut ostendatur res per syllogismum particularem. Et quomodo est possibile hoc, cum syllogismus particularis non sit nisi ex rebus singularibus individualibus, et non sit alicui ex rebus particularibus[1] definitio penitus? Et in syllogismo omni,[2] et qui universalis est ex eo et qui particularis, praedicatur aliquid de aliquo; et definitio est ex rebus quae dicuntur praeter compositionem.[3] Et qui modus remansit ex eo quo[4] possibile est ostendere quid est res in se? Et non licet tibi ut[5] dicas quod ad illud[6] innuitur[7] cum digito, aut ostenditur per oculos aut absque utrisque ex sensibus.[8] Et hoc iterum[9] est ex eo quod inest dubitanti inesse definitionis, an ei sit ostensio qua[10] ratiocinetur. Dico quia oportet necessario ei qui scit quid est homo aut aliud quodcumque[11] sit, ut sciat cum illo quia existit; nam quando res non existit, non est via ad sciendum quid est ipsa. Verum possibile est ut sciatur quod significat nomen quando dicitur hircocervus; sed quid est hircocervus non est possibile ut sciat ille, qui ignorat an existit an non. Oportet ergo inde ut ille qui ostendit quid est res in se, jam ostendit[12] simul quia existit iterum. Et illud est ex eo quod non est possibile, quoniam ostensio una non est[13] nisi ubi eidem rei et intentio quid est homo est praeter intentionem[14] quod homo existit. Et primae harum duarum intentionum[15] est definitio et secundae est demonstratio. Jam ergo pervenimus cum demonstratione super hoc quod[16] ordinatio creatoris existit. Et pervenimus etiam per demonstrationem super hoc quod Deus existit. Quomodo[17] ergo potest ille qui definit ut cum definitione sua syllogizet et concludat? Et opifices scientiarum cavent hoc capitulum et abhorrent ipsum et singularem[18] faciunt super rem significationem quid est per se et ostensionem super quod res existit per se.

Et quando[19] intendunt ostendere quod res existit, incipiunt inprimis super quod significat nomen ejus. Inde est quod ipsi incipiunt inprimis super quod significat nomen[20] trianguli. Et dicunt quod triangulus est quod continent tres lineae rectae; deinde ostendunt quia existit ita quod componunt ipsum tribus lineis rectis; nam propositum intentionis, quam significat nomen, est principium omnis quaestionis. Oportet ergo ut sit ostensio una rebus pluribus aut illo quo[21] ostenditur quid est res in se non sciatur quia existit. Et ostenditur iterum[22] ex definitionibus quas[23] assertit[24] quod ipsae non ostendunt simul quod res existit; dicens enim, verbi gratia, quod circulus est figura plana, quam continet una linea, non ostendit quod ipse existit. Quod est quia non ostenditur ex definitione circuli causa qua sit necessarium quod circulus existat, neque in ea est ratio cogens quod sit definitio circuli; nam inest alicui ut dicat quod haec definitio aeris, quoniam non est in definitione circuli ratio, quae significet, quod ipsa est definitio circuli. Et hic est egrediens[25] ab eo ad quod intendimus. Si ergo illud, quod ostendit quid est res in se, non ostendit quia existit, tunc non ostendit definitio de esse rei[26] quid est. Verum non significat[27] nisi illud quod significat nomen. Et secundum hanc semitam oportet ut definitiones rerum nomina[28] existant. Hirocervi enim nomen significat aliquid; et similiter derivatores nominum significant ex nominibus aliquid; immo erunt omnes sermones definitiones, et erunt omnia verba nostra[29] definitiones et versus homeri[30] omnis definitio et sermo dicentis, 'quis es tu ex hominibus et unde venisti'?, definitio et sermo ejus 'fuimus sicut praecepisti' definitio et sermo hujus 'narraverunt nobis de hoc viro Musa' definitio, et similiter sermo ejus 'veni de Ablion'.[31] Unusquisque enim horum sermonum est aequalis in potentia[32] rei et intentio ejus et[33] intentio rei ejusdem; unius ergo eorum est intentio ejusdem quaestionis et alterius intentio intentio responsionis, et alius intentio est intentio petitionis, et alius intentio intentio est intentio narrationis.[34] Et dicens quidem hoc meretur per sermonem suum ut rideatur de eo et derideatur. Quod est quia sermo, qui exponit intentionem nominis quod dicitur et super quod significat cum hoc, quia non definit, (72^v) non ostenditur per ipsum etiam quia oportet necessario ut aequetur nomini in potentia sua. Et si illud esset ita, non essent nomina posita per concessionem neque nomina communia caderent. Jam ergo manifestum est ex istis rebus quod definitio et syllogismus non sunt intentio una eadem, et quod non est rei uni syllogismus et definitio, et quod definitio non ostendit quod[35] res sit neque definitio sit illi rei ad quam proportionatur (145^v) quia est ejus definitio.

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[25] aut *T.*
[26] intendens *P.*
[27] alterum *T.*
[28] quod *T.*
[1] *om. MP.*
[2] in omni *P.*
[3] opinionem *T.*
[4] quod *MP.*
[5] *om. M.*
[6] illum *M.*
[7] sumitur *P.*
[8] *add.* amplius quomodo membra *P.*
[9] verum *T.*
[10] quae *PT.*
[11] alio quocumque *P.*
[12] ostenderit *M.*
[13] *om.* iterum . . . est *M.*
[14] *add.* rei *P.*
[15] *om. T.*
[16] cum *MP.*
[17] quoniam *T.*
[18] et secundam rem *P.*
[19] *om. T.*
[20] *om.* nomen ejus . . . trianguli *T.*
[21] quod *MP.*
[22] *add.* terminum *P.*
[23] qua *MP.*
[24] affertur *M*; affirmatur *P.*

CAPITULUM OCTAVUM

Et oportet ut redeamus et inquiramus quae harum rerum dicantur recte aut non secundum rectitudinem et quomodo est possibile ut erigatur demonstratio super definitionem. Et nos revertimur in illo a capite. Dicimus ergo quia sicut quando quaerimus quare est res et simul quia existit, fortasse est ostensio utriusque[1] simul; verumtamen non est possibile ut sit cognitio nostra quare est res ante cognitionem nostram quod res existit. Similiter non quaerimus super quid est res per se nisi quia[2] res existit. Quod est quia inconveniens est, sicut diximus multotiens, ut non sciamus quod res est, sed ignoremus eam et inquiramus quid est illa res in se; hoc namque, verbi gratia, non oportet necessario ut ostendant definitiones. Quod est quia definitiones non sunt nisi postquam est hoc positum. Et sicut quando nos ostendimus quod res existit, invenimus iterum cum[3] illo quare existit, cum demonstratio non est nisi per causam. Similiter multotiens, quando ostendimus quod res existit, ostenditur declaratione illius iterum quid[4] est illa[5] res in se.

Oportet ergo ut redeamus in hoc et dicamus quando est illud et qualiter est. Dico ergo quod esse[6] in demonstrationibus est secundum modos plures. Quod est quia fortasse est[7] ex accidente et per longinquitatem a substantia rei. Et fortasse est ex ipsa re et propterea quod in ipso est aliquid ejus, verbi gratia, in demonstrationibus super quod in ipso est aliquid ejus, verbi gratia, in demonstrationibus super quod Deus existit ex accidente quidem quia decollatorium existit, sicut dixit Arusius;[8] et ex ipsa quidem re[9] quoniam ipse sanat et quia ipse facit prophetizare et quia ipse movet[10] in tempore infinito motus diversos. Et res quae sunt ex ipsa re, quarum quaedam sunt propinquiores et quaedam longinquiores sunt, sicut est dispositio in istis exemplis quae dixi. In rebus ergo quas non scimus quod existant nisi ex accidentibus, non invenimus viam penitus ad hoc ut sciamus quid sunt; immo forsitan non scitur in eis, neque quod ipse sunt, quoniam in scientia, quae est secundum semitam accidentis, non est quod necessarium faciat omnino. Et ex rebus autem, quas scimus ex rebus convenientibus ipsis et ex ipsa re, nostra permutatio ad quid sunt est facilioritas ut secundum quod nobiscum de praeparatione in hoc ut[11] sciamus causam esse, secundum illud est nobiscum de praeparatione in hoc ut sciamus[12] quid sunt in se ipsis. Et oportet ut exercitemus speculatorem in illo per exemplum. Ponamus ergo quod aliquis quaerat an eclipsis lunae existit. Ille ergo qui ostendit quia existit ex hoc quod, quando luna est plena non est ei umbra, non respondet in quaestione nisi ex accidente. Et qui incedit hac via non praemittit aliquid quo perveniat ad hoc ut sciat quid est eclipsis. Dicens autem quod terra, quando separat inter lunam in dispositione suae impletionis et inter solem, tegit lunam a lumine suo, et propter illud eclipsatur luna, facit scire vere et per viam convenientem, quod eclipsis lunae existit, et facit scire cum illo quid est eclipsis lunae. Quod est quia jam narravit causam veram in eclipsi. Et illud est definitio et quid est res in se ipsa. Quod est quia definitio rei in hujusmodi rebus currit et quaeret[13] propter quam[14] res est cursu uno, verbi gratia, si quando interrogator quaerit quid est eclipsis lunae[15] et inde[16] dicitur quia est tegumentum luminis a luna per terram, tunc causa eclipsis lunae est tegumentum.[17] Et quando quaerens interrogat iterum quid est tonitruum, dicitur quia est extinctio ignis in nube, tunc causa tonitrui est extinctio ignis in nube.[18] Et ex eo quod significat illud[19] est quod,[20] quando tu convertis has differentias et ponis[21] eas quaestiones, respondes[22] de causis earum per has easdem res, verbi gratia, quando tu dicis: 'quare fit eclipsis in luna'? est responsio 'propterea quod terra cooperit eam;' et si dicis: 'quare fit tonitruum'? est responsio 'propter extinctionem ignis.' Jam ergo ostensum est ex omnibus, quae diximus, quia non erigitur super definitionem, (73^{r}) verumtamen verificatur[23] per demonstrationem in rebus, quarum esse[24] ostenditur quia sunt per causam.

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[25] ingrediens *MP.*
[26] circuli *MP.*
[27] significando *T.*
[28] non *MP.*
[29] nomina aut *MP.*
[30] hominum *PT.*
[31] Iliothen *gr. tx. p.* 49, *l.* 3.
[32] hypothesi *MP.*
[33] est *MP.*
[34] unius ergo intentio est intentio quaestionis et alterius intentio est intentio rei positionis et alius est intentio petitionis et alius intentio est intentio narrationis *M.*
[35] quid *T.*

[1] *om. T.*
[2] *om. MP.*
[3] *add.* in *T.*
[4] quod *M.*
[5] alia *PT.*
[6] etiam *M.*
[7] cum *T.*

CAPITULUM NONUM

At vero oportet necessario ut excipiatur[1] et dicatur quod hoc non accidit in omnibus rebus, quarum definitiones quaerimus, sed in rebus proprie existentibus in aliis, sicut eclipsis et tonitruum. Res enim istae sunt tolerantes demonstrationem; et medium et causa in istis rebus[2] sunt praeter conclusionem, et praeter ipsam rem quaesitam. In rebus autem existentibus per se, non in re alia, non erit ergo possibile uti[3] hac eadem via in omnibus eis. (146^{r}) Quod est quia non est causa in omnibus rebus aliquid praeter eas, verbi gratia, res primas[4] in unaquaque scientiarum. Oportet enim ut ponantur illae res existentes, et ponatur quid sit scitum aut exponatur per alium modorum aut per syllogismum particularem aut per sufficientiam aut per experimentum. Et non ostenduntur[5] hujusmodi res per demonstrationem. Quod est quia sunt principia demonstrationis. Et similiter invenimus opifices scientiarum facere. Inde est quod opifex scientiae numerorum ponit quod unitas existit et quid est unitas. Et jam manifestum est etiam quia non est possibile ut sciatur per demonstrationem quid est Deus. Quod est quia esse Dei non demonstratur nec est ex eo quod suffert demonstrationem, quid est Deus. Quod est quia esse Dei non demonstratur nec est ex eo quod suffert demonstrationem, quoniam non possumus invenire ei causam aliam. Nam per juvamentum suum creaturis et quod movet[6] eas in tempore infinito ostenditur substantia ejus; et sunt res acceptae[7] ex ipsa re, sed non sunt causae esse ejus.[8] Et forsitan aliquis dicet quod possibile est ut aliquis[9] afferat[10] definitionem aliquam ex hujusmodi rebus; cujusmodi exemplum est ut dicatur quod Deus est animal aeternum et dat bonitatem hominibus. Et sequitur, qui hunc sermonem dicit, quia si est haec definitio Dei, tunc est procul dubio causa ejus esse; et quod est causa esse ejus[11] est principium ejus.

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[8] Chrysippus, *gr. tx.*, p. 49, *l.* 24.

[9] res *M.*

[10] neque *T.*

[11] ubi *M.*

[12] *om.* ut secundum . . . ut sciamus *T; add. in margin M.*

[13] causa *T.*

[14] propter quid vel propter quam *M.*

[15] *om.* eclipsis lunae *T.*

[16] *om. MP.*

[17] *om.* luminis . . . tegumentum *MP.*

[18] *om.* tunc . . . nube *T; cf.* Aristotle, *Meteor.* 369 b 12-16.

[19] significans aliud *T.*

[20] *om. PT.*

[21] *add.* in *M.*

[22] respondens *T.*

[23] verificat *MP.*

[24] est *M.*

[1] excipiamus *MP.*

[2] *add.* per se *T.*

[3] in *T.*

[4] prima *M*; primae *P.*

CAPITULUM DECIMUM

Et definitio quidem dicitur[1] secundum multos modos. Unus eorum est sermo exponens de hoc esse nominis quod significat; et non meretur sermo ut[2] nominatur definitio vere. Verum non est nisi sermo exponens nomen; et fortasse est intentio hujus sermonis. Et nos nescimus an illa res, quam significat nomen, existat neque quae causa est, cum sit[3] in esse ejus. Inde est quod nos intelligimus intentionem, quam significat nomen 'inanis', et nescimus an inane existat, neque pervenimus ad hoc ut dicamus quid[4] sit causa in esse inanis. Et fortasse scimus ex hujusmodi sermone quod res existit,[5] sed[6] nescimus ex eo quare sit existens. Cujus exemplum est ut sit definitio quod eclipsis lunae sit ut luna sit in dispositione suae impletionis ne appareat. Nam modus iste definitionum significat rem, sed non ostendit causam omnino. Et ex definitionibus est alia definitio significans cum hoc quod est res quae est causa ejus, etiam per quam existit. Et haec quidem definitio sola ex definitionibus est quasi demonstratio super hoc quod res existit. Et non est differentia inter ipsam et[7] demonstrationem nisi in positione tantum. Nos enim extrahimus hunc sermonem extractione, et est demonstratio; et extrahimus ipsum extractione altera, et est definitio. Cum ergo extrahimus ipsum extractione demonstrationis, dicimus quod in nube est extinctio ignis, et extinctio ignis est tonitruum; ergo in nube est tonitruum. Iste enim[8] sermo in figura prima currit[9] secundum continuationem; et quando extrahimus ipsum extractione definitionis, dicimus quod tonitruum est extinctio ignis in nube. Et ex definitionibus est definitio tertia, quae est quando intendimus ad definitionem,[10] in qua est causa; et facimus conclusionem ejus singularem secundum se, et dicimus[11] quod tonitruum est vox in nube.

Et ex definitionibus est definitio quarta rebus primis ostensis absque medio, et non est differentia inter hanc definitionem et inter demonstrationem in positione, (235ʳ) cum causa[12] non sit in ea manifesta, quoniam causae primae manifestae absque medio non habent causam; neque iterum est conclusio demonstrationis, sed est dignior ut sit positio demonstrationis significans quid est res. Cum ergo removetur[13] definitio prima, sunt omnes definitiones tres.

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[5] extenduntur *T.*
[6] inest *T.*
[7] exceptae *P.*
[8] dei *T.*
[9] *om. MP.*
[10] afferatur *M;* affirmatur *P.*
[11] rei *M; add.* quod est dei esse rei *P.*

[1] est *T.*
[2] nisi *M.*
[3] *om.* est cum sit *MP.*
[4] quae *MP.*
[5] existat *T.*
[6] *om. MP.*
[7] *add.* inter *T.*
[8] est *T.*
[9] erit *P;* cum *T.*
[10] a definitione *MP.*
[11] ea(m) ejus exemplum est ut dicamus *M.*
[12] jam *T.*
[13] ergo removetur: ergo quid movetur *T.*

Una earum est haec, a cujus narratione jam[14] expediti sumus, et est sermo significans quid est res[15] absque demonstratione. Et alia[16] est sermo inter[17] quem et inter demonstrationem est differentia in positione. Et alia[18] est[19] sermo (73^{v}) qui[20] est conclusio demonstrationis. Oportet ergo ut inquiramus de sermone in quo est causa solum, et in quam harum definitionum ingreditur. Cujus exemplum est, ut dicatur, quod ira[21] est desiderium vindictae, aut[22] quod tonitrum est exstinctio ignis in nube. Et dignius[23] est ut istae definitiones sint in quibus non est medium neque demonstratio. Jam ergo manifestum est ex eo quod diximus, quod non affertur[24] super aliquam definitionum demonstratio, verumtamen inter illas[25] definitionum tantum,[26] ex quibus scitur etiam causa rei quaesitae, et inter demonstrationem non est differentia nisi in situ; et istae definitiones sunt propinquiores definitiones scientiae.

CAPITULUM UNDECIMUM

Causae vero sunt quattuor: una earum est quid est res in se. Et causa alia est ex quibus rebus subjectis est, et est illa[1] quam nominamus yle. Et causa tertia est ex qua est initium motus. Et causa quarta est propter quam est res.[2] Et omnes istae causae[3] ingrediuntur in[4] demonstrationem quare est res et sunt termini medii hujusmodi demonstrationum. Et jam quidem praecessit ex sermone nostro qualiter sumitur[5] in demonstrationibus quid est res in se ipsa. Et sumitur in demonstrationibus yle et ponitur loco termini medii proprie. Et terminus medius[6] in omni demonstratione est quasi yle syllogismo ordinato; iste enim terminus est, qui facit duas duas propositiones, a quibus est conclusio. Et multotiens quidem iterum afferimus[7] rem appropriatam nomine yle; et quando afferimus eam, sumus jam expediti a capitulo[8] quaestionis 'quare est res'. Cujus exemplum est: 'quare[9] corpora nostra corrumpuntur'? tunc dicimus: 'quoniam sunt composita in contrariis'; est yle, et terminus medius est 'quoniam corpora nostra corrumpuntur'.[10] Et dicimus iterum:[11] 'quare[12] mundus est melior rerum'? Et dicimus in responsione illius: 'quoniam deus creavit ipsum;' ergo causa in hoc et terminus medius est motor primus. Et dicimus[13] iterum: 'quid[14] perduxit Socratem[15] ad nubendum?' Et dicimus[16] in responsione illius: 'quia amavit ut esset ei filius'. Et dicitur: 'quare[17] fecit deus mundum?' Et dicitur in responsione illius: 'propter bonitatem'. Et haec est[18] causa (146^{v}) propter quam est res.

Et non est ordo medii et causae ordo unus idem in omnibus rebus; verum ordo ejus in quibusdam rebus est[19] ordo primus, sicut ordo rerum moventium, et ordo ejus in quibusdam rebus est postremus, sicut ordo finium ad quod intenditur, et ordo ejus in quibusdam rebus est[20] simul, sicut ordo definitionum et quid est res in se. Et non est quod[21] prohibeat quin sit res una eadem propter rem et ex necessitate. Intelligo autem per sermonem meum 'ex necessitate' causam ex via[22] yle. Cujus exemplum est ut interroget aliquis, quare lumen candelae penetrat; nam illud est necessarium,[23] cum[24] res, quae est subtilior[25] partium,[26] penetret in[27] meatus qui sunt latiores,[28] et est propter rem, et est quia non alteratur in eis. Et[29] hoc[30] manifestius est[31] in corporibus caelestibus; illa enim corpora moventur circulariter per necessitatem, quoniam corpus eorum nec est grave neque leve; et propter rem, et est oboedientia dei.[32] Et natura iterum facit plurimum quod[33] facit per[34] necessitatem et propter rem simul; inde est quod dentes in anteriore parte oris ponuntur secundum quod sunt ex[35] superfluitate latitudinis et paucitate spissitudinis propter yle. Quod[36] est quia ortus eorum[37] est ex osse[38] subtiliore et ut incidant ossa per acuitatem suam. Et vox tonitrui iterum est necessario[39] propter exstinctionem ignis et ut terreantur eo illi qui sunt in inferno, sicut dixit Pythagoras.

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[14] eam *M*; ideo *P*.
[15] *om. P.*
[16] alius *MP.*
[17] *add.* quem *T.*
[18] alius *M.*
[19] *om. T.*
[20] quid *MP.*
[21] ita *PT.*
[22] an *MP.*
[23] dignum *T.*
[24] afferunt *T.*
[25] illos *MP.*
[26] *add.* et *MP.*
[1] ita *T.*
[2] motus *P.*
[3] res *T.*
[4] *om. MP.*
[5] sumentur *T.*
[6] *add.* proprie *P; om.* Et . . . medius *T.*
[7] asserimus *M.*
[8] capite *P.*
[9] quia *P.*
[10] *om.* Tunc dicimus . . . nostra corrumpuntur *MP.*
[11] etiam *MP.*
[12] quia *P.*
[13] diximus *M;* dicitur *P.*
[14] quod *T.*
[15] *om. T.*
[16] dicitur *T.*
[17] quia *P.*
[18] *om. T.*
[19] cum *T.*
[20] *om.* postremus sicut . . . rebus est *MP.*
[21] qui *P.*
[22] una *T.*
[23] necessario *T.*
[24] *add.* est *T.*
[25] est subtilior: subtiliarum *T.*
[26] *om. P.*
[27] ut *T.*
[28] subtiliores *MP.*

Et omnino[40] natura omnis rerum est[41] duobus modis, unus eorum[42] est[43] species ejus,[44] et est res propter quam est res; nam species oculi est visus, et propter visum est oculus, et species aurium est auditus, et propter auditum sunt aures; et alter est secundum semitam yle et necessitatis; et jam ostensum est in[45] sermonibus naturalibus[46] qualiter[47] dicitur[48] yle quia[49] est[50] necessario. Quod est quia oculi quando sunt, est necessaria yle ex qua (74^{r}) fit eventus oculorum, et similiter quando sunt dentes, necessaria est materia a qua proveniunt. Et haec necessitas in se existens est innata in unaquaque rerum, cum yle innata sit unicuique rerum, et operationes[51] iterum quarum [52] causae sunt secundum hoc exemplum sunt necessariae, cum non separent[53] rem, sicut[54] terrae inest ut descendat propter gravitatem suam et igni ut ascendat propter levitatem suam. Et similiter non dicitur huic necessitati iterum quare res est cum dispositione egressa a cursu naturali neque deforis neque secundum semitam violentiae,[55] sed secundum cursum cujusque rerum et quasi[56] secundum desiderium suum. Quod est quia initium earum est ex substantia rei et[57] ex forma cujusque rerum naturali; necessitas autem et violentia sunt ex re alia et egressae a cursu naturali. Et natura[59] facit totum quod facit omnino propter rem, et similiter facit providentia;[60] ipsa enim non intendit nisi ad bonum aliquod aut bonum quod vere est bonum aut quod ita in manifestum[61] rei fortunae. Ex fortuna[62] vero non est res propter rem, et si accidat in rebus ut sit propter rem, tunc hoc est, quando accidit res aliqua in rebus quae sunt propter rem aliam. Fossor enim puteorum, verbi gratia, non fodit ut inveniat censum, et qui egreditur volens balneari, verbi gratia,[63] non intendit ut quaerat aurum. Et accidunt res multae ex rebus quae sunt per intentionem artis aut provisionis per fortunam et ex se ipsis; infirmus enim sanatur per potum ejus quo non intendit sanitatem, verum non intendit[64] per illud nisi[65] quaerere delectationem, et salvatur navis quando impellit eam ventus ad locum salvum.[66] At vero non est possibile ut fiat domus per fortunam,[67] neque lectus. Quod est quoniam non omnes artes communicant fortuna secundum similitudinem unam, sed communitas[68] ejus quarundam earum est minus et quarundam ipsarum est plus, et illae ex eis, quae plus sunt communicantes, sunt quae utuntur aestimatione.[69]

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[29] *add.* quare *MP.*

[30] *add.* simile *P.*

[31] *om. MT.*

[32] rei *P; obedientia—homoioseos, gr. tx. p.* 52, *l.* 24.

[33] que *T.*

[34] propter *T.*

[35] et *M;* om. *P.*

[36] et hoc *T.*

[37] earum *T.*

[38] officio *MP.*

[39] necessarium *T.*

[40] omnino natura omnis: omnis naturas omnis *M*, ideo omnis natura *P.*

[41] *add.* cum *T.*

[42] earum *T.*

[43] *om. MP.*

[44] *om. T.*

[45] *om. MP.*

[46] Aristotle, *Physics* II, 8-9.

[47] quare *MP.*

[48] *add.* in *MT.*

[49] quare *P.*

[50] *om. T.*

[51] compositiones *P.*

[52] quare *P.*

[53] separarent *T.*

[54] situ *T.*

[55] insolentiae *P.*

[56] *om. T.*

[57] *om. T.*

[58] *om. M.*

[59] notum *T.*

[60] providentiam *MP;* dianoia,,*gr. tx. p.* 53, *l.* 9.

[61] manifestum *T.*

[62] *add.* quod *T.*

[63] *om.* verbi gratia *M.*

[64] accidat *P.*

[65] *om. MP.*

[66] salvinum *T.*

[67] fortunas *T.*

[68] communicat *M.*

[69] *add.* et tactu *MT.*

CAPITULUM DUODECIMUM

Et forsitan jam pertransivimus in hoc quo[1] contenti essemus. Et causa[2] secundum semitam speciei et quid est res in se currit in tempore semper cum re quae est ei causa aut[3] in esse suo aut[4] in suo eventu. Et jam diximus quod haec causa in rebus multis invenitur terminus medius syllogismi, et haec causa est in rebus existentibus existens, et in rebus accidentibus accidit,[5] et in rebus, quae accidunt, jam accidit, et in rebus, quae accident, accidet. Cujus exemplum est ut dicatur: 'quare accidit eclipsis?', et dicitur[6] in responsione illius: 'quoniam terra est[7] in medio'. Aut[8] dicatur: 'quare fuit[9] eclipsis?' et dicitur[10] in responsione illius: 'quoniam terra fuit[11] in medio'. Ex[12] hoc ergo[13] modo revertitur unaquaeque[14] duarum rerum super alteram cum aequalitate, scilicet causa quae currit hoc cursu et causatum quod currit hoc cursu. In rebus autem quae non sunt[15] simul, sed quaedam earum[16] praecedunt alias in tempore, non inveniuntur causa et causatum redire unumquodque eorum super[17] suum compar cum aequalitate. Et hujusmodi quidem ex causis activis[18] multae sunt, sicut assultus illorum de Media[19] adversus illos de Sardis[20] fuit causa Graecorum pugnae adversus illos[21] de Media,[19] et dolus opinionis Ulixis fuit causa destructionis civitatis[22] Troiae.

In hujusmodi enim rebus, sicut diximus, non invenitur reversio cujusque duorum super alterum cum aequalitate servata, neque necessitas una eadem existens cum incipimus ex inferiori aut incipimus a superiori; verum quando incipimus a causa non est conclusioni causa faciens necessitatem, et quando incipimus a rebus causatis est necessitas existens in syllogismis. Nam si domus existit, tunc oportet[23] ante ipsam ut[24] paries existat,[25] et si paries existit, tunc oportet ut fundamenta existant;[26] at vero si fundamenta sint existentia, non oportet procul dubio ut parietes sint existentes; neque si parietes existant, tunc domus procul dubio existit. Et in hoc est locus admirationis speculationi.[27] Quod est quia si non est res, quae est imprimis causa efficiens procul dubio rei, quae est post ipsam, tunc quae causa est in continuatione (147^{r}) generationis et in eventu rei alterius semper post illam quae fuit imprimis ita ut non sint in illa[28] generatione intermissiones? Dico ergo quod[29] tempus, quoniam est continuum, facit imaginari in rebus, quae eveniunt, quod[30] sunt continuae cum illis, quae evenerunt, quoniam generatio non est nisi in (74^{v}) tempore et generationis antecedentis[31] extremitas pervenit apud illud,[32] quod jam generatur, et est quasi punctum ex[33] linea. Et sicut quando punctum sumitur ex linea, tunc jam dividitur linea[34] et non est adhuc[35] ut sumatur continua.[36] Similiter quando accipitur quod jam generatum est, tunc jam dividitur generatio et non[37] est generatio[38] post illam continua cum illa, quae fuit ante[39] illam, quoniam quod jam generatum est,[40] est in extremitate temporis et in instanti. Et tempus non est compositum ex numero instantis neque generatio est composita ex numero ejus[41] quod jam generatum est. Verumtamen et[42] istae res non sunt convenientes huic intentioni ad quam intenditur; et jam dictus est[43] sermo magis[44] completus hoc et vehementius perscrutatus[45] in sermonibus de motu.

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[1] hoc quo: hoc quod *T;* hoc vel quo quod *P.*

[2] causam *MP.*

[3] an *MP.*

[4] an *MP.*

[5] accidet *T.*

[6] dicatur *P.*

[7] erit *T.*

[8] an *MP.*

[9] sit *P.*

[10] dicatur *MP.*

[11] sit *P.*

[12] ex *T.*

[13] *om. MP.*

[14] unamquamque *P.*

[15] *om. T.*

[16] eorum *M.*

[17] sunt *T.*

[18] actis *P.*

[19] meie *M,* medie *P.* more *T; add.* et assultus eorum et *T.*

[20] *om. T.*

[21] eos *T.*

[22] *om. T.*

[23] *add.* ut *MP.*

[24] *om. MP.*

[25] sit existens *MP.*

[26] sint existentia *MP.*

[27] speculari *T.*

[28] alia *T.*

[29] ergo quoniam quas *T.*

[30] eveniunt quod; conveniunt quae *T.*

[31] accidentis *PT.*

[32] illum *M.*

[33] in *M.*

[34] *om.* linea *M;* sumitur jam tunc dividitur linea *P.*

[35] adeo *MP.*

[36] contra *T.*

[37] et non: quae *MP.*

[38] *om. MP.*

[39] fuit ante: sumantur *P.*

[40] *om. MP.*

[41] est *T.*

[42] *om. MP.*

Et manifestum est quod in rebus plurimum[46] quae eveniunt secundum plurimum[47] ex rebus causatis ad causas et ex rebus quae sunt vehementius postpositae ad res quae sunt anteriores est necessitas. Et si generatio[48] esset continua, ingrederetur semper procul dubio inter rem, quae est vehementius postposita,[49] et est causatum, et inter rem, quae est anterior, et est[50] causa, res[51] alia media quae est causa. Quia[52] ergo non est continua, tunc acceptio terminorum stat apud res inter quas non est medium. Inde est quod[53] dicimus: 'si domus existit, tunc parietes[54] existunt, et si parietes existunt, tunc fundamenta existunt,[55] et si fundamenta existunt, tunc lapides et lutum existunt'; et non est inter hos terminos aliquid omnino.

Et quoniam videmus[56] in rebus[57] evenientibus post generationem esse revolutionem, oportet ut sit in hujusmodi rebus quae ostenduntur circulariter locus sermonis, cum omnia redeant ad invicem cum aequalitate et fiant causae et causata, et allatio quidem currit secundum similitudinem unam ei qui[58] incipit ab inferiori et ei qui incipit a superiori. Cujus exemplum est quod terra quando infusa est,[59] generatur ex ea vapor, et quando generatur[60] vapor, est ex eo nubes, et quando est nubes, oportet ut infundatur terra. Et hoc est quod praemissum est ab initio rei. Revolvuntur ergo haec res[61] circulariter. Quod est quia[62] quando una earum,[63] quaecumque res[64] sit, existit, est alia existens, et quando illa iterum est existens, est alia existens, et quando iterum est existens illa, est[65] iterum existens alia. Et quando est illa dispositio rerum quae sunt secundum viam sempiternitatis et necessitatis, tunc ostensio circularis in illis rebus oportet ut sit necessario, cum motus in eis sit circularis necessarius. In rebus autem, quae sunt plurimum, syllogismi sunt secundum rectitudinem et non sunt ex omnibus partibus,[66] sicut diximus, sed quando incipimus ex rebus quae sunt vehementius postpositae, et in[67] istis rebus assumuntur res mediae ex hac eadem natura, scilicet ex eo[68] quod est secundum plurimum et secundum[69] semitam possibilis. Et oportet ut redeamus ad illud in quo fuimus ubi recessimus ab eo.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM TERTIUM

Dico ergo quia[1] postquam non est[2] possibile afferre super definitionem[3] demonstrationem,[4] quamvis ostendatur per demonstrationem, tunc oportet necessario ut inquiramus inventionem viae qua perveniamus ad inventionem definitionum et earum venationem. Dico ergo quod de rebus existentibus in capitulo quid est res, et sunt majores ea, quaedam superfluunt super eam superfluitate qua[5] pertranseunt illud genus ita quod egrediuntur ab eo[6] et a natura subjecta[7] et quaedam superfluunt superfluitate qua non pertranseunt illud genus, sed stant[8] apud ipsum. Cujus exemplum est quia invenimus in ternario quod est existens et invenimus in eo quia est impar, verumtamen primum horum duorum pertransit numerum et naturam[9] ex qua est ternarius; est enim inventum in rebus aliis quae[10] non sunt numeri. Et secundum eorum stat apud hanc naturam et invenitur cum ternario, quinario, septenario, nonario et numeris aliis multis, verumtamen non egreditur a numero. Oportet ergo ut eligamus hujusmodi res ex eis quae praedicantur in capitulo quid est res; et non cessemus eligere et colligere hujusmodi res usquequo accipiamus ab eis primum numerum in quo[11] unumquodque eorum, quod existit, superfluat[12] super illam rem,[13] verumtamen illa omnia[14] non superfluunt super eam. Cujus exemplum est quod in ternario numerus existit, et similiter impar existit in eo, et existit in ipso iterum quod est primus in utrisque rebus simul, scilicet in hoc quod non numerat eum numerus et in hoc quod non est compositus ex numeris. Oportet ergo ut sit hoc ipse ternarius, scilicet numerus impar primus. Nam quiddam (75^r) quod est in hac definitione existit in omnibus imparibus et quiddam ejus existit in binario, sed totum non est penitus alicui alii[15] numerorum nisi ternario. Et ex eo quod significatur,[16] quod hic sermo est definitio ternarii, est ut ponamus quod definitio oportet ut insit necessario illi[17] rei ad quam intendimus per definitionem. Manifestum est igitur quod istae res existunt necessario, quoniam omnes sunt praedicatae[18] ex capitulo quid est res, et res, quae praedicantur per hanc dispositionem, sunt res universales necessariae. Ergo oportet ut ostendam[19] quod ipsa est ternario[20] solum; quod si non est haec definitio ternario solum, tunc manifestum est quod est genus ei et est[21] major eo.[22] Et cui rei est nisi ternario? Totum ergo quod est cum hac dispositione ex sermonibus est definitio et significat quid est res in se. Et similiter definimus hominem, per hoc quod eligimus, animal et rationale et mortale aut animal et gressibile et bipes. Per hanc ergo (147^v) semitam oportet incedere in eo quod est ex speciebus non divisis.[23]

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[43] intendimus et jam intendimus cum in eis *M.* intendimus cum in eis *P.*

[44] *om.* magis *P.*

[45] perscrutatur *MP.*

[46] *add.* plurimum *T.*

[47] *om. T.*

[48] si generatio: significatio *MPT; gr. tx. p.* 54, *l.* 18 genesis.

[49] postposite *M.*

[50] *om. P.*

[51] rei *P.*

[52] quoniam *M.* quando *P.*

[53] quia *M.*

[54] partes *P.*

[55] *om.* et si . . . si fundamenta existunt *MP.*

[56] quoniam videmus: quando vidimus *P.*

[57] *add.* existentibus *P.*

[58] quae *MP.*

[59] *om. T.*

[60] *add.* ex ea *P.*

[61] *om. M;* tres *P.*

[62] quia quando; quia quandocumque *P,* quando *T.*

[63] causarum *T.*

[64] *om. T.*

[65] *om.* iterum est . . . Et quando *MT.*

[66] *om. T.*

[67] *om. T.*

[68] *om.* ex eo *T.*

[1] *om. MT.*

[2] *om. T.*

[3] demonstrationem *T.*

[4] definitionem *T.*

[5] quidem *T.*

[6] ea *P.*

[7] substantia *T.*

[8] sed stant: haec stant *P;* si fuerit *T.*

In generibus autem quae dividuntur in species oportet ut ingrediamur[24] hac semita. Sed oportet imprimis ut accipiamus quod est in illo genere de speciebus[25] quae non dividuntur. Cujus exemplum quia, si est numerus, accipiemus binarium et ternarium. Nam illae species non dividuntur,[26] quamvis sint species aliae praeter eas similes eis. Et si est linea, accipiemus rectam et circularem et flexuosam. Et si est angulus,[27] accipiemus rectum, acutum et obliquum. Deinde si istae species non dividuntur, oportet ut accipiamus definitiones earum per illam viam quam narravimus, et quod invenimus in definitionibus omnium earum commune eligamus[28] ipsum et colligamus.[29] Cujus exemplum est ut consideremus quid est linea recta. Et inveniemus[30] eam longitudinem sine latitudine et puncta tegunt[31] extremitates ejus. Deinde consideramus[32] quid est linea circularis. Et invenimus eam longitudinem sine latitudine, et omnes lineae rectae, quae egrediuntur ad eam[33] a puncto uno, donec concurrant[34] ei, sunt aequales. Deinde consideramus[35] quid est linea flexuosa. Et invenimus eam longitudinem sine latitudine cum aliqua dispositionum. In omnibus istis definitionibus invenitur sermo noster 'longitudo sine latitudine[36]' communis.

Cum ergo accipimus hoc, oportet ut redeamus ad lineam et consideremus in quo capitulorum adjecti ingrediamur[37] et quia invenimus eam[38] in quantitatis capitulo, tunc oportet ut componamus[39] cum hoc genere omnes res, quas invenimus in hoc genere[40] communes in definitionibus specierum quae non dividuntur. Fit ergo definitio lineae 'quantitas longitudo sine latitudine', et ponuntur cum genere omnes res quae sunt communes in definitionibus[41] specierum indivisibilium quae sunt sub eo. Res enim communes non assumuntur secundum hanc conditionem nisi ut non pertranseant illud genus, et quia non pertranseunt illud genus, sunt illi generi solum. Et quia[42] sunt communes omnibus speciebus quae sunt in eo, sunt illi generi omni, quoniam genus non est compositum nisi[43] ex speciebus, et sicut genus existit loco specierum, similiter omnia, quae existunt in eo, non existunt nisi in loco specierum.[44] Ergo sunt in eo[45] principia definitionum definitiones[46] specierum simplicium, et significo per 'species simplices' species[47] quae non dividuntur. Simplex enim in omni re est principium. In quibuscumque ergo definitionibus specierum, quae non dividuntur, invenitur res una eadem communis; per hanc venatur definitio generis in eis.[48] Et in quibuscumque illarum definitionum non invenitur res communis penitus neque res una existens eadem, tunc species illae indivisibiles non sunt sub genere uno. Cujus exemplum est ut quaeramus quid est magnanimitas. Accipimus ergo[49] imprimis res sensibiles hujus naturae, scilicet unumquodque eorum qui proportionantur ad magnanimitatem, sicut Alcibiades et Ajax et Achilles. Deinde consideramus[50] quid sit quod in istis omnibus est commune, aequale cum aequali, et invenimus illud quia non tolerabant injuriam. Unum enim eorum perduxit illud[51] ad hoc ut pugnaret[52] et alium ut minoraret et exprobraret et alium[53] ad hoc ut interficeret se ipsum. Et fuit iterum Diogenes magnanimus, et similiter Socrates. Consideremus iterum[54] an proportionentur isti duo iterum ad magnanimitatem propterea quod utrique non tolerabant[55] (75^{v}) injuriam; et nos non invenimus illud ita, verum utrique non proportionantur ad illud nisi propter illud[56] quod ipsi vituperabant quod contingit per fortunam. Fit ergo definitio magnanimitatis[57] assumpta ex illis praeter definitionem magnanimitatis[58] assumptam ex istis ita ut sit definitio accepta[60] ex istis 'difficultas tolerandi injuriam super illos, et definitio accepta ex illis,[61] 'vituperatio fortunae' et quod venit per eam. Fiunt ergo istae[62] definitiones duarum specierum indivisibilium. Quomodo ergo[63] venatur ex istis duabus definitio generis per inquisitionem[64] rei communis existentis[65] in parvitate tolerandi injuriam et in vituperatione fortunae et quod venit per eam? Et non invenitur in istis duabus res communis.[66] Penitus non est ergo magnanimitas genus, sed est duae species diversae communes in nomine uno tantum, sicut reliquae res communium nominum.

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[9] natura *T.*

[10] qui *M.*

[11] *om.* in quo *T.*

[12] superfluerent *MP.*

[13] *om. MP.*

[14] illa omnia: ista omnino *T.*

[15] *om. T.*

[16] significat *MP.*

[17] *add.* soli *MP.*

[18] praedicantur *MP.*

[19] opportet ut ostendam: quidem ut ostendam *M;* quod ut ostendimus *P.*

[20] *add.* simul *T.*

[21] *om. T.*

[22] ei *MP.*

[23] diversis *T.*

[24] ne gradiamur *MT.*

[25] generibus *MP.*

[26] *om.* Cujus exemplum ... non dividuntur *MP.*

[27] triangulus *T.*

[28] eligimus *T.*

[29] colligimus *T.*

[30] invenimus *MP.*

[31] regunt *MP.*

[32] Deinde consideramus: deinde regamus consideramus *M,* deinde consideremus *P.*

[33] dictam *MP.*

[34] occurant *MP.*

[35] consideremus *MP.*

[36] *om.* cum aliqua . . . sine latitudine *MP.*

[37] adjecti ingrediamur: adjecti ingrediatur *M,* aut ingrediuntur *P.*

[35] *om. T.*

Jam ergo manifestum est ex eo quod diximus quod definitio speciei, quae non dividitur, est facilioris esse multum quam definitio generis, quoniam res communes existentes in rebus singularibus[67] individualibus sunt notiores rebus[68] communibus existentibus in speciebus. Et definitio speciei componitur[69] ex rebus singularibus et individualibus,[70] et definitio generis componitur ex speciebus. Et communitas in nomine, quando est in specie, est minoris occultationis quam[71]

[39] consideremus *P.*

[40] *om.* in hoc genere *MP.*

[41] diffinitione *T.*

[42] *add.* non *MP.*

[43] *om.* *T.*

[44] *om.* similiter omnia . . . loco specierum *M.*

[45] fiunt *MP.*

[46] et differentias? *T.*

[47] *om.* simplices species *P.*

[48] communi *MP.*

[49] Accipimus ergo: accipiamus sicut *P.*

[50] consideremus *MP.*

[51] *om. M;* illum *P.*

[52] pugnet *T.*

[53] *om.* ut minoraret . . . et alium *MP.*

[54] ergo *MP.*

[55] toleraverunt *MP.*

[56] propter illud: propteret *MP.*

[57] *om.* *MP.*

[58] *om.* *MP.*

[59] existit *T.*

[60] assumpta *MP.*

[58] *om.* *MP.*

[61] *om.* difficultas tolerandi . . . ex illis *MP.*

[62] *add.* due *T.*

[63] indivisibilium. Quomodo ergo: indivisibilium quomodo sicut *P;* divisibilium quoniam ergo *T.*

[64] per inquisitionem: inquisitione *T.*

[65] existens *T.*

[66] communioris *T.*

[67] *add.* existentibus *T.*

[68] *om.* *T.*

[69] opponitur *M.*

[70] et individualibus: non dividualibus *T.*

[71] *add.* est *MP.*

quando est in genere, quoniam species non dicitur nisi de rebus sensatis; et nos possumus in istis rebus, ut videamus eas, an sint communes in nomine an non communes, sicut videmus in homine picto et in homine vivo. Communitas autem nominis in generibus non scitur nisi per comparationem generis ad species suas. Animal enim pictum non dicitur quia est animal nisi secundum viam communitatis in nomine, propterea quod homo pictus non dicitur quia est homo nisi secundum viam communitatis in nomine.[72] Si ergo istae res, quas diximus, sunt verae, tunc simile est ut sit inventio definitionum ex speciebus secundum semitam compositionis facilior quam sit inventio earum ex generibus[73] secundum viam divisionis. Verumtamen divisio generum per differentias[74] dispositio est innata[75] in receptione rerum universalium et praedicantium per se, quoniam utitur in ea ordo in electione (236^{r}) universalium per se et collectione[76] ipsarum.

Quod est quia componitur ex hac via semper differentia cum genere quod dividitur et ponitur summa illius genus. Deinde dividimus iterum illud genus et non cessamus facere illud, donec ponamus definitionem completam ex duabus rebus et sunt genus[77] et differentia postrema. Et non dicitur genus[78] nisi propterea quod omnes differentiae, (148^{r}) quae sunt ante differentiam postremam, componuntur cum genere et est summa earum[79] genus et non nominatur illud procul dubio nomine uno; verumtamen virtus[80] ejus est virtus[81] generis unius. Quod est quia est in[82] plus et praedicatur ex[83] capitulo quid est res. Et hac[84] via pervenit ad ultimationem mirabilem in consecutione ordinis, ita ut non[85] dimittat aliquid[86] penitus ex rebus existentibus in capitulo quid est res. Quod est quia oportet necessario semper ut ponamus differentias, quae sunt majores, priores aliis, et non pertranseamus illud. Quod est quia, si nos non ponimus divisionem secundum hanc semitam, tunc[87] pertransit ut dividimus[88] genus multotiens non in differentias generis, sed in alias,[89] sicut si[90] dividamus[91] vivum in illud cujus alae sunt[92] continuae et cujus alae de ipso sunt[93] sparsae. Istae enim duae species[94] non sunt duae[95] species animalis,[96] sed sunt duae species animalis volatilis. Species autem animalis sunt volatile et gressibile. Divide[97] ergo imprimis animal in has differentias,[98] deinde pone species volatilis, secundum ipsum quod[99] est genus unum; quaedam[1] est ex eo[2] sparsarum[3] alarum. Ergo sunt differentiae primae ex differentiis generis[4] illae in quas cadit illud genus ita ut sint differentiae animalis illae in quas cadit[5] omne animal, et differentiae volatilis differentiae in quas cadit omne volatile, et differentiae[6] piscis[7] illae in quas cadit omnis piscis.

Cum ergo incesseris hoc itinere in hac via et secundum hunc ordinem, poteris scire quod non[8] dimisisti aliquid[9] in divisione, et ex modo alio oportet necessario ne dicatur quod tu non scis illud. At vero Solkios[10] non[11] dicit nisi hoc in sermone suo quia oportet necessario ut, qui definit rem unam, sciat omnem rem. Quod est quia indiget, per aestimationem ejus, ut sciat differentias omnes, quae sunt inter reliquas res, et impossibile est ut sciat differentias, quae sunt inter eam et inter unamquamque rerum nisi sciat ipsam unamquamque rerum.[12] Et nos dicimus imprimis quia non oportet necessario ut sciamus species omnes. Quod est quia multae earum sunt ex accidentibus et multae res diversificantur per hujusmodi differentias et sunt cadentes secundum dispositionem sub specie una sicut Socrates et Plato sub specie una. Hujusmodi enim differentiae non ponunt substantiam praeter quod est; et non est ex eis definitio. Et dico post hoc quod qui dividit genus in species propinquas[13] contrarias sicut qui dividit animal in rationale[14] et cui non est ratio et scit quod homo necessario cadit sub istis duabus speciebus, deinde accipit rationale, non cogit eum res post illud ad hoc ut sciat super quod res cadat, illud cui[15] non est ratio, et est species altera. Quod est quia sufficit in definitione ut sciat quod homo non cadat sub ista specie. Et quando iterum dividit[16] animal rationale in illud quod moritur et illud quod non moritur, et invenit quod moritur homo,[17] non indiget ut consideret super quot res cadat 'quod non moritur'. Cum ergo incedit hac via et aequatur sermo speciei et non indiget differentia alia, jam invenit sermonem significantem illam[18] substantiam,[19] et est[20] ejus definitio. Et non licet illis ut dicant vobis quia, quod vos dixistis de casu speciei[21] procul dubio in una duarum specierum contrariarum, non fecistis nisi currere cursu contrarietatis; quae non conceditur. Quod est quia[22] accipiuntur duae species propinquae generi continuae cum eo et [contrarietas[23]] inter eas[24] est contrarietas. Quod[25] non est possibile ut sit inter utrasque species alia penitus, tunc non est possibile ut non[26] cadat species sub una duarum specierum.

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[72] *om.* propterea quod . . . in nomine *MP.*

[73] communibus *T.*

[74] differentias dispositio: differentias secundum dispositionem *T.*

[75] in natura *T.*

[76] collectionem *M.*

[77] rebus *T.*

[78] *om. MP.*

[79] ejus *T.*

[80] tum *P*, initus *T.*

[81] *om.* ejus est virtus *T.*

[82] *om. T.*

[83] in *MP.*

[84] haec *T.*

[85] *om. T.*

[86] aliquis *M.*

[87] *om. MP.*

[88] dividamus *P.*

[89] Aliquas *M;* aliis *T.*

[90] om. *P.*

[91] dividimus *MP.*

[92] de ipso *T.*

[93] *om. T.*

[94] *add.* animalis *P.*

[95] *om. P.*

[96] *om. P.*

[97] deinde *PT.*

[98] *om.* in has differentias *T.*

[99] quod ipsum *MP.*

[1] quae *MP.*

[2] *om. MP.*

[3] consparsarum *M;* cum ipsarum *P.*

[4] mediis *T; add.* differentiae *P.*

[5] *om.* illud genus . . . quas cadit *T.*

[6] species *T.*

[7] piscis species *M.*

[8] *om. PT.*

[9] quidquid *P.*

[10] soskos *M;* Sokios *P;* Speusippus, *gr. tx. p.* 58, *l.* 4; cf. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics* (Oxford, 1949), p. 660.

[11] ubi *M.*

[12] *om.* nisi . . . rerum *MP.*

Et oportet in compositione[27] definitionum nostra per divisionem ut tendamus versus tres[28] intentiones; quarum prima est ut accipiamus res praedicantes ex capitulo quod est res, et istae res sunt genera et species, quae componuntur cum eis. Et nos quidem accipimus[29] ab eo in[30] libro *Topicorum*, et est liber locorum disputationis, res quibus indigetur in hoc capitulo. Cujus exemplum est quod haec res sequitur hanc rem; ergo verificatur per illud quod haec res est[31] genus huic[32] rei et quod haec res huic rei est differentia[33] substantialis. Et intentio secunda est ut intendamus ad differentiarum ordinem secundum quod oportet; et illud est sicut quando accipitur differentia major ante aliam. Et intentio tertia est ut non cesses[34] dividere donec[35] aut perveniat divisio ad speciem indivisibilem aut ut parificetur[36] et aequatur[37] per summam definitionis rei definitae. Cum ergo feceris illud, eris ausus per visum et[38] fiduciam affirmare quod ist sermo est definitio hujus rei, cum praedicetur de ea ex capitulo quid est res[39] et sit aequalis ei.[40]

Et omnis definitio semper est universalis sicut omnis scientia et omnis ars non sunt nisi per rem universalem. Quod enim, verbi gratia, medicus scit non est sanitas hujus oculi,[41] sed quod scit est sanitas speciei absolute[42] et sanitas oculi absolute. Et sicut oportet in demonstrationibus ut petatur ante[43] omnem rem ut currat res in eis[44] cursu syllogismi,[45] similiter oportet ut petatur in definitionibus[46] de earum ostentione.[47] Et occultationi[48] quidem sunt causae multae et earum major est transumptio[49] secundum viam assimilationis. Oportet ergo ut caveamus eam in definitionibus, quoniam possibile est ut perducat nos ad modos diversos. Et nos quidem jam diximus quod sufficit nobis in definitione qualiter declaratur ex[50] demonstratione et qualiter oportet ut venetur.

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[13] *om. T.*
[14] *om.* in *P;* irrationale *T.*
[15] enim *MP.*
[16] dividitur *M; om.* iterum *M.*
[17] *om.* et . . . homo *T.*
[18] al *T.*
[19] substantia *T.*
[20] *om. P.*
[21] specierum *T.*
[22] quando *T.*
[23] contrarias *MP.*
[24] eos *T.*
[25] quae *T.*
[26] *om. T.*
[27] comparatione *MP.*
[30] ex *MP.*
[31] *add.* per illud *MP.*
[32] hujus *MP.*
[33] *om. MP.*
[34] cessem *T.*
[35] *om. T.*
[36] perficietur *T.*
[37] equetur *T.*
[38] per *T.*
[39] om. *MT.*
[40] ei aequale *T.*
[41] *om.* hujus oculi *MP.*
[42] absoluta *T.*
[43] *om.* ante *MP;* petat *P.*
[44] omni *MP.*
[45] universali *P.*
[46] demonstrationibus *T.*
[47] intentione *T.*
[48] occultatione *MP.*
[49] majorem transumptionem *T.*

CAPITULUM DECIMUM QUARTUM

Quod autem oportet nos praeparare[1] responsionem[2] in[3] quare est res donec facile est[4] nobis occurrere quaestionibus quae quaeruntur a nobis; in hoc capitulo est quod ego narro. Dico quia oportet ut sint apud nos res[5] praeparatae in rebus divisionum[6] et in[7] rebus anatomiae[8] quam operatus est Aristoteles. Nam illae res (148^{v}) convenientes in unoquoque (76^{r}) generum; et[9] non est consideratio nisi per hunc modum. Verbi gratia, nos non invenimus in animali spirans et sensibile nisi ex divisione. Quod est quia, postquam divisimus substantiam in spirantem et non spirantem, invenimus animal in spirante, et postquam divisimus spirans in sensibile et non sensibile,[10] invenimus animal in sensibili. Quod vero omne animal[11] sit ex re humida et re sicca non excipitur[12] nisi ex anatomia. Et oportet iterum ut fiat illud idem[13] in speciebus animalis propinquis ei[14] continuis cum eo, sicut ave et pisce; ergo intendimus ad nomina[15] communia inventa in universali aut ex ave aut ex pisce[16] et accipimus quaedam earum[17] ex anatomia. Nam quando res istae sunt praeparatae apud nos, pervenimus in multis rebus ad expositionem[18] cum facilitate in capitulo quare est res. Quod est quia res[19] existentes in genere toto insunt propter genus speciebus ejus.[20] Cujus exemplum est ut quaerat aliquis quare gallus est sparsarum alarum, et dicatur ei[21] in responsione illius quoniam est avis. Et quaerat aliquis[22] quare sabhot[23] non habet pulmonem. Et dicatur in responsione illius[24] quoniam est piscis. Et si non est commune iterum genus neque nominatur nomine uno, sed est accidens aliquod commune existens in rebus multis sicut cornutum animal.[25]

Oportet ut consideretur in rebus quae sequuntur hoc iterum. Cujus exemplum est quoniam sequitur animal, cui sunt cornua, ut sit ei kibatum[26] et non sint ei dentes in mandibula[27] superiore, et istae quidem res non inveniuntur nisi ex anatomia. Et oportet iterum ut consideremus cui animali sunt cornua, sicut ipsa sunt bobus, et cervis, et pecudibus. Nam tu invenis unicuique horum animalium res sequentes illud cui sunt cornua propter hoc idem medium.[28] Cujus exemplum est ut quaerat aliquis quare taurus habet kibatum.[26] Et dicatur in responsione[29] illius quoniam habet cornua. Et quaerat aliquis quare cervus non habet in mandibula superiore dentes. Et dicatur in responsione[29] illius quoniam habet cornua. Et quaerat aliqius quare fit homo[30] longae vitae. Et dicatur in responsione illius quoniam non habet fel. An vides quod medium in hoc est quod accipitur ex anatomia? Non est res quae sequitur medium. Et sequitur res communes secundum viam accidentis ut inveniamus quod sequitur eas ex anatomia, et in generibus ut inveniamus quid sequitur eas ex divisionibus. Et ex rebus communibus[31] sunt res quarum communitas est secundum semitam proportionalitatis[32] sicut ostreum[33] ex animali et spina et os. Et oportet ut eligamus istas res iterum et colligamus ad praeparationem responsionis in quaestionibus.

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[50] in *T*.

[1] properare *T*.

[2] rationem *P*.

[3] *om. MP*.

[4] sit *MP*.

[5] *om. T*.

[6] *om.* in rebus divisionum *MP*.

[7] ex *MP*.

[8] athonomie *MP;* antonomie *T*.

[9] *om. MP*.

[10] in spirans insensibile et in sensibile *MP*.

[11] *om. T*.

[12] accipitur *MP*.

[13] inde *T*.

[14] eis *P*.

[15] nota *M*.

[16] et ave et pisce *T*.

[17] *om. MP*.

[18] responsionem *T*.

[19] *om.* quod est quia res *T*.

[20] *om. M*.

[21] *om. MP*.

[22] alias *T*.

[23] ssaboth *M:* sabeth *P; probably* shubbūt; glanis, *gr. tx. p.* 59, *l.* 22.

[24] intentione ejus *P*.

[25] cornu animalis *M;* cornix animalis *P*.

[26] Kibate, ribatum, bibatum; echinon, *gr. tx. p.* 59, *l.* 28; cf. L. Minio-Paluello, *Analytica Posteriora, translatio anonyma, p.* 74, *l.* 1; magnum ventrem. Aristoteles Latinus IV, 2 (Bruges—Paris 1953). *perhaps a corruption of Kibatn or bibatn.*

[27] mandibilia *M*.

[28] illud medium *M*.

[29] intentione *P*.

[30] fuerit hoc *P;* elaphos *gr. tx. p.* 59, *l.* 29.

[31] ex rebus communuibus et ex divisionibus *T*.

[32] proportionalis *MP*.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM QUINTUM

Et sunt quaestiones. Quaestiones cadunt[1] quando[2] causa et medium sunt in eis[3] unum et idem. Cujus exemplum[4] est ut dicatur quare magnetes lapis attrahit[5] ferrum et karabe[6] et ventosa. Medium enim et causa in istis quaestionibus sunt unum et idem in sermone Platonis,[7] et est permutatio aeris. Et medium quidem est unum[8] idem aut in specie aut in genere. In specie quidem sicut in exemplis, quae praemissa sunt, permutatio namque aeris est causa in eis omnibus. In genere autem sicut est dispositio in istis quaestionibus: 'Quare est Echo'? et, 'Quare videamus formas nostras in speculo'? et, 'Quare videmus Irin'? Omnium enim horum causa est conversio.[9] Verumtamen primum est per conversionem aeris[10] et secundum per conversionem visus et tertium per conversionem luminis. Oportet ergo inde ut quaestiones sequantur medium. Et sunt quaedam earum unae eaedem in genere. Et sunt quaestiones secundum semitam aliam unae eaedem quando causa est in una quaestionum pendens[11] per causam in quaestione alia ita ut ponatur sub ea.[12] Cujus exemplum est ut quaerat aliquis quare cursus Nili est vehementior in diminutione mensis. Dicitur ergo in responsione illius quod illud est quoniam dispositio in diminutione mensis est propinquior dispositioni[13] in hieme. Et haec est quaestio prima.

Et quaeret iterum aliquis quare est propinquior[14] dispositioni in hieme; dicitur ergo in responsione hujus quoniam illud est quoniam lunae tunc minuitur lumen. Et haec est quaestio secunda. Et quaerat iterum aliquis quare lunae[15] in illa hora minuitur lumen.[16] Dicitur ergo in responsione illius quoniam currit tunc sub sole. Et istae quaestiones tres cadunt sub medio uno et una causa, et est conjunctio. Verumtamen quadam earum sunt propinquiores et quaedam earum sunt longinquiores. Quod est quoniam conjunctio est diminutioni luminis causa propinqua. Deinde in ordine secundo est dispositio mensis in diminutione sua propinquior dispositioni in hieme. Deinde in ordine tertio est quod cursus Nili tunc est vehementior.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM SEXTUM

Et quaerenti inest ut quaerat et ambigat de causa et re cujus est causa in istis modis quamvis dictum sit. Et significo per 'causam rei' medium et significo per 'rem' cujus est medium et illud cujus est causa 'conclusio'.[1] Et quaerenti inest ut[2] quaerat an sicut quando hoc medium existat[3] vere, haec conclusio vere existit; similiter quando haec conclusio vere[4] existit, oportet necessario ut haec causa existat.[5] Nam si res est ita, tunc unaquaeque earum convertitur super alteram per aequalitatem (77^{r}) et affirmatio utrarumque est circularis sicut ostensum est quod luna eclipsatur propterea quod terra est in medio; et similiter quod terra est in medio propterea quod luna eclipsatur.[6] Et horridum est ut ostendatur unaquaeque duarum rerum per alteram. Et cum illo iterum non ostenditur una duarum rerum per causam, neque per rem quae sit magis praemissa in mente. Quod est quia non est causa quod terra sit in medio eventus eclipsis in luna; verum licet ut sit illud causa ut terra sit in medio[7] ad complendum syllogismum et conclusionem,[8] verum non est possibile ut res ipsa sit causa.[9] Et ex eo quod significat tibi, illud est quod nos non invenimus in definitione terrae et loci ejus in medio eclipsim lunae existentem, sed invenimus in definitione eclipsis quod terra est in medio. Si ergo unaquaeque earum non redit super alteram per aequalitatem, sed conclusio una eadem sequitur causam, et non sequitur medium, et causa eadem (149^{r}) est conclusioni, tunc possibile est ut sint res[10] mediae quae sunt causae res diversae conclusioni uni eidem. Et[11] est ex illo quod est impossibile, quoniam causa et res[12] ejus, cujus est causa, sunt universales, et utraeque necessario oportet ut existant in natura posita sub utrisque secundum similitudinem unam quaecumque res sit illa natura. Cujus exemplum est quoniam si causa in arbore est ut cadant folia ejus latitudo foliorum aut quoniam lac ejus congelatur,[13] tunc casus foliorum non est nisi illi arbori. Et non est inconveniens ut hujusmodi causa redeat super conclusionem per aequalitatem. Verumtamen non ostenditur unaquaeque earum per alteram secundum similitudinem unam. Verum una earum ostenditur secundum semitam syllogismi tantum et alter ostenditur secundum semitam demonstrationis tantum.

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[33] ostraceum *M.*

[1] eaedum *MP.*

[2] quoniam *MP.*

[3] *om.* in eis *P.*

[4] *om. P.*

[5] afferat *M;* afferent *P.*

[6] karabe *MPT, perhaps* Kahrobā; elektron, *gr. tx. p.* 60, *l.* 1.

[7] *Timaeus* 80 C.

[8] non *T.*

[9] ostensio *M.*

[10] *om. T.*

[11] pendere *T.*

[12] a sensu *MP.*

[13] diminucioni *MP.*

[14] Et quaeritur quare aliquis est propinquior *P;* Et quaeritur iterum aliquis quare dispositio in diminutione mensis est similior *T.*

[15] luna *M.*

[16] in lumine *M; om.* Et haec . . . minuitur lumen *P.*

[1] *om.* Et quaerenti inest . . . est causa conclusio *MP.*

[2] quod *T.*

[3] existit *MP.*

[4] *om. T.*

[5] existit *T.*

[6] *om.* propterea quod . . . luna eclipsatur *M.*

CAPITULUM DECIMUM SEPTIMUM

Et non est possibile ut uni eidem rei sint media et causae diversae[1] nisi ostendatur per accidens aut per[2] signum. Cujus exemplum est ut quaerat aliquis quare cadant folia arboris. Et sit responsio in illo quoniam contrahuntur aut quoniam albificantur. Aut quaerat aliquis quare accenditur in hoc loco ignis. Et sit responsio in eo[3] quoniam remansit in eo carbo aut cinis. Et jam diximus multotiens quod haec non est demonstratio neque[4] hujusmodi res sunt causae rei quaesitae, sed sunt causae conclusioni tantum. Oportet ergo ut removeantur omnes hujusmodi res ex demonstrationibus et proprie quod est in eis per viam accidentis.

Inde est quod non quaerit aliquis quare vitis sustentatae cadant folia neque quare vitis nigrae cadunt folia neque inferioris[5] rami obrumbrati aut superioris cadunt folia. Verum non quaerat nisi quare arboris folia cadunt. Et causa una in hoc[6] est causa arbori omni, et illud est[7] propter quod causa in casu foliorum est definitio casus foliorum et quid est in se sicut quia est lac ejus congelatum et in eclipsi coopertura. Et causa in demonstratione est medius terminus et res, cujus causa est,[8] est extremitas major duorum terminorum in[9] conclusione, et res cui causa est extremitas minor. Et medius terminus est indicium extremitatis majoris duarum extremitatum in conclusione; et est in omnibus suis dispositionibus ei similis. Nam si haec est[10] communis in nomine, est medium iterum commune in nomine.[11] Et si est una in genere, est medium iterum unum in genere. Et si est secundum semitam proportionalitatis, est causa iterum secundum hanc semitam.

Et dispositio in reditione harum rerum ad invicem per aequalitatem, scilicet causae et rei cujus est causa et rei[12] cui[13] est causa secundum hoc[14] quod est[15] secundum quod narro tibi. Et significo per 'rem cui est causa' rem subjectam sicut arborem vel ficum et per 'rem cujus est causa'[16] sicut casum foliorum. Et significo per 'causam' sicut coagulationem lactis aut quaecumque res sit.[17] De causa autem et eo cujus[18] est causa jam diximus quod redit unumquodque eorum[19] necessario super alteram per aequalitatem cum dispositio inter utraque sit sicut dispositio inter definitionem et definitum.

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[7] *om.* ut terra sit in medio *T.*

[8] in conclusione *MP.*

[9] verum res ipsa non possibile ut sit causa *M.* vera ipsa est res non est possibile ut sit causa *P.*

[10] tres *M.*

[11] quod *T.*

[12] *add.* ejus MP.

[13] *add.* nisi *T.*

[1] diversa *T.*

[2] *om. MP.*

[3] *om.* in eo *MP.*

[4] om. *T.*

[5] *om.* quare vitis . . . inferioris *MP.*

[6] *om.* in hoc *T.*

[7] *add.* necessarium *MP.*

[8] *om. T.*

[9] *om. T.*

[10] *om. T.*

[11] *om.* medium . . . nomine *T.*

[12] res *M.*

[13] *om.* et rei cui *T.*

[14] *om. M.*

[15] *om.* est secundum hoc quod est *T.*

Oportet ergo ut dicamus qualiter est dispositio inter utraque et inter rem subjectam. Oportet enim ut exponamus illud. Dico ergo quod quando tu accipis ex natura subjecta rem singularem sensatam[20] et individualem non redit unaquaeque earum per aequalitatem[21] super alteram. Cujus exemplum est quod non accipimus casui foliorum ex subjecto vitem[22] aut ficum, quoniam casus foliorum et coagulatio lactis est plus unoquoque horum subjectorum. Et si accipiatur omnis arbor, cujus folia cadunt, redeunt ad invicem et aequantur. Oportet ergo ut quaeramus rem, quae est communis omni arbori, cujus folia cadunt, donec comprehendamus eam in ea et quaeramus in ea quare est res. Huic enim imprimis est medium causa et secundum hoc per aequalitatem redeunt, sicut si nos accipimus[23] latitudinem foliorum causam communem existentem in omni arbore cujus folia cadunt. Super hoc redit ergo causa et illud cujus[24] est causa. Et fiunt in quaestionibus quattuor termini et sunt casus foliorum et coagulatio lactis, et latitudo foliorum et ficus .Et duo[25] horum terminorum sunt duae extremitates et duo sunt media. Verumtamen unum[26] eorum est propinquius subjecto et non redit super ipsum per aequalitatem.[27].

CAPITULUM DECIMUM OCTAVUM

Si autem quaeratur quid est quod est dignius ut dicatur quia est causa in rebus in[1] quibus inveniuntur media diversa, (77^{v}) dicam quod dignius illo est quod est propinquius unicuique rerum subjectarum. Propter illud enim est causa illud quod est longinquius. Cujus exemplum est quod latitudo foliorum ficus est[2] dignius ut sit causa foliorum ejus casui, quoniam propter hoc fit aliud ei causa, scilicet coagulatio lactis. Et fortasse est aliquis qui dicat quod invenimus in quibusdam rebus inventione manifesta causas diversas. Nos[3] enim invenimus causam in eclipsi ut sit terra in medio et ut sit luna in medio.[4] Et nos dicimus quod illud non est uni eidem eclipsi, sed causa una est eclipsi solis et causa altera est eclipsi lunae. Et fortasse alicui inest ut quaerat et dicat an est possibile ut sint uni eidem rei definitiones diversae aut non est possibile[5] illud iterum. Et nos dicimus[6] in responsione illius, quia est possibile ut sint uni[7] eidem rei definitiones diversae secundum[8] quod est nomen unum idem, sed secundum quod res est una eadem non est[9] possibile. Jam ergo diximus in demonstrationibus quod sunt et qualiter sunt.[10] Et diximus iterum cum eo[11] in scientia demonstrativa; nam demonstratio non est nisi operatio ejus.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM NONUM

Res autem principiorum demonstrationis, qualiter sit cognita et quae virtutum sit virtus quae facit eam[1] cognosci, declarabitur per illud, quod ego nar (149^{r}) ro

[16] *om.* rem subjectam . . . cujus est causa *T.*

[17] *om.* res sit *MP.*

[18] cui *MP.*

[19] *om.* unumquodque eorum *P.*

[20] sensibilem *T.*

[21] *om.* per aequalitatem *P.*

[22] victum *M; om. T.*

[23] accipiamus *MP.*

[24] cui *MP.*

[25] duorum *P.*

[26] unus *T.*

[27] *om.* et alterum est . . . per aequalitatem *T.*

[1] *om. T.*

[2] *om. T.*

[3] *non T.*

[4] *om.* ut sit luna in medio et *T.*

[5] non posse *T.*

[6] *om. T.*

[7] *add.* et *M.*

[8] sed *T.*

[9] *om. T.*

[10] quid sit et qualiter sit *T.*

[11] ea *M. om. P.*

[1] ea *MP.*

tibi, postquam attulero de difficultate et ambiguitate in illo[2] et responsione[3] in ipso illud in quo[4] indigemus. Oportet enim necessario ut aut sciamus principia inprimis aut ignoremus ea.[5] Si ergo scimus ea, tunc oportet ut sit[6] scientia nostra de eis[7] aut per demonstrationem aut per aliquem modorum aliorum. Si ergo scientia nostra de eis est per modum alium non potest esse quin sit aut per scientiam aut per virtutem aliam praeter scientiam. Nos enim scimus res multas absque demonstratione, sicut scimus rem[8] definitionum. Et nos quidem diximus in eo quod praemissum est quod scientia principiorum est necessaria ei qui intendit ad sciendum aliquid ex istis principiis; nam non est possibile ut sciamus principia per demonstrationem. Jam ergo restat nobis ut inquiramus et consideremus an principiis vacuis ex medio sit[9] scientia an genus aliud virtutis per quod sciantur. Et principium[10] quidem hujus[11] considerationis et ejus clavis est ut consideremus et inquiramus an illa virtus sit generata in nobis a principio[12] nostri esse, verumtamen est occulta nobis, aut non accidit in nobis nisi in fine post complementum. Et impossibile est ut sit in nobis et occultetur[13] nobis, cum non sit possibile ut sit nobiscum demonstratio et occultetur nobis quod est nobiscum nedum de scientia certiore demonstratione. Et adeptio[14] eorum nostra, postquam non sunt nobiscum ante illud, non ordinatur ei qui ponit quod omnis doctrina et[15] omnis disciplina non est nisi a scientia praecedente; nam non est ante principia aliquid magis praecedens eis. Neque ad evadendum ex hac difficultate et ex hac haesitatione[16] est modus alius nisi ut inveniamus animae virtutem qua sit possibile nos scire praeter[17] quod praecedat nobis scientia rei alterius penitus. Acceptio enim principiorum non licet nisi per hanc virtutem (237^{r}) tantum. Et apparet nobis quod haec virtus existit in omni animali, quoniam in eo est virtus innata experta, et est virtus quam nominamus sensum.[18] Sensus ergo existit in animali; verumtamen in quodam figitur[19] sensibilitas sua de eo quod sentit et remanet in eo spatio longo, et in quodam non figitur,[20] aut penitus, sicut sunt vermes et muscae et fires,[21] aut fixione debili et re parva, sicut fixio quarundam vocum in quibusdam avibus et fixio cujusdam viae in quibusdam bestiis. Quodcumque ergo animal non figit[22] in se ipso sensibilitatem ejus quod sentit, non habet de scientia aliquid nisi sensum.[23] Et in animali est quod[24] possibile est ut sit in anima sensibilitas ejus quod sentit absque sensato, sicut remanet nobiscum post separationem Socratis, verbi gratia, forma ejus et ipsius imago, fit cum hac scientia[25] scientia alia, et est servatio. Et quod[26] ex hac specie animalis est a complemento longinquius summa virtutis servationis in eo est, ut sit[27] cum eo forma sensus qui praecessit spatio longo tantum; et quod est cum quo est de summa servationis ut possit discernere inter res similes et pervenit ad scientiam convenientium[28] ad invicem. Istud est complementum[29] ex animali rationali et ex hoc animali est speculatio in sillogismis a similitudine[30] et[31] discretio. Et generatur[32] quidem a sensu servatio, sicut ostendimus, et generatur a servatione, quando iteratur res una eadem multotiens, experimentum [consuetudo]; numerus enim multus servationis est experimentum unum. Homo enim sentit et servat quod haec medicina quae evacuat corpus et mundat ipsum est elleborus. Deinde videt istum vice altera facere illud et iterum sentit et servat quod haec medicina quae evacuat hoc corpus et mundat ipsum est etiam elleborus. Deinde videt ipsum tertio et quarto; ergo ex iteratione servationis multotiens ex sensibilitate multotiens aggregatur experimentum unum et est quod elleborus evacuat corpus quod eo mundificatur. Cum ergo additur hoc experimentum et advenit ei ex sensu et servatione quod est simile,[33] primo figitur et locatur in anima res universalis, et est quod omnis elleborus evacuat corpus[34] hominis quod eo mundificatur.

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[2] vero *T*.
[3] *add.* et *P*.
[4] in quo: quoque *MP*.
[5] *om.* principia . . . ignoremus ea *T*.
[6] scit *MT*.
[7] *om.* de eis *P*.
[8] om. *T*.
[9] scit *T*.
[10] primum *MP*.
[11] hujusmodi *P; om. T*.
[12] prima *T*.
[13] *add.* in *MP*.
[14] et eadem post *P*.
[15] *om.* omnis doctrina et *MP*.
[16] exitatione *M;* extinctione *P*.
[17] propter *MP*.
[18] *meta.* 890a28ff.
[19] fingitur *MP*.
[20] fingitur *P*.
[21] empisi *gr. tx. p* 63, *l* 6; *perhaps a corruption of* qirs.
[22] fixit *MP*.
[23] sensus *T*.
[24] cum primo *M*; cum quo *P*.
[25] *om. M.*
[26] *om. P.*
[27] *om. MP.*
[28] convenientiam *T*.
[29] completum *M*.
[30] speculatio . . . discretio: in similitudine et a similatione et discretio *T*.
[31] quia *M*.
[32] *Text of T breaks off here; folio* 78^{r} *is blank.*

Et res universalis est[35] simile et assimilatio et res eadem ex rebus singularibus et individualibus[36] et rebus multis. Et hoc est principium artis et scientiae. Artis quidem principium est quando est principium rerum quae sunt <ab ipsa; scientiae, si circa ea quae sunt> ex natura.[37] Jam ergo manifestum est quod principia non existunt in nobis inprimis cum sumus, quoniam, si essent in nobis in primo rei fieremus et essemus completi. Et non evenirent in nobis principia cum dispositione melioris scientiae quam dispositio quae esset ante ea, ita ut oporteret necessario praecedere apud nos scientiam rei. Verum ex sensu et servatione aggregantur et complentur in nobis. Et sicut videmus in pugna, postquam fugiunt gentes, quod unus stat, deinde stat alter, postea alter, et non cessant donec aggregatur acies, deinde redit pugna cursus, et est illud principium ejus. Similiter quando figitur in anima forma, adjungitur ad eam forma alia, deinde alia, deinde non cessat aggregari, donec multiplicatur earum numerus, et confortetur, et erigitur universale. Causa igitur est anima, quando est naturata natura cum qua non tenetur ex (150ʳ) rebus sensibilibus, quae cursu, sed transit per eas et per res similes et reponit eas servatio et aggregatur ex eis res universalis; et universale primum, similitudo et assimilatio in rebus singularibus individualibus, quas jam percepit[38] sensus quodammodo perceptionis.[39] Ille enim, qui sentit Socratem, sentit et cum eo hominem, et ille, qui sentit hoc album, sentit et cum eo album. Homo enim, qui sentit hoc album, sentit et cum eo album. Homo enim, qui sentit Calliam, verbi gratia, et hominem <non sentit> secundum quod ipsi[40] sunt res una eadem ex omnibus partibus, etsi illud esset ita, non judicaret[41] de aliquo nisi Callia quod[42] esset homo. Verum quando videt Socratem, tunc videt in eo apud illud[43] cum eo quod videt ex eo rem per quam assimiliatur alii ex omnibus et est res communis. Ergo oportet ut sensus jam comprehenderit[44] universale ex aliquo modo. Verum non comprehendit[45] ipsum secundum hanc viam, ita ut separetur ipsum et accipiat illud et sciat ipsum secundum singularitatem suam. Verum non sentit ipsum nisi permixtum cum[46] singulari individuali et est ad ipsum declivus.[47] At vero in omnibus est virtus alia, quae agit post operationem sensus in rebus particularibus ad unum ex multo, et ad unum quod non diversificatur ex eo quod diversificatur, et ad illud quod est unum idem ex eo quod est aliud, et aggregat ipsum. Cujus exemplum est, quia[48] aggregat hominem ex Callia et Aristotele, et aggregat animal ex homine et leone, et substantiam ex planta et animali. Ipsa enim[49] ascendit quo elevatur multum ad unum singulare et aggregat ipsum et ligat ipsum. Oportet ergo inde ut haec via, qua erigitur res universalis, sit syllogismis, viae syllogismi particularis. Quod est quia omnis sermo intendens ad res particulares et aggregans ex eis rem universalem nominatur syllogismus particularis et quia propositiones in sermone, quarum haec est dispositio, ponit sensus. Tunc sensus sunt principia et causae intellectibus particularibus; conclusionem autem universalem non concludit nisi alachil.[50]

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[33] sensibile *P.*
[34] ex corpore *M.*
[35] *om. P.*
[36] individuantibus *P.*
[37] ab ipsa; scientiae si circa ea quae natura.
[38] praecepit *P.*
[39] praeceptionis *P.*
[40] ipsa *M.*
[41] judicium *P.*
[42] *om. M.*
[43] illum *P.*
[44] apprehenderit *M.*
[45] comprehenditur *P.*
[46] *om. P.*
[47] declinatius? *M.*
[48] quod *P.*
[49] cui *P.*

Operatio enim alachil est ut componat res multas[51] numero, quarum non est finis, sicut dicit[52] Plato, in summa una. Quod est quoniam de proprietate alachil est[53] ut dividat et componat et mutetur de re ad rem; et est velocioris motus quam omnes res in multis modis. Et non est velocioris motus quam omnes res in multis modis. Et non est situs propositionum hujus viae syllogismi, quem assimilavimus syllogismo particulari, et conclusionis earum, subito statim nec spatio parvo temporis, sed oportet necessario ut sit inter utraque temporis spatium longius. Quod est quoniam propositiones ponit sensus in principio rei cum inceptione sua in nobis; deinde moramur[54] post illud quasi incedamus spatium longum donec concludamus. Et aggregat alachil ex illis[55] propositionibus judicium universale. Et quoniam per spatium longinquum, et per se est de proprietate ejus ut aggreget rem universalem, petit[56] super eam ex re viae quam incedit quod sit similis syllogismo particulari ita ut opinetur cum quo non erit experientia, quia non accipit intellectum nisi ex natura, non ex[57] se, et ex eo quod significat tibi quod alachil. Quod est quia invenit in nobis propositiones universales, manifestas absque medio non virtus alia penitus est, quam narro tibi. Dico quod de dispositionibus visus alachil sunt dispositiones quas non verificat semper, sicut dispositio opinionis et dispositio cogitationis, et utraeque sunt in rebus, quae sunt secundum[58] dispositiones diversas, modis diversis; verumtamen multotiens opinio in ipsa speculatione et cogitatio[59] pervenit et declinat omnino versus operationem. Virtutes autem, quas semper verificat, sunt virtus scientiae et virtus alachil. Et principiis quidem[60] non est scientia quoniam scientia vera non est nisi per demonstrationem. Remanet ergo quod alachil est quod facit cognoscere principia. Quod est quia oportet[61] ut sit scientia nostra de principiis verior scientia nostra de rebus, quae sunt post principia; et non est res verior scientia nisi alachil. Sola ergo alachil est quod recipit principia, scilicet alachil prima quam invenit natura in animali rationali. Et est virtus singularis, simplex in[62] ultimo quod est sic, et est quasi visus animae cum qua non est considerator nec elector; et per ipsum a principio rei fit[63] homo in natura sua animal rationale. Et hoc alachil, quando plus extenditur nobiscum in tempore, et augmentum additur et augmentatio in nobis, inprimis quidem[64] versus operationes simplices principiorum, et versus intellectum rerum simplicium, quas nominamus definitiones, et versus terminos rerum longinquarum a compositione, quae sunt in ultimo simplicitatis et versus situm elementorum et sensibilitatum simplicium.

Pueri enim non incipiunt nisi loqui et intelligere hominem, verbi gratia, et album cum praeparatur in eis ratio. Cum ergo protenditur cum eis tempus et fiunt adulescentes, acquirunt[65] cum illo virtutem qua possint componere illas res simplices, et intelligunt tunc quod homo existit. Cum ergo acquirit alachil res multas et multiplicatur portio[66] ejus, ex ipsis fiunt potentiores ad hoc ut intelligant rem universalem, et ratiocinentur[67] in ipsa, cum intelligent in se dispositionem rationalem qua[68] dicitur quia rationales sunt. Per hoc quidem anima recipit quod est simile ei quod facit corpus. Nam corpus etiam, quando incipit incedere via complementi, acquirit inprimis ex virtute (150ᵛ) hoc ut procedat rectum et levet se ipsum ex terra et stet rectum.[69] (237ᵛ) Deinde post illud tendit ad illud quod est inter manus ejus parumper; deinde non cessat addi in illo,[70] donec sit possibilis ei deambulatio et incessus, et figitur in eo virtus secundum illud. Et alachil iterum currit cursu. Hoc ergo potest inprimis nominare et potest intelligere res quae cadunt[71] sub nominibus; deinde potest componere eas, post illud et cogitare in eis,[72] deinde in fine figantur in eo judicia aliqua universalia vera; et reponit ea alachil. Igitur est principium scientiae primi, et est causa[73] principiorum, et scientia tota est scito toti. Quod est quia dispositio principii apud principium est sicut dispositio totius ad totum.

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[50] A. M. Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina* (Paris, 1938), *p.* 226, no. 439.

[51] malas *P.*

[52] ostendit *P*; cf. *Philebus* 27 D.

[53] *om. P.*

[54] moriamur *P.*

[55] subjectis *P.*

[56] pervenit *P.*

[57] extra *M.*

[58] *om. M.*

[60] *om. M.*

[61] *om.* quia oportet *P.*

[62] et *P.*

[63] fuit *P.*

[64] quam *P.*

[65] acquirant *P.*

[66] possessio? *P.*

[67] ratiocinatur *P.*

[68] quam *P.*

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[69] Cf. Aristotle, *De Part. Anim.* 656a11ff.;686a27*ff*. Plato, *Tim.* 91E.

[70] *om.* in illo *P.*

[71] cadit *M.*

[72] *om.* in eis *M.*

[73] scientia *M.*

[74] Explicit commentum Themistii super librum Posteriorum Aristotelis *P.*

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